TŁrk porno yayini yapan http://www.smfairview.com ve http://www.idoproxy.com adli siteler rokettube videolarini da HD kalitede yayinlayacagini acikladi. Ayrica porno indir ozelligiyle de http://www.mysticinca.com adli porno sitesi devreye girdi.
Page 3 of 5 FirstFirst 12345 LastLast
Results 31 to 45 of 71

Thread: Could Britain have won Malaya?

  1. #31
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Surrey
    Posts
    2,923

    Default

    Considering the climate etc. as described in post .20: did the Japanese use of radial-engined aircraft give them an advantage over those aircraft that were available to the British - anybody?
    Last edited by 32Bravo; 05-13-2007 at 02:21 PM.


    "Although God cannot alter the past, Historians can"


    Samuel Butler


  2. #32
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by 32Bravo View Post
    Considering the climate etc. as described in post .20: did the Japanese use of radial-engined aircraft give them an advantage over those aircraft that were available to the British - anybody?
    I recall that when the Spitfires long promised to Australia finally arrived, long, long after Singapore fell and possibly a few upgrades later, they experienced problems in service in the tropics which hadn't been encountered elsewhere. Alas, I can't recall the details.

  3. #33
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    It could be argued that France had more to do with losing Malaya than did Britain.

    If the Vichy French hadn’t succumbed to Japanese demands to enter Indo-China the Japanese might have had more trouble expanding into Indo-China, which was their springboard for Malaya.

    If the Vichy French had succumbed to British demands for transfer of the French navy to Britain as easily as they succumbed to Japanese demands for Indo-China, or if France had ensured that its navy was transferred to its Ally to enable its Ally to fight on for both nations when it became clear that France was going under, there would have been ample naval forces available to resist the Japanese invasion without taking one ship away from British naval activities elsewhere.

    If both these things had happened, the French navy could have been based in French Indo-China well before hostilities began and might well have deterred the Japanese assault on Malaya.

    LATE EDIT But this would have required two things that weren't going to happen. A French government which wasn't pro-Axis, or at the very least unwilling to defy the Axis powers. And a Thai government that wasn't pro-Japanese following Japan's gift of parts of former French Indo-China to Thailand.
    Last edited by Rising Sun*; 05-14-2007 at 02:38 AM.

  4. #34
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    One thing Percival, and his predecessors, should have done in preparing for war with Japan was to arrange conferences with or otherwise communicate with Chiangís Chinese generals; the Russian generals who fought at Nomonhan in 1938-39; and Claire Chennault and his Flying Tiger pilots who had been operating in China for several years by 1941, to acquire a clear understanding of Japanese tactics, strengths, and weaknesses on land and in the air.

  5. #35
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    For reference.

    Click on map for larger image, but use back arrow to return here as it opens in same window.


    .
    Attached Thumbnails Attached Thumbnails Click image for larger version. 

Name:	map malaya.jpg 
Views:	122 
Size:	87.7 KB 
ID:	721  
    Last edited by Rising Sun*; 05-14-2007 at 01:21 AM.

  6. #36
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    One thing that should have been done was to erect invasion obstacles at Kota on the beach and in the water. They were erected in the south but not at Kota. Given the rough seas and strong winds which applied at the actual landing and capsized some small boats, adequate obstacles in the water might well have caused serious problems by capsizing some landing barges or just making the already difficult landing impossible.

  7. #37
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    The defences at Kota should have been better fortified. Two MG pill boxes did a lot of damage and held up the Japanese on the beaches. There should have been more. There should have been more artillery registered on the beaches to kill the Japanese pinned there. There should have been more artillery to deal with the landing barges and escorts, which needed the Japanese to be kept on the beaches to allow forward observers to direct fire on the beaches and naval craft. Once the forward observers were forced back, the artillery lost effect. The key to Kota was not letting them off the beaches, or at least not in sufficient numbers to win. The key to doing that was to keep them from reaching the beaches as much as possible, hence the importance of obstacles and artillery.

  8. #38
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    The central problem is that there weren't the planes available to do what was at least as necessary as defending Kota, which was to attack the Japanese landings in Thailand at Singora and Patani from Kota, Alor and elsewhere, to prevent the Japanese establishing airfields there.

    Pervcival believed that the Japanese had been storing fuel at one or both of those airfields well before the invasion as they got into serious operation very quickly.

    This then leads into the next failure, which was not implementing the revised Matador plan soon enough to enable the British to take Singora and Patani to repel the Japanese landing. Given the performance at Kota and elsewhere which had longer to establish defences, it may be wishful to think that they would have done any better even if they got to Singora and Patani.

  9. #39
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    One aspect which was important in the chain of defeats was British failure to deny weapons and supplies to the enemy. Within the first week the Japanese captured enough food at Jitra to supply a division for three months, along with 300 trucks, 50 machine guns and 50 pieces of field artillery. The enemy got 1,000 drums of fuel for its aircraft at Alor, along with bombs and operational runways, enabling them to fly off a British airfield on British fuel to drop British bombs on British troops.

    These and other similar events, along with a succession of failed demolition attempts on bridges etc, are all symptomatic of a routed army from very early in the campaign.

  10. #40
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    The central flaws in planning, both at the Malayan and London levels, with what was actually available was to require a 'whole of Malaya' defence which was beyond the capacity of the British forces while also requiring that forces must be conserved for the ultimate defence of Singapore, compounded by the need to defend tactically disastrous airfield locations. This resulted in troops being put out in dispersed penny packets in many tactically bad positions where the more concentrated enemy could deal with them one by one, in circumstances where they had to be withdrawn when severely pressed because they needed to be conserved to defend Singapore. It might have been wiser to concentrate the British forces in southern Malaya where their superior numbers could offer a solid defence to the invader; where concentrated artillery could deal better with enemy tanks (of which the British had none); and provide a better siege defence of Singapore. Still, none of this would overcome Japan's air superiority.

    Whatever analysis one applies, it always comes back to the lack of air power on the defender's side.
    Last edited by Rising Sun*; 05-14-2007 at 02:41 AM.

  11. #41
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rising Sun* View Post
    On the Japanese side of the ledger, the simple facts are that it had ... troops generally with battle experience against troops generally without it which, all other things being equal, can be decisive on its own .....
    Mabye not.

    I'd forgotten that the Imperial Guards were ceremonial elements which hadn't fired a shot in anger for a very long time, if ever. They certainly learned quickly on the job in Malaya.

    I'd also made the assumption that the units taken from China all had some or a lot of battle experience.

    More detailed knowledge of the histories of the units used in the invasion might show that there wasn't any more experience in some, maybe many, units than on the British side. In which case it just reinforces how good the average Japanese soldier really was.

  12. #42
    Join Date
    Jan 2007
    Location
    Surrey
    Posts
    2,923

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Rising Sun* View Post
    Mabye not.

    I'd forgotten that the Imperial Guards were ceremonial elements which hadn't fired a shot in anger for a very long time, if ever. They certainly learned quickly on the job in Malaya.

    I'd also made the assumption that the units taken from China all had some or a lot of battle experience.

    More detailed knowledge of the histories of the units used in the invasion might show that there wasn't any more experience in some, maybe many, units than on the British side. In which case it just reinforces how good the average Japanese soldier really was.
    Or, perhaps, how bad the British soldier, or, rather, his leadership was.
    Later, in the Burma Campaign, the British and Indian troops - having by that time received better training and, dare I say, better leaders at all levels - proved again and again that they were more than a match for the Japanese soldeir.

    The Argyll's put up a good fight in Malaya. However, despite being jungle trained, they weren't very effective in the jungle as such. Much of what they achieved was by ambushing the roads. When they evacuated the ambush (prior to the Japanese assaulting them) they took to trucks, and beat a retreat to the next best place to ambush the road. Nothing wrong with that.

    What was needed from a troop training point of view, was for more troops to have trained in the Ulu, so that they were able to navigate, communicate and not be as afraid of it. In doing this, better jungle tactics would (in my opinion) have evolved as the commanders would have discovered what could and could not have been done, as units do when exercising.
    Last edited by 32Bravo; 05-14-2007 at 08:55 AM.


    "Although God cannot alter the past, Historians can"


    Samuel Butler


  13. #43
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by 32Bravo View Post
    Or, perhaps, how bad the British soldier, or, rather, his leadership was.
    Perhaps not.

    After posting my quoted comment about the ability of perhaps inexperienced Japanese soldiers, I thought that I had unfairly elevated any inexperienced Japanese against British troops such as the Indian Dogras who did so well, just by Japanese standards, at Kota Bahru; the Argylls you mentioned; the outstanding charge by the Punjabi Sikhs at Kampar which showed that ground could be recovered from the Japanese even in the face of apparently imminent defeat; and the Australiansí ambush and resistance around Gemas. And many other sterling British actions in the campaign which contradict the notion that it was just an unbroken string of Japanese wins in every contact, which it certainly wasn't.

    I donít think that the British leadership was too bad, from platoon to senior command level. There was no shortage of courage and resolution at section, platoon, company, and battalion level, which is all you need. At senior command level they knew what they had to do. They just didn't have resources to do it, which was London's fault. London might as well have tried to fight the Battle of Britain with a score of squadrons of Swordfish and sundry other outdated planes.

    Sure, there were some lousy performances by various British units in Malaya, but overall probably no worse than in Crete, or France, or North Africa.

    The real problems were higher up as Malaya command tried to deal with cascading defeats.

    Malaya commandís problems were in turn the inevitable problems caused by London failing to give Malaya anything like what it needed for a proper defence. It was like a man with ten fingers trying to stop water coming out of a bucket with twelve or more holes.

    Iím sure that with better, more innovative, and more aggressive leadership the British could have done better in Malaya, but I doubt that they could have won as long as they were required to attempt a whole of Malaya defence with inadequate forward land and air elements virtually unsupported, and with no defence in depth anywhere, dispersed all over the peninsular.

  14. #44
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by 32Bravo View Post
    The Argyll's put up a good fight in Malaya. However, despite being jungle trained, they weren't very effective in the jungle as such. Much of what they achieved was by ambushing the roads. When they evacuated the ambush (prior to the Japanese assaulting them) they took to trucks, and beat a retreat to the next best place to ambush the road. Nothing wrong with that.
    I disagree.

    Just about everything is wrong with that, and it typifies the Malaya campaign where the British relied upon road transport.

    The ambushing part is spot on. As the Australians showed in the latter parts of the campaign around Gemas in probably the best laid and most effective road ambush, which didn't have much impact on the overall Japanese advance.

    The realiance on road transport limited the scope of action of the British forces to roads. This meant that they would always be ahead of the Japanese somewhere down the road.

    Contrast this with Japanese tactics of infiltration and envelopment, which used the jungle even along the roads.

    To take a simple example, what would have happened if the British had used more or less the same tactics as the Japanese while retreating? Ambush on road. Evaporate into jungle. Japanese advance. British move toward Japanese rear off roads. Ambush Japanese some miles further back from initial ambush point when it is thought that British (as in fact happened) had retreated ahead of the Japaneses advance. Japanese now confront, for the first time, the infiltration and envelopment tactics they use. And which they were no more adept at handling than their enemy.

    It's about going onto the front foot instead of being constantly on the back foot.

    And it doesn't need a formation, just half-section, section, platoon, and at most company attacks to have some real impact on an advance.

  15. #45
    Join Date
    Mar 2007
    Location
    Australia
    Posts
    9,281

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by 32Bravo View Post
    What was needed from a troop training point of view, was for more troops to have trained in the Ulu, so that they were able to navigate, communicate and not be as afraid of it. In doing this, better jungle tactics would (in my opinion) have evolved as the commanders would have discovered what could and could not have been done, as units do when exercising.
    Undoubtedly.

    Definitely.

    Learn to fight the enemy to win, instead of silly ideas about holding him for 70 days until the fleet from England turns up, and does what, inland?

Page 3 of 5 FirstFirst 12345 LastLast

Thread Information

Users Browsing this Thread

There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)

Bookmarks

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •