Biggest mistakes.

[Ashes]

Anyone care to have a stab at what were Britain's biggest mistakes in the following.....

Battlefield (specific battles, campaigns or operations)
Non-Battlefield (i.e. production decisions, etc.)
Political (alliances, promotions, demotions, etc.)

[Churchill]

I think the one to bribe Hitler's gardener to put estrogen in/on Hitler's food was an... interesting, if not loony idea.

[Rising Sun*]

Anyone care to have a stab at what were Britain's biggest mistakes in the following.....

Battlefield (specific battles, campaigns or operations)
Non-Battlefield (i.e. production decisions, etc.)
Political (alliances, promotions, demotions, etc.)

1. Greece. Idiotic and pointless commitment of troops for political reasons to shore up political support from the obviously doomed Greeks, who didn't matter strategically or tactically. Drew troops and naval forces and LOC away from North Africa to no purpose. Idiocy and pointlessness and drain on resources then re-confirmed in Crete.

2. Hamstringing Percival in Malaya by requiring him to await an established Japanese attack rather than allowing him to advance into Thailand to deny the Japanese targets to Japan, to achieve the political aim of making Britain look to America like the victim of Japanese aggression.

In both cases Churchill deprived his forces of the air forces his commanders advised and knew were necessary for success, because as a politician he subordinated military to political considerations and to his own curious strategic visions, as he did in WWI with similarly disastrous results in trying to capture the Dardanelles.

[Rising Sun*]

I think the one to bribe Hitler's gardener to put estrogen in/on Hitler's food was an... interesting, if not loony idea.

Beer is very high in estrogens.

I'd volunteer to be killed that way. :D

[Nickdfresh]

I would add the pursuance of the "Mediterranean Strategy" long after the War in Italy outlived its usefulness and became a place where Allied forces were bogged down. The hopes of Churchill and Brooke of pushing into Austria through the "soft underbelly" and through the Alps was characteristic of Churchill's sometimes suspect military judgement and made absolutely no military sense beyond a debatable point after Sicily was taken. Although he was a wartime political leader second to none, certain flaws like Gallipoli taint him, I think the fact that Marshal Brooke had a good deal of influence over him as well as his trust, along with the fact that Ike just learned to say "no!" after a certain point to Churchill may have saved the Allies from bigger blunders.

[larryparamedic]

Beer is very high in estrogens.

I'd volunteer to be killed that way. :D


Don't know where you're buying your beer from, but I'd look elsewhere.

http://dapatchy.com/chuckles/estrogen.html

[Churchill]

Hahaha, that's a good one...

[Rising Sun*]

Don't know where you're buying your beer from, but I'd look elsewhere.

http://dapatchy.com/chuckles/estrogen.html

:mrgreen:

That's just what I need.

It might get me onto the same level as my wife and daughter. Then I might be able to understand how their brains work.

At the worst, at least it won't be me that always has to apologise, even when I'm not the one who should be apologising. :)

[Rising Sun*]

Anyone care to have a stab at what were Britain's biggest mistakes in the following.....

Battlefield (specific battles, campaigns or operations)
Non-Battlefield (i.e. production decisions, etc.)
Political (alliances, promotions, demotions, etc.)

Another one was Churchill arrogantly diverting the 6th & 7th AIF Divisions to Burma on their way back to Australia, in another of his strategic misconceptions flowing from an inability to balance the total military situation against his narrow political and imperial concerns.

The gravity of the situation caused the Australian Government, led by Prime Minister John Curtin, to decide in February 1942 to recall Australia's AIF 6th and 7th Divisions from the Middle East to defend their own country. This decision was forced on Curtin by a realisation that Britain was more concerned to defend India against the Japanese rather than Australia, and that little material assistance in Australia's defence could be expected from Britain. While the troops of the AIF 6th and 7th Divisions were on route to Australia, with most of their fighting equipment following them aboard slow-moving merchant ships, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, tried to divert them to Rangoon for use against the Japanese invaders of Burma.

However, Curtin stood firm, insisting that the battle-toughened AIF troops were vital to the defence of their own country. At this time Australia was being defended by 250,000 hastily recruited militia troops. Although mostly led by capable AIF officers and NCOs, the raw militia troops were poorly armed and inadequately trained to meet battle-toughened Japanese troops on equal terms. Had Curtin not resisted Churchill, it is likely that Australia's two AIF Divisions would have been swallowed up in the Burma disaster. As for Australia, without its AIF 7th Division, Port Moresby would almost certainly have fallen to the Japanese in September 1942. With Port Moresby in Japanese hands, Japanese bombers would have been able to strike deeply into the Australian mainland and Australia would have been exposed to a very substantial risk of Japanese invasion. http://www.users.bigpond.com/battleforAustralia/battaust/JapaninvadesNewGuinea.html

[Rising Sun*]

As a general observation, Churchill when dealing with military strategy had a gift for creating the circumstances for military failure and, not content with that, then committing the cardinal military sin of reinforcing failure. For all the reasons outlined so far in this thread, and more.

Then again, he wasn't any worse than Hitler or Stalin in their own ways, all of whom were a long way behind Mussolini's brilliant ability to get into losing campaigns.

But Churchill was probably much worse than Roosevelt, who determined grand strategy and pretty much left it to his military commanders to achieve the military aspects of it.

[Nickdfresh]

Yeah, FDR did give his commanders a much freer hand. The fact that he had little personal military experience and none in uniform may have actually been a bit of an advantage over the Austrian & Italian Corporals, the Admiral, and the Marshal...

Though I believe that Roosevelt was an assistant secretary of the Navy to bolster his political career in lieu of actual uniformed service...In some ways, FDR was perhaps even a little wiser than his generals early on --rejecting the early plans for the invasion of France in 1942 and siding with the British commanders...

[Rising Sun*]

In some ways, FDR was perhaps even a little wiser than his generals early on --rejecting the early plans for the invasion of France in 1942 and siding with the British commanders...

Even allowing for hindsight, an invasion of France in 1942 would have been the biggest mistake of WWII. As Dieppe and Torch proved in 1942, for the Allies lacked everything necessary for a successful invasion of France, whether cross Channel or, less likely, cross Mediterranean.

[Rising Sun*]

Yeah, FDR did give his commanders a much freer hand. The fact that he had little personal military experience and none in uniform may have actually been a bit of an advantage over the Austrian & Italian Corporals, the Admiral, and the Marshal...

John Curtin, our wartime Prime Minister during the period it mattered, after December 1941, was similarly devoid of military experience and similarly disposed to set grand strategy and then leave it to his military commanders to achieve.

Mac was his main military commander, although not directly under Curtin's control. Nonetheless, they got on quite well and produced sound results in the critical year of 1942 but less so as the war progressed and Mac pursued his own and American aims. http://john.curtin.edu.au/macarthur/assessment1.html

Curtin was actually in the anti-war camp in WWI and never served in the military, but he didn't lack the courage of his convictions. http://john.curtin.edu.au/resources/biography/details.html

[Ashes]

The Times conducted a pole, asking ''What were the 10 greatest mistakes in British history''

The top of the list was ''Appeasing Hitler''

[snebold]

I´ll vote for the Greek adventure, the Greeks did even want that help (famously they´d rather have the boots of the Britsih soldiers, than British soldiers), and just when the British was kicking Italian butt in Africa.

FDR did insist on a large production programme of sub hunters too small to hunt subs, but what the h... the US could endure to produce stuff it didn´t need, alongside stuff it did need.

(Churchill: tell me more about the gardener plan (even though it can´t be called a major war deciding mistake-?)

[Churchill]

I read it in a book about stupid people. If I can find it I'll post more about it.

Edit: Ok, here's the story:

"The plot to kill Hitler's mustache

US intelligence operatives tried to win WW2 with hormones. In the midst of the war, the OSS comissioned a wild ranging study of Hitler's health and habits. Among other findings, the report suggested that the Fuhrer wasn't as virile as he would have liked the world to believe. In fact, he was "close to the male-female line", Rights Stanly Lovell, wartime director of R&D for the OSS. "A push to the female side might make his mustache fall out and his voice become soprano." There was also a good chance he would grow breasts.

Natually, a smooth-shaven, big-busted Hitler would quickly become a national laughingstock and be driven from power(imagine crowds of smirking Germans saluting each other in the street with a breathy "Heil Hitlette!") To make it happen, the OSS bribed Hitler's personal gardener to inject large quantities of estrogen into carrots headed for the Fuhrer's table.

Inevitably, this absurd "destabilisation program" failed. Lovell speculates that either Hitler's official tasters noticed something funny about the carrots or, more likely, the gardener was a double-crosser who kept the bribe and threw away the hormones."

[snebold]

Difficult to figure why they didn´t try some more potent poison while they were at it.

Returning to British failures; non battlefield type:

It took them the entire war to develop a useful allround tank with sloped armour. That must constitute a failure of some magnitude.

[Ashes]

Biggest mistakes by Britain [and France] was probably the appeasement of Hitler in the lead up to the war.

In January 1936 Hitler decided to reoccupy the Rhineland.

It was a major gamble and although France was the only country that could actually do something about it, virtually no one in Britain raised any opposition to it, most Brits thought it was no more then the Germans taking back what was theirs, The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden actually discouraged military action by the French and was against any financial or economic sanctions against Germany.

Almost the lone voice from Britain to challenge the remilitarization of the Rhineland, was at the time a backbench MP.......Winston Churchill.


Hitler himself later said:

"The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance."


The most devastating blunder by Britain and France, once the war started, would probably be convincing themselves that no major armored attack could come through the Ardennes, although there were many clear signals of Germany's plans, according to E. R. May, a professor of history at Harvard and the author of ''Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France''

If the French and British had anticipated the Ardennes offensive, it is doubtful that they would have been defeated when and as they were. The whole affair, May argues, was a classic case of intelligence surprise.

[Churchill]

Speaking of that... Somehow... Why didn't the Allies(Britain and France) attack Germany in the winter of '39-'40? If they had done that, they probably could have ended the war sooner. No?

[Ashes]

Speaking of that... Somehow... Why didn't the Allies(Britain and France) attack Germany in the winter of '39-'40? If they had done that, they probably could have ended the war sooner. No?

You mean when the Germans attacked Poland?
Yep, that was another case of letting Hitler off the hook, although I doubt the 100 French divs. facing 25 German divs. quoted by the Germans after the war, was as one sided as that.

But it was a real feeble attempt by France in the Saar offensive.

That's what happens when you have massive defensive fortifications, and the mind set that goes along with it.:(

[Chevan]

But it was a real feeble attempt by France in the Saar offensive.

I doubt they even have tryed to do something that looks like an "attempt".

[Churchill]

I heard and read from many English and French sources that both sides did nothing. But what would have happened if the Allies had attacked? The trenches again, but this time inside Germany?

[Chevan]

I think the French attack not later 15 september could finally break out the German offensive in the Poland.
And saved Poland from total defeat.
The war could be more bloody in september but... if Nazis have been stoped by the British-French troops in the 1939- it should prevent a Germans Crusade to the East , millions of lives and ... soviet liberation of Europe.
But this is still a good question... did the Brits and Frenchs really wish to prevent the Eastern expantion of Nazy?
Or may be they wished of it?In aime to turn the Nazy to the East?

[Churchill]

I remember hearing, from some source or another, that "Hitler was better than Stalin any day", or something to that extent.

[Chevan]

This is not surprise fro me that there a lot of people in the West looked at Hitler as for "ideal defender of Europe from Bolshevism". Besides Nazy leaders actively PRed themself in this role.
If you look at Furthers "Main Kampf" , the main idea of it was "GErmans Living Space in the East " ( well except the anti-semitism :) of course)So from the Western prospect - there is nothing illegal:)
He did not write about "victorious war against Britain or France", he just ideologically prepeared the GErmans people for the future war in the East.
The Chemberlian "policy of pacification of Germany" ( Munich 1938) was a great evidence that in the West was not against the Idea of GErman expantion to the East.The later attack of Poland and "Phony war" also proves it a much.

[Cojimar 1945]

The allied inaction does seem very odd given how Britain and France behaved in 1914-1918. Millions of veterans of the Great War would still have been around in 1939/1940 and it seems odd that they would be so passive.

The allied collapse in 1940 also seems bizarre given how fiercely they resisted in 1914.

[snebold]

The Chemberlian "policy of pacification of Germany" ( Munich 1938) was a great evidence that in the West was not against the Idea of GErman expantion to the East.The later attack of Poland and "Phony war" also proves it a much.

Not right. Look down through European history, and the nations will always be very much against power growing strong enough to dominate the continent.

This is why the UK and France became allies, this is why they gave a guarantee to Poland, this is why they went to war against Germany.

German domination of all Eastern Europe would be intolerable to France and very scary for the British. They would NOT have it. This is how WWII came about.

The French did march a few miles into German soil, only to withdraw again soon after.
The British and French were very surprised with how quickly the Germans defeated Poland, didn´t know what to make of the new German-Soviet agreement and didn´t really seem to know how to handle it all.

This was not the kind of war the French had expected, they did not feel ready for a major offensive. They had their massive fortifications that made them feel ready for a defensive stance and the rearmament programme which might ready the armed forces for offensive operations some time in the future.

What did Britain and France plan for 1940??
I do not know, but I´ve been thinking about launching a thread about it for some time.

Perhaps they just felt that time was working for them and the longer it all dragged out the better (remember that the F/UK armaments industry was slowly cacthing up on the German lead, and the two countries had outstanding orders for combat aircraft with US companies for more than a year´s worth of German construction by May 1940).
F/UK thought they knew how the Germans would be coming at them, if the Germans chose to and planned for that.

It´s getting quite off topic, so to return to the "mistake" related:
It was a mistake not to keep an eye on the Ardennes. It was of course a neutral country, but it was a country they thought the Germans would be coming through anyway, just not a that location. (nowadays you´d have special forces camping in the woods...)

As it was, they took the German bait (thinking the Germans attacked in the fashion expected and acting against it as planned, it all fitted so well) and lost.

[Nickdfresh]

I think the idea of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement as a policy that was usurped by Churchill is largely mythical at this point. Churchill himself limited the scope of the War hoping to delay a full-blown conflict until the Allies were ready to deliver a killing blow to Germany. One which would take years to prepare for..

The truth is that the Allies were woefully unprepared to meet Germany in battle during 1939-1940. They did however have many strategic advantages and after isolating Germany, they were planning a grand offensive for sometime in late 1941. But for a variety of reasons, the French Army would be unable to defeat the Germans in a bloody war of attrition since they had exactly half of the German male birthrate (which was their main expectation as their methodical battle doctrine did not account for the potentialities of armored formations by-passing enemy strong points in the doctrines that the German's would later call "schwerpunkt" [or Blitzkrieg] and the Soviets "deep battle."). But the idea the somehow Chamberlain is merely an icon of the weak-minded, spineless giving into aggression is a bit callous and disingenuous methinks. In many ways it was a ruthless (to the Czechoslovakians) but cunning policy that delayed war and allowed the British to prepare. If they had not, then the Battle of Britain may have been fought without enough Hurricanes and NO Spitfires!

The overall Allied strategy in many ways did make sense. France was unable to conduct a major offensive for many reasons and their air forces would be outnumbered in the face of a modern Luftwaffe. And their Army was largely a paper one as they French politicians favored a 'peoples army' approach heavily dependent on reserves and a small professional cadre. French defense spending had only recently begun to accelerate incorporating newer equipment that the French had yet to decide on doctrinally --this coupled with the French experience of WWI in which they suffered heavy casualties and defeats after attempting a direct attack over the Franco-German border and the knowledge that they, along with Britain, had the strategic advantage over Germany and were already attempting to isolate the Fatherland and strange her with blockade while simultaneously building her Army and Armée de l'Air to overwhelming advantage-- was what gave the appearance of inaction.

While appeasement was extremely distasteful, it is often mischaracterized and decontextualized --thwarting any real fair treatment of the subject.

Here are some related comments I made in another thread regarding the Saar Offensive and the disposition of the French Army:

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=3795&page=9

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=120776&postcount=136

[Nickdfresh]

The allied inaction does seem very odd given how Britain and France behaved in 1914-1918. Millions of veterans of the Great War would still have been around in 1939/1940 and it seems odd that they would be so passive.

The two are very closely related actually. Both developed new methods of warfare which the French called 'methodical battle.' But the conceptualization of command and control of battle was much, much slower than that of the Germans --who developed much of their "Blitzkrieg" tactics from their infiltration methods used in 1918. They, like the French and British had also adopted new methods for breaking the deadlock of trench warfare. But the Germans adapted it to the new technologies of the tank and air power...

The allied collapse in 1940 also seems bizarre given how fiercely they resisted in 1914.

The Poles fought fiercely, and so did much of the Red Army being swarmed in May of 1941. It was futile as they were cut off and by passed...

[Chevan]

The Poles fought fiercely, and so did much of the Red Army being swarmed in May of 1941. It was futile as they were cut off and by passed...
In May 1941:):D
Nick do you again aduse of beer?:)

[Chevan]

Not right. Look down through European history, and the nations will always be very much against power growing strong enough to dominate the continent.

This is why the UK and France became allies, this is why they gave a guarantee to Poland, this is why they went to war against Germany.

German domination of all Eastern Europe would be intolerable to France and very scary for the British. They would NOT have it. This is how WWII came about.

Agree
Especially if look through the history we should see that the behaviour of F/UK in that period was to direct the GErmany to the East....where they should face the USSR.
So in the best their interest was to push them both of their enemies ( Germany and USSR) off and benefited of it.
This was a best decision for them.
Even the Poland would not be a problem.They did nothing, nd hardly even plan to do sometnig.
Do you know for instance that the in august the 1939 during the F/UK military staff conference about possible war against Germany they have decided NOT to invite the "allies" Poles:)
Further dreamed about Easten Living space - let him to do it, and than break the Germany in the West.
But nobody did not even expect that Stalin was such dastard:)

[snebold]

But the idea the somehow Chamberlain is merely an icon of the weak-minded, spineless giving into aggression is a bit callous and disingenuous methinks.
Agree.
Taking the hard line against Germany and have nothing to back it would also have made Britain look like a loud-mouthed weakling as the Germans would have done as they pleased anyway. That would not have inspired an anti-German policy in eastern Europe.

In many ways it was a ruthless (to the Czechoslovakians) but cunning policy that delayed war and allowed the British to prepare.

One of the interesting if´s:
The German army leadership was quite ready to coup the Nazis if war broke out over Czechoslovakkia. They thought Hitler´s policies at this point foolhardy and way too dangerous.
The Munich agreement defused that danger to the regime completely; Hitler had pulled off one of his greatest tricks and the "unity" of army leadership dissent was no more.

Nick: I guess any plan for that allied 1941 offensive must have been pretty vague, but do you have any idea what they had in mind?

Chevan: Even the Poland would not be a problem.They did nothing, nd hardly even plan to do sometnig

The loss of a free Poland WAS A BIG PROBLEM to them: they started WWII because of it. Not having any plans was bad planning, not lack of interest!

[Nickdfresh]

In May 1941:):D
Nick do you again aduse of beer?:)

Well, after pointing out years worth of your factual errors, you've finally got me on one.

May is when the Germans should have attacked, but of course they were not ready...

And I never abuse beer. I treat it gently and lovingly! :mad:

Perhaps you can comment on why Stalin ordered his Red Army commanders (via Zhukov) to stand down when it was painfully obvious the Wehrmacht was ready to launch a full attack...

[Rising Sun*]

And I never abuse beer.

It is impossible to abuse beer.

More is always better. :D

[Nickdfresh]

It is impossible to abuse beer.

More is always better. :D

Well, I've started running again, so I have to be very careful not to spill any. ;)




JK - actually, I've quit for a couple weeks to get my road legs back...

[Cojimar 1945]

Some of them resisted but I don't see why the French and British would stand idle rather than attack. With regards to being bypassed why wouldent they simply chase the Germans that tried to bypass them down and kill them?

[Ashes]

Nick: I guess any plan for that allied 1941 offensive must have been pretty vague, but do you have any idea what they had in mind?


Found this on another site, but no collaborating evidence, so make of it what you will.


''Phase I. Clear the German border and secure the Saarland for a assembly area for the next phase. This is supposedly what the Sarr Offensive was all about.

Phase II. Late September - Oct. Close up to the main zone of the Siegfried line. Clear the German outer defenses, secure the Rhine river flank, reconnoiter & probe the main defense zone.

Phase III. Late October - November. Make deliberate assaults on the main defense zone using overwhelming artillery firepower to annihilate defending units. The infantry would be heavily reinforced with engineer and assault tank groups formed around the colossal B1 tanks. Airforce fighters would be concentrated over the battlefield.

The object would be to threaten the Ruhr, particularly the industry on the west bank of the Rhine, and close more of the Rhine river & its valley to industrial traffic. The river is critical to German industry for barge transportation and the parallel railroads were important as well.''


The loss of a free Poland WAS A BIG PROBLEM to them: they started WWII because of it. Not having any plans was bad planning, not lack of interest!

Even though they weren't ready for war at the time, and does away with the crazy ''conspiracy'' theories saying that Britain wanted Hitler to attack East. The Guarantee to Poland was probably more of a hopeful bluff, hoping that by drawing a line in the sand, along with France, would make Hitler pause, it was a reasonable assumption if you were dealing with a reasonable leader, but Hitler called their bluff and it hit the fan.




This is a little off topic, but does anyone have good figures on the French army pre war and during mobilization, especially leading up to the invasion of Poland?


What ive been able to gather is that the degree of mobilization would give Gamelin over 90 divs. but at the time of the French declaration of war the French army in the field was well short of this and French mobilization was slow.

There was about 10 French divs deployed against the Italians on the Alpine front and others in Africa, and there were just two Brit. Divs in the line by Oct 3rd, on 7 September Gamelin advanced about 9 Divs into the Saar.

And what was the German strength facing the French?

Were there originally 35 divs. reinforced with 9 divs. on 10th Sept?

Did the French inform the Poles on about the 12th Sep. that the main offensive would be changed from 17th to 20th Sep?

By then the Soviets had invaded Poland.

Think most expected the fighting to drag on longer then it did and were surprised at the rapid conclusion.

When Kietal and Jodl said when they were interrogated after the war that they were surprised that the French and British with over 100 divisions didn't make an all out attack on German's 25 divisions facing them, those figures may have been a quite a bit off.

[Nickdfresh]

Found this on another site, but no collaborating evidence, so make of it what you will.


''Phase I. Clear the German border and secure the Saarland for a assembly area for the next phase. This is supposedly what the Sarr Offensive was all about.

Phase II. Late September - Oct. Close up to the main zone of the Siegfried line. Clear the German outer defenses, secure the Rhine river flank, reconnoiter & probe the main defense zone.

Phase III. Late October - November. Make deliberate assaults on the main defense zone using overwhelming artillery firepower to annihilate defending units. The infantry would be heavily reinforced with engineer and assault tank groups formed around the colossal B1 tanks. Airforce fighters would be concentrated over the battlefield.

The object would be to threaten the Ruhr, particularly the industry on the west bank of the Rhine, and close more of the Rhine river & its valley to industrial traffic. The river is critical to German industry for barge transportation and the parallel railroads were important as well.''
...

Some more from Wiki, which actually has a pretty good article on the Battle of France: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France)

Allied strategy

In September 1939, Belgium and the Netherlands were still neutral. They tried to stay out of the war for as long as possible by adhering to a policy of strict neutrality. Though they made arrangements in secret with the Entente for future cooperation should the Germans invade their territory, they did not openly prepare for this. The Supreme Commander of the French Army, Maurice Gamelin, suggested during that month, that the Allies should take advantage of the fact that Germany was tied up in Poland by occupying the Low Countries before Germany could. This suggestion was not taken up by the French government however.

In September 1939, in the token Saar Offensive—only made to nominally fulfill the prewar guarantee to Poland to execute a relief attack from the West—French soldiers advanced 5 kilometres into the Saar before withdrawing in October. At this time, France had deployed 98 divisions (all but 28 reserve or fortress divisions) and 2,500 tanks against German forces consisting of 43 divisions (32 of them reserve divisions) and no tanks. According to the judgment of Wilhelm Keitel, then Chief OKW, the French army would easily have been able to penetrate the mere screen of German forces present.[15]

After October, it was decided not to take the initiative in 1940, though important parts of the French army in the 1930s had been designed to wage offensive warfare. The Allies believed that even without an Eastern Front the German government might be destabilised by a blockade, as it had been in the First World War. In the event the Nazi regime would not collapse, a possibility that seemed to grow ever more likely,[16] during 1940 a vast modernisation and enlargement programme for the Allied forces would be implemented, exploiting the existing advantages over Germany in war production to build up an overwhelming mechanised force, including about two dozen armoured divisions, to execute a decisive offensive in the summer of 1941. Should the Low Countries by that date still not have committed themselves to the Allied cause, the Entente firmly intended to violate their neutrality if necessary.[17]

Obviously the Germans might strike first, and a strategy would have to be prepared for this eventuality. Neither the French nor the British had anticipated such a rapid defeat in Poland, and the quick German victory was disturbing. Most French generals favoured a very cautious approach. They thought it wise not to presume that the German intentions could be correctly predicted. A large force should be held in reserve in a central position, north of Paris, to be prepared for any contingency. Should the Germans indeed take the obvious route of advance through Flanders, they should only be engaged in northern France, when their infantry would be exhausted and they had run out of supplies. If however they would try an attack on the centre of the Allied front, this Allied reserve would be ideally positioned to block it. If the Germans advanced through Switzerland, a large reserve would be the only means to deal with such a surprise.

Dyle Plan

Gamelin rejected this line of thought, for several reasons. The first was that it was politically unthinkable to abandon the Low Countries to their fate, however prudent it might be from an operational point of view. Certainly the British government insisted that the Flemish coast remain under Allied control. The second reason was that the 1941 offensive had no chance of being decisive if it had to be launched from the north of France against German forces entrenched in central Belgium. The German offensive had to be contained as far east as possible. The last and for him personally most cogent argument was that Gamelin did not consider the French army capable of winning a mobile battle with the German army. The French infantry divisions as yet were insufficiently motorised. The events in Poland helped confirm his opinion. Such a confrontation had to be avoided at all cost, and Gamelin intended to send the best units of the French army along with the British Expeditionary Force north to halt the Germans at the KW-line, a defensive line that followed the river Dyle, east of Brussels, in a coherent tightly packed continuous front uniting the British, Belgian, and French armies. This plan thus presumed that the Germans planned to concentrate their forces where they could be well supplied by the better road network of northern Belgium.

Gamelin however did not have the personal influence to simply impose his will. The first step he took was to propose the "Escaut" variant as an option for Plan D — the codename for an advance into the Low Countries. It was named after the river in Flanders. This was a shrewd move: protecting the Flemish coast seemed the least one could do; on the other hand it created an enormous salient, showing that it made more sense to defend along the shorter Dyle line, which was precisely the content of Gamelin's next proposal. This however was too transparent. His second "Dyle Plan" met with strong opposition, not growing any less when the 10 January crash confirmed that the German plans conformed to Gamelin's expectations. Also Lord Gort, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, was beginning to expect that whatever the Germans came up with instead would not be what he had initially predicted. The main objection was that the manoeuvre was very risky. The Allied forces had to complete their advance and entrenchment before the Germans reached the line, for which there seemed to be too little time. When entrenched they would have trouble reacting to German strategic surprises, also because their fuel supplies would have to be replenished. The next problem was that this line was very vulnerable to the German main strength, their large tactical bomber force. Nothing seemed to prevent them from breaking the line by a massive bombardment, forcing the French Army to an encounter battle after all.
....

During the first months of 1940 the size and readiness of the French army steadily grew, and Gamelin began to feel confident enough to propose a somewhat more ambitious strategy. He had no intention of frontally attacking the German fortification zone, the Westwall, in 1941, planning instead to outflank it from the north, just as four years later Bernard Montgomery intended in Operation Market Garden. To achieve this, it would be most convenient if he already had a foothold on the north bank of the Rhine, so he changed his plans to the effect that a French army should maintain a connection north of Antwerp with the Dutch National Redoubt, "Fortress Holland". He assigned his sole strategic reserve, the elite 7th Army, to this task. His only reserves now consisted of individual divisions. Again there was much opposition to this "Dyle-Breda-Plan" within the French army, but Gamelin was strongly supported by the British government, because Holland proper was an ideal base for a German air campaign against England.

What should also be noted before punishing the French for not conducting the Saar Offensive more forcefully was that general mobilization of the French Army had yet to be completed. The French, who had a reserve dependent "peoples'" Army, had only started calling up reserves right before the start of the German aggression in Poland and were not due full mobilization until the end of October or November at the earliest....

French intelligence was poor, and had little idea of the lack of German armor in part because of a pretty good deception program on the part of Abwehr and because of their own timidity. Also, basic French strategy called for the Germans to attack and to suffer high casualties before the French would prosecute a counterattack into the Ruhr. The French Army was also apparently unaware that landmines could now be made to kill people and not just vehicles..


Thirdly, by the time the Saar Offensive (actually it was little more than a probe), Poland had already lost the ability to defend itself as its main line of resistance had fallen and they were in a state of collapse. And oh yes, the Soviets had invaded from the east...

[Nickdfresh]

Incidentally, the Saar region was a bad place to launch an offensive. It's a large bowl, geographically speaking, that only serves to bog down fast moving mechanized forces...

[Ashes]

Could the failure to come to grips with modern tank warfare be classified as a major blunder?

The Brits invented the tank, and forward thinking visionaries like Liddel Hart, Fuller and Hobart wrote the manuals on combined arms tank tactics, which were put into field practise in the late 20's at Salisbury Plain.

But by 1935, the proponents of using the tank purely as infantry support won the day and it was left to the German commanders like Guderian that put into practice the tank tactics and theories that the British were experimenting with.

Other countries were in the same boat as Britain, in France, General Paul Andre Mais, and Colonel Doumemc and De Gaulle, were advocating combined tank operations, but like the Brits they were butting their heads against the brick walls of conservative army high commands. In Russia, Tukhachevsky held very advanced ideas on military strategy, particularly on the use of tanks and aircraft. But he and his concepts came to an abrupt end when he was shot during the purges of '37/'38 to the great detriment of the Red Army and as Erickson said, the men that followed Tukashevski lacked that insight into the probable forms of modern mobile warfare.


[ Among Liddel Harts mementos is a tribute to him before the war, Guderian sent an inscribed photo of himself with the words ... ''To captain Liddel Hart, from one of his disciples in tank warfare and the creator of modern tank strategy.'']

[snebold]

Could the failure to come to grips with modern tank warfare be classified as a major blunder?

Disregarding the concept they developed and being very slow to re-learn it, even while watching the Germans practice something like it might...

[Ashes]

Disregarding the concept they developed and being very slow to re-learn it, even while watching the Germans practice something like it might...

Hi snebold!

Seeing that it was a relatively few elite German Panzer and Mechanized divisions that created most of the mayhem in both the West and East, it all ''might'' have turned out a little bit different if the same far sighted visionaries in Western Armies [and the Red Army] were backed by the military establishment like Guderian and his fellow commanders were backed by Hitler in Germany.


BTW, was it you who mentioned the book ''Wages of Destruction'' by Adam Tooze?
Been keeping an eye out for it in local bookshops but haven't seen it yet.
Was thinking of ordering it, but I usually like to have a perusal first before I outlay big bucks.

If you have read it, would you recommend it?

[snebold]

Seeing that it was a relatively few elite German Panzer and Mechanized divisions that created most of the mayhem in both the West and East, it all ''might'' have turned out a little bit different if the same far sighted visionaries in Western Armies [and the Red Army] were backed by the military establishment like Guderian and his fellow commanders were backed by Hitler in Germany.

That´s an "if" that brings up a row of questions so long, that I don´t even want to try to predict the outcome;)

BTW, was it you who mentioned the book ''Wages of Destruction'' by Adam Tooze? Yes.
Been keeping an eye out for it in local bookshops but haven't seen it yet.

Don´t expect it to turn up there, but with the current exchange rates ordering it from Amazon.com is probably the cheapest (unless it´s taxed upon arrival in Australia). I got mine from Amazon.co/uk (no taxes within the EU).

If you have read it, would you recommend it?

Yes, and yes.
It has many interesting tables, I´ve been looking for this stuff for years and it contains some I´ve never seen.
It´s about economic policy in the Third Reich, with all that comes with it, which is a lot (so 800pages are fitting).
There´s a good account of the time from 1918-1932 and then it gets quite thourough, gives a good description of the difficulties the German economy faced during rearmament. If you´re not into economic history or the German interwar society, you´ll be bored, but I still think you´ll find it interesting from 1938 anyway as there is much material about armaments production dillemas, Hitler´s vision´s for the timing of future wars, and a few things about what the nazis planned for the east I haven´t seen elsewhere (despite searching).
I liked it and put it down with the feeling that had it been a fiction book, I could not have read it through, as the story was too unrealistic and far out, (-like every good book I´ve read concerning the Third Reich)
And if you wan´t to know things like that in last quarter of 1942 more than half the German army´s allocation of steel went to production of ammunition, or that the German per capita GDP of 1946 was as in the 1880´s, this book is a must.
I recommend it;)

[Ashes]

That´s an "if" that brings up a row of questions so long, that I don´t even want to try to predict the outcome;)

Yes.


Don´t expect it to turn up there, but with the current exchange rates ordering it from Amazon.com is probably the cheapest (unless it´s taxed upon arrival in Australia). I got mine from Amazon.co/uk (no taxes within the EU).



Yes, and yes.
It has many interesting tables, I´ve been looking for this stuff for years and it contains some I´ve never seen.
It´s about economic policy in the Third Reich, with all that comes with it, which is a lot (so 800pages are fitting).
There´s a good account of the time from 1918-1932 and then it gets quite thourough, gives a good description of the difficulties the German economy faced during rearmament. If you´re not into economic history or the German interwar society, you´ll be bored, but I still think you´ll find it interesting from 1938 anyway as there is much material about armaments production dillemas, Hitler´s vision´s for the timing of future wars, and a few things about what the nazis planned for the east I haven´t seen elsewhere (despite searching).
I liked it and put it down with the feeling that had it been a fiction book, I could not have read it through, as the story was too unrealistic and far out, (-like every good book I´ve read concerning the Third Reich)
And if you wan´t to know things like that in last quarter of 1942 more than half the German army´s allocation of steel went to production of ammunition, or that the German per capita GDP of 1946 was as in the 1880´s, this book is a must.
I recommend it;)


Thanks for that info snebold, your recommendation has sold me...

I'm going to put in an order quick smart.

Oh, and don't forget to put in a commission claim to the publishers.:D

[Alex]

I'd agree that the British venture to Greece was proably the most aimless endevour in Europe. Aid to Greek resistence movements would have sufficed to keep the Germans busy with having their hands full after Italian capitulation.

The Italian campaign however rough and 'lackluster' saved the Allied a great deal of trouble on the western front. Between the well coordinated Anglo Yugoslav effort (led by Fitzroy MacLean) to fight over 14,000 Germans and the two German army's tied down on the Gothic Line in late '44, the MTO was hardly a wasted effort.

We have to remind ourselves however that despite the hindsight we give to the military operations at the time, Churchill saw the Germans nearing the end by 1943 and began to recognize Russia's aims for Eastern Europe. He feverently supported a Royal Polish govt in exile and despised the Greek Communists.
Even his support for Tito in an attempt to swing them towards a pro West stance failed as Broz issued orders for the British Commandos stationed on the island of Vis and all other allied spec ops (SOE, OSS OG's) to halt all operations and leave by the end of 1944.

[aly j]

Anyone care to have a stab at what were Britain's biggest mistakes in the following.....

Battlefield (specific battles, campaigns or operations)
Non-Battlefield (i.e. production decisions, etc.)
Political (alliances, promotions, demotions, etc.)

There biggest mistake was not up dating there equitment and making sure that there army was fit and large from after ww1.
Britain was the first one that invent the tank in ww1 and had the biggest army in the world, but in ww2 they where way behind in tank enginerring and the German army took over Britains title of worlds biggest army.They should of keept the British Empire small and they would been ahead of tank enginerring and would have enough population to keep the biggest army.;)

[ptimms]

The British did not have the biggest Army in WWI, Germany, France, Russia all had more. I'm not sure but by 1919 the USA's may have been bigger too. There was no will to keep the Army the size it was in 1918 and more importantly no need. No country did until the 30's.

[aly j]

The British did not have the biggest Army in WWI, Germany, France, Russia all had more. I'm not sure but by 1919 the USA's may have been bigger too. There was no will to keep the Army the size it was in 1918 and more importantly no need. No country did until the 30's.

NOPE, britain was the largest army right before ww1 and Germany had the second largest before ww1. Usa only took over britain after ww2.And look what happen too Britain for not keeping her large army, she was nearly run over by Germany, so England there was a ned to keep a large army and keep up with eginerring. Cheers.

[Nickdfresh]

NOPE, britain was the largest army right before ww1 and Germany had the second largest before ww1. Usa only took over britain after ww2.And look what happen too Britain for not keeping her large army, she was nearly run over by Germany, so England there was a ned to keep a large army and keep up with eginerring. Cheers.


Um, Britain didn't have close to the largest army prior to WWI....

And you, with your 21.40 trolling posts a day, are getting tiresome...

[Churchill]

I think the size of an army is relevant to the population. England's population(not counting the Empire, just the UK) was less because the population was smaller. Russia, on the other hand, had a huge army because they had a huge population. If England had a population of about 100 million(give or take a few ;)), sure, they would have had a 10 million man army. With Russia and The States having the biggest population, it was a given that they had the biggest armies.

[aly j]

Um, Britain didn't have close to the largest army prior to WWI....

And you, with your 21.40 trolling posts a day, are getting tiresome...

Hate too say this, but all of youre information and others on here is exacley the same as the History channel.
So all of you a trolls too. cheers.ps are you sure England didt have the biggest army prior too ww1, cause i just watch a program a couple of months and Engalnd had the biggest army,Germany 2nd biggest.USA didt even have there own troops ships.:D

[aly j]

I think the size of an army is relevant to the population. England's population(not counting the Empire, just the UK) was less because the population was smaller. Russia, on the other hand, had a huge army because they had a huge population. If England had a population of about 100 million(give or take a few ;)), sure, they would have had a 10 million man army. With Russia and The States having the biggest population, it was a given that they had the biggest armies.

Thats what i was talking about, if they kept the empire really small.
Englands population would of been larger.

[ptimms]

Turn off the History Channel and do some real research, any programme Britains Army was biggest is just bo*****s.

August 1914

British Army 247,000 Regulars (with all reservists this would go up to 700,000 but not immediately). To defend the largest Empire in the World, immediately available to seve in France 150,000 men in 7 Divisions.

German Army 1.75 million men plus the same available at length through mobilisation.

French Army 1.1 million.

Tsarist Army 3.5 million men.

When I went to school this makes the British by far the smallest.

[Alex]

The British Army was a small, efficient, highly trained crafty force. As stated, the BEF in 1914 August the 2nd, was 247,000 men. They engaged the German Imperial Army in Belgium and Northern France in what was a very small sector of the front. The BEF disn't even launch its first offensive until March 10, 1915 at Neuve Chapelle. Get one thing straight aly.j the BEF never became the largest army in WWI or II. Their size was formidable after Kitchner's New Army, the Derby Scheme and finally conscription in 1916 - but Russia, Germany and France (in that order) had FAR more men.

Could we please get back to the original issue. I love WWI history but we're taking this off topic.

[Rising Sun*]

There biggest mistake was not up dating there equitment

Apart from tanks, which equipment should Britain have updated?

How would this have altered the British result in France in 1940? In Malaya and Burma in 1942? In the Middle East, Greece and Crete 1940-42?

What was wrong with the SMLE?

What was wrong with the 1937 pattern webbing, which was pretty fresh when WWII started?

What was wrong with British artillery?

What was wrong with the Hurricane and Spitfire?

And so on.

[ptimms]

To be truthful in the Matilda II they had one of the best tanks of it's time too.

[Alex]

I agree with the above. The Matilda II and its sister tank the Valentine MkIII were only really outclassed in 1942 by the German Pzkw VI Tiger in Tunisia.

I think most people observe the early reversals from France, Norway, Greece, Singapore and North Africa as somehow the fault of outdated equipment and even poor training.

Plus the Germans were still using the bolt action rifle as the main infantry small arm during the Blitzkrieg. And their main transportation of supplies and material to the front was the horse and carriage throughout the war.

England's greatest mistake I'd state again is the Dardanelles expedition in 1943 right as the Italian invasion was developing and the resources were needed there.

[aly j]

Apart from tanks, which equipment should Britain have updated?

How would this have altered the British result in France in 1940? In Malaya and Burma in 1942? In the Middle East, Greece and Crete 1940-42?

What was wrong with the SMLE?

What was wrong with the 1937 pattern webbing, which was pretty fresh when WWII started?

What was wrong with British artillery?

What was wrong with the Hurricane and Spitfire?

And so on.
I tell you why,the spitfire was faster than the m/schimitt,but the m/schimitt out classed the spitfire in any other way.
British artillery was out classed by the Germans-Germany had rockets,had anti rocket guns,had v-2 weapons, what did the british have, a descent army with out class weapons. The only thing Britain had over Germany was that Britain had a bigger navy than Germany thats all.I also read ww2 books and study ww2. If britain was up with Germany with technolghy, there would not of been the battle of Britain.Britain had too fight so hard for the first time in her life cause she never kept up with production like other countries did.

[aly j]

The British Army was a small, efficient, highly trained crafty force. As stated, the BEF in 1914 August the 2nd, was 247,000 men. They engaged the German Imperial Army in Belgium and Northern France in what was a very small sector of the front. The BEF disn't even launch its first offensive until March 10, 1915 at Neuve Chapelle. Get one thing straight aly.j the BEF never became the largest army in WWI or II. Their size was formidable after Kitchner's New Army, the Derby Scheme and finally conscription in 1916 - but Russia, Germany and France (in that order) had FAR more men.

Could we please get back to the original issue. I love WWI history but we're taking this off topic.
I just saw a docomentry stating England 1st and Germany 2nd, where did you get youre information from the internet?

[ptimms]

Aly,

This info is widely available on the net but also any reference book you care to mention, the BEF was only 6 Divisions, this was nearly half Britains standing Army. Germany sent many times that into France, how do you think Germany was able to fight on two fronts with an army smaller than UK's.

[Rising Sun*]

I tell you why,the spitfire was faster than the m/schimitt,but the m/schimitt out classed the spitfire in any other way.

Really?

Then how do you explain Spitfires shooting down the odd 109?

And don't overlook the sturdy old Hurricane, which actually did most of the fighting during the BOB.

Do you think the 109 was superior because it could turn inside the Hurricane and Spitfire?

British artillery was out classed by the Germans-

Really?

Where and when (ignoring the 88 adaptability)?

How come the British artillery at first Tobruk weren't pulverised by the German artillery?

Germany had rockets,

Where were these deployed successfully against British artillery?

had anti rocket guns,

Why did the Germans need these if the British didn't have rockets?

Why would rocket experts use guns instead of anti-rockets on rockets?


had v-2 weapons

Give three instances of these being used tactically against British artillery, and one instance of them being used succesfully tactically against British artillery.

Also, give the average deaths caused per V2 launched offensively, to demonstrate just what an accurate and destructive piece of rocket artillery it supposedly was.

what did the british have, a descent army with out class weapons.

The British army suffered a number of descents during the war, but they ascended again with their weapons which were adequate against the Germans. Otherwise, strange to relate but true, the British wouldn't have beaten the Germans now and again during six years of war which, equally strange to relate but true, the British won.

The only thing Britain had over Germany was that Britain had a bigger navy than Germany thats all

So?

Isn't that a bit of an advantage when the Germans were fighting an island nation reliant upon the seas for its supplies?

Or do you think Britain should have put all its resources into its army and left its sea lanes unprotected?

I also read ww2 books and study ww2.

Well, old sport, there's <beep> all evidence of that.

If britain was up with Germany with technolghy, there would not of been the battle of Britain.

Really?

Why?

Would British technology have reached into Poland and stopped the Germans dead in their tracks before they even thought about attacking Britain?

What brilliant pieces of British technology could have stopped the defeat in France and discouraged Germany from attacking Britain itself? A death ray at Dover? A force field over England? Dorothy, being Britain's Chief Scientist, clicking the heels of her little red shoes and moving England to Kansas?

Britain had too fight so hard for the first time in her life

Really?

Ever heard of Napoleon?

The Spanish Armada?

Crecy?

Hastings?

cause she never kept up with production like other countries did.

Which countries would they be, crushed as most of the world was by the Depression during the 1930s?


I don't know whether you're a troll or just hopelessly out of your depth, but you are wasting a lot of bandwidth with vacuous and asinine topics and posts. Which is the only reason I've gone to the trouble of the above post to demonstrate that point to you, not that I expect you'll grasp it. Do yourself and everyone else a favour and stop posting drivel.

[Nickdfresh]

I tell you why,the spitfire was faster than the m/schimitt,but the m/schimitt out classed the spitfire in any other way.
British artillery was out classed by the Germans-Germany had rockets,had anti rocket guns,had v-2 weapons, what did the british have, a descent army with out class weapons. The only thing Britain had over Germany was that Britain had a bigger navy than Germany thats all.I also read ww2 books and study ww2. If britain was up with Germany with technolghy, there would not of been the battle of Britain.Britain had too fight so hard for the first time in her life cause she never kept up with production like other countries did.

This is just trolling...Plain and simple. But mostly simple...

[ww11freak34]

i think the dieppe raid was a mistake the allies got slaughted by the germans

[Alex]

Didn't mean to be harsh but it seems you were pretty stuck on the fact that Britain's LAND ARMY, not Navy or combined forces, was bigger than Germany's.
Whats frustrating is how that doesn't immediately relate to the topic of Britain's biggest WWII mistake.

Yes Dieppe was a misadventure but even though it was a failed large scale raid, it did in the end at least teach the U.S. and some of Britain's High Command that an invasion of Festung Europa before late 1943 was an impossbility.

There were no gains in the Dardenelles expedition. The Germans held Leros, Kos and the Dodacanese with a totally confused state in Greece by 1945. The resource the british alocated in that campaign could have helped the Italian Front.

[Nickdfresh]

Hey winston and the other guy i forgot youre name,I beleive you when you guys say germany has got more foot soilders.Only 3000 more than britain thats not that much difference ,so in that case they are bigger,but ist the british navy included with the army, if thats the case the british army is bigger than the Germans, and i must say Britains navy is Bigger than Germanys at that time. So i see what you mean bigger but 3000 more soilders compared with the British navy.Does that add up to Germany being bigger?.The complete Idots Guides 2 ww1 that better not mean me, ive never insulted you churchill.Cheers

Um, I never gave you a formal warning. So, consider this it.

If you keep argument trolling, and creating 800 threads along with your 25 mostly meaningless posts a day, you'll receive another infraction...

All silly tolling post=B.S. moved to "the Dump." (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=7533)

That's why I started it, folks! ;)

[windrider]

Um, I never gave you a formal warning. So, consider this it.

If you keep argument trolling, and creating 800 threads along with your 25 mostly meaningless posts a day, you'll receive another infraction...

All silly tolling post=B.S. moved to "the Dump." (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=7533)

That's why I started it, folks! ;)

Hi Nick, I agree with you, this nonsense is starting to get out of hand...
Maybe adding a "moronic poster icon" beside all new threads posted by known offenders could warn us not to click ?
Or... why not a good old martial court ? People who would post idiocies would loose rank or not gain any.
Just my 2 cents.

[Nickdfresh]

Hi Nick, I agree with you, this nonsense is starting to get out of hand...
Maybe adding a "moronic poster icon" beside all new threads posted by known offenders could warn us not to click ?
Or... why not a good old martial court ? People who would post idiocies would loose rank or not gain any.
Just my 2 cents.

The "moronic threads" are just going to be stopped.

I absolutely detest the idea of any censorship, but we do need quality control as our resident engineer, pdf27, tells us...

This is a very solid WWII site free of the dullness of other boards, while being much more lean. I prefer it this way, and the silly f***ing threads asking questions that either could be Googled and answered in five seconds with no thoughtful discussion, or have already been beaten to death in older threads no one even bothered to search, will be going into a "dump" from now on.

And that goes DOUBLE for obvious attention-whore-thread-jacks like the one occurring here...

[Churchill]

Now this thread gets its name for a reason! :)