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Thread: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

  1. #16
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Frankly Dude Really View Post
    Look at this " These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces in suppressing the communists during the Malayan Emergency. (And, for cynics like me, anyone want to know why it was called an Emergency rather than a war? I haven’t been able to verify it as accurate,"...
    WHO IS ASKING FOR MALAYAN AFTER WW2 SHIT ???????
    AND WHO IS ASKING FOR YOUR OPINION ON AFTER WAR MALAYAN SHIT ???

    (and that is just ONE of your ill conceived contemptuous remarks and just bark into the air thoughts)


    .....


    How the FOK can you compare STRATEGY concepts in coldwar GLOBAL affairs in Vietnam, afghanistan with a LOCAL small scale uprising of SOME handfull of communists in Malaya !!! STRATEGY ??? in Malaya ???
    That is at a scale of POLICING action in Belfast !
    I apologise for barking into the air my thoughts relating the British Commonwealth success in Malaya to Vietnam, as you clearly know that Malaya had nothing to do with Vietnam.

    If he was still alive, you could also seek an apology from General Westmoreland for studying the Malayan experience and incorporating it into his command in Vietnam. I'm sure he would be grateful to you for your superior knowledge. If only you'd been there at the time, you could have stopped him making a massive mistake in Vietnam by trying something that succeeded in Malaya.

    Vietnam Tries the Tactics That Halted Malaya Reds

    PETER GROSE; Special to The New York Times OCT. 10, 1964

    SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 9—Quietly, behind the blare of the political upheavals of recent weeks, the United States and Vietnamese military commands have embarked on an intricate and intensive pacification ef*fort in the provinces sur*rounding Saigon.

    Many months in the planning, the operation is an attempt to apply to South Vietnam the lessons of the 12‐year Malayan struggle against Communist terrorists.

    The operation holds priority in the American military effort though few important results can be expected for some time. Its purpose is to defeat the Vietcong insurgents militarily and politically in specified areas rather than in scattershot fashion.

    The program is combining theories and tactics long talked about here but never applied in more than a half‐hearted and

    Senior officials directing the program are aware that their effort may go the way of the poorly implemented 1962 pro*gram of fortifying so‐called strategic hamlets and building militia among the inhabitants, or of the hastily conceived country‐wide participation ef*fort launched last March.

    Furthermore, the upheavals in the cities during the last six weeks have given a clear warn*ing that it may be too late for victory through a pacification program

    The example of Algeria in 1962 reminds officials that po*litical developments can lose a war even if the ground has been won. International and internal pressures on the French Government to negotiate a settlement with the Moslem nationalists had become so over*whelming that the military situ*ation was ignored.
    Continue reading the main story

    The current attempt is de*signed for political as well as military impact. It follows a careful study of the nature of this war, so unlike any previous military action in which the United States has played a major role.

    Observers have long noted that the Vietcong consider that their route to victory lies through political penetration and agitation rather than through purely military action.

    ‘Winning the War’

    To deal with this, according to the concept based on the Malayan experience, “winning the war” is more complex than a classically defined military goal. A terrorist political or*ganization must he isolated and crushed by military, police and civilian operations performed in harmony before any meaningful victory is won, it is “said.

    The Vietcong concentrations close to Saigon are not new. For many years two of the strongest guerrilla positions have been in the thick jungles of two zones within 50 miles of the capital. It is the Vietcong's increasing ability to move freely out of these seemingly impen*etrable areas to carry out at*tacks, ambushes and terrorism that helped to inspire the new pacification program.

    The Malayan experience has been closely studied by Ameri*can civilian and military offi*cials. From 1948 to 1960 a spreading Communist revolt was by Britain through the use of new methods of warfare.

    Britons with Malayan experi*ence have been working in South Vietnam since 1961, but their ad*vice was seldom heeded by the Americans or the Vietnamese until this spring. Then both countries had a new team di*recting the war effort. Premier Nguyen Khanh had none of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's suspicions of foreign ideas or interference, and Gen. William C. Westmoreland had arrived with a fresh look at the mili*tary problems facing him at the start of his command of the United States military assist*ance organization.

    More Than Up Service

    Instead of having only lip service paid to their lessons, the experts from Malaya found a receptive atmosphere at the top levels.

    In June General Westmore*land flew to Kuala Lumpur with a few senior civilian offi*cials for a three‐day briefing on the British methods. The cur*rent effort is a direct out*growth of that visit.

    The essence of the system is that success comes with the destruction not of the enemy's main fighting force or of his “will to win” but rather of his apparatus of communication and command.

    Once the system of inter*mediaries through which pass orders, taxes and intelligence is detected and eliminated, the insurgency becomes nothing more than aimless banditry.

    This was the ‐ lesson from Algeria and Malaya. General Westmoreland and the then United States Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, became convinced it applied equally to South Vietnam. In Algeria, ad*mittedly, the nationalist army usually operated in smaller units than does the Vietcong. Even greater differences be*tween the Malayan and Viet*namese situations were noted.

    First, it was said, the enemy in Malaya was clearly identifi*able by appearance—the insur*

    Second, Malaya has no sig*nificant land frontier with an*other country that could act as a base of supply and personnel for the guerrillas. South Viet*nam has 900 miles of frontier with Cambodia and Laos, both of which are said to provide facilities to the Vietcong, and with Communist North Vietnam where the guerrillas, most of whom are South Vietnamese, undergo training and from which they receive supplies.

    Third, ultimate authority and responsibility in Malaya lay with the British. At every level in Vietnam, the Americans are able to offer only advice and support. Furthermore, in almost every measurable factor, such as the size of the forces on both sides, the emergency in Malaya was about half the scale of that in. Vietnam.

    12‐Year‐Long Effort

    Finally, it took 12 years for the system to achieve success in Malaya. For six or eight of those years the British and the Malays were living from month to month and wondering if they could continue to hold on.

    The United states has been in Vietnam on an extensive scale for only three years, and during that time many energies have been dissipated in political matters remote from the war effort.

    Clearly the situation is dif*ferent from that in Malaya, and few purely political parallels can be drawn. However, the military differences were not judged to be so great as to preclude application of the Ma*layan tactics here.

    The essence of the Malayan system that is absent in South Vietnam is a tight organization of all civilian and military re*sources under one direction, called in Malaya the War Exec*utive Committees.

    On his return from Kuala Lumpur, General Westmoreland undertook to establish similar committes for the United States effort, bringing together military advisers and represen*tatives of civilian agencies for each of the 45 provinces.

    The operation was first given the code name Pica, though now Americans generally refer to it by the Vietnamese code word Hoptac, meaning “cooperation.”

    The plan envisages a series of concentric circles around the capital in which, step by step, the Vietcong presence is to be eliminated.

    Military units operate just outside a particular perimeter to engage and disrupt Vietcong military concentrations. Inside the perimeter it is the task of the police and administrative officers to register and scruti*nize the population, detect and arrest Communist agents, and substitute a new administrative apparatus to maintain two‐way contact between the Govern*ment and the population—some*thing lacking in South Vietnam for a number of years.

    Neither the United States mission nor the Government of Premier Khanh has given any publics explanation of the oper*

    It will take many months be*fore meaningful results will ap*pear, and a senior American officer acknowledged a few days ago that the undertaking, which began early last month, had got off to a “very, very slow start.”

    Clearing operations are being conducted just outside the first concentric circle, with a radius of about 12 miles from the center of the city. Most nights artillery fire can be heard in downtown Saigon.

    Gia Dinh Province surround*ing the capital is the limit of the first circle. Outside this area, troops of Hoptac's first phase are operating in Hau Nghia Binh Duong and Long An Provinces.

    Hoptac is the most complex pacification operation under*taken in South Vietnam. It will require time. With the maneu*ver barely begun, it is an open question whether the onrush of political developments will al*low the time needed.
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  2. #17
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Back to lighting up bunker fuel tanks, this is about the most viscous fuel oil there is, looking far more like Tar, than refined oil. It would be nearly impossible to set fire to Bunker oil (No. 6 residual fuel ) using 7.7 mm tracers, even small caliber incendiary ammo will not light it normally. It has to be preheated for use in ship's boilers. A pic will show what it looks like, and that aught to explain it's disinterest in lighting up.
    Attached Thumbnails Attached Thumbnails Click image for larger version. 

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  3. #18
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by tankgeezer View Post
    Back to lighting up bunker fuel tanks, this is about the most viscous fuel oil there is, looking far more like Tar, than refined oil. It would be nearly impossible to set fire to Bunker oil (No. 6 residual fuel ) using 7.7 mm tracers, even small caliber incendiary ammo will not light it normally. It has to be preheated for use in ship's boilers. A pic will show what it looks like, and that aught to explain it's disinterest in lighting up.
    As the tanks were full, there wasn't much prospect that any bullet of any calibre or type fired from an IJN plane was going to set fire to the tanks.

    It's a bit similar to the basics in an internal combustion petrol engine, where you need fuel and air in the correct ratios plus an ignition source to fire the mixture.

    Once the fuel tanks at Pearl were breached and oil flooded the berms around them so that the large surface area of oil was exposed to air, I suspect that suitable bombs of an incendiary type burning at much higher temperature than, depending on the fuel grade, the approximately 150 - 270 degrees Centigrade required to preheat it for burning in a ship's engine would have been sufficient to ignite a localised fire. As the fire spreads, the heat increases and expands across the surface and presumably continues to burn until all burnable fuel is exhausted.

    Be interesting to see if the Japanese had considered this aspect and carried suitable munitions to ignite the oil.

    If not, and contrary to my earlier comment about oil flooding into the harbour before I recalled that (I think, anyway) there were captive berms around the tanks, my recollection from some past reading is that a good quantity or perhaps all of the oil from breached tanks would have been trapped in the berms around the tanks, from where it could have been recovered.
    Last edited by Rising Sun*; 05-20-2016 at 05:52 AM.
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  4. #19
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    The image you posted of a tank farm showed the containment Berms clearly, these as you said would certainly contain and Oil that an attack might have let loose, unless the Japanese were using a large number of large general Demolition bombs.

  5. #20
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by tankgeezer View Post
    The image you posted of a tank farm showed the containment Berms clearly
    Yeah, a perfect example of tunnel vision. I was focused exclusively on the big white tanks and nothing else in the picture registered.
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  6. #21
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Rising Sun* View Post
    I apologise for barking into the air my thoughts relating the British Commonwealth success in Malaya to Vietnam, as you clearly know that Malaya had nothing to do with Vietnam.

    If he was still alive, you could also seek an apology from General Westmoreland for studying the Malayan experience and incorporating it into his command in Vietnam. I'm sure he would be grateful to you for your superior knowledge. If only you'd been there at the time, you could have stopped him making a massive mistake in Vietnam by trying something that succeeded in Malaya.
    I didn't read the article closely but I believe it is touched on fact that there were significant differences between the Malaysian communists - that were essentially of Chinese ethnic extract and a separate and distinct culture from the Malaysian people, making them easy to isolate the population from IIRC. In Vietnam, most of the NLF/VC were southerners and the Vietnamese were deeply tied to their ancestral lands and resented being hauled off into guarded camps far away from their dead ancestors. The camps also made easy targets for underfunded, poorly armed garrisons that were undermanned and easily overwhelmed by VC attacks. It was so bad by the end that many of the South Vietnamese militia were either terrorized strawmen that would melt under any assault, or were bought off into handing over excess ammunition and weapons to the VC. In some cases the SVN militia were basically thinly veiled-Viet Cong/National Liberation Front members being armed (but not paid much, if at all) by the Saigon graft gov't. It should also be noted that well into the 1960's, many on the South saw the Viet Minh as the liberators of the French colonial yoke and even ARVN troops referred to the VC as "Viet Minh".....

  7. #22
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    I didn't read the article closely but I believe it is touched on fact that there were significant differences between the Malaysian communists - that were essentially of Chinese ethnic extract and a separate and distinct culture from the Malaysian people, making them easy to isolate the population from IIRC.
    Correct.

    However, there was a chance for the same principles to apply in Vietnam, if they had been applied with the same energy and rigour as they were in Malaya. But they weren't, not least because the US didn't support the program properly. Some years ago I read an excellent book by an American soldier (?Lt?) who with a few other American troops was plonked into a village to try to win over the local area. They weren't supported by the Army and duly failed. Can't recall the author or the title, and I think I lent it to a mate who still has it.

    IIRC, there was a marked difference between USMC and US Army approaches and results in Vietnam, with the Marines focusing with some success (outside main battles) on their version of the Malayan approach while the Army went for a more armed conflict approach at all levels, which further alienated the locals

    A favourite tv show starting now. More later.
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  8. #23
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Searched forum as I thought I'd mentioned it before (maybe a couple of years ago rather seven years ago as it turns out, but that's how old age goes), and here is the book I couldn't recall above.

    If you haven't already read it, you might find David Donovan's (it's not his real name) Once a Warrior King interesting. Summary and reviews here.
    http://www.amazon.com/Once-Warrior-K.../dp/0345333160

    I read it a few months ago. He makes the point strongly that he feels the US could have done a lot better if it had provided more support to the small teams like his living in the villages as this would have increased effective grass roots opposition to the VC.

    His account shows that teams like his were given grossly inadequate support, at all levels.

    It's illustrated by a petty event when his team was told they could have a hot meal choppered in for Thanksgiving (or maybe Christmas - I can't remember) as it's apparently traditional in the US Army for the men to get a hot roast dinner on that day. He accepted the offer and was then told that he and his men had to pay for the meal. He told HQ to shove their dinner.
    http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/arch...p/t-10060.html
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  9. #24
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    In Vietnam, most of the NLF/VC were southerners and the Vietnamese were deeply tied to their ancestral lands and resented being hauled off into guarded camps far away from their dead ancestors. The camps also made easy targets for underfunded, poorly armed garrisons that were undermanned and easily overwhelmed by VC attacks. It was so bad by the end that many of the South Vietnamese militia were either terrorized strawmen that would melt under any assault, or were bought off into handing over excess ammunition and weapons to the VC. In some cases the SVN militia were basically thinly veiled-Viet Cong/National Liberation Front members being armed (but not paid much, if at all) by the Saigon graft gov't. It should also be noted that well into the 1960's, many on the South saw the Viet Minh as the liberators of the French colonial yoke and even ARVN troops referred to the VC as "Viet Minh".....

    All true.

    Some of the important differences between Malaya and Vietnam were:
    1. Scale of conflict. Malaya was a small scale guerrilla war with no regular, let alone enemy forces able to engage British Commonwealth forces in even battalion or upwards scale battles.
    2. In Malaya there was a single British Commonwealth military / political command without the corruption and duplicity of the SVN forces and government.
    3. In Malaya the British Commonwealth forces had no territorial restrictions preventing them from going into the enemy’s territory and fighting him there and depriving him of food and logisitical support streaming southwards because SVN and its allies wouldn’t cross the DMZ to take the steps necessary to win the war. Also, in Malaya the British Commonwealth forces didn’t have much to deal with in the way of troops or supplies coming south from Thailand.
    4. In Malaya, the British Commonwealth forces could bring much greater forces to suppress the enemy than the enemy had any hope of bringing against the Brits, so the Brits could deny the enemy ground, food, etc. This was much the same as the tactics applied in Vietnam, but against a much more fluid enemy with much greater local support (whether voluntary or by extortion) which was continually supplied from NVN.
    Be all that as it may, the failure of village protection / segregation in Vietnam was essentially a failure of will, commitment and resources by SVN and the US which allowed the VC to terrorise some villagers and thereby to encourage others at least to do nothing to obstruct the VC / NVA and at worst to aid them. However, that is all against a background of corrupt and duplicitous SVN government and armed force people, mostly at senior levels, who undermined their own country to the extent that it was impossible for anything like the unified British Commonwealth effort in Malaya to succeed in Vietnam.

    The problem wasn’t with the Malayan strategy but in trying to implement it in circumstances where it had little chance of success because of the local background and the lack of necessary commitment by relevant authorities.

    Then there is the simple fact, generally ignored by the US and its allies including my country and most other countries (notably post WWII France, USSR / Russia, UK), that nobody likes outsiders sending soldiers into their country or otherwise jerking their country around to suit the invader and riding roughshod over the locals.

    If Indonesia invaded Australia, does anyone think it's softest and cuddliest soldiers could make me well-disposed towards them while they're imposing their military rule and culture on me?

    Yet major nations all seem to think they can win the hearts and minds of people in the lands they invade for their own purposes, which almost never align with the purposes or benefits of the locals.
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

  10. #25
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Rising Sun* View Post
    Correct.

    However, there was a chance for the same principles to apply in Vietnam, if they had been applied with the same energy and rigour as they were in Malaya. But they weren't, not least because the US didn't support the program properly. Some years ago I read an excellent book by an American soldier (?Lt?) who with a few other American troops was plonked into a village to try to win over the local area. They weren't supported by the Army and duly failed. Can't recall the author or the title, and I think I lent it to a mate who still has it.

    ...

    A favourite tv show starting now. More later.

    Have you ever read The Bright Shining Lie by Neil Sheehan? Long but excellent read about a very proficient and competent, but deeply flawed, US Army turned civilian pacification officer named John Paul Vann. He basically became a civilian "general" commanding US and ARVN troops in the field towards the very end...

    I came away from it with the thoughts that the "Strategic Hamlet Program" was deeply mislaid culturally, and the US strategy of Attrition and Search and Destroy were deeply asinine as well...

    IIRC, there was a marked difference between USMC and US Army approaches and results in Vietnam, with the Marines focusing with some success (outside main battles) on their version of the Malayan approach while the Army went for a more armed conflict approach at all levels, which further alienated the locals
    Sheehan goes into this in some detail. I believe the Marine General was Krulak (IIRC). Initially he hates Vann, but essentially believed the same ideal of pacification through "Clear and Hold" while isolating large units of NVA rather than directly engaging them, because it was usually on the NVA terms when the US infantry went in. Krulak came to despise Westmorland and his crony attrition strategists...
    Last edited by Nickdfresh; 05-21-2016 at 11:12 AM.

  11. #26
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    Default Re: 1937 Newspaper Accurately Predicted Pearl Harbor Attack

    Quote Originally Posted by Nickdfresh View Post
    Have you ever read The Bright Shining Lie by Neil Sheehan?
    No, but as you recommend it I'll order it online soon.

    For an outside view of pacification, anti-guerrilla warfare etc by a long serving Australian adviser in Vietnam, you might be interested in Ted Serong's experience.
    http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/19...s/tenyears.php
    ..
    A rational army would run away.
    Montesquieu

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