Greek soldiers in a moment of rest, 1940-41. DVX

Greek troops

Vidkun Quisling, leader of Norway's unconstitutional, pro-Nazi "government" from the time of Germany's invasion of Norway, reviews soldiers of Norway's volunteer Waffen SS brigade, late-1941 or early 1942.  His fellow-reviewer is SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Rediess, Hgher SS and Police Leader in Norway and de facto controller of all SS and Police affairs in Norway.

Quisling is, indeed, somewhat of an enigma - although some may find comparisons with Britain's Oswald Mosley informative.  Following brilliant success in his military education, his early career was with the Royal Norwegian Army Staff, and as a diplomat representing Norwegian and British interests in various capacities, mainly in the newly-minted Soviet Union.  Early on, he seems to have conceived a distaste for "disorderly" democratic government, but this took a long time to harden into a particular political programme.  In fact, it might be argued that it never did.  Perhaps under the influence of his Soviet experience, he initially flirted with the Soviet authoritarian model, but seems to have rejected this as Leninism moved to Stalinism - the start of a move towards the radical Right that, in progression, led him to favour Italian Fascism, a sort of Norse Naziism, all the way to pretty full-blown National Socialism (although he would probably have denied the label) complete with full-blown anti-Semitism and his own form of "Nordic" racial supremicism.  One strand was constant - the need to establish a "strong", independent Norwegian state under "rational" direction.  In this, his political career was a total failure.

Whatever he may have thought himself, he appears to have been used by the Germans to facilitate their invasion of Norway and the subversion of the legitimate government.  By the time this came about, his political party (the "National Unity" Party) had endured the typical electoral decline of western European Nazi-type parties - but more so.  Quisling entered power on the back foot and, by late-1942, was rendered increasingly powerless in the face of intrusions by Reichcommissar Josef Terboven (head of the German civil administration in Norway) and by Obergruppenfuhrer Rediess.  All his efforts to secure even nominal Norwegian independence within the German empire were deferred to the conclusion of the war in the East.  It is worth noting, in this context that - typically of west European Nazi-type thinkers, he was early to propose a form of European Union, involving Great Britain, Germany, Norway and other western European nations - an idea of little real interest to the Germans, even if they were willing the use it as a propaganda ploy.

In any event, his failure to secure "independence", combined with the increasingly harsh government exercised (often through his administration) by Terboven and Redeiss, and by the German military authorities, destroyed any chance Quisling had of bringing the Norwegian people over to his side.  He would ever afterwards be marked as a puppet collaborationist and a traitor.  Eventually brought to trial under emergency laws promulgated by the Royal government-in-exile based in London in 1942, Quisling was convicted of what amounted to High Treason, and executed by firing squad on 24 October, 1945.

His name lives on ....

Best regards, JR.

Enigmatic Fuhrer - Vidkun Quisling.

A disconsolate Gen. Tsolakglou with another Greek staff officer and a radiant Dietrich, before signing the surrender of his army and of all the Greek troops.
Actually Tsolakglou wasn't authorized by the Greek chief of staff, gen. Papagos, to surrender and furthermore he didn't have the authority for signing for all the Greek troops. In fact the other Greek troops continued to fight until it was possible.
After the war Gen. Tsolakoglou  was sentenced to death (with commutation to life prison) not only for his collaboration with the Axis during the occupation, but also for his "betrayal" during the war. 
Actually nobody remembers that Tsolakoglou have had a fierce debate with gen. Papagos and the Greek goverment when the Germans were menacing the Greece. In fact he didn't rely on the resistance of the Yugoslavian army and of the Metaxas line and pretended to withdraw the Greek armies arrayed against the Italians to shorter and more defensible positions. Furthermore he wanted to split the west armies to reinforce the east menaced by Germans (the most part of Greek troops was deployed against the Italians). Papagos and the Greek government strictly refused this strategy, for reasons of pride and prestige and ultimately of moral. It was impossible to left back the territories conquered to the Italians with so many sacrifices and courage, and even part of national land, without a conseguence of a moral backlash in the troops and in the country. Furthermore, even if the west Greek armies were very strong , they were also exhausted , and their move and splitting could give the Italians a risky advantage that until then they haven't had. So the  Tsolakoglou "technical" proposals were denied, and when what he feared happened, with the encirclement of the west Greek armies by the Germans, he thought that were was no reason to continue the fight and it was better for all the Greek armed forces to surrend. DVX