the Wonderful Barrack Buster, a bomb in a bin

Big Punch

Germans advance on tundra in July 1941. Arctic front.


Tundra

“The Effect of Allied Air Activity on Tank Warfare” is another chapter of report with the comments (June 1945) of the commander of the German 26th Panzer Division, Generalleutnant Victor Leopold Linnarz, about the Italian Campaign published on January 1946 by “Defeat”, HQ Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C. In the picture a German armoured column destroyed during the Italian Campaign, 1944-1945, perhaps on Northern Italy. Victor Sierra
«Allied air attacks compelled us to execute most of our tank movements at night and remain concealed by day. Troops were very reluctant to cross streams by day in spite of the fact that our camouflage was good. Jabos (note JagdBomber/Fighter bombers) were sometimes successful in seeing through our camouflage and destroying our tanks. Air attacks against our tanks became more and more effective with the decline of our own Air Force and as soon as Allied air superiority was complete they were able to pick out and forestall any tank movement through: a. Air reconnaissance; b. Artillery-directing aircraft; c. Fighter bombers».
«From the beginning of the battle of the Po (13 April 1945) our tanks could not move even halfway freely by day. Earlier in the war, at Cassino for instance, our tanks were still able to move about individually, protected by trees, ruins, and so forth. It must be admitted, however, that at Cassino our tanks were used separately as a sort of mobile artillery and not in large scale movements like in Russia. With the attainment of air superiority on your part (note: the General Linnarz speaking with American officers), the fact of tank units operating in masses was predetermined. Very large tank units could not, of course, be used in Italy by either side because of the terrain, but our relatively small scale movements were constantly harassed by your air attacks and also discovered by artillery-directing aircraft».

