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Thread: Tanks of France.

  1. #76
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Chevan View Post
    Hardly it can treat to GErman army. More likely it would be lost in rural in few first miles of way to the front. As it happends with soviet T-35. The multi-turret monsters like this was proved to be absolutly uneffective and sensless peice of shit in ww2.
    Not to mention that the production of 150 such a super-expensive monsters should devastate the all the another tank units of France.
    I agree. The French really may not have need super-tanks to break through the West Wall at all. How far they would have gotten, and what would have happened after that, is anybodies' guess...

  2. #77
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Chevan View Post
    Nobody finished Poles. The Stalin just "gathered" what was lost.No battles were in the East. Poles though hold the front almost 3 weeks - enough time for the west to do something( or at least to begin to do or even simulate it). They pomised to Poles the military help already within 2 weeks of war...
    Three weeks was far too little time for the cumbersome French Army to mobilize, and the premise of launching a quick strike offensive was completely out of the question for the stogy old French high command. They had little in the way of a coherent offensive doctrine--other than some nebulous notions regarding a 'methodical battle'--as they always envisioned having to fight defensively first in order to grind down the superior German manpower advantages. The actual numbers of trained, professional French troops necessitated for such an offensive were busy either training called-up reservists or guarding the Maginot Line as the question of maintaining a professional, mechanized counter-attack/reaction force had been settled long ago with visionaries like De Gaulle cast aside in favor of an essentially wholly conscript 'peoples army.' So, the French were thusly pursuing a 'long war' strategy of strategic blockade and envelopment conducive to the Anglo-French economic advantages to be punctuated by a coup de grāce offensive in the middle of 1941 or so. However, if the Poles had been able to hold out longer and impose a higher toll on the Germans (not that the Poles didn't exact a decent sized pound of flesh from the Wehrmacht as it was), there would have been undeniably more political pressure for Generalissimo Gamelin to be more proactive...I agree that the potential in the Saar Offensive is fascinating. But even by that point, the Wehrmacht was already withdrawing air and ground assets from Poland, and having to go into the Saar region was a very sign of French weakness, as the best route into Germany was through (now neutral) Belgium whereas the Saar was a heavily forested depression not conducive to sustained mechanized offensive. But it was all they had...
    Last edited by Nickdfresh; 07-26-2011 at 08:16 PM.

  3. #78
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    I agree. The French really may not have need super-tanks to break through the West Wall at all. How far they would have gotten, and what would have happened after that, is anybodies' guess...
    SOmething kinda this may happend just when it goes OFF-road.

    "I decide who is a Jew and who is an Aryan "- Hermann Goering

  4. #79
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    Three weeks was far too little time for the cumbersome French Army to mobilize, and the premise of launching a quick strike offensive was completely out of the question for the stogy old French high command. They had little in the way of a coherent offensive doctrine--other than some nebulous notions regarding a 'methodical battle'--as they always envisioned having to fight defensively first in order to grind down the superior German manpower advantages. The actual numbers of trained, professional French troops necessitated for such an offensive were busy either training called-up reservists or guarding the Maginot Line as the question of maintaining a professional, mechanized counter-attack/reaction force had been settled long ago with visionaries like De Gaulle cast aside in favor of an essentially wholly conscript 'peoples army.' So, the French were thusly pursuing a 'long war' strategy of strategic blockade and envelopment conducive to the Anglo-French economic advantages to be punctuated by a coup de grвce offensive in the middle of 1941 or so. However, if the Poles had been able to hold out longer and impose a higher toll on the Germans (not that the Poles didn't exact a decent sized pound of flesh from the Wehrmacht as it was), there would have been undeniably more political pressure for Generalissimo Gamelin to be more proactive...I agree that the potential in the Saar Offensive is fascinating. But even by that point, the Wehrmacht was already withdrawing air and ground assets from Poland, and having to go into the Saar region was a very sign of French weakness, as the best route into Germany was through (now neutral) Belgium whereas the Saar was a heavily forested depression not conducive to sustained mechanized offensive. But it was all they had...
    That is all fair. However the allies had an operative plan of anti-german contr-offensive. In case of German attak.Which was fully phony if to consider a facts above.The plan was failured coz of quick polish collaps as i understand. But poles claims the plan supposed to Poland to fight alone NO more then 2 week. And they had almost realized this plan from their side.

    "I decide who is a Jew and who is an Aryan "- Hermann Goering

  5. #80
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    Three weeks was far too little time for the cumbersome French Army to mobilize, and the premise of launching a quick strike offensive was completely out of the question for the stogy old French high command. They had little in the way of a coherent offensive doctrine--other than some nebulous notions regarding a 'methodical battle'--as they always envisioned having to fight defensively first in order to grind down the superior German manpower advantages. The actual numbers of trained, professional French troops necessitated for such an offensive were busy either training called-up reservists or guarding the Maginot Line as the question of maintaining a professional, mechanized counter-attack/reaction force had been settled long ago with visionaries like De Gaulle cast aside in favor of an essentially wholly conscript 'peoples army.' So, the French were thusly pursuing a 'long war' strategy of strategic blockade and envelopment conducive to the Anglo-French economic advantages to be punctuated by a coup de grāce offensive in the middle of 1941 or so. However, if the Poles had been able to hold out longer and impose a higher toll on the Germans (not that the Poles didn't exact a decent sized pound of flesh from the Wehrmacht as it was), there would have been undeniably more political pressure for Generalissimo Gamelin to be more proactive...I agree that the potential in the Saar Offensive is fascinating. But even by that point, the Wehrmacht was already withdrawing air and ground assets from Poland, and having to go into the Saar region was a very sign of French weakness, as the best route into Germany was through (now neutral) Belgium whereas the Saar was a heavily forested depression not conducive to sustained mechanized offensive. But it was all they had...
    I agree with you Nickdfresh, we could not respond in the Saarland, the government policy of France at that time was the especially not making waves with "Herr Hitler", more as you point out very well, the doctrine of the French army was still that of the sliced ​​and despite the mechanization of the army corps made ​​this one remained on the defensive, something completely ridiculous at the same time when the German army was on it a doctrine of the attack on all fronts, this largely explains why during the reconquest of the Saarland by the German army, no one in the French camp has moved. If you look out the balance of power at the time, we (French) had more than enough to force the German reduce the number of French Division was then well above that of Germany, in terms of armored unfortunately few generals considered the weapon as a decisive battle, we were still mired in the doctrines of 14-18 fights and especially our general aviation had absolutely no vision of what the couple would mechanized force and air cover, more than they absolutely did not trust their reconnaissance planes into evidence a recognition of the airmen had reported the presence of large armored forces in the Ardennes, this message was never considered it preferable that the pilot told anything, this speaks volumes about the inability of our generals to understand the evolution of the doctrines of war and the neglect with which they treated the information that reached them.
    Friendly Fred
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  6. #81
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    Default Re: Tanks of France.

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    And a bigger petrol tank...
    I think it could go further than our darn Cent AVRE's with their thirsty Meteor engines (we had one with a range of 60 miles), the Battle Group rear echelon hated us turning up with them (especially as they always assumed they were diesel and we stole all their petrol). Not much better than the Churchill's they replaced.
    IN the days of lace-ruffles, perukes and brocade
    Brown Bess was a partner whom none could despise
    An out-spoken, flinty-lipped, brazen-faced jade,
    With a habit of looking men straight in the eyes
    At Blenheim and Ramillies fops would confess
    They were pierced to the heart by the charms of Brown Bess.

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