PDA

View Full Version : US Unpreparedness 1945-1950



Cojimar 1945
05-31-2008, 09:00 PM
America certainly did not seem terribly determined or effective in the Korean conflict. If provoking the United States is such a big mistake why did Americans allow themselves to be humiliated by the Chinese and North Koreans only a few years after the conflict with Japan?

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:43 AM
America certainly did not seem terribly determined or effective in the Korean conflict. If provoking the United States is such a big mistake why did Americans allow themselves to be humiliated by the Chinese and North Koreans only a few years after the conflict with Japan?

Well, this isn't the forum for that. But you seem to fail to appreciate that the Korean War was the last thing that anyone in America expected. She merely arrogantly sent in half-trained troops softened by years of guarding Japanese girls, Sapporo beer, and sushi. They were expecting the North Korean soldiers to drop their rifles and run, but US soldiers found that they had absolutely no means to destroy the Soviet supplied T-34 tanks as their 2.75" bazookas that were already obsolete by 1943 were even more ineffective and many of the weapons were literally pulled out of storage they had been in since 1945. And the tanks that the Americans had in occupation Japan were M-24 Chaffees chosen for their low weight and not combat effectiveness for an erroneous rapid deployment concept. In short, the US conventional forces had deteriorated since WWII basically due to the over reliance on nuclear deterrence and had become a "tripwire force" that lacked training for defense-in-depth warfare (very ironically, since that's exactly what they would have to engage the Soviets in during a potential European conflict. It took one of America's finest generals of the 20th century, Matthew Ridgway, and a couple of years of on-the-job retraining and reequipping for the conscript US Army to overcome all this. There are several sources that detail this. I suggest Max Hastings' book on "The Korean War."

http://www.amazon.com/Korean-War-Max-Hastings/dp/067166834X

Here are some links:

http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/tfsmith.shtml

http://www.korean-war.com/Archives/2002/04/msg00044.html

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:48 AM
Tanks and the Korean War: A case study of unpreparedness
Armor; Sep/Oct 2000; George F Hofmann;

ISSN: 00042420

Abstract:
When the US Army went to war with Korea, it found itself unprepared to fight
and win the first and succeeding battles. Hofmann argues that the
unpreparedness was due to massive underfunding and poorly managed
demobilization after World War II.

"I believe we need to read the lessons closely lest we repeat, at
inestimable cost, the mistakes for which we paid so dear a price."

General Matthew B. Ridgway The Korean War (1967)

As the U.S. Army went to war in Korea in June 1950, it once again found
itself unprepared to fight and win the first and succeeding battles.1 In
order to understand why the Army was unprepared, we must examine the postwar
development of doctrine regarding mechanized warfare with tanks as the main
maneuver element.

On the eve of the Korean War, the nation's defense establishment had set
aside much of what had been learned about the conventional combined arms
armor doctrine so successfully demonstrated in Western Europe in World War
II, and instead had begun to depend on nuclear weapons delivered by air
power. As this was happening, the Army was digesting the war's lessons,
attempting significant changes in organizations, weapons systems
development, and doctrine, based on the success of the combined arms
approach developed during the war.

It was quite evident that the tank had revolutionized battlefield dynamics.
The armored force that swept across Europe had learned some important
lessons, chiefly that it was essential for ground forces and tactical air to
fight in combination, and that tanks could not operate independently in
battle. Another lesson was that it was important to have tank units organic
to infantry divisions, and consequently, a tank battalion was made organic
to each infantry division to assist in the assault.2 Armor was expected to
exploit the breakthrough, then strike out to pursue the enemy. In short, the
Army believed that the combined arms team, built around the tank, could make
operational level exploitation possible.

One doctrinal milestone emerged in January 1946, with the "Report of the War
Department Equipment Board," the Stilwell Board, which was named after its
president, the respected General Joseph W. Stilwell. Based on immediate
postwar reports from Europe on tactical employment of armored and infantry
divisions, one of its many recommendations called for establishment of a
combined arms force to conduct extended service tests of new weapons and
equipment. The board suggested that this proposed combined arms force
formulate a doctrine for its employment, specifically aimed at providing a
ready force quickly available for any military contingency.

The report proposed three types of tanks: a light tank for reconnaissance
and security; a medium tank capable of assault action, exploitation, and
pursuit; and a heavy tank capable of assault action and breakthrough. The
board also recognized the importance of developing components specifically
for tanks rather than relying, as in the past, on standard automotive
components. It was now accepted that the tank was a special vehicle.
Finally, the board based its recommendations on the idea that the next war
would again be total, with the use of air power and atomic weapons, and that
victory could only be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory.3

Based on another recommendation of the Stilwell Board, the commander of the
Army Ground Forces, General Jacob L. Devers, disbanded the tank destroyer
branch. Tank destroyer doctrine was no more than an early World War II
defensive response to the threat of mechanized warfare and its main ground
maneuver element, the tank. But as the war progressed, tanks improved and
accounted for most of the tank-on-tank combat. By the end of the war, the
M26 Pershing tank offered better armor protection than the openturreted tank
destroyers and mounted a 90mm gun as good or better than the guns on the
TDs.4

As the Army was steeply down-sizing, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to implement the Stilwell Board's recommendations. The cuts were
so drastic that during his tour as Army Chief of Staff, between November
1945 and February 1948, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower remarked
that implementing the rapid demobilization of the wartime army was more
unpleasant than being head of the occupation forces in Germany. His tenure
as Chief of Staff, Eisenhower noted, was full of frustrations. The wartime
Army was falling apart, rather than demobilizing, while he was struggling
with Congress over budgetary problems and the public outcry to "bring the
boys home." Adding to this dilemma, troop discontent over inequities in
demobilization almost turned into a mutiny. Eisenhower struggled with the
need to redeploy the Army for occupation duties in Germany, Austria, Japan,
and Korea, and there was an ongoing debate over the unification of the
military services.5

Although the U.S. had developed more modern tanks, the WWII-era Sherman
M4A3E8s carried the burden of much of the fighting early in the Korean War.

Speaking on national security at the Nebraska Fair in Lincoln on August 31,
1947, General Devers observed that during the two years after the end of
hostilities in Europe and the Pacific, the United States demobilized the
Army and Navy, "until it became evident that, with every reduction in the
power at our disposal, there was a corresponding deterioration in the
international situation."6 Even before the war had ended in Europe, the
Secretary of State advised the War Department of serious deterioration of
relations with the Soviet Union. A year later, Secretary of State James
Byrnes had painted a very pessimistic picture regarding Soviet aggressive
tendencies in Eastern Europe.7 These developments made the international
situation more unstable, yet the President was implementing a defense policy
based on deep cuts in conventional military expenditures in favor of
reliance on nuclear power delivered by air.

General Devers reacted with criticism of the nation's policy makers. He
claimed they had missed opportunities to educate the public about world
problems. Regarding the future Army, he said he was disappointed that
Congress was resisting the President's and War Department's plan for
universal military training, which was necessary to fill the ranks of the
National Guard and Organized Reserves. Devers argued that since the bulk of
the Regular Army was on occupation duty and garrisoning United States
territories, there would be a major manpower problem if a war occurred.8 Two
years later, the Army would be stretched even further by the need to assign
ground troops to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which - along with
the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan - were part of the nation's new policy
of containing Soviet expansionism.

When the economy-minded Republicans gained control of both houses in
Congress in the 1946 elections, the Army's future became even more vague.
Senator Robert A. Taft, an influential Republican isolationist, challenged
the country's postwar role in internationalism, and was a proponent of
limited government. The Ohio senator was not enthusiastic about committing
U.S. ground forces in Europe. Instead he supported the Navy and a policy of
reliance on air power and nuclear weapons for national defense.9

Adding to the Army's predicament was the influence of atomic bomb scientist
and author Vannevar Bush, who was head of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development during World War II, and beginning in September 1947, the
director of the Joint Research and Development Board, created to resolve
technological differences between the several departments and agencies in
the military establishment. Earlier he had suggested to Congress that the
military limit its work to improvements in existing equipment rather than
perusing technological development. Shortly before the war started in Korea,
Bush wrote the Army Chief of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, that the day of
the tank's dominance was fading. He argued that for the cost of one tank,
100 antitank guns could be built, using new ammunition to fight and hold
defensive lines in Europe against a preponderance of Soviet tanks.10

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:49 AM
Throughout this period Congress tenaciously held to its illusion of insular
security despite growing Soviet intransigence and aggressiveness. By
controlling the purse, Congress was able to influence a national strategic
policy, limiting military force levels and weapon systems development
programs. The Army suffered the most under the fiscal restraints of the
legislative branch, having its appropriations, especially for research and
development, cut each year until the war broke out in Korea. Before he left
office in February 1948, General Eisenhower warned that the unbalanced
budget situation had rendered the Army increasingly unable to mobilize in a
national emergency. The outgoing Army Chief of Staff stated that the Army
had in essence purchased no new equipment, including tanks, since World War
II. Therefore the Army, he warned, was in no situation to train and arm its
troops adequately to meet demands of emerging international threats.
Consequently, the ground forces reported state of readiness to deal with
contingencies and defensive plans were nothing but "mere scraps of paper,"
Eisenhower concluded.11

Military manpower continued to decline, not for a lack of volunteers, but
due to Army budget cuts. Despite an increasingly turbulent new world order,
the home front was more preoccupied with its move to suburbia, concern over
rising prices and inflation, labor unrest, a crisis in education, housing
shortages, and tax disputes. Meanwhile, the National Defense Act of 1947 had
separated the Air Force from the Army, giving it equal status with the Army
and Navy. The new Defense Department establishment, under a civilian head
with cabinet status, was intended to improve wartime operations of the
services, but instead politicized the process, making it difficult to
establish centralized planning due to multiservice bickering and squabbling
amongst the service chiefs. This increased the competition for military
technology funding during a period of budget constraints.

With the technologically driven air power proponents striving to achieve a
greater nuclear delivery capability and the Navy, traditionally the most
expensive of the military services, fighting for its share, there were
virtually no funds for armor research and development. This weakened the
Army's political situation, depriving the ground forces of the means to
develop a proper relationship between the doctrine and technology required
for mechanized warfighting as envisioned by the Stilwell Board.

The Truman Administration, continually driven by domestic policies that
focused more on the postwar economy and social programs, remained adamant
about defense cuts. In 1948, the Army had to impose an 80 percent reduction
in equipment requirements, thus deferring any equipment modernization. In
1948, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a $30 billion defense budget
based on their perceptions of national security needs, Truman capped their
budget at the $14.4 billion set in 1947 and progressively reduced in
succeeding fiscal years until January 1950, when it was reduced again to
$13.5 billion. Congress also reduced the authorized Army end-strength from
677,000 to 630,000. When North Korea invaded South Korea, the U.S. Army's
actual strength was only about 591,000 men. And only 6,000 serviceable tanks
remained in 1950 of the more than 28,000 tanks the country had at the end of
World War II.12

Although President Truman blamed rapid post-World War II demobilization of
America's mighty military force on the people, the press, and Congress, he
also went to great lengths to hold down defense spending.13 Truman's
ambitious Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, whose economy drive on the
eve of the Korean War again fell heavily on the Army, best illustrated this.
Johnson believed that the best national defense policy rested on nuclear air
power. Unlike Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Acheson favored a more
flexible policy based on deployable military power that would enhance
American diplomacy. This policy found support in a recommendation made
shortly before the invasion of South Korea in a secret National Security
Council study (NSC-68), which called for a stronger ground force to deal
with increasing challenges caused by the spread of communism worldwide.14

Secretary Acheson, however, defined the country's strategic defensive
perimeter along a line that included Japan and Taiwan but did not include
Korea, a country where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had earlier advised the
President that the United States had little strategic interest. They argued
that military retrenchment and budget cuts forced them to take U.S. military
forces out of Korea.15 At the same time, there was disagreement between the
Central Intelligence Agency and Army Intelligence over the possible outcome.
The CIA advised that withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from South Korea in
the spring of 1949 would in time be followed by an invasion from the North.
The Army's Intelligence Division disagreed, claiming troop withdrawal would
not encourage a North Korean move.16

Meanwhile, early in 1949, an advisory panel on armor reported that the U.S.
Army had no tank on production or in development capable of defeating the
types possessed by the country's potential enemies. The panel considered
this situation critical. Unless the Army's tank development situation was
improved, the panel reported, the United States would not have enough tanks
to support a major ground war for a least two and a half years after the
beginning of hostilities. One solution suggested was to take advantage of
America's great industrial capabilities and the mechanical aptitudes of its
people.17

A 1949 field manual emphasized the importance of the offensive role of
armor, noting that the faster armor moves and the quicker it accomplishes
its offensive mission of penetration and envelopment, the fewer the losses
and more effective the gains. Exploitation was considered a continuation of
penetration and envelopment. Tankers were expected to plan boldly and
execute their missions with aggressiveness and violence, employing
firepower, mobility, and speed.18

In March 1950, the Hodge Report named after Lieutenant General John R.
Hodge, the post-World War II Army corps commander in Korea - stated that
armor was more effective when employed as part of the combined arms team of
tank, infantry, artillery, combat engineers, and tactical air power. Armor's
mission with the combined arms team was destruction of enemy forces with
firepower, mobility, and shock action. The report added that attacking
towards deep objectives in pursuit and exploitation over considerable
distances was the role for armor at the operational level. In the design of
tanks, the report stated, firepower, maneuverability, and mobility were more
important than armor protection, although armor remained important. Like the
Stilwell Board, it recommended tanks be organic to infantry regiments and
divisions, and that three types of functional tanks be developed.
Disheartened, the Hodge Report noted that Army research and development had
been curtailed and would likely be further reduced.19

By 1950, Army doctrine had been revised in many ways; however, it was
basically a refinement of World War II experience. It was Eurocentric,
designed to fight a total war, rather than contingency operations in present
and future less-than-total war situations around the world.20 Congressional
and White House actions had reduced nine of 10 Army divisions into
ineffective skeletons, impacting training. This was especially true of the
four occupation divisions stationed in Japan. That congested country and its
road conditions did not permit extensive training exercises, especially for
medium and heavy tanks. Moreover, because of the military austerity program,
these divisions were deficient in authorized tank strength. Rather than
having a standard complement of one heavy tank battalion of M26s and three
regimental medium tank companies of M4s, each division had only one company
of M24 Chaffee light tanks, no match for the Soviet-built T34/85 tanks that
the North Koreans Peoples' Army used to spearhead their invasion of South
Korea.

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:50 AM
On the eve of the Korean War, the Army had approximately 3,400 M24 light
tanks in the inventory, most of them unserviceable. In addition, there were
available approximately 3,200 M4A3E8 Sherman medium tanks of World War II
vintage, of which only a few more than half were serviceable.21 The M4
mediums were the workhorse of U.S. ground troops during World War II. They
were not tactically capable of head-to-head engagement with German tanks.
Their battlefield success was due more to superior numbers and the ability
of U.S. tankers to maneuver to a position where a penetrating round could
find a weak spot.22 To engage superior German tanks, the Army introduced,
late in the war, the heavier armed and armored M26 Pershing. However, the
first three M26s that were rushed to Korea from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot had
chronic problems, especially overheating engines and defective fan belts.23

Also introduced to Korea was the M46 Patton. Fielded in 1949, the M46 was an
M26 upgraded in engine reliability and cooling. Accordingly, tankers went to
war in Korea with equipment mostly left over from World War 11. In addition,
many tankers were illtrained and ill-prepared, receiving equipment just days
before engaging the T34/85S.24

In the beginning, the Korean War was a war of movement. U.S. tank units were
assigned to various infantry divisions, regimental combat teams, and task
forces for mobile fire support and antitank capabilities. No large armor
units - regiments, brigades or divisions - saw service in Korea. After the
counter-invasion by the Chinese Communist forces and what was left of the
North Korean People's Army, the conflict became a defensive war of attrition
and increased firepower to support infantry forces. Despite mountainous
terrain and restricted trafficability, tanks proved to be potent adjuncts in
support of infantry. Often they were used for indirect fire missions or
deployed in fixed defensive positions. Though most armor action was
infantry- and artillery-driven, Korea demonstrated the value of tanks as
infantryaccompanying weapons, and on occasion, achieved spectacular results
in executing fairly deep mechanized task force operations despite
mountainous terrain and trafficability restrictions.25

A 1954 Johns Hopkins study, "Tankvs-Tank Combat in Korea," recorded that
U.S. tanks were approximately three times as effective as enemy tanks. It
noted that American tanks destroyed about 25 percent of the enemy tank
force, largely due to higher first-round engagements and hits.26 As a result
of early experiences in Korea, a 1951 policy conference on armor revived the
Stilwell Board's recommendations for three types of functional tanks: a
light gun tank distinguished by its mobility; a medium tank characterized by
its ability to sustain itself in all types of combat action; and a heavy
tank to defeat any enemy on the battlefield.27 Conversely, the British, who
considered the Patton tank "all too pansy," had indicated that, unlike the
U.S. Army, one all-purpose tank, like their Centurion, was more suitable for
armor operations.28

In spite of various armor policy recommendations following the Stilwell
Board Report, battlefield dynamics in a limited war changed the relationship
between maneuver and firepower, emphasizing increased use of air power and
artillery.

At the 1954 Armor Conference, the question of armor mobility was positioned
within the national strategy of nuclear air power. It rationalized that
mobility and flexibility would become more decisive on a nuclear
battlefield. The conference concluded that armor was more capable of
attaining relatively superior mobility that could provide a decisive
advantage in a European-style battle. The conference accepted the concept of
firepower and attrition but suggested it be integrated with the freedom of
action that armor provided.29 Naturally, mobility depended upon equipment
characteristics, which required a trade-off between mobility and
survivability. Summarizing, the conference noted that firepower was the
decisive factor, and that armor doctrine be based on the fundamental concept
that power coupled with an unexcelled ability to maneuver firepower at the
decisive time to the decisive place. Yet for the decades following the
Korean War, firepower systems and attrition warfare doctrine dominated. This
doctrine finally gave way to the visionary AirLand Battle doctrine for
warfighting at the operational level that characterized Allied operations
during the Gulf War.30

Concluding, there are a number of historical observations to consider. First
are the country's political objectives. Until the war in Korea, Congress and
the President were more prone to political and economic containment of the
Soviet Union and collective security through the United Nations rather than
promoting a combat-ready ground force to deal with contingencies, as
suggested by the Stilwell board.

This situation again demonstrated that the country's leadership failed to
adopt a national defense policy that took advantage of technological changes
brought about as a result of World War IL Congress and the President also
lacked the vision to fully understand the importance of the conventional
component of a national military policy. The outcome was that traditional
military heritage once again came in conflict with postwar domestic and
political demands, causing a serious gap between foreign policy and a
suitable military policy.

The second observation deals with the issue of military strategy, which is
how to win the next war. The post-World War II military austerity invoked by
the White House and Congress had a ripple effect, stifling Army research and
development necessary for innovation with a mobile strike force trained and
equipped to fight and win the first and succeeding battles.

At top of page, M46 tanks of the 64th Tank Battalion undergo final
inspection before an operation supporting the 3rd ID in July, 1951. At left,
an M46 rolls down one of country's few high-speed roads. The M-46 at lower
right slowly moves into a village. The knocked-out North Korean vehicle at
center, above, is a 76mm self-propelled field gun.

The Army's post-war doctrine on how to organize and fight its next war was
not in agreement with required modern equipment assets necessary to execute
its mission. Consequently, the strategic, operational, and tactical links
for winning the first battle never materialized. This was due to a national
strategy that did not take into consideration the relationship between
threats and the need for technological advances. As a result, the Army had a
force structure and equipment that did not fit its future warfighting
doctrine that became outmoded in spite of the Stilwell Board's
recommendations. Instead the national defense strategy of the country relied
on nuclear weapons and intercontinental airpower capabilities and the
exercise of coercion called deterrence, America's Maginot Line.

Third, when the U.S. Army entered the Korean War, an innovative tank program
and a visionary mobile combined arms doctrine - suggested by the Stilwell
Board and endorsed by the Hodge Report - were all but forgotten.

As revolutionary as the tank was in World War II, its future full potential
was not to be realized with a ground force whose mission began to change as
a result of America's expanding international commitments to contain
communism. As a result of the Army's lack of preparedness, North Korean
forces, led by their T-34/85s, pushed the allies back to the Pusan
Perimeter, a tiny sliver of the peninsula, before it could accumulate
sufficient strength to stop the North Koreans and launch a counteroffensive.

The neglect of armor research and development and a makeshift organization
led to many frustrations for tankers in Korea, who fought and died there
while employing, in most cases, wornout, World War II equipment. This
experience was a clear example of the importance of readiness and the need
to modernize organization, training, and equipment to deal with the
ever-changing threats and technical advances of warfighting.

Unfortunately, funds that did trickle down for armor research and
development degraded the health of the armor force, a legacy that continued
long after the "Forgotten War" in spite of the changes in warfighting from a
World War II concept of total war to the dynamics of a limited war.

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:50 AM
This paper was presented as part of a panel session entitled, "The Korean
War `Tank Crisis' of 1950, " chaired by BG Jack Mountcastle, USA (Ret.) at
the Society for Military History annual meeting at the Marine Corps
University. The commentator at the session was GEN Donn A. Starry. The
author would like to express thanks to GEN Starry and Charles Lemons,
Curator of the Patton Museum, for their assistance while he was researching
the article.
The Sherman "Easy-8" was outclassed in tank-to-tank combat by the early
'50s, but was still formidable in its main Korean War role, supporting
infantry. This scene shows an M4 accompanying U.S. and Korean infantrymen
through a nibbled street.

Notes
1Eric C. Ludvigsen, "The Failed Bluff of Task Force Smith: An `Arrogant
Display of Strength'," ARMY, February 1992, pp. 36-45, and William G.
Robertson, "Economy of Force: Repulsing the North Koreans Along the Naktong,
1950," in Roger J. Spiller, gen. ed., Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939
(Fort Leavenworth, Kan: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press,
1992), pp. 97-103.
2Christopher R. Gabel, "World War II Armor Operations in Europe," in George
F. Hofmann and Donn A. Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History
of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1999),
pp. 179-80.
3Report of War Department Equipment Board, 19 January 1946, Falkovich
Collection, Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor, Fort Knox, Ky., pp. 8-9,
42-4. Hereinafter cited as Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum. Also see
Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century
Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, Research Survey No. 2 (Fort
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, August 1984), pp. 146-9, and Philip L. Bolte, "Post-World War II
and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm, pp.
218-20.
4Report of War Department Equipment Board, Falkovich Collection, Patton
Museum, p. 42. For an excellent study on the too-specialized TD doctrine,
see Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: LLS. Army Tank
Destroyer Doctrine in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 1985).
5Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories 1 Tell to Friends (New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 316-20, and R. Alton Lee, "The Army
`Mutiny' of 1946," Journal of American History, December 1966, pp. 555-71.
For a provocative account of mobilization and military unpreparedness, see
Michael Kendall, "An Inflexible Response: United States Army Manpower
Mobilization Polices, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University,
1982).
6Address by General Jacob L. Devers at Veterans' Day Observance, Lieutenant
General George W. Read, Jr. Files in possession of author, p. 2.
7Samuel P. Huntington, "The Interim Years: World War II to January, 1950,"
in Raymond G. O'Connor, ed., American Defense Policy in Perspective: From
Colonial Times to the Present (London: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p.
298, and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Friendly (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1947), pp. 277-97.
8Address by General Jacob L. Devers, pp. 2, 4.
9Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making of the Modern U. S. Military,
1945-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 116-7.
10S. Everett Gleason and Fredrick Aandahl, gen. eds., Foreign Relations of
the United States
1950: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Vol. I
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 231-33. Also see
Nathan Reingold, "Vannevar Bush," in John A. Garraty and Mark C. Carnes,
eds., American National Biography, Vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), p. 80.
11Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Chief of
Staff, Vol. IX (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp.
2254-6. For an excellent study on Congress and its ability to influence the
military through power of the purse, see Edward A. Kolodzeij, The Uncommon
Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1966).
12William W. Epley, America's First Cold War Army 1945-1950 (Arlington, Va.:
The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 1999),
pp. 6, 11.
13Memoirs by Harry A. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952 (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 345.
14Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The
Formative Years 19471950 (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 1984), pp. 406-10. For brief discussions of NSC-68,
see Maurice A. Mallin, Tanks, Fighters, & Ships: U.S. Conventional Force
Planning Since WWII (Washington: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), pp. 41-62, and John
Edward Wilz, "Korea and the United States, 19451950," in Stanley Sandler,
ed., The Korean War: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
1995), pp. 176-7.
15Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 349-53, and Eisenhower, At Ease,
pp. 319-20.
16"Consequences of a U.S. Troop Withdrawal from Korea in Spring, 1949," and
"Appendix," 28 February 1949, in Michael Warner, el., The CIA under Harry
Truman (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, 1994), ORE 3-49.
17Report of Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Armor, Vol. 1, 18 February
1949, Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 5-7.
18Department of the Army, FM 17-100 Armored Division and Combat Command,
December 1949, Patton Museum, pp. 85-7.
19Report of the Army Equipment Board 1950, Fort Monroe, Va., 8 March 1950,
Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 27-9.
20Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76,
Leavenworth Papers (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, August 1979), p.1.
21Bolte, "Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness," p. 204.
22S. R. Hinds, "Comparison of United States Equipment with Similar German
Equipment," in Major General I. D. White, Commanding General
2d Armored Division, A Report on United States vs. German Armor to General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, 20 March 1945,
Patton Museum, p. 1.
23R, p, Hunnicutt, Pershing: A History of the Medium Tank 720 Series
(Berkeley, Calif.: Feist Publications, 1971), pp. 178-9.
24For two superb studies on armor's calamity and the excellent adjustments
made by tankers during the war, see Bolte, "Post-World War II and Korea:
Paying for Unpreparedness," pp. 21758, and Arthur W. Connor, Jr., "The Armor
Debacle in Korea, 1950: Implications for Today," Parameters, Spring 1992,
pp. 66-76.
25eadership Branch, Armor in Battle, (Fort Knox: Leadership and Training
Division, Command and Staff Department, U.S. Army Armor School, March 1986),
pp. 3-I to 3-27. For additional details, see John F. Antal, "Tanks at
Chipyong-Ni," ARMY, March 1998, pp. 24-32, Scott D. Aiken, "The 72d Tank
Battalion in Operation TOUCHDOWN," ARMOR SeptemberOctober 1992, pp. 44-8,
and Sam Friedman, "Tankers at Heartbreak," ARMOR, SeptemberOctober 1952, pp.
24-7.
26Vincent V. McRae and Alvin D. Coox, "Tank-vs-Tank Combat in Korea,"
Operations Research Office (Chevy Chase, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University,
8 September 1954), Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 2-3.
27Report of U.S. Army Policy Conference on Armor, Fort Monroe, 16-20 October
1951, Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, pp. 1-2.
28"Tanks: How Do They Rate?" 24 March 1952, Newsweek, pp. 30-1.
29"Effect of Atomic Weapons on the Employment of Armor," in Final Report of
United States Army Policy Conference, 15-19 November 1954, Fort Knox,
Falkovich Collection, Patton Museum, 1-3.
30On This issue, see Robert H. Scales, "From Korea to Kosovo: America's Army
Learns to Fight Limited Wars in the Age of Precision Strikes," Armed Forces
Journal International, December 1999, pp. 36-41.

[Author note]
Dr. George F. Hofmann is a history professor at the University of
Cincinnati, who served in the U.S. Army (Armor). He is the author of The
Super Sixth: A History of the Sixth Armored Division, Cold War Casualty: The
Court Martial of Major General Robert W. Grow, and edited with Donn A.
Starry Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces. He is
a contributor to History in Dispute, World War N, and a frequent contributor
to ARMOR and The Journal of Military History.

Link (http://www.korean-war.com/Archives/2002/04/msg00044.html)

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 11:55 AM
BTW, I do not agree totally with the thesis of the above article that "it was Truman's fault." The writer fails to account for the high costs in terms of command-and-control, security, and vigilance of America's Nuclear arsenal and how many in the Army simply thought that conventional forces were largely useless for more than guarding and occupying...

It not just simply a case of the US Army being underfunded, as the much higher initial performance of the US Marine Corp, which showed immense tactical superiority over their largely demoralized, half-trained US soldier counterparts, is evidence that the US Army was poorly trained for real combat and simply trained for the expectation of repeating the Autumn 1944 to Spring 1945 into Germany while "rolling along." The US Army had simply forgot how to defend, and devalued the notions of rigorous combat training and rigorous cohesion inspired by good, qualified leadership. Their leadership had become complacent and had reverted to allowing incompetent mid-level officership which WWII had done a good deal to purge in a Darwinian sense. And much of this began at the top with Douglas MacArthur.

But he raises a lot of interesting points regarding the directionless post-WWII US doctrine regarding the use of conventional forces.

Chevan
06-01-2008, 02:56 PM
Well, this isn't the forum for that. But you seem to fail to appreciate that the Korean War was the last thing that anyone in America expected. She merely arrogantly sent in half-trained troops softened by years of guarding Japanese girls, Sapporo beer, and sushi. They were expecting the North Korean soldiers to drop their rifles and run, but US soldiers found that they had absolutely no means to destroy the Soviet supplied T-34 tanks as their 2.75" bazookas that were already obsolete by 1943 were even more ineffective and many of the weapons were literally pulled out of storage they had been in since 1945. And the tanks that the Americans had in occupation Japan were M-24 Chaffees chosen for their low weight and not combat effectiveness for an erroneous rapid deployment concept.

Hardly the T-34 that was obsolet already in the 1944 were so invincible for US army in 1950.
Remember Europe 1944- even when US army had nothing simular to the newest GErman heavy tanks - the USAAF very effectively knocked them out . The P-51 relatively easy destroed and neitralized the German Panthers and Tigers.
So there is no doubt- the reason of initual failure of US army in Korea wasn't military.
I rather think it was a psychological-in fact the Korean war started as inner civil war of Koreans.
But after involving to it the US army - this has been international conflict where a lot of states like China and USSR would have been inevitably involved.
I think the initial lack of American- they simply didn't wish to fight and die on Alien war.The entire Korean war was an alien for them.
What did they fight for here?
For "democracy"?
But if the absolute majiority of Koreans didn't wish it.
But the SOuthern Korean democracy hardly differ from Nother one in 1950.They also killed a political opponents and civils , suspected in symphaties for commis.
For virtual Americans "interests"?
Probably, but anyway they were not so motivated as the N.Koreans who fought for their land.
Besides don't forget - in fact this war for N/Korean was a sort of "anti-colonian" it has been portrayed as "liberation" in their propogand.
Therefore they were so strong and Southern Koreans - such weak. They would lose for sure if not the DIRECT American military support.

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 05:12 PM
Hardly the T-34 that was obsolet already in the 1944 were so invincible for US army in 1950.

Let me clarify. It was invincible to the men of "Task Force Smith," the first troops deployed directly from Japan. They did not have access to the newer 3.5" Bazooka rocket launcher which would destroy the T-34. And the weapon's issuance was slowed simply because it was not a priority. Most of their weapons were from WWII, making the T-34/85 more than adequate. I think they had artillery that was about 105mm and there were some Chaffee tanks that were considered light tanks designed for reconnaissance that still mounted the ineffective 75mm gun. The NK Army had about 150 T-34s and they simply, in the initial contact, drove past US infantry after they had shot down most of the North Korean infantrymen who then found themselves leap frogging in full retreat with tanks and greater numbers of NK reinforcements in pursuit or simply ignoring them...:shock:


Remember Europe 1944- even when US army had nothing simular to the newest GErman heavy tanks - the USAAF very effectively knocked them out . The P-51 relatively easy destroed and neitralized the German Panthers and Tigers.

Oh contraire. It is now generally recognized that VERY FEW German panzers were hit from the air. It was mostly their support vehicles and horses, but few panzers were hit by the "jabolts." They mostly moved at night. Most German tanks were in fact destroyed by Shermans, Tank destroyers, anti-tank wielding infantry, mines, or indirect fire artillery..


So there is no doubt- the reason of initual failure of US army in Korea wasn't military.
I rather think it was a psychological-in fact the Korean war started as inner civil war of Koreans.
But after involving to it the US army - this has been international conflict where a lot of states like China and USSR would have been inevitably involved.
I think the initial lack of American- they simply didn't wish to fight and die on Alien war.The entire Korean war was an alien for them.
What did they fight for here?
For "democracy"?
But if the absolute majiority of Koreans didn't wish it.
But the SOuthern Korean democracy hardly differ from Nother one in 1950.They also killed a political opponents and civils , suspected in symphaties for commis.
For virtual Americans "interests"?
Probably, but anyway they were not so motivated as the N.Koreans who fought for their land.
Besides don't forget - in fact this war for N/Korean was a sort of "anti-colonian" it has been portrayed as "liberation" in their propogand.
Therefore they were so strong and Southern Koreans - such weak. They would lose for sure if not the DIRECT American military support.

We'll, you're over politicizing it a bit. The American Army's performance dramatically improved by mid-1951 as more rigorous tactical unit training was re-instituted by request of Ridgway. The US Marines greatest issue was their use of mass infantry human wave assault tactics which caused them heavy casualties on counterattacks, but the fought much better than their US Army counterparts. And as for air support, that was one of the major reasons they were not pushed into the sea to begin with. But things took a while to reposition in Japan and there speed of the NK advance overran many potential US airfields as the attack almost caught the US completely by surprise. And while South Korea was governed by tin pot dictators, there was absolutely far more tolerance given to opposition as S. Korea was authoritarian with a political opposition while the North was autocratic under complete state control..

The war as an "anti-colonial" one is a sham, since North Korea was no less a colony than South Korea was and Sung was simply installed after the Soviets decided they wanted to control the northern half. There is much blood on the hands of both sides, but the Northern ones' are far bloodier. In fact, we'd be hard pressed to find any US colonists as even the army really didn't want to be there:D. And it was little more than a cynical power grab by Kim il Sung who was never democratically elected, and unlike Ho Chi Minh, probably never would have been accepted in the South of the country. Not without a pluralistic, factional gov't...

And I think 99.9% of humanity would prefer to be South Korean over being a starving, fearful North Korean at this point as we all know which "colony" evolved into a vibrant, economic powerhouse of a democracy. You can say whatever one wants about US policies which are often shitty, but in Korea, they were resisting a war of aggression, not an armed struggle of national liberation.

pdf27
06-01-2008, 05:38 PM
The biggest problem the US forces had when first sent to Korea was a very simple one - they weren't soldiers. They were civilians, who dressed up in pretty uniforms while running the occupation of Japan. When deployed overseas to face soldiers - even very bad ones such as the North Koreans were - they fell to pieces. A few still fought (largely the senior ones with WW2 experience) but the majority fell to pieces.
The follow-on forces who had actually been trained properly and turned into soldiers did rather well...

Nickdfresh
06-01-2008, 05:46 PM
The biggest problem the US forces had when first sent to Korea was a very simple one - they weren't soldiers. They were civilians, who dressed up in pretty uniforms while running the occupation of Japan. When deployed overseas to face soldiers - even very bad ones such as the North Koreans were - they fell to pieces. A few still fought (largely the senior ones with WW2 experience) but the majority fell to pieces.
The follow-on forces who had actually been trained properly and turned into soldiers did rather well...

I agree. But even more than the soldiers overall fitness and training, their tactical training seem to involved little more than a mechanized army on holiday. There was little defensive training conducted by the US Army by 1948, and the Army was gutted from 1945 levels in terms of manpower as there were less than 600,000 US soldiers from I think a peak Wartime level of over seven million (without checking, I could be wrong)...

The main problem is that US commanders and politicians from both parties saw future war as push button.

I would contest the notion that the North Koreans were "bad" soldiers though. Many had been in combat since the thirties fighting the Japanese and both North and South Korea sparred over the years. They were actually a pretty experienced force that was vastly better equipped than the South and even the Americans initially. However, they were annihilated after Inchon and most of the better units were destroyed in the siege of the Pusan peninsula. That goes double for the Chinese, who were very good and well trained soldiers with an enormous amount of experience to draw on.

Chevan
06-02-2008, 01:51 AM
Let me clarify. It was invincible to the men of "Task Force Smith," the first troops deployed directly from Japan. They did not have access to the newer 3.5" Bazooka rocket launcher which would destroy the T-34. And the weapon's issuance was slowed simply because it was not a priority. Most of their weapons were from WWII, making the T-34/85 more than adequate. I think they had artillery that was about 105mm and there were some Chaffee tanks that were considered light tanks designed for reconnaissance that still mounted the ineffective 75mm gun. The NK Army had about 150 T-34s and they simply, in the initial contact, drove past US infantry after they had shot down most of the North Korean infantrymen who then found themselves leap frogging in full retreat with tanks and greater numbers of NK reinforcements in pursuit or simply ignoring them...:shock:

Oh so Yanks had noting to stop the T-34:)
But can ignore the rest of NK army;)
That's most fanny explanation tht i've even heard


Oh contraire. It is now generally recognized that VERY FEW German panzers were hit from the air. It was mostly their support vehicles and horses, but few panzers were hit by the "jabolts." They mostly moved at night. Most German tanks were in fact destroyed by Shermans, Tank destroyers, anti-tank wielding infantry, mines, or indirect fire artillery..

Oh Nick this is really revelation for me.
The US aviation wasn't so effective endeed as it was portrayed in West?
Really just FEW tanks has been destroyed?


We'll, you're over politicizing it a bit. The American Army's performance dramatically improved by mid-1951 as more rigorous tactical unit training was re-instituted by request of Ridgway. The US Marines greatest issue was their use of mass infantry human wave assault tactics which caused them heavy casualties on counterattacks, but the fought much better than their US Army counterparts.

You can't ignore the political and patriotic motivation of NK army, Nick.
I'm agree the US army capabilities to fight rised seriously during the conflict.
But it was still alien war for them, wasn't it?


And as for air support, that was one of the major reasons they were not pushed into the sea to begin with. But things took a while to reposition in Japan and there speed of the NK advance overran many potential US airfields as the attack almost caught the US completely by surprise. And while South Korea was governed by tin pot dictators, there was absolutely far more tolerance given to opposition as S. Korea was authoritarian with a political opposition while the North was autocratic under complete state control..

What difference between the Two dictators states if one have the opposition ( but periodically executed them, we all saw the photos) and other - that forbid the opposition at all?
Take a look at the modern S Korea.
I hardly doubt that they have more democraty then for instance the communist China- both states enough autocratic and have own "formal" opposition. ( In China this is ComParty opposition)


The war as an "anti-colonial" one is a sham, since North Korea was no less a colony than South Korea was and Sung was simply installed after the Soviets decided they wanted to control the northern half.

Nick , every time when you are going to use the academic style, you make a simle mistakes.
Soviets NEVER controlled neither the N Korea in 1951 nor China during the Civil war 1946-49.
Thay simple helped them with wearponry and specialists.
The both just use the simular communist ideoligy - but this wasn't nessesary they were the firends( remember the SOviet-Chinas military comflicts in 1970)
The N Korean Forces have not been managed by the Soviets.
TO the contrast in the SOuthern Korea there were american contingent and the UNION Alles command was under full American controll ( MacArtur). The OWN S. Korean forces were subordiated to the American command.
Soviets never "controlled" the Koreans as much as Yanks controlled the SOuth, just helped them.


There is much blood on the hands of both sides, but the Northern ones' are far bloodier.

And now you use the pure propogand:)
Hardly the N Koreans killed more own peoples then the Americnas who started the new Firebombing compain.


And I think 99.9% of humanity would prefer to be South Korean over being a starving, fearful North Korean at this point as we all know which "colony" evolved into a vibrant, economic powerhouse of a democracy. You can say whatever one wants about US policies which are often shitty, but in Korea, they were resisting a war of aggression, not an armed struggle of national liberation.
You always "resisted of agression" .
Even in dirty war in Vietnam:)where according the US "reports" 99.9% of peoples in Nother Vietnam "being a starving" and "treating" by the commie...
I hope you understand that this is a matter of propogand:)
Be sure N/Koreans also portrays as they resisted of an "American Imperialism":)
I/m not going to insult the american fellows who so greatly fought in Korea ( even in Sky against "Soviet Inviders":) But this was a alien war for them.
As and most of other post ww2 conflict where the USA has been involved.

pdf27
06-02-2008, 02:32 AM
Oh so Yanks had noting to stop the T-34:)
They had plenty of things that could deal with the T-34, but none of them were given to Task Force Smith in Korea.

Rising Sun*
06-02-2008, 08:34 AM
That's most fanny explanation tht i've even heard.

Mate, you asked me in another thread why I didn't help you improve your English.

This could be the time to start. ;)

Because they don't speak normal English there, 'fanny' in America means bottom, backside, arse. :rolleyes:

In Australia, much to the amazement of Americans shocked by the reaction of my primitive people when Americans use the term in polite society (I'm going on what people tell me about polite society as I have no experience of it ;) ), fanny means the opposite anatomical orifice on the front of a lady.

I think you mean funny.

Unless you want to make a fanny of yourself. :D

Digger
06-02-2008, 08:44 AM
You can be a funny fanny when you want to be RS;)

Regards digger

Chevan
06-02-2008, 09:03 AM
Mate, you asked me in another thread why I didn't help you improve your English.

This could be the time to start. ;)

Because they don't speak normal English there, 'fanny' in America means bottom, backside, arse. :rolleyes:

In Australia, much to the amazement of Americans shocked by the reaction of my primitive people when Americans use the term in polite society (I'm going on what people tell me about polite society as I have no experience of it ;) ), fanny means the opposite anatomical orifice on the front of a lady.

I think you mean funny.

Unless you want to make a fanny of yourself. :D
Sure i man funny, sorry and ...many thanks..
I was afraid you will criticize my post for its political anti-americanism:)
But you just make fun with me:)
There are certain troubles for me in English, not as much in grammatic ( the translater usially helps) , but in Times of VErbs and formulation the sentences.
Egorka , who speaks in English entire his working time ( becouse he communicates in english at work all time) is in more proper situation for studying enlglish.
I use it only in forums.
Thank you for the patience gentlemens;)

Rising Sun*
06-02-2008, 09:23 AM
I was afraid you will criticize my post for its political anti-americanism:)

Nah, the Yanks can take care of themselves.


But you just make fun with me:)

Only because you're a fanny. :mrgreen:


There are certain troubles for me in English, not as much in grammatic ( the translater usially helps) , but in Times of VErbs and formulation the sentences.

Have you learnt English formally, such as at school, or are your using on line translators for most of your posts?

How do you read the English posts here? In English or translated into Russian?

Nickdfresh
06-02-2008, 10:18 PM
Oh so Yanks had noting to stop the T-34:)
But can ignore the rest of NK army;)
That's most fanny explanation tht i've even heard

Feel free to research and provide Task Force Smith's TO&E...


Oh Nick this is really revelation for me.
The US aviation wasn't so effective endeed as it was portrayed in West?
Really just FEW tanks has been destroyed?

In WWII or Korea? And aviation was very effective, by hindering the movement of the panzers. But the Germans weren't stupid and didn't exactly put them on roads in daylight. Relatively few panzers were knocked out from the air. And most German tactical movement took place at night. Of course, there were times that Germans did lose a lot of armor and other equipment from the air. I think the slaughter at the Falaise Gap would be an example of this. But in Normandy, most German armor moved carefully at night -- which in itself was a negative effect of air power on German tankers...


You can't ignore the political and patriotic motivation of NK army, Nick.
I'm agree the US army capabilities to fight rised seriously during the conflict.
But it was still alien war for them, wasn't it?

Well, I'm not sure they all shared the same motivation in North Korea. But yes, it was an alien war for the average GI. But at the same time, there was the extreme fear of communist expansion as well. So while most probably never wanted anywhere near Korea, I think even the slowest of them realized that it was a confrontation between the UN and Soviet, Chinese, and NK communism...


What difference between the Two dictators states if one have the opposition ( but periodically executed them, we all saw the photos) and other - that forbid the opposition at all?
Take a look at the modern S Korea.

Of course. But there was still an opposition in South Korea and the country was able to at least evolve into what it is today while North Korea is a backwater of famine and tyrants...


I hardly doubt that they have more democraty then for instance the communist China- both states enough autocratic and have own "formal" opposition. ( In China this is ComParty opposition)

You mean today? Or in 1950-1953?


Nick , every time when you are going to use the academic style, you make a simle mistakes.
Soviets NEVER controlled neither the N Korea in 1951 nor China during the Civil war 1946-49.

But Soviet troops were in Korea after WWII and helped install the Sung regime helping to form what was a system essentially modeled on theres...


Thay simple helped them with wearponry and specialists.
The both just use the simular communist ideoligy - but this wasn't nessesary they were the firends( remember the SOviet-Chinas military comflicts in 1970)

But for a time the Chinese and the Soviets were in an uneasy, tenuous alliance that I believe largely fell apart by the late 60s, and would have ended earlier had not been for Vietnam...


The N Korean Forces have not been managed by the Soviets.
TO the contrast in the SOuthern Korea there were american contingent and the UNION Alles command was under full American controll ( MacArtur). The OWN S. Korean forces were subordiated to the American command.

But the US didn't control Syngman Rhee. He in fact often infuriated the US commanders and was anything but a "puppet"...

And of course his army was under UN/US control, they had been shattered, just like the NK would be under Chinese PLA "volunteer" control after they were destroyed as an effective force by 1950...


Soviets never "controlled" the Koreans as much as Yanks controlled the SOuth, just helped them.

But the Soviets provided North Korea with offensive weapons while the US denied South Korea modern armor and artillery.

So, this would explain the huge NK advantage over SK in armor, men, and virtually all categories in 1950 how?


And now you use the pure propogand:)
Hardly the N Koreans killed more own peoples then the Americnas who started the new Firebombing compain.

And you believe all the crap you've read in Soviet era text books...

Who started the War? Who was the aggressor?


You always "resisted of agression" .
Even in dirty war in Vietnam:)where according the US "reports" 99.9% of peoples in Nother Vietnam "being a starving" and "treating" by the commie...
I hope you understand that this is a matter of propogand:)

I have no idea where you get this statistic? Please post the source by all means...

And there are numerous key differences between Korea and Vietnam, most notably the involvement of the French in the latter. And of course Vietnam was far less black and white...


Be sure N/Koreans also portrays as they resisted of an "American Imperialism":)

By invading another sovereign nation and killing thousands? That's like saying: "I'm going to fight corruption by killing my neighbor and raping his wife"...


I/m not going to insult the american fellows who so greatly fought in Korea ( even in Sky against "Soviet Inviders":) But this was a alien war for them.
As and most of other post ww2 conflict where the USA has been involved.

Was it more or less of an "alien war" for the Soviet pilots, or the Chinese "volunteers?"

Chevan
06-03-2008, 02:53 AM
Feel free to research and provide Task Force Smith's TO&E...

OK


In WWII or Korea? And aviation was very effective, by hindering the movement of the panzers. But the Germans weren't stupid and didn't exactly put them on roads in daylight. Relatively few panzers were knocked out from the air. And most German tactical movement took place at night. Of course, there were times that Germans did lose a lot of armor and other equipment from the air. I think the slaughter at the Falaise Gap would be an example of this. But in Normandy, most German armor moved carefully at night -- which in itself was a negative effect of air power on German tankers...

In Germany and Korea.
I do agree with - aviation was very effective against any ground vehicles. The P-51 was very great against T-34.
So you are going to say that TSF had no aviation at all?


Well, I'm not sure they all shared the same motivation in North Korea. But yes, it was an alien war for the average GI. But at the same time, there was the extreme fear of communist expansion as well.

What is "fear of communism"?
Were the N.Koreans and Chinas planning to invide the USA/Australia/Japane?
Or Americans simply feared to lose the Rich of resources Southern-Eastern Asia?
You see , becouse of mythical fear communism , the USA has been involving into the alien civil war.
After that the violence in region has been increased in times.


So while most probably never wanted anywhere near Korea, I think even the slowest of them realized that it was a confrontation between the UN and Soviet, Chinese, and NK communism...

Exactly..
This was alien war and for then- becouse in fact , finally the Korean war has been transformed itno the International a War between China , USA and USSR.
But the victims of this war - were a simple Koreans, Nick.
So we have a situation when the Korean civil war , that probably would finish already in 1951 by the victory of N Koreans - continie whole 3 years with using of all sort of modern wearpon, including the napalm and strategic aviation.
Becouse of fear of communism.....
You fought for you fear , killing the alien peoples..


Of course. But there was still an opposition in South Korea and the country was able to at least evolve into what it is today while North Korea is a backwater of famine and tyrants...

But who made the N Korea such poor and hard to leave?
Who created and support the economical blocade all this time?
Is today the Vietnam , where the communists have finally won , one of the most dumanic-developings state of asia , looks like the N Korea?
You see even the communist can build the relatively normal, market oriented economy like in modern China.
SO why the Koreans should be worsen?
Even the communist Koreans, who inevitably should make the inner regime softer and began the international cooperation.
May be you know the USA today is the MOST importain economical parthner both of Communist China and Communist Vietnam.


You mean today? Or in 1950-1953?

Today.


But Soviet troops were in Korea after WWII and helped install the Sung regime helping to form what was a system essentially modeled on theres...

Sure they were there and helped to inslall th pro-soviet regime(as wll Yanks who were in S.Korean and installed its own pro-american dictarors regime).This was STRONGLY ACCORDING Potsdam declaration 1945
But as you probably know, till the 1949 all the soviets and amerians troops have been withdrew out of Korea.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War

By 1949, both the Soviets and Americans had withdrawn all but advisors in Korea
So the Korean war was a civil from most beginning.

In mid 1949, Kim Il-Sung pressed his case with Joseph Stalin that the time had come for a reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Kim needed Soviet support to successfully execute an offensive far across a rugged, mountainous peninsula. Stalin, however refused support, concerned with the relative lack of preparedness of the North Korean armed forces and with possible U.S. involvement
Just after US military intervention- into the wr have been involved the Chineses and Soviet pilots.


But for a time the Chinese and the Soviets were in an uneasy, tenuous alliance that I believe largely fell apart by the late 60s, and would have ended earlier had not been for Vietnam...

Sure they were in an uneasy, becouse the Alien American troops , after the full scal invasion crushed the almost entire N Korean army till the october 1950.
As yo know USA actively supported the Gomindan during the recent Chinas civil war 1946-49. SO they had a hell of reasons to worry about:)


But the US didn't control Syngman Rhee. He in fact often infuriated the US commanders and was anything but a "puppet"...

And of course his army was under UN/US control, they had been shattered, just like the NK would be under Chinese PLA "volunteer" control after they were destroyed as an effective force by 1950...

Actually the CHina controlled much of Communist forces. But it was happend AFTER the USA has been involved itno the conflict.


But the Soviets provided North Korea with offensive weapons while the US denied South Korea modern armor and artillery.

And the both sides provided and supplies with wearpon of the Koreans in during pre-war period.


So, this would explain the huge NK advantage over SK in armor, men, and virtually all categories in 1950 how?

HArdly the 150 of N Koreans tank was a "Huge adventage" Nick:) For the thearthe where almost 500 000 of mans fought.
In the WW2 this "Huge adventage" would be called only couple of battalions..
Besides as you sayed the USA supplies the S Koreans with modern artillery

The South Korean Army had 150,000 soldiers armed, trained, and equipped by the U.S. military, and as a force was deficient in armor and artillery. The South Korean military had only 40 tanks, 14 attack planes, and few anti-tank weapons. There were no large foreign combat units in the country when the war began, but there were large American forces stationed in nearby Japan.



And you believe all the crap you've read in Soviet era text books...

Soviet crap,:)
Mate i never heard about Firebombing of Korea till when i've come at our forum:)
And learn it from the related thread "Firebombing of Korea" , you can check it.
BTW i've learned here that in many aspects the Korean firebombng was even more cruel than the German one..


Who started the War? Who was the aggressor?

Koreans..started that all:)
But the USA transformed it into the International War, with the mass aplication of modern wearpon and alien forces.
They just rised the level of cruelty and violence in several times.And made war far longer and bloody.
Becouse of paranoic "fear of communism"..


I have no idea where you get this statistic? Please post the source by all means...

Nowhere.
But you my friend ALSO was not going to worry about the source of you figure "99,9%" in your previous post?
Why i should.


And there are numerous key differences between Korea and Vietnam, most notably the involvement of the French in the latter. And of course Vietnam was far less black and white...

Really?
You think that the 1.5 mln of Korean civils, killed during the 3 years is rather differe the 2 mln of Vietnamises , killed during the 8 years?
And is the French involvements is differ of "UNN forces" that fought in Korea?
I think on the contrary- there were TOO many common moment in both those wars.
The sides of supportes of Communist- also was CHina/USSR.


By invading another sovereign nation and killing thousands? That's like saying: "I'm going to fight corruption by killing my neighbor and raping his wife"...

What a 'sovereign nation" do you mean?
The S Korea is just a Korea.


Was it more or less of an "alien war" for the Soviet pilots, or the Chinese "volunteers?"

This is true.
This war also was allien for CHineses and especially for Soviets.
I've read a memours of Ivan Kojedub who prepeared the Soviet pilots in Korea.
He wrote that -
"there were absolutly no any other sense in soviet participation in war, except to rise our professionalism in dogfight.
Today they bombs the Phenjian- tomorrow , probably Vladivostok and Moscow.
We need to learn how to intercept the strategic bombers"
So you see
We rise skill level, while local population died.
So this was rather alien war for all of us.
But it was adirect resault of American intervention of 1950.

pdf27
06-03-2008, 05:53 PM
So you are going to say that TSF had no aviation at all?
Task Force Smith itself was armed with nothing heavier than 2.75 inch bazookas and light machine guns. They had no organic air component or forward air controllers. USAF aircraft will have been operating over Korea at the time from bases in Japan, but without forward air controllers on the ground will have been unable to provide effective close air support.

Nickdfresh
06-03-2008, 10:13 PM
OK

In Germany and Korea.
I do agree with - aviation was very effective against any ground vehicles. The P-51 was very great against T-34.
So you are going to say that TSF had no aviation at all?

Yes, but you're assuming the US had absolute power in which to deploy such aircraft instantly.

They didn't! Certainly not in 1950...

Where were they going to fly from? Japan?

Secondly, I think I said that tactical air forces were invaluable to the UN, but several weeks after the war started.


What is "fear of communism"?
Were the N.Koreans and Chinas planning to invide the USA/Australia/Japane?

I don't know, were Finns, Poles, and Hungarians going to invade Soviet Russia?


Or Americans simply feared to lose the Rich of resources Southern-Eastern Asia?
You see , becouse of mythical fear communism , the USA has been involving into the alien civil war.
After that the violence in region has been increased in times.

Um, like which valuable resources? Were they like the valuable resources in Eastern Europe?

And the famine and backwardness has increased in the North.

BTW, which state would you rather live in again?


Exactly..
This was alien war and for then- becouse in fact , finally the Korean war has been transformed itno the International a War between China , USA and USSR.
But the victims of this war - were a simple Koreans, Nick.
So we have a situation when the Korean civil war , that probably would finish already in 1951 by the victory of N Koreans - continie whole 3 years with using of all sort of modern wearpon, including the napalm and strategic aviation.
Becouse of fear of communism.....
You fought for you fear , killing the alien peoples..

I'd be inclined to agree if North Korea wasn't run by one of the worlds biggest flaming assholes and a complete shit-hole of famine, suffering...

How many South Koreans haven't starved to death?


But who made the N Korea such poor and hard to leave?
Who created and support the economical blocade all this time?
Is today the Vietnam , where the communists have finally won , one of the most dumanic-developings state of asia , looks like the N Korea?

Um, we really aren't talking about Vietnam whose leadership was far more dynamic and outward looking...


You see even the communist can build the relatively normal, market oriented economy like in modern China.

Then they're really just fascists with a mixed economy...


SO why the Koreans should be worsen?
Even the communist Koreans, who inevitably should make the inner regime softer and began the international cooperation.
May be you know the USA today is the MOST importain economical parthner both of Communist China and Communist Vietnam.

Today.

The United States, as well as many Euro nations and even the invadee, the ROK, send fuel oil and foodstuffs to the North to prevent all out starvation!


Sure they were there and helped to inslall th pro-soviet regime(as wll Yanks who were in S.Korean and installed its own pro-american dictarors regime).This was STRONGLY ACCORDING Potsdam declaration 1945
But as you probably know, till the 1949 all the soviets and amerians troops have been withdrew out of Korea.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War

So the Korean war was a civil from most beginning.


So what if it was "civil?" It was an invasion from the North and the US was obligated to help by treaty...


Just after US military intervention- into the wr have been involved the Chineses and Soviet pilots.

Sure they were in an uneasy, becouse the Alien American troops , after the full scal invasion crushed the almost entire N Korean army till the october 1950.
As yo know USA actively supported the Gomindan during the recent Chinas civil war 1946-49. SO they had a hell of reasons to worry about:)

The war wasn't "alien" after a time. No more "alien" to US troops than the Pacific or European theaters during WWII...


Actually the CHina controlled much of Communist forces. But it was happend AFTER the USA has been involved itno the conflict.

Actually, bot the Chinese and the Soviets approved Sung's invasion and offered active assistance...


And the both sides provided and supplies with wearpon of the Koreans in during pre-war period.

No heavy weapons were supplied to the South. Perhaps a few 105mm pieces. But that was it. They used armored cars and old Japanese tanks against the T-34s..


HArdly the 150 of N Koreans tank was a "Huge adventage" Nick:) For the thearthe where almost 500 000 of mans fought.
In the WW2 this "Huge adventage" would be called only couple of battalions..
Besides as you sayed the USA supplies the S Koreans with modern artillery

Rather silly statement, that's like saying that the German panzers invading the Soviet Union were no advantage since the Red Army had far more armor.

It was a surprise attack that quickly took Seoul and threw the ROK forces in complete disarray...


Soviet crap,:)
Mate i never heard about Firebombing of Korea till when i've come at our forum:)
And learn it from the related thread "Firebombing of Korea" , you can check it.
BTW i've learned here that in many aspects the Korean firebombng was even more cruel than the German one..

Firebombing "even more cruel?"
And I think you started the thread on Korean air attacks...


Koreans..started that all:)
But the USA transformed it into the International War, with the mass aplication of modern wearpon and alien forces.
They just rised the level of cruelty and violence in several times.And made war far longer and bloody.
Becouse of paranoic "fear of communism"..

And have saved millions of South Koreans from starvation and a shit life under the largest pimple on the ******* portion of humanity...

Are you serious with this?

Really? It was some how immoral to save South Korea? Do you actually read anything besides Putin's cliff notes of the world?


Nowhere.
But you my friend ALSO was not going to worry about the source of you figure "99,9%" in your previous post?
Why i should.

So perhaps you should base your opinions on actual information and not hyperbole?


Really?
You think that the 1.5 mln of Korean civils, killed during the 3 years is rather differe the 2 mln of Vietnamises , killed during the 8 years?
And is the French involvements is differ of "UNN forces" that fought in Korea?
I think on the contrary- there were TOO many common moment in both those wars.
The sides of supportes of Communist- also was CHina/USSR.

So, why is the US solely responsible for the death tolls?


What a 'sovereign nation" do you mean?
The S Korea is just a Korea.

LOL But Finland was just a rebel Soviet province, right flaming hypocrite? :lol:

Chevan, are you drunk, or just a blind fool that ignores all the flaming he's conducted defending Stalinist aggression and massacres in Finland, Germany, or Poland...

I guess only the fearless generalissimo Stalin had the right to decide when his country went to war or who should die when... :rolleyes:


This is true.
This war also was allien for CHineses and especially for Soviets.
I've read a memours of Ivan Kojedub who prepeared the Soviet pilots in Korea.
He wrote that -
"there were absolutly no any other sense in soviet participation in war, except to rise our professionalism in dogfight.
Today they bombs the Phenjian- tomorrow , probably Vladivostok and Moscow.
We need to learn how to intercept the strategic bombers"
So you see
We rise skill level, while local population died.
So this was rather alien war for all of us.
But it was adirect resault of American intervention of 1950.

Well, congratulations to both Soviet and PRC efforts to "liberate" North Korea, only 300,000-500,000 North Koreans died per year of a 90s famine because of their gov'ts wanton brutality, callous indifference, and incompetence. Well done!


...
In the 1990s North Korea faced significant economic disruptions, including a series of natural disasters, economic mismanagement, serious fertilizer shortages, and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. These resulted in a shortfall of staple grain output of more than 1 million tons from what the country needs to meet internationally-accepted minimum dietary requirements.[47] The North Korean famine known as "Arduous March" resulted in the deaths of between 300,000 and 800,000 North Koreans per year during the three year famine, peaking in 1997, with 2.0 million total being "the highest possible estimate."[48] The deaths were most likely caused by famine-related illnesses such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, and diarrhea rather than starvation.[48]...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea

Nickdfresh
06-03-2008, 10:15 PM
Oh, and the "democides":


# North Korea (1948 et seq.) [make link]

* Communist regime:
o Rummel estimates that the Communist regime of North Korea committed 1,663,000 democides between 1948 and 1987
+ North Korean victims: 1,293,000
+ South Korean victims: 363,000
o Courtois, Stephane, Le Livre Noir du Communism: 2,000,000
+ In Party purges: 100,000
+ In concentration camps: 1.5M
o 23 June 2003 US News & WR: 400,000 died in gulags in past 3 decades.
o The Center for the Advancement of North Korean Human Rights estimates that some 400,000 prisoners have died in labor camps since 1972. [http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/oldnkhuman/eng/nk/nknews12_01.html]
o Famine, 1995-98
+ 13 March 1999, Agence France Presse: (citing N. Korean defector) 3,500,000 deaths as of 12/98
+ 19 Oct. 2000 Guardian: 3M
+ MSF: 3.5M [http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/other/deadly_2001.shtml]
+ 19 Oct. 2003 NY Times: 2M died in preventable famine.
+ 10 May 1999, AP:
# The North Korean govt. estimates 220,000 famine-related deaths, 1995-98
# US Congressional delegation: 2M
# South Korean intelligence estimates that the population of North Korea fell from 25M to 22M.

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm

Chevan
06-04-2008, 02:44 AM
Where were they going to fly from? Japan?

Secondly, I think I said that tactical air forces were invaluable to the UN, but several weeks after the war started.

Why from Japane?
Were the airfields not avialable in S Korea?
And how much time needs to move and deploy the fighters regiment from Japane to Korea?
Several weeks?Hardly.
In the ww2 this period was several days usially.


I don't know, were Finns, Poles, and Hungarians going to invade Soviet Russia?

You don't know:)?
So just look at related threads how the they were going to invide the russia in diffeent times of history:)
BTW what to hell this has dto Korea/Asia/Cold war?


Um, like which valuable resources? Were they like the valuable resources in Eastern Europe?

Id didn't even hear that STalin considered the Korean war from this point.
Did you?


And the famine and backwardness has increased in the North.

BTW, which state would you rather live in again?

I prefer to live in USA to meet you and say everything what i think about :)
But no more then for one week.


I'd be inclined to agree if North Korea wasn't run by one of the worlds biggest flaming assholes and a complete shit-hole of famine, suffering...

Yes they were as much assholes as Chinas commies:)
But you prefered to deels with CHinas , right?Instead to attack them:)
So hardly they are so much assholes if even USA today trades with them


How many South Koreans haven't starved to death?

Is it a legitime reason to kill additionaly couple of millions of Koreans?


Um, we really aren't talking about Vietnam whose leadership was far more dynamic and outward looking...

And why they were more outward looking?
May be becouse the USA did not support the hard embargo agains them?And prefere to trade , neitralizing the Chinas/Soviet influence toward the Vietnam?


Then they're really just fascists with a mixed economy...

Oh the Chanis are already fascists?
What then?


The United States, as well as many Euro nations and even the invadee, the ROK, send fuel oil and foodstuffs to the North to prevent all out starvation!

Ha ..
They initially started the full blockade during decades, then send then a few oil and foodstuffs:) as a gift.
Nice method..


So what if it was "civil?" It was an invasion from the North and the US was obligated to help by treaty...

There were no treaty , you know it.
If treaty ever was, the USSR would do the same and the soviet troops have been invvolved officially into the conflict.
But this was the inner Korean war on sense.


The war wasn't "alien" after a time. No more "alien" to US troops than the Pacific or European theaters during WWII...

The ww2 was an international agression , you know it.The entire world has been involved.
The USA didn't declared war on Germany neither when Hitler started the ethnical clearisings nor EVEN when the he captured the entire Austria and Chehooslovakia, right?
So where come from such touching wonderful care about Koreans?


Actually, bot the Chinese and the Soviets approved Sung's invasion and offered active assistance...

Approved , is't the supported or be involved.
The WIKI articke proves it.
This is historical FACT, that till American intervention - neither China not USSR have nbeen involved into conflict.


No heavy weapons were supplied to the South. Perhaps a few 105mm pieces. But that was it. They used armored cars and old Japanese tanks against the T-34s..

And what did bother you to send them a bit more 105mm peices?Stalin forbid?


Rather silly statement, that's like saying that the German panzers invading the Soviet Union were no advantage since the Red Army had far more armor.

Silly?
Hardly the GErmans had no advantage , keep in mind the fact that only no more 5% of the Soviet tank was newest T-34 and KV-1/2.
Besides the one importaint advantage was a Germans staff professionalism( best of the world in that time) in management of army that previously captured the entire Europe for dozen months.


It was a surprise attack that quickly took Seoul and threw the ROK forces in complete disarray...

I doubt it was JUST surprise, th N/ Koreans army was STRONGER obviously.


Firebombing "even more cruel?"
And I think you started the thread on Korean air attacks...

Thats' true:)
But i started to learn about it just in this thread.Finding the western sources.


And have saved millions of South Koreans from starvation and a shit life under the largest pimple on the ******* portion of humanity...

This is a disputable matter who have you saved..
The S. Koreans pro-americans dictators and rotten elite.But the fact is- the millions of OTHERS have not survived the "Saving compain".


Are you serious with this?
Really? It was some how immoral to save South Korea? Do you actually read anything besides Putin's cliff notes of the world?

Nick, i never use the best frined of G. Bush - Putin in my sources, yo know it.
And i never watch the Russian pro-putins TV:)


So perhaps you should base your opinions on actual information and not hyperbole?

But you are even not goint to confirm your figures about 99,9% , right?
You use the hyperbole all time.And all is OK?


So, why is the US solely responsible for the death tolls?

I never told the only USA responsible for all victims.
The USSR and CHinas also pretty added in it.
But it was USA who started the interntional long war.
And the Korean civil has become FAR longer and bloody


LOL But Finland was just a rebel Soviet province, right flaming hypocrite? :lol:
Chevan, are you drunk, or just a blind fool that ignores all the flaming he's conducted defending Stalinist aggression and massacres in Finland, Germany, or Poland...

Nickdfreash are you TOO pissed or drunk yourself, saying that the critic of USA policy is the "defending of Stalinism"?
That's enough the beer for today. I know you like it periodically.
I was drunk only ONCE ( when i started the thread about " Germans girls in uniform":D:D:D)
The Rising Sun still remind me about it:)
I try not to drink more in forum after that...


I guess only the fearless generalissimo Stalin had the right to decide when his country went to war or who should die when... :rolleyes:

You will laught, but even "fearless generalissimo Stalin" with his crazy friend Mao Zedong, have not decided to join the Korean civil war openly from the begin.


Well, congratulations to both Soviet and PRC efforts to "liberate" North Korea, only 300,000-500,000 North Koreans died per year of a 90s famine because of their gov'ts wanton brutality, callous indifference, and incompetence. Well done!

And continie to die every day....
But hardly the Soviets who aslo till the 1991 helped the Korea with food and fuel, have deel with their troubles.
the cruel economical blokade , embargo and constant political pressure outside plus anti-Koreans hysteria in mass media , put this country into the famine.
The any attempts of both sides to joine the country picefully since the 1990 has been interrupted by the USA.
May be this is time to change the tactic toward N.Korea?
Or we will wait when they die.
You see Nick, when the after the Chinas have suffered with their callous indifference, and incompetence (this actually was in the 1950-60) . they after all have been forced to think how to live further.
And they learn the lessons enough good, today they even pass the USA in economical rise.
The same with Vietnam.
SO hardly the Koreans much more stoopid then their Chinases comrides.
Finally they would have to liberalize thier society soon or further.

pdf27
06-04-2008, 03:02 AM
Why from Japane?
Were the airfields not avialable in S Korea?
And how much time needs to move and deploy the fighters regiment from Japane to Korea?
Several weeks?Hardly.
IIRC there was one around Seoul, but that was about it. The US effectively had no interest at all in South Korea until the North Koreans actually invaded - it was a backwater they were only running because it had been under Japanese occupation for 50 years or so at this point and so had no competent government they could immediately hand it over to, and was partitioned in a similar manner to Germany and Austria into occupation zones at the end of the war to accept the Japanese surrender.
Prior to the DPRK invasion, the US had no interest in the place and so no reason to build anything more than maybe a couple of airports to support the small garrison.

Nickdfresh
06-05-2008, 09:44 AM
Why from Japane?
Were the airfields not avialable in S Korea?
And how much time needs to move and deploy the fighters regiment from Japane to Korea?
Several weeks?Hardly.
In the ww2 this period was several days usially.

You don't know:)?
So just look at related threads how the they were going to invide the russia in diffeent times of history:)
BTW what to hell this has dto Korea/Asia/Cold war?

Id didn't even hear that STalin considered the Korean war from this point.
Did you?

There was minimal US military presence in the area at the time of the invasion. And the war came as nearly complete surprise. So, how many available aircraft: carrier based, Japan-based, or in theater do you think there were?

It took months, but yes, UN air superiority eventually helped stop the momentum of the North Korean advance.

And my only point is that you are well known on this board for arguing for, rationalizing, and apologizing for Soviet aggression yet put US/NATO acts of war under a hypercritical lens.

It just sort of makes you look like a bit of a raving, nationalist hypocrite...


I prefer to live in USA to meet you and say everything what i think about :)
But no more then for one week.

That would be interesting...


Yes they were as much assholes as Chinas commies:)
But you prefered to deels with CHinas , right?Instead to attack them:)
So hardly they are so much assholes if even USA today trades with them

Very different, in both your analogies of communist China and Vietnam to North Korea are deeply flawed for several reasons. Mainly, because Vietnam and China have fought on the battlefield and were never really close other than in a mutually beneficial but temporary alliance against the presence of US troops on the ground in Asia. One that fell apart shortly afterward. And as far as both societies, they practice a pragmatic form of both economic and political engagement with the outside world, and shows that the US will trade and offer mutually beneficial agreements. The case with North Korea is that the gov't practices a wonderful form of "self-reliance," meaning they shut themselves off from the rest of the world in order to maintain absolute control, despite overtures from South Korea and many other nations. Only recently have they even considered market reforms.

So again, you're blaming the US and South Korea for the actions of xenophobic assholes:

http://beconfused.com/images/2007/10/North-Korean-leader-Kim-Jong-Il.jpg
Notice that as his country starves, the little bastard has no problem sipping beer in the sauna.


Is it a legitime reason to kill additionaly couple of millions of Koreans?

Who killed a couple million Koreans? The UN or other Koreans?

Be specific!


And why they were more outward looking?
May be becouse the USA did not support the hard embargo agains them?And prefere to trade , neitralizing the Chinas/Soviet influence toward the Vietnam?

The "hard embargo" is the fault of the North Korean gov't which spurns any engagement with anyone. The "embargo" is largely self-imposed -- "self-reliance!"

If they US is such a horrible nation that embargoes everyone they disagree with, they why would they trade with China and the former bitter enemy Vietnam?


Oh the Chanis are already fascists?
What then?

Ha ..
They initially started the full blockade during decades, then send then a few oil and foodstuffs:) as a gift.
Nice method..

Because they've refused to stop blatant militarism and are for more guilty of rekindling the War with provocative acts and maintain one of the worlds largest armies despite their economic nightmare...

How about blaming the North Korean gov't for their own policies rather than everyone else?


There were no treaty , you know it.
If treaty ever was, the USSR would do the same and the soviet troops have been invvolved officially into the conflict.
But this was the inner Korean war on sense.

Soviet troops were involved when they insisted on creating North Korea and installing what was an ineffective and unpopular guerrilla movement as its head instead of allowing the people to decide their own fate...


The ww2 was an international agression , you know it.The entire world has been involved.
The USA didn't declared war on Germany neither when Hitler started the ethnical clearisings nor EVEN when the he captured the entire Austria and Chehooslovakia, right?
So where come from such touching wonderful care about Koreans?

Two entirely different situations. The US didn't declare war on the Soviet Union when they invaded Poland and Finland either. And the US didn't attack the Soviet Union when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 either!

And South Korea was an ally near another major ally and protectorate that the US had treaty obligations too...


Approved , is't the supported or be involved.
The WIKI articke proves it.
This is historical FACT, that till American intervention - neither China not USSR have nbeen involved into conflict.

They were involved when they armed and trained the North Korean army with offensive weaponry...

And the USSR wasn't involved in Poland nor Finland prior to their aggression there, but I never hear you piss and moan about that.

The US had been in Korea and kept a small garrison of trainers. The US was ALREADY THERE and involved from the beginning!


And what did bother you to send them a bit more 105mm peices?Stalin forbid?

I dunno. Maybe we were more interested in avoiding wars than Stalin was? But supplying the Republic of Korea's (ROK) forces heavier weapons like the M-4A1E8 Shermans and even M-26 Pershings was briefly considered -- but it was decided to build a "constabulary" type army to maintain order, but one incapable of offensive military action.


Silly?
Hardly the GErmans had no advantage , keep in mind the fact that only no more 5% of the Soviet tank was newest T-34 and KV-1/2.
Besides the one importaint advantage was a Germans staff professionalism( best of the world in that time) in management of army that previously captured the entire Europe for dozen months.

I doubt it was JUST surprise, the N/ Koreans army was STRONGER obviously.

So you admit you're wrong! Thank you! :)

And if you read the Wiki article, you'd know it was a complete surprise to everyone not in the DPRK gov't or military...


Thats' true:)
But i started to learn about it just in this thread.Finding the western sources.

This is a disputable matter who have you saved..
The S. Koreans pro-americans dictators and rotten elite.But the fact is- the millions of OTHERS have not survived the "Saving compain".

Jesus Christ Chevan, do us all a favor and read about contemporary North Korea, South Korea, and compare and contrast... :rolleyes:


Nick, i never use the best frined of G. Bush - Putin in my sources, yo know it.
And i never watch the Russian pro-putins TV:)

But you are even not goint to confirm your figures about 99,9% , right?
You use the hyperbole all time.And all is OK?

I don't throw shit out there that I cannot back up with something. Or at least I admit I'm wrong and move on and stop making silly points...


I never told the only USA responsible for all victims.
The USSR and CHinas also pretty added in it.
But it was USA who started the interntional long war.
And the Korean civil has become FAR longer and bloody

But you just said the US (United Nations actually, because they sanctioned the War and the Soviets didn't seem to mind at the time) killed two million Koreans above? Which is it?


Nickdfreash are you TOO pissed or drunk yourself, saying that the critic of USA policy is the "defending of Stalinism"?
That's enough the beer for today. I know you like it periodically.

LOL Are you done pissing and moaning in PMs to me about my one or two drinking references after your dozen or more "beer" comments you've peppered this board with?


You will laught, but even "fearless generalissimo Stalin" with his crazy friend Mao Zedong, have not decided to join the Korean civil war openly from the begin.

They began when they insisted on installing Kim il Sung as the leader of a partitioned North!


And continie to die every day....
But hardly the Soviets who aslo till the 1991 helped the Korea with food and fuel, have deel with their troubles.
the cruel economical blokade , embargo and constant political pressure outside plus anti-Koreans hysteria in mass media , put this country into the famine.
The any attempts of both sides to joine the country picefully since the 1990 has been interrupted by the USA.
May be this is time to change the tactic toward N.Korea?
Or we will wait when they die.
You see Nick, when the after the Chinas have suffered with their callous indifference, and incompetence (this actually was in the 1950-60) . they after all have been forced to think how to live further.
And they learn the lessons enough good, today they even pass the USA in economical rise.
The same with Vietnam.
SO hardly the Koreans much more stoopid then their Chinases comrides.
Finally they would have to liberalize thier society soon or further.

LOL So, it's everybody's fault but Kim Jong Il's, is it?

Funny how no other post-communist states have massive internal famines because the horrible United States blockades them...

How's things at the Ministry of Truth today?

Nickdfresh
06-05-2008, 10:04 AM
I was drunk only ONCE ( when i started the thread about " Germans girls in uniform":D:D:D)
The Rising Sun still remind me about it:)
I try not to drink more in forum after that...

:lol: Yes, you were what we call "beergoggling" in that one!

Chevan
06-06-2008, 09:16 AM
There was minimal US military presence in the area at the time of the invasion. And the war came as nearly complete surprise. So, how many available aircraft: carrier based, Japan-based, or in theater do you think there were?

Well may be couple of handreds?


It took months, but yes, UN air superiority eventually helped stop the momentum of the North Korean advance.

And my only point is that you are well known on this board for arguing for, rationalizing, and apologizing for Soviet aggression yet put US/NATO acts of war under a hypercritical lens.

Did i rationalizing and apologizing the Soviet agression in this thread?or somewhere?
And we don't tell about NATO.


It just sort of makes you look like a bit of a raving, nationalist hypocrite...

well if just a bit:)....
But you also look like a rather nationalist who consider any critic as hypercritical, does not you ?


Very different, in both your analogies of communist China and Vietnam to North Korea are deeply flawed for several reasons. Mainly, because Vietnam and China have fought on the battlefield and were never really close other than in a mutually beneficial but temporary alliance against the presence of US troops on the ground in Asia. One that fell apart shortly afterward.

Absolutly true.
Endeed the three those states N Korea, CHina and Nothern Vietnam was very simular in 1950-60.
They had a simular regimes that have fought on the battlefienld and ..endeed were never close or friendly.
Infact the Chinases even attacked the Vietnam in the 1979 , atheir relation with N Korea wasn't so good also.
The ONLY the Soviet-Vietnam relation was more or less reliable and friendly till the most end of USSR.
Also the SOviets a troubles with both Chinas and N Korea were well know.



And as far as both societies, they practice a pragmatic form of both economic and political engagement with the outside world, and shows that the US will trade and offer mutually beneficial agreements. The case with North Korea is that the gov't practices a wonderful form of "self-reliance," meaning they shut themselves off from the rest of the world in order to maintain absolute control, despite overtures from South Korea and many other nations. Only recently have they even considered market reforms.

But was a wonderfull "self-reliance" unique in History?
Was the blocade of Cuba or Iraq ONLY due their decision "shut themself out of world"?
Come on Nick..


So again, you're blaming the US and South Korea for the actions of xenophobic assholes:

i/m not blaming the US for ALL actions.
But as it was said the USA involvement into the war and American Blocade provoked a lot of ADDITIONAL nasty things for Koreans..


http://beconfused.com/images/2007/10/North-Korean-leader-Kim-Jong-Il.jpg
Notice that as his country starves, the little bastard has no problem sipping beer in the sauna.

Aha ha ha
what a little bas..dr:)


Who killed a couple million Koreans? The UN or other Koreans?

UN and Other Koreans boths:)


The "hard embargo" is the fault of the North Korean gov't which spurns any engagement with anyone. The "embargo" is largely self-imposed -- "self-reliance!"
If they US is such a horrible nation that embargoes everyone they disagree with

Not such horrible as look at the first view:)
But they pretty like to embargoes everyone who disagree... Iraq ,Cuba, now you try to bann Iran's trade.


, they why would they trade with China and the former bitter enemy Vietnam?

Becouse you used a diplomatic and political pressure right according situation, instaed of Blokade and Propogandic Hysteria..
Besides the American succesfully played on contrauctions between the former allies- USSR , China and Vietnam.
You see , this methods worked much better then direct American Intervention into those states.
They simply have to liberalize their social communistic structure.
Instead of N Korea where the constant American blockade pushed into starvation and famine.


Because they've refused to stop blatant militarism and are for more guilty of rekindling the War with provocative acts and maintain one of the worlds largest armies despite their economic nightmare...

Not correct..
China never stopped blatalian militarism.
In the 1970 accurate they even tryed to attack the USSR, and later in 1979 - Vietnam.
But this fact don't bother USA , to begin the trade with Chinas communits, right?
Even when the CHineses almost openly planns to invide the American ally - Taiwan.
So as you can see the "inner militarism" is not a reason to starve the state?


How about blaming the North Korean gov't for their own policies rather than everyone else?

I blame them too...
Those batsards just drunk the beer in sauna and nothing do to improve the situation , except the starting new Missles:)
But something confuse me, why when the China has build its own A-bomb in mid of 1960 - nobody in Western MAss media has not started the Anti-Chinas hysteria?
Why everybody around CAN have as much wearpon as they dream ( Especially the S . Korea,fully armed with new American wearponry ) , but the N Koreans are ONLY agressors in region?
Is it not sort of race prejudices?


Soviet troops were involved when they insisted on creating North Korea and installing what was an ineffective and unpopular guerrilla movement as its head instead of allowing the people to decide their own fate...

Well strongly saying i seriously doubt that hte Puppet S. Korean gov , installed at the same time, was "popular and effective".
Even the wiki tells
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_Korea#In_the_South

Little changed in the administration of the country; officials then serving under the Japanese authorities remained in their positions. The Japanese governor was not dismissed until the middle of September and many Japanese officials stayed in office until 1946. These decisions angered most Koreans since these same Japanese had helped exploit Koreans. Adding to this anger was the American military's choice to give many governmental positions to Koreans who were perceived to have betrayed their country by collaborating with the Japanese rulers
So hardly the former Japane occupants , who certainly know how to starve the Koreans to death, was so POPULAR among the S.Koreans.
Besides the Pocket Dictator Rhee , who most of his life lived in USA, has been moved to the Korea and "elected as president" :)On the Elections where the all left parties was BANNED.
This wasn't evel looks like democracy:)
The ONLY thing in which he was REAL effective - in perseqution of Left-wings parties and peoples.



Two entirely different situations. The US didn't declare war on the Soviet Union when they invaded Poland and Finland either. And the US didn't attack the Soviet Union when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 either!

Abslolutly right.
The USA did not even want to do something when Japs began the slaughtering of China in 1930-yy befor Pirl Harbour.
they just sold the old for Japane ( as wel and for NAzy till the most end of 1941).
The Aerican Isolationists were a perfect democrats- money doesn't smell for them:)
So you see in many aspect the Amerian policy looks simular to Soviet one:)
They also pretty well traded with Germany and Japane. after 1939.

to be continied...

Chevan
06-06-2008, 09:53 AM
They were involved when they armed and trained the North Korean army with offensive weaponry...

But you also trained and armed the S Korea.
The N Koreans was stronger in 1950 - there is no doubt, but hardly it was resault just Soviet and Chinas


And the USSR wasn't involved in Poland nor Finland prior to their aggression there, but I never hear you piss and moan about that.

Yes the USSR wasn't involved .
But Poland was:)
Stealing the great part of Ukrainian lands in 1920.
And Finland...has been involved.


The US had been in Korea and kept a small garrison of trainers. The US was ALREADY THERE and involved from the beginning!

Thiat's what a problem.
The Soviets have leaved the Korea in 1948 while the AMericans were still here.
May be becouse the S Korean regime was still too weak to hold the real power?


I dunno. Maybe we were more interested in avoiding wars than Stalin was?

Just like in Vietnam:)?
You simply avoided the Khrushev war, starting the bombing of country?


But supplying the Republic of Korea's (ROK) forces heavier weapons like the M-4A1E8 Shermans and even M-26 Pershings was briefly considered -- but it was decided to build a "constabulary" type army to maintain order, but one incapable of offensive military action.

Oh the M-26 was really great.
It can crush the several t-34 running


So you admit you're wrong! Thank you! :)

And if you read the Wiki article, you'd know it was a complete surprise to everyone not in the DPRK gov't or military...

You are welcome.
And yes it was rather surprise but not just it.
The N Koreans was really stronger.


Jesus Christ Chevan, do us all a favor and read about contemporary North Korea, South Korea, and compare and contrast... :rolleyes:

Done:)
And Jesus Nick, why communist CHinas more impressive in economical achivenments then the democratic
S Korea?


I don't throw shit out there that I cannot back up with something. Or at least I admit I'm wrong and move on and stop making silly points...

When have you admitted you are wrong?


But you just said the US (United Nations actually, because they sanctioned the War and the Soviets didn't seem to mind at the time) killed two million Koreans above? Which is it?

Actually it was the USA who thransformet this war into international.
And they don't killed all of them- but they increased the violence in times.
To the contrast of Soviets who just very limited participated in the conflict - the UN forces have been pretty involved into the killing of Civils/ they even has been suspected in Military crimes toward civils Korean population.
Chineses also commited a lot of crimes- they have no any mercy to the local population.
Soviets just provided the wearpon and air support.


LOL Are you done pissing and moaning in PMs to me about my one or two drinking references after your dozen or more "beer" comments you've peppered this board with?

no more will PM you. if you such as...


They began when they insisted on installing Kim il Sung as the leader of a partitioned North!

You are forgetting - it was according Potsdam agreements. SO USA pretty involved into the installing Kim il Sung.The Americans installed OWN dictator in South and forbidded the lefts.And nobody argued with them.



LOL So, it's everybody's fault but Kim Jong Il's, is it?

Funny how no other post-communist states have massive internal famines because the horrible United States blockades them...

Well i don't know about other communist states, Well i heared the Cuba was starved due to US embergo) but as i know the Isolation of Iraq since 1991-2003 has brought to nothing except the famine and starvation of local population.


How's things at the Ministry of Truth today?
I prefer the "Diaries of Doctor Hoebbels" in Egorka thread:)
He actually explained the many things

Rising Sun*
06-06-2008, 09:53 AM
I was drunk only ONCE ( when i started the thread about " Germans girls in uniform":D:D:D)
The Rising Sun still remind me about it:)
I try not to drink more in forum after that...

Mate, I thought you were drunk all the time! :D

I thought slamming vodka and the occasional potato or cabbage into the gut was the whole purpose of Russian existence. ;)

I'm starting to worry if some of your posts are sober. ;)

Mine rarely are, unlike Nick's coldly logical expositions. :D

As for the rest of this topic, I know bugger all about it, but you and Nick have been warned that I am watching. ;)

Chevan
06-06-2008, 11:39 AM
Mate, I thought you were drunk all the time! :D

You have catched me mate.
Actually it was not just one time :)
Beeing associated with Nick , ive learn that many things are getting more explainable if befor posting drink some of wine ( i don't like a beer).
Initially it has helped - i almost getting the best Nick's friend.
But soons methods make me to write a foolish things
You remember thas devil thread about "girls in uniform..." What a shame to me
They ALMOST as terrible and ugly as the Nicdfresh notions about life in USSR..;)


I thought slamming vodka and the occasional potato or cabbage into the gut was the whole purpose of Russian existence. ;)

You are very lucky indeed when you have a potaito or cabbage to use with vodka.
Beenig a student usially we have just couple of sigarettes or candies per one bottlle.


I'm starting to worry if some of your posts are sober. ;)

Mine rarely are, unlike Nick's coldly logical expositions. :D

That's true mate.
If even you start to worry about my posts - definitely something wrong with it:)
What do yo advise to me?


As for the rest of this topic, I know bugger all about it, but you and Nick have been warned that I am watching. ;)

Good new..

Ashes
06-06-2008, 11:55 PM
A couple of points......

Could you make the argument that Stalin, in giving Sung the green light to invade South, was the start of the road to the ultimate destruction of the Soviet Empire?

From the book, ''Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms Build-Up''..........

Harry S. Truman,in discussing the impact of the Korean War with a journalist in 1953, said that the communist invasion of South Korea was "the greatest error he [Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin] made in his whole career." Without that invasion, Truman continued, "we'd have done what we did after World War I: completely disarm'' [from 8 million men and 89 divisions in 1945 to 591,000 men and 10 divisions in 1950.]

Truman's reaction to the outbreak of war in Korea was not limited to the defense of the government in Seoul. Within the next two years, the US defense budget tripled in size, and America embarked on a massive conventional- and nuclear-arms build up.

It soon became a frantic arms race between the super powers, which was a major reason for the Soviets eventual demise.

A couple of other blunders are worth mentioning.

First, a mistake by the Americans, as pdf pointed out, the Americans considered Korea a backwater, and that an attack by the North unlikely, and on January 12, 1950, at a National Press Club briefing, Secretary of State Acheson spoke of American interests in the Far East and said nothing about defending South Korea from an attack by North Korea, implying that America might not fight over Korea. Acheson said Korea’s defense would be the responsibility of the United Nations, which wouldn't have gone unnoticed by Sung, who wanted to unify Korea as a communist dictatorship.

Second, a mistake by the Russians, Truman went to the United Nations for sanction. Under U.S. guidance, the UN called for the invasion to halt, then for the UN member states to provide military assistance to the ROK. By charter the Security Council considered and passed the resolutions, which could have been vetoed by a permanent member such as the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, however, were boycotting the Council over the issue of admitting communist China to the UN, so the vote passed.

Chevan
06-07-2008, 02:46 AM
A couple of points......

Could you make the argument that Stalin, in giving Sung the green light to invade South, was the start of the road to the ultimate destruction of the Soviet Empire?

Good question.
Actually as i know Stalin was afraid of possible ww3. Althoutgh the USSR has developed own A-bomb in 1949 in the 1951 the USSR have just no more dozen of bombs. The USA had about hundred at that time. So the total nuclear distruction of USSR was very possible.
The Stalin hold the Sung utnil the most moment when he got the guaranties- the Korean war will not start the WW3.


From the book, ''Beginnings of the Cold War Arms Race: The Truman Administration and the U.S. Arms Build-Up''..........

Harry S. Truman,in discussing the impact of the Korean War with a journalist in 1953, said that the communist invasion of South Korea was "the greatest error he [Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin] made in his whole career." Without that invasion, Truman continued, "we'd have done what we did after World War I: completely disarm'' [from 8 million men and 89 divisions in 1945 to 591,000 men and 10 divisions in 1950.]

Hardly it was a mistake of STalin rather then the owm mistake of Sung, who convinced the STalin that the Southen Koreans strat the anti-american uprising and supported the N Koreans troops.Stalin initially actually believed that the the S Koreans dictatorship as weak as Sung presended for him.So the possible N Korean attack would be endeed soon after the beginning by the total victory of N Koreans in peninsula.
FOR sake of justice- there were actually a disaster of political stability in S Korea til the 1950.
The ignoring of lef-wings parties provoked a mass demonstration and violence
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Military_Government_in_Korea#Ke y_events

The USMGIK tried to contain civil violence by banning strikes on December 8 and outlawing the revolutionary government and the people's committees on December 12. Things spiralled quickly out of control quickly however, with a massive strike on September 23 1946 by 8,000 railway workers in Busan which quickly spread to other cities in the South. On October 1, police attempts to control rioters in Daegu caused the death of three student demonstrators and injuries to many others, sparking a mass counter-attack killing 38 policemen. Over in Yeongcheon, a police station came under attack by a 10,000-strong crowd on October 3, killing over 40 policemen and the county chief. Other attacks killed about 20 landlords and pro-Japanese officials. The US administration responded by declaring martial law, firing into crowds of demonstrators and killing an unknown number of people
So even the American troops have been involving in fight against demonstrants.
Keep in mind also the fact that the Amerian military administration still hold the certain number of former Japanes occupants and their korean colloborationits working in S Korean gov - and you will finally learn - was the "democratic" S Korean gov so much popular in Korea?
SO there wer no even hint of political stability and democracy here.
So from this point of vew - the Korean lack was a mistake of N Korean gov who has not real vision of situation.
However it was also and failure of Stalin, who finally was agreed with Sung.
Don't forget the USSR already almost openly fought with USA in CHina during the Civil war of 1946-49 where communists so succesfully breaked the Gomindants ( supported by the USA).
But after losing in CHina - the USA was ready to fought desperately for Korea to the MOST end.
Stalin , obviously, has not guessed obout it- it was his main mistake in 1951.
He obvioulsy didn't suspect about American strong determination to fight, even till the Direct American intervention.



A couple of other blunders are worth mentioning.

First, a mistake by the Americans, as pdf pointed out, the Americans considered Korea a backwater, and that an attack by the North unlikely, and on January 12, 1950, at a National Press Club briefing, Secretary of State Acheson spoke of American interests in the Far East and said nothing about defending South Korea from an attack by North Korea, implying that America might not fight over Korea. Acheson said Korea’s defense would be the responsibility of the United Nations, which wouldn't have gone unnoticed by Sung, who wanted to unify Korea as a communist dictatorship.

There was more complex situation IMO for USA.
Americans actually didn't expect the attack of N Koreans- they though if the attack would be started - it would the attack of joined Soviet-Korean-chinas forces.And after that they will have the full right to use against "International agressor" all possible means including a-bombs( the USA still have the absolute nuclear advantage in the 1951).And job well done..
So they without any doubts will apply the nuclear wearpon- Stalin clearly understood it.
From the military poin - the USA simply did not need to hold the strong military garrisons in Korea - the A-bomb was vey enough "Argument" to hold the Soviets out of Korea ( as they thought)
But the whole surpise of attack was - that this was pure Korean forces who started the war- so americans have simply no legitime reasons to use their A-trump agains USSR and CHina.
Formally it was pure Inner Korean civil war.
Therefor they was forced to start this procedure of "persecution of agressosr in UN" using the formal UN order as justification of their Intervention in alien Civil war.
The situation was such complex that even when after the Chinases entering on war ( october 1951) when the crazy MacArthur demanded to use a "dozen of a-bomb agains insolent CHina"- the Washington refused it, becouse there were no moral reason to attack the CHina when the Americans themself was widely involved in this bloody war.
Beside the nuclear attack of CHinas would inevitably involve the Soviet troops, who still was hold away of conflict- this is already a REAL WW3.


Second, a mistake by the Russians, Truman went to the United Nations for sanction. Under U.S. guidance, the UN called for the invasion to halt, then for the UN member states to provide military assistance to the ROK. By charter the Security Council considered and passed the resolutions, which could have been vetoed by a permanent member such as the Soviet Union.

The Soviets, however, were boycotting the Council over the issue of admitting communist China to the UN, so the vote passed.

Actullay the whole Korean war was a political failure for Soviets.
The N Korean wasn't able to crush the UN forces and cupture the entire Korean from most beginning .
Besides the USA using the political motivation, joined the Western world around itself. The NATO has been created soon. The fromer agressor Japanese was fully rehabilitated and tied with the USA.
To the contrast the deth of Stalin and soviet final refuse to participate in this dirty war ( 1953) , created the problems among the communist allied forces.
The CHinases and Korens was pissed of on USSR for that.
However from military point - it was rather succes for the USSR.
it was proved the effectivenes of newest soviet wearpon. the Soviet Honchos proved to be very succesfull in interceptions of strategic bomber armades, besides they were more then equal in dogfight with the best American pilots.
The soviet military authoritet has seriously rised after korean war.
Besides the soviet casualties ( few hundreds of specialist and pilots died) were incomparable with Americans ones ( 36 000 only killed)
As well as combat ability of Amerian Army that were rising their effectivenes during the whole conflict.
We we both trained pretty good on this alien civil war, helping in murdering of the local population. :evil:

Ashes
06-08-2008, 03:17 AM
Good question.
Actually as i know Stalin was afraid of possible ww3. Althoutgh the USSR has developed own A-bomb in 1949 in the 1951 the USSR have just no more dozen of bombs. The USA had about hundred at that time. So the total nuclear distruction of USSR was very possible.
The Stalin hold the Sung utnil the most moment when he got the guaranties- the Korean war will not start the WW3.


What guarantees were they?

Stalin seemed in a win win situation at the time, at least as far as the Soviets were concerned.

There was little chance of the Soviets being attacked, as long as the Red Army kept out of it, it was the Soviets surrogates, the Koreans and Chinese who would do the dirty work, so no come back on Stalin, although he was the instigator of the war.




Hardly it was a mistake of STalin rather then the owm mistake of Sung, who convinced the STalin that the Southen Koreans strat the anti-american uprising and supported the N Koreans troops.Stalin initially actually believed that the the S Koreans dictatorship as weak as Sung presended for him.So the possible N Korean attack would be endeed soon after the beginning by the total victory of N Koreans in peninsula.
FOR sake of justice- there were actually a disaster of political stability in S Korea til the 1950.
The ignoring of lef-wings parties provoked a mass demonstration and violence
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Military_Government_in_Korea#Ke y_events

So even the American troops have been involving in fight against demonstrants.
Keep in mind also the fact that the Amerian military administration still hold the certain number of former Japanes occupants and their korean colloborationits working in S Korean gov - and you will finally learn - was the "democratic" S Korean gov so much popular in Korea?
SO there wer no even hint of political stability and democracy here.
So from this point of vew - the Korean lack was a mistake of N Korean gov who has not real vision of situation.


Not sure what you mean ''not real vision of situation.''

As youve posted it, Sung was pretty much on the ball about the instability in the South, and the communists did quickly over run the South, as Wiki says..Within days, South Korean forces, outnumbered, outgunned, and often of dubious loyalty to the Southern regime, were in full retreat or defecting en masse to the North, it was just a desperate last ditch defence at Pusan, and then MacAurthers brilliant stroke at Inchon that saved the day for the U.N.



However it was also and failure of Stalin, who finally was agreed with Sung.
Don't forget the USSR already almost openly fought with USA in CHina during the Civil war of 1946-49 where communists so succesfully breaked the Gomindants ( supported by the USA).
But after losing in CHina - the USA was ready to fought desperately for Korea to the MOST end.
Stalin , obviously, has not guessed obout it- it was his main mistake in 1951.
He obvioulsy didn't suspect about American strong determination to fight, even till the Direct American intervention.


And I'd go along with that.

During WW2, Roosevelt became very chummy with the dictator, more or less agreeing to most of what Stalin wanted, expecting [hoping] that eventually Stalin would let the Eastern countries decide their own fate.

But with Roosevelt's death, Truman took a harder line and listened more to Churchill, who was espousing in the U.S. the ''iron curtain descending across Europe''theme.



The situation was such complex that even when after the Chinases entering on war ( october 1951) when the crazy MacArthur demanded to use a "dozen of a-bomb agains insolent CHina"- the Washington refused it, becouse there were no moral reason to attack the CHina when the Americans themself was widely involved in this bloody war.
Beside the nuclear attack of CHinas would inevitably involve the Soviet troops, who still was hold away of conflict- this is already a REAL WW3.


Not to sure about the use of nukes, from Wiki.....

Historian Bruce Cumings said that the U.S. reached its closest point of using nuclear weapons during the war in April 1951. At the end of March, after the Chinese had moved large amounts of new forces near the Korean border, U.S. bomb loading pits at Kadena air base in Okinawa were made operational, and bombs were assembled there "lacking only the essential nuclear cores." On April 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using atomic weapons against Manchurian bases in the event that large numbers of new Chinese troops entered into the fights or bombing attacks originated from those bases. The same day Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules "to the air force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons" and "the president signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets." Remarking that the signed order was never sent.

In October 1951, U.S. forces performed Operation Hudson Harbor intending to establish the capability to use nuclear weapons. Several B-29s conducted individual simulated bomb runs from Okinawa to North Korea, delivering “dummy” nuclear bombs or heavy conventional bombs; the operation was coordinated from Yokota Air Base in Japan. The battle exercise was intended to test “actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming,” and so on. The results indicated that nuclear bombs would be less effective than anticipated, because “timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare.”


And would the Soviets become involved, as you said... the total nuclear destruction of USSR was very possible.





Actullay the whole Korean war was a political failure for Soviets.
The N Korean wasn't able to crush the UN forces and cupture the entire Korean from most beginning .
Besides the USA using the political motivation, joined the Western world around itself. The NATO has been created soon. The fromer agressor Japanese was fully rehabilitated and tied with the USA.


Yep, from then on as far as the super powers were concerned, it was an arms race between them, and to use surrogates, or to fight only where their was no danger of head to head confrontation like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan [1978-88 version]





However from military point - it was rather succes for the USSR.
it was proved the effectivenes of newest soviet wearpon. the Soviet Honchos proved to be very succesfull in interceptions of strategic bomber armades, besides they were more then equal in dogfight with the best American pilots.
The soviet military authoritet has seriously rised after korean war.
Besides the soviet casualties ( few hundreds of specialist and pilots died) were incomparable with Americans ones ( 36 000 only killed)
As well as combat ability of Amerian Army that were rising their effectivenes during the whole conflict.
We we both trained pretty good on this alien civil war, helping in murdering of the local population. :evil:


So I guess you could say that the Soviets did have a direct involvement in the Korean War.

Plus as you say it led to the Soviet military joining the arms race, which was Initially, with post war generation weapon systems [how many T-series tanks were produced in total] neck and neck, but with the advent of modern [and more expensive] Western technology, the Soviets couldn't go the pace, which eventually leads to the fall of the Soviet Union.

pdf27
06-08-2008, 04:54 AM
Historian Bruce Cumings said that the U.S. reached its closest point of using nuclear weapons during the war in April 1951. At the end of March, after the Chinese had moved large amounts of new forces near the Korean border, U.S. bomb loading pits at Kadena air base in Okinawa were made operational, and bombs were assembled there "lacking only the essential nuclear cores." On April 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using atomic weapons against Manchurian bases in the event that large numbers of new Chinese troops entered into the fights or bombing attacks originated from those bases. The same day Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules "to the air force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons" and "the president signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets." Remarking that the signed order was never sent.
This sounds very fishy indeed to me. The whole reason MacArthur was fired was the advocating of the nuclear bombing of China at a level way above his pay grade (Omar Bradley considered it to be insubordination and was scathing of it in testimony before Congress). The nuclear bombing of China (indeed, any bombing of China) would have got the US in an open war with China, and widened the whole situation out. Truman was specifically trying to keep it to a local "police action" on the Korean Peninsula under a UN cloak, and so to sign nuclear release orders would go against his whole strategy for the war.

Nickdfresh
06-08-2008, 10:11 AM
But you also trained and armed the S Korea.
The N Koreans was stronger in 1950 - there is no doubt, but hardly it was resault just Soviet and Chinas...And yes it was rather surprise but not just it.
The N Koreans was really stronger.

They outnumbered the South Korean forces by 2.5:1 to 3:1 in virtually all areas. I'm certainly not saying that Rhee was blameless; but his army was clearly incapable of a sustained invasion of the North as the DPRK army was the recipient of an influx of much arms and equipment from Soviet Russia...

I think this point has been beaten to death.


...

Thiat's what a problem.
The Soviets have leaved the Korea in 1948 while the AMericans were still here.
May be becouse the S Korean regime was still too weak to hold the real power?

Just like in Vietnam:)?
You simply avoided the Khrushev war, starting the bombing of country?
...Actually it was the USA who thransformet this war into international.
And they don't killed all of them- but they increased the violence in times.
To the contrast of Soviets who just very limited participated in the conflict - the UN forces have been pretty involved into the killing of Civils/ they even has been suspected in Military crimes toward civils Korean population.
Chineses also commited a lot of crimes- they have no any mercy to the local population.
Soviets just provided the wearpon and air support...


You are forgetting - it was according Potsdam agreements. SO USA pretty involved into the installing Kim il Sung.The Americans installed OWN dictator in South and forbidded the lefts.And nobody argued with them.

Actually, there are very clear differences from "Vietnam," namely that the Soviets and the North Korean gov't refused to allow a free and fair election because they both knew that Kim Il-Sung would lose it, probably to Rhee. I think you said you read the (somewhat poorly written but apparently factually correct) Wiki link on the Korean War but have decided to conveniently ignore pertinent information...

This is what sparked the War, the fact that the South was having some sort of elections and the North was unable to overthrow Rhee's strengthening gov't that was easily able to overcome any communist guerrilla insurgents:

In Vietnam, the reverse was the case as it was Eisenhower that canceled elections in order to prevent Ho Chi Minh from being elected.

From the Wiki link: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War)


In South Korea, an anti-trusteeship right wing group known as the Representative Democratic Council emerged, this group came to oppose these U.S. sponsored agreements. Because Koreans had suffered under Japanese colonization for 35 years, most Koreans opposed another period of foreign control. This opposition caused the U.S. to abandon the Soviet supported Moscow Accords.[citation needed] The Americans did not want a communist government in South Korea so they called for elections in all of Korea. Since the population of the South was double that of the North, the Soviets knew that Kim Il-sung would lose the election.[citation needed]

The government that emerged was led by anti-communist U.S.-educated strongman Syngman Rhee, a Korean who had been imprisoned by the Japanese as a young man and later fled to the United States.[30] The Soviets, in turn, approved and furthered the rise of a Communist government in the North. Bolstered by his history as an anti-Japanese fighter, his political skills, and his connections with the Soviet Union, Kim Il-sung rose to become leader of this new government and crushed any opposition to his rule by the summer of 1947.[17] In the south, those who supported Communism were driven into hiding in the hills, where they prepared for a guerrilla war against the American supported government.[17]

By 1949, both the Soviets and Americans had withdrawn all but advisors in Korea.[citation needed]
...
In mid 1949, Kim Il-Sung pressed his case with Joseph Stalin that the time had come for a reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Kim needed Soviet support to successfully execute an offensive far across a rugged, mountainous peninsula. Stalin, however refused support, concerned with the relative lack of preparedness of the North Korean armed forces and with possible U.S. involvement.

Over the next year, the North Korean leadership molded its army into a relatively formidable offensive war machine modeled partly on a Soviet mechanized force but strengthened primarily by an influx of Korean veterans who had served with the Chinese People's Liberation Army since the 1930s.[citation needed] By early 1950 the possibility of reunification through insurgency seemed closed, and Rhee's regime was gaining in strength if not popularity. Kim was left with the sole option of conventional invasion if he wished to unify Korea as a communist dictatorship before the Southern government became strong enough to defend itself.[33] By 1950, the North Korean military was equipped with modern Soviet weaponry, and it enjoyed substantial advantages over the Southern forces in virtually every category of equipment. On January 30, 1950, Stalin, via telegram, informed Kim Il Sung that he was willing to help Kim in his plan to unify Korea. In the discussions with Kim that followed, Stalin suggested that he wanted lead and said that a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons would help. After another visit by Kim to Moscow in March and April 1950, Stalin approved an attack.[30][35] Coincidentally, on March 9, 1950, North Korea had agreed to send to the Soviet Union 9 tons of gold, 40 tons of silver, and 15,000 tons of monazite concentrate as payment for additional Soviet arms, ammunition and military technical equipment.[36]


So I would again ask: Who were the "colonialists" trying to impose their will on the Korean peoples by force of arms and by denying them a free and fair national election?

Nickdfresh
06-08-2008, 02:26 PM
From the link in the second post:


Task Force Smith was the first U.S. Army ground maneuver unit to enter combat in Korea. On June 30, 1950, President Harry S. Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur to commit ground forces under his command to Korea, and MacArthur in turn instructed Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of the Eighth Army, to order the 24th Division there. Early on July 1, the Eighth Army provided for a makeshift infantry battalion of the 24th Division to be flown to Korea in the six C-54 transport aircraft available. The remainder of the division followed by water. The initial force was to make contact with the enemy and fight a delaying action. This was Task Force Smith, "that arrogant display of strength" that MacArthur hoped would fool the North Koreans into thinking a larger force was at hand. Some officers assumed that even this small force would give the North Koreans pause once they realized whom they were fighting.

Task Force Smith was named for Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith, commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, 24th Infantry Division. It comprised 406 officers and men: half of the battalion headquarters company, two understrength rifle companies (B and C), a communications section, a recoilless rifle platoon and two mortar platoons. In addition to its rifles, the task force had two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 4.2-inch mortars, six 2.36-inch "bazooka" rocket launchers and four 60mm mortars. Each man was issued 120 rounds of ammunition and two days' C-rations. Most of the men were 20 years old or less; only one sixth had seen combat.

The men of Task Force Smith left Japan on the morning of July 1. Major General William Dean, 24th Division commander, ordered Smith to block the main road to Pusan as far north as possible.

The men landed at an airfield near Pusan and moved north to Taejon by train, arriving there on the morning of July 2. Smith ordered his men to rest while he and his staff officers drove north to reconnoiter. About three miles north of Osan, Smith found an ideal blocking position, a line of low rolling hills about 300 feet above the level ground. This position also commanded the main railroad line to the east, and afforded a clear view to Suwon, about eight miles north.

On July 4, the task force was joined at Pyongtaek by part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion: half each of headquarters and service batteries, and all of A Battery with six 105mm howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller O. Perry. In the late afternoon of July 4, Smith, Perry and some others made a final reconnaissance of the position that Smith had selected. The combined infantry and artillery moved out of Pyongtaek by truck, arriving at the position about 3:00 a.m. In cold, rainy weather they dug foxholes. The American position extended about a mile on both sides of the Suwon-Osan road. The troops laid telephone lines to four of the howitzers, placed in a concealed position some 2000 meters to the south. One 105mm howitzer was positioned halfway between the battery and the infantry position in order to cover the length of the road and serve as an antitank gun. Volunteers from the artillery made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined the infantry position to the north. The infantry vehicles were located just to the south of their position; the artillerymen had concealed their trucks just north of Osan. The Americans were vulnerable to enemy flanking attacks, lacked the means to stop enemy tanks and were without reserves.

At dawn on the July 5th, Smith ordered his artillery, mortars and machine guns to conduct registration fire. Steady rain precluded air support. Further, because of earlier, disastrous cases of U.N. aircraft hitting friendly ground forces, all air support that day was confined to north of Suwon. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., movement was detected to the north. Within half an hour, a column of eight North Korean T-34 tanks, part of the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, approached across the open plain from Suwon. At 8:00 a.m. the artillery received a request for a fire mission and at 8:16 a.m. the first American ground fire of the Korean War was opened against the tanks, about 2,000 yards in front of the infantry position. The high-explosive (HE) rounds had no effect on the tanks, which had their hatches closed. The battery had only six armor-piercing high-explosive antitank HEAT rounds available (one-third of the total on hand when the 52d was loading at Sasebo, Japan), all of which were given to the single howitzer forward. Antitank mines would have stopped the enemy advance, but there were none in Korea. Smith ordered 75mm recoilless rifle fire withheld until the column of tanks reached the 700-yard range. The recoilless rifle crews scored direct hits, again without apparent effect. The tanks stopped and opened fire with their 85mm main guns and 7.62mm machine guns. Second Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired twenty-two 2.36-inch bazooka rounds at the enemy armor, all from close range, including a number at the more vulnerable rear ends of the T-34s, but there was no apparent damage. The 2.36-inch rounds could not penetrate the armor of the T-34. Smith later said he believed that the rounds had deteriorated with age. The 3.5-inch bazooka round would have been effective, but again, there were none in Korea.

As they approached the lone 105mm gun forward, the two lead tanks were hit and damaged, probably by HEAT rounds. One caught fire and two of its crew members came out of the turret with their hands up; a third came out with a burp gun and fired it against an American machine gun position beside the road, killing an assistant gunner, the first American ground fatality of the Korean War. The third tank through the pass, however, knocked out the forward 105mm howitzer with its cannon fire. The other tanks swept on south past the artillery battery, which fired HE rounds against them. One tank was disabled and ultimately abandoned.

By 10:15 a.m. the last of 33 North Korean tanks had driven through the American position, killing or wounding some 20 Americans by machine gun and shell fire. Most of the vehicles parked immediately behind the infantry position were destroyed. The wire communications link with Battery A had been chewed up by the tanks as they passed. Fortunately there were no accompanying infantrymen; the tankers were unable to locate the artillery battery firing on them and the T-34s rumbled on toward Osan. A lull of about an hour followed. The steady rain continued and the defenders used the time to improve their position. At about 11:00 a.m., three more tanks were sighted advancing from the north. Behind them was a column of trucks, followed by miles of infantry on foot. These were men of the 16th and 18th regiments of the North Korean 4th Division. The column apparently was not in communication with the tanks that had preceded it.

It took about an hour for the head of the column to reach a point about 1,000 yards from the American position, when Smith ordered fire opened. American mortars and machine guns swept the enemy column causing heavy casualties but did not stop the three tanks. These advanced to within 300 yards and raked the ridge with shell and machine gun fire. Smith had no communication with the artillery battery, which he believed had been destroyed.

Smith held his position as long as he dared, but casualties mounted rapidly. His men were down to less than 20 rounds of ammunition each and the enemy threatened to cut off the position. The enemy tanks were to the rear of the American position, and Smith consolidated his force in a circular perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. The enemy was now using mortar and artillery fire. About 4:30 p.m., Smith ordered a withdrawal, remarking, "This is a decision I'll probably regret the rest of my days." The plan was for an orderly leap-frogging withdrawal, with one platoon covering another. Under heavy enemy fire, the poorly-trained American troops abandoned weapons and equipment in sometimes precipitous flight. Not all of them had received word of the withdrawal, and it was at this point that the Americans suffered most of their casualties. When they reached the battery position Smith was surprised to find it intact with only Perry and one other man wounded. The artillerymen disabled the five remaining howitzers by removing their sights and breechblocks. Then all walked to the outskirts of Osan where they recovered most of their trucks that had been hidden earlier. South of Osan the Americans were forced to detour, and some stragglers were picked up. Fortunately there was no enemy pursuit. At Chonan, only 185 men of the task force could be accounted for. Subsequently, C Company commander Captain Richard Dashmer came in with 65 more, bringing the total to 250. More trickled back to American positions during the following week. One survivor even made it from the west coast by sampan, or small, flat-bottomed Chinese boat, to Pusan. In the battle approximately 150 American infantrymen were killed, wounded, or missing. All five officers and ten enlisted men of the forward observer liaison, machine gun and bazooka group were lost. North Korean casualties in the battle before Osan were approximately 42 dead and 85 wounded; four tanks had been destroyed or immobilized. The enemy advance was delayed perhaps seven hours.



con'td

Nickdfresh
06-08-2008, 02:27 PM
The rest.


The North Koreans continued their offensive south against more and more units of the 24th Division. On July 6, they forced an American withdrawal from the next blocking position at Pyongtaek, held by the 34th Regiment. The 21st Regiment imposed another slight delay on the enemy in front of Chochiwon, but both regiments suffered heavily in these actions. However, these and other battles through July 21 did buy some time for the 1st Cavalry and 25th Infantry divisions to be rushed from Japan.

Task Force Smith's action is noteworthy almost entirely because it was the first ground clash between invading North Korean and defending U.S. forces, and one of its soldiers became the first ground battle death of the Korean War. It was hardly a major clash of arms and only momentarily delayed the enemy. The diary of a killed North Korean soldier did note, "Near Osan there was a great battle."

Spencer Tucker

Sources

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the (1961).

Cannon, M.C. "'Task Force Smith': A Study in (Un)Preparedness and (Ir)Responsibility," Military Review (February 1988).

Collins, J. Lawton. War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of the Korean War (1969).

Gugeler, Russell A. Combat Actions in Korea (1954).

Ludvigsen, E.C. "The Failed Bluff of Task Force Smith: An 'Arrogant Display of Strength,' " Army

(February 1992).

http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/tfsmith.shtml

Ashes
06-11-2008, 01:57 AM
This sounds very fishy indeed to me. The whole reason MacArthur was fired was the advocating of the nuclear bombing of China at a level way above his pay grade (Omar Bradley considered it to be insubordination and was scathing of it in testimony before Congress). The nuclear bombing of China (indeed, any bombing of China) would have got the US in an open war with China, and widened the whole situation out. Truman was specifically trying to keep it to a local "police action" on the Korean Peninsula under a UN cloak, and so to sign nuclear release orders would go against his whole strategy for the war.


Except if perhaps things got out of hand.

Haven't read Cumings book, a bit of it here......
http://hnn.us/articles/9245.html

Have you read Max Hastings book and his take on the use of nuclear weapons?

Hastings writes.....

How close did the U.S. come to, in the Winter of 1950, to employing nuclear bombs against China?
Much closer, the answer must be, than the Allies cared to believe at the time.
Americas leading military men from the joint chiefs down, were not disturbed by the prospect of using them.
Had the Chinese proved able to convert the defeat of the UN forces into their destruction, had 8th army been driven headlong for the coastal ports with massive casualties, it is impossible to say with certainty that Truman would have resisted demand for an Atomic demonstration against China.
The pressure upon the politicians from the military leaders of America might well have become irresistible in the face of strategic disaster.

Thankfully it didn't get to that situation, but there's not much doubt that the use of nukes was always a possibility as Truman said at a press conference on 30th Nov. that the U.S. would take whatever steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of nuclear weapons.

Nickdfresh
06-11-2008, 10:39 PM
Except if perhaps things got out of hand.

Haven't read Cumings book, a bit of it here......
http://hnn.us/articles/9245.html

Have you read Max Hastings book and his take on the use of nuclear weapons?

Hastings writes.....

How close did the U.S. come to, in the Winter of 1950, to employing nuclear bombs against China?
Much closer, the answer must be, than the Allies cared to believe at the time.
Americas leading military men from the joint chiefs down, were not disturbed by the prospect of using them.
Had the Chinese proved able to convert the defeat of the UN forces into their destruction, had 8th army been driven headlong for the coastal ports with massive casualties, it is impossible to say with certainty that Truman would have resisted demand for an Atomic demonstration against China.
The pressure upon the politicians from the military leaders of America might well have become irresistible in the face of strategic disaster.

Thankfully it didn't get to that situation, but there's not much doubt that the use of nukes was always a possibility as Truman said at a press conference on 30th Nov. that the U.S. would take whatever steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of nuclear weapons.

I've read Hasting's book, and it is recommended by me.

But that was pure speculation. No actual war plans were proven too exist. Of course the US military would have used nukes to stave off certain defeat. But I think it was realized rather quickly that the Chinese PLA "volunteers" had many limitations and would outrun their very limited logistical capability. Also, how effective would atomic weapons have been against an agrarian dispersed army and nation? Then balance that against how effective Soviet ones would have been against the industrialized and densely populated US mainland..

In fact Hastings also relates that the US Marines could well have held the North Korean port city of Hungnam as a fortified thorn in the Chinese/NK side, but decided to abandon the city rather than risk losing the garrison...

Ashes
06-12-2008, 02:17 AM
I've read Hasting's book, and it is recommended by me.

But that was pure speculation. No actual war plans were proven too exist. Of course the US military would have used nukes to stave off certain defeat. But I think it was realized rather quickly that the Chinese PLA "volunteers" had many limitations and would outrun their very limited logistical capability. Also, how effective would atomic weapons have been against an agrarian dispersed army and nation? Then balance that against how effective Soviet ones would have been against the industrialized and densely populated US mainland..

In fact Hastings also relates that the US Marines could well have held the North Korean port city of Hungnam as a fortified thorn in the Chinese/NK side, but decided to abandon the city rather than risk losing the garrison...

Yep, Hastings work is the best I've read on Korea.

But that scenario Hastings describes, could easily have become reality, and as you say, ''the US military would have used nukes to stave off certain defeat''

And for a period, things were pretty grim.

According to Cumings, on the same day as Trueman said that the U.S. would take whatever steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of nuclear weapons, Air Force General George Stratemeyer sent an order to General Hoyt Vandenberg that the Strategic Air Command should be put on warning, "to be prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East . . . this augmentation should include atomic capabilities."

How useful would they be?

Haven't thought of it to be truthful, but I for one wouldn't like to be on the Communists side if they started going off.:(

Don't think the Russians would have [or could have] done much, by all accounts they had about 25 bombs to the U.S. at least 450.

But you never know do you?

What chance do you think the Sovs had of hitting U.S. cities with the Tu-4 [B-29]

Nickdfresh
06-12-2008, 11:02 PM
Yep, Hastings work is the best I've read on Korea.

But that scenario Hastings describes, could easily have become reality, and as you say, ''the US military would have used nukes to stave off certain defeat''

And for a period, things were pretty grim.

According to Cumings, on the same day as Trueman said that the U.S. would take whatever steps necessary to meet the military situation, including the use of nuclear weapons, Air Force General George Stratemeyer sent an order to General Hoyt Vandenberg that the Strategic Air Command should be put on warning, "to be prepared to dispatch without delay medium bomb groups to the Far East . . . this augmentation should include atomic capabilities."

Well, the problem here is that Cumings is failing to put things in historical context and is guilty of sensationalism. War plans and hypotheticals do not equate to close calls nor definitive planning.

The US military was supremely nuke-happy, which was one of the factors allowing the US Army to fall into complete disarray as far as training and conventional equipment. Of course there was discussion and speculation. But I'd love to see their target list. The "pretty grim" situation wasn't caused by lack of firepower, it was caused by the over-reliance on firepower, and the inability to deal with Chinese tactics that essentially thwarted US artillery and tactical air support by tactically closing with US formations and swarming their flanks. Once the Army learned how to deal with this with old fashioned WWII style infantry training in small unit tactics and defense; the situation improved. Organic firepower was able to defeat superior Chinese numbers, and the tide turned. It should be said that the Marines never really had this problem as they were always very infantry-centric.

I'm not sure what effective role nukes would even have played. It's the classic quandary of high tech, industrialized societies attacking low tech, agrarian societies with weapons meant to destroy other high tech industrialized societies...


How useful would they be?

Haven't thought of it to be truthful, but I for one wouldn't like to be on the Communists side if they started going off.:(

That's a great question. Do we vaporize Peking and kill millions of civilians because Mao is a *****? Or do we attempt to employ tactical nukes to attack the already faulty Chinese logistics that were pretty rotten even without any UN interdiction?

What's the point?

It's like lobbing hand grenades to kill chipmunks!


Don't think the Russians would have [or could have] done much, by all accounts they had about 25 bombs to the U.S. at least 450.

But you never know do you?

Well, they could have given a couple to the Chinese and/or nuked Seoul or even Tokyo...Though I honestly did not know the US advantage was that great, but then again, I doubt the Truman administration did either...


What chance do you think the Sovs had of hitting U.S. cities with the Tu-4 [B-29]

I dunno. But if you consider that the CONUS was defended by piston engined P-51 Mustangs of the US Air National Guard (and not the F-86 Sabres being sent to the front in Korea), then I think their odds improve quite a bit. Certainly enough to think twice.

And even if they can't get at the US, what about hitting European or Asian allies? Is Peking worth Bonn or Paris?

I think the Administration quickly thought twice about the consequences about using nukes. I also think that there was a certain weakness in the discussion of using nuclear weapons because our Army was too soft and under trained to fight in the field...

Better to be able to beat them in an infantry engagement as well as in a nuclear confrontation I think!

Cojimar 1945
06-27-2008, 12:17 AM
I can understand the US not initially doing spectacularly in the Korean war but the conflict dragged on for several years and following initial setbacks the U.S. not only did not proceed to win impressively, it did not win at all. How do people explain the failure to achieve decisive victory in 1951-53?

Nickdfresh
06-27-2008, 07:51 AM
I can understand the US not initially doing spectacularly in the Korean war but the conflict dragged on for several years and following initial setbacks the U.S. not only did not proceed to win impressively, it did not win at all. How do people explain the failure to achieve decisive victory in 1951-53?


The entire war was one of surprise and momentum. There was no plan, just reaction to crisis. Nobody really knew what to do, and I think you're failing to appreciate the scale to which the US Army slipped only five years after WWII ended.

In fact, the original mission of preventing South Korea from being controlled from Pyongyang was achieved. Also, US and NATO conventional forces were rebuilt into viable armies and the Chinese suffered heavy losses. Ultimately, there was a deterrent effect...

Chevan
06-27-2008, 08:02 AM
At dawn on the July 5th, Smith ordered his artillery, mortars and machine guns to conduct registration fire. Steady rain precluded air support. Further, because of earlier, disastrous cases of U.N. aircraft hitting friendly ground forces, all air support that day was confined to north of Suwon. Shortly after 7:00 a.m., movement was detected to the north. Within half an hour, a column of eight North Korean T-34 tanks, part of the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division, approached across the open plain from Suwon. At 8:00 a.m. the artillery received a request for a fire mission and at 8:16 a.m. the first American ground fire of the Korean War was opened against the tanks, about 2,000 yards in front of the infantry position. The high-explosive (HE) rounds had no effect on the tanks, which had their hatches closed. The battery had only six armor-piercing high-explosive antitank HEAT rounds available (one-third of the total on hand when the 52d was loading at Sasebo, Japan), all of which were given to the single howitzer forward. Antitank mines would have stopped the enemy advance, but there were none in Korea. Smith ordered 75mm recoilless rifle fire withheld until the column of tanks reached the 700-yard range. The recoilless rifle crews scored direct hits, again without apparent effect. The tanks stopped and opened fire with their 85mm main guns and 7.62mm machine guns. Second Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired twenty-two 2.36-inch bazooka rounds at the enemy armor, all from close range, including a number at the more vulnerable rear ends of the T-34s, but there was no apparent damage. The 2.36-inch rounds could not penetrate the armor of the T-34. Smith later said he believed that the rounds had deteriorated with age. The 3.5-inch bazooka round would have been effective, but again, there were none in Korea.

Ha ha ha.This is very interesting story, thank you.
The helpless jankees nothing can do with T-34 with their 2.36 bazooka:)
As i nowte americans started to produse the bazookas in 1943 to fight against Germans Panzers. But if this shit was incapable to destroy even t-34-85, how can they hope to hit the TIger with it?

Chevan
06-27-2008, 08:11 AM
Well, they could have given a couple to the Chinese and/or nuked Seoul or even Tokyo...Though I honestly did not know the US advantage was that great, but then again, I doubt the Truman administration did either...

Hardly they the SAF would nike the ONLY the Tokio or Seoul , in case if Americans will start the WW3 by a-bombing the CHina.The more likely scenario on this terrible way - is to hit the AMerican allies in Europe including the Britain and of course the USA biggest cities. The Soviets had enought abilities to drop at least half of avialable bombs at the targets in USA and Europe.

Chevan
06-27-2008, 08:34 AM
What guarantees were they?

Stalin seemed in a win win situation at the time, at least as far as the Soviets were concerned.

There was little chance of the Soviets being attacked, as long as the Red Army kept out of it, it was the Soviets surrogates, the Koreans and Chinese who would do the dirty work, so no come back on Stalin, although he was the instigator of the war.

The chance of attack of USSR were very possible , keep in mind that officially the Chian was the ally of USSR. But the USSR was still weak to wage the war agains USA&company. Pure the economical abilities were weak.


Not sure what you mean ''not real vision of situation.''

The Sung made the rough mistake when he was sure that the S .Koreans "workers" would support the N/Koreans troops right after the N Koreans enter the country.
He obviously was,'t aware of real political situation.



During WW2, Roosevelt became very chummy with the dictator, more or less agreeing to most of what Stalin wanted, expecting [hoping] that eventually Stalin would let the Eastern countries decide their own fate.

But with Roosevelt's death, Truman took a harder line and listened more to Churchill, who was espousing in the U.S. the ''iron curtain descending across Europe''theme.

Actually Rooswelt know how to search understanding with Stalin.
But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.


Not to sure about the use of nukes, from Wiki.....

Historian Bruce Cumings said that the U.S. reached its closest point of using nuclear weapons during the war in April 1951. At the end of March, after the Chinese had moved large amounts of new forces near the Korean border, U.S. bomb loading pits at Kadena air base in Okinawa were made operational, and bombs were assembled there "lacking only the essential nuclear cores." On April 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using atomic weapons against Manchurian bases in the event that large numbers of new Chinese troops entered into the fights or bombing attacks originated from those bases. The same day Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules "to the air force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons" and "the president signed an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets." Remarking that the signed order was never sent.

In October 1951, U.S. forces performed Operation Hudson Harbor intending to establish the capability to use nuclear weapons. Several B-29s conducted individual simulated bomb runs from Okinawa to North Korea, delivering “dummy” nuclear bombs or heavy conventional bombs; the operation was coordinated from Yokota Air Base in Japan. The battle exercise was intended to test “actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, ground control of bomb aiming,” and so on. The results indicated that nuclear bombs would be less effective than anticipated, because “timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare.”

And would the Soviets become involved, as you said... the total nuclear destruction of USSR was very possible.
But the resault wasn't so ineffective agains the Soviet and N/Koreans cities( i mena if the ww3 would have been started). SO finally the USSR ability to wage the war could be damaged by a-bombing.
BTW this is interesting information for me.



Yep, from then on as far as the super powers were concerned, it was an arms race between them, and to use surrogates, or to fight only where their was no danger of head to head confrontation like Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan [1978-88 version]


yes , as i sayd , we trained each other by killing the lockal population. The Korea was the first international "test field" created by USA during the cold war.

pdf27
06-27-2008, 08:42 AM
But if this shit was incapable to destroy even t-34-85, how can they hope to hit the TIger with it?
The answer is that it was useless against the later German tanks, and marginally capable against the Panzer IV. They did later develop the 3.5" Bazooka to give the infantry a chance against the Tiger/Panther, but for some mad reason none of these made it to Korea in time for use with Task Force Smith.


But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.
Roosevelt was more interested in getting Stalin's help in breaking up the British Empire than he was in resisting Stalin taking over Eastern Europe...

Rising Sun*
06-28-2008, 09:10 AM
Roosevelt was more interested in getting Stalin's help in breaking up the British Empire than he was in resisting Stalin taking over Eastern Europe...

I haven't encountered that view before.

Could you expand on it?

the_librarian
06-28-2008, 03:18 PM
Here's a background link with more information, mostly political as well as being "airpower" oriented. Nevertheless, might add to the general knowledge:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Nov2000/1100korea.asp

Ashes
06-28-2008, 10:48 PM
The chance of attack of USSR were very possible , keep in mind that officially the Chian was the ally of USSR. But the USSR was still weak to wage the war agains USA&company. Pure the economical abilities were weak.


Think there was little chance of the Soviets being attacked, as long as the Red Army kept out of it, and I don't think Stalin was crazy enough to do that, as you say the USSR was still weak to wage the war.

U.S. was in a shooting war with the Chinese and despite MacArthur urging the use of Nuclear weapons, Truman refused, although emergency plans were put in place, and if things became critical for the U.N. forces, there was a chance of them being used in Korea.




The Sung made the rough mistake when he was sure that the S .Koreans "workers" would support the N/Koreans troops right after the N Koreans enter the country.
He obviously was,'t aware of real political situation.

What do you think was the real political situation?



Actually Rooswelt know how to search understanding with Stalin.
But Rooswelt never seriously think that STalin would let the Eastern Europe to be independent, as well the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.


Agreement signed by the big three at Yalta......

The Big Three agreed that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries [the Polish government-in-exile were excluded by Stalin] and that all civilians would be repatriated. Democracies would be established and all countries would hold free elections and European order restored per this statement.......

“ The establishment of order in Europe, and the rebuilding of national economic life, must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. ”

Roosevelt seemed to think that with Germany nuited and occupied, and no danger to Russia, that Stalin would keep to the signed agreement.

Not sure what you mean by ''the USA/UK never let to be really independet the states of Southern-Eastern Asia like Birma.''







But the resault wasn't so ineffective agains the Soviet and N/Koreans cities( i mena if the ww3 would have been started). SO finally the USSR ability to wage the war could be damaged by a-bombing.
BTW this is interesting information for me.


The last thing the U.S. [or anyone else] wanted was world war3.



yes , as i sayd , we trained each other by killing the lockal population. The Korea was the first international "test field" created by USA during the cold war.

The difference in Korea was that the U.S. kept Rhee on a leash, while Stalin gave Sung the both the ability, and the green light to attack South.

Which brings us back to my first post on this thread, did that green light set in motion the eventual downfall of the Soviet empire, or was the Soviet system so flawed that it's end was inevitable?