Withering assessment of IJN & IJA

[Deaf Smith]

Originally Posted by Nickdfresh

Not too mention machine guns, submachine guns, tanks, self-loading rifles, trained pilot replacements, dug in enemy infantry supported by artillery, et cetera...

And right up to the Atomic Bomb they were still in 'Banzai' mode. A large portion of their home defense organzation were armed with bambo spears.

Yea, like that would do it.

Deaf

[Rising Sun*]

Originally Posted by Nickdfresh

Not too mention machine guns, submachine guns, tanks, self-loading rifles, trained pilot replacements, dug in enemy infantry supported by artillery, et cetera...

It doesn't matter how good those things were if the troops were too ill and or too starved to use them properly, as many were on the Kokoda Track retreat and at Gona - Buna - Sanananda by the end of 1942, a bare ten months on from their triumphant victory in Malaya.

The following note illustrates both the belief in spirit over medical treatment, and from a medical officer, and the breakdown in field hygiene.

Gastroenteritis afflicted most of the Japanese soldiers in New Guinea, causing diarrhoea and dysentery. While rarely fatal, it could be a debilitating condition, causing dehydration and complicating other illnesses. Medical 2nd Lieutenant SAVATARI Zengoro "...did not think this was a very serious menace". He stated there were numerous cases "PW stated that soldiers with strong constitutions carried on when they were suffering from dysentery." [1]

Cause: Gastroenteritis is caused by a bacterial or viral infection transmitted through contaminated water and food. In the 1940’s, native New Guineans did not use latrines, their houses were built on stilts and they defecated on the ground through holes in the floor, counting on the rain to wash away the waste. The runoff contaminated available fresh water. Flies would land on the excrement and then transfer the micro-organisms by landing on food. Since Japanese (as well as Australian and American) soldiers were not immune to the local diseases, they would get infected if they drank the water or ate the contaminated food. [2]

Prevention: The Japanese No. 55 Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit was sent to New Guinea to identify disease pathogens in the combat zone and ensure a clean water supply for the soldiers. However, the unit’s effectiveness decreased the further inland the troops went as noted by Savatari, "special units were responsible for filtering, but whilst this was practical when in billets away from the front, it was impossible to expect such units to cope with the situation on active operations. All water was supposed to boiled before use, but river water was more often than not drunk straight from the streams." [3]

Sanitation efforts broke down in the field, further compounding Japanese soldiers’ exposure to pathogens. While, as Savatari reported, "all ranks were lectured on the need for hygiene, but on active service it was practically impossible to enforce any set rule or regulation." [4] Even in garrison, sanitary rules were not always enforced. An American internee described one base in 1943–44, "Although it was announced that Amele was to remain a Japanese Army base, the latrine which the officers used was soon filthy and the whole compound became polluted with Japanese faeces. The American internee put in more effort at sanitary policing than the Japanese officer-in-charge." [5]

Epidemiology: Although there are no known reliable statistics, most Japanese soldiers suffered from diarrhoea and dysentery. Those suffering from dysentery usually stayed with their unit, frequently walking naked with leaves hanging from their buttocks to prevent them from soiling their uniform. The cases that were hospitalised, since they were the most serious cases, had a high mortality rate. In 1943, the case mortality rate of gastroenteritis patients from the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade was 69 per cent. [6]

Treatment: The medical treatment was a traditional Japanese charcoal preparation Arushirin taken three times daily after meals. [7]

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/AJRP/remember...1?OpenDocument

Medical services can make a winning contribution to the success of long campaigns, especially in jungle or other high disease areas.

Professor Humphreys says that during the Battle of Kokoda in 1942, when Japanese troops came within 55km of Port Moresby, more than 2000 Australian soldiers were stricken with bacillary dysentery and were admitted to medical holding units, after forcing a Japanese retreat.

The soldiers were treated with the first 37kg of sulphaguanidine ever to be produced from a manufacturing process developed by Professor Trikojus, and the epidemic was rapidly checked.

Wartime medical expert Colonel Sir Alan Newton wrote at the time that “had the drug not been available the course of the new Guinea campaign might have been unfavourable to our cause...Happily the drug was there to give, owing to the efforts of an Australian scientist, Professor Trikojus.

http://voice.unimelb.edu.au/view.php?articleID=699

The Japanese did not have sulphaguanidine and suffered a much greater reduction than the Australians in combat efficiency because of it.

As a result of sickness and the failure to supply troops with adequate rations because of the Japanese preference for living off the land, the Japanese became pathetically ill and weak on the retreat on the Kokoda Track.

In September 1942, HORII ordered serious ration restrictions. Rice rations were reduced to two-thirds of a pint for the physically active and half a pint for others. Commanders were urged to capture food supplies and live off the land. Foraging parties were organised. A few parachute drops of supplies were made but there was no real attempt to use aircraft to solve the supply problem. By October, requisitioning food from Papuans was failing as a strategy and even dried roots were being eaten. Discipline was breaking down – bags of rice were being stolen and supply units were consuming food intended for front-line units. Grass, roots and fruits that Papuans and Australians knew were inedible were being eaten by the Japanese. In mid-October a 41st Regiment document stated "officers and men realise the present condition of the formation cannot be helped. However, the men are gradually weakening in their physical condition due to lack of food and the continuous rain with no chance of recovery." The Japanese captured tainted rations along the Kokoda Trail and ate them quickly resulting in stomach pains, internal problems and widespread dysentery.

The Japanese retreat back down the Kokoda Track was pitiful. They were famished, ill and weary. Unable to carry much, they left a trail of discarded equipment and comrades who were too badly wounded or sick to carry on. The Japanese were so short of rations that some had resorted to cannibalism. On the overland retreat from Sio to Wewak, tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers perished, mostly as a result of sickness and malnutrition. New Guinea was the place, "where soldiers are sent into the jungle without supplies." This seems to have proven the Japanese saying that, "Java is heaven, Burma is hell, but you never come back alive from New Guinea."

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/remember...ges/NT00005106

This could easily have been avoided by greater attention to the practicalities of medical services, field hygiene and rations rather than believing that 'spirit' could overcome all obstacles.