Hard Facts about Communism/USSR. [Archive]

Chevan

11-19-2007, 03:36 AM

1) Cancellation of class society and other communist nionsenses - it's utopia
The class devision is not utopia.
This was may be the one of few RIGHT things that Carl Marx has invented in 19 centure.
The class devision is the obvious thing Jan.
True.. the bolshevick via their unhuman methouds have compromated this concept.
However the class struggle is the very accurate term for the actual relations of the Richs and Poors( ot betwen the masters and its workers)

2) Today not, but you probably don't know anything about 50's years in "democratic" czechoslovakia.

Probably you right.I know a not much about Chehoslovakia.
But at least i know for sure - in the soviet block the Chehoslovakia played the great and importaint economical and military role.
It was a industry and military producer.
Do you even know that the Czech produced the manies of kinds of the modern wearpons including the licensed Soviet aircrafts.
The Czech motorcycle Jawa was a one of the best in the USSR.So indeed communist made a lot of the creating the great industry in Chehoslovakia.

Communists liqided patriotism and Czech culture. After 89. people doted on American life style - our televisions are a full of foreign POP shit! Today aou people can't use czech language, because they known only lousy words like a "ok, fuck, shit, good, cool", they dosn't know Czech orthography. These factors are in our society because of communsit control until 1989.

He he he.
Americans finished your Language and culture?;)
And who did help them today - YOUR DEMOCRATS-PATRIOTS.Not communists.
So relax and enjoy;)
YOUR democrats has finished you country Chehoslovakia.They has teared it into pieces.

We are free?! It's relative.

Punnish for what? For "liberation", 41 years of lack of freedom, collectivisation, witch-hunt of not communist people, executed humans, censorship... If you doesn't know about reality in eastern block, don't discuss about communism.
now you will tell me about realities in Eastern block:)
That's fun Jan.
I lived in USSR and I KNOW for sure that the DDR and Chehoslovakia was the BEST countries in the whole soviet block where the life level was much higher then in the USSR.
Those both states had no crisis like the Poland or Romanian had in 1980-yy.
So i would not portray on you rplace the terrible conditions in the Eastern block.;)
You really have not seen the bad reality.

Jan Fiala

11-19-2007, 10:50 AM

Stratification of the population is sole possibility.

And who did help them today - YOUR DEMOCRATS-PATRIOTS.Not communists.

Our current politicans are (exservice) communists who work only for money, not for our country.

I lived in USSR and I KNOW for sure that the DDR and Chehoslovakia was the BEST countries in the whole soviet block where the life level was much higher then in the USSR.

Yeah, but in prewar times was a life level very higher than in age of communists. We were advanced like a France, GB and other western states. Collectivisation destroyed agronomy in all eastern block, but in such advanced country as Czechoslovakia it was catastrophe.

You really have not seen the bad reality.

I know about the bas reality' That's just it why comunists must be punnished.

Chevan

11-21-2007, 03:24 AM

Our current politicans are (exservice) communists who work only for money, not for our country.

But your people have voted for them- so why is guit that such bastards are in a power;)
Righ ,thaey have no political convictions, and want just a money and power.
But why do you want to punish not them , but simple peoples around you who are not in the power but who believe in the equal of social rights and its ideals?They are at least honest and didnot changed their convictions in aim to get the power.
No you see while you want to punish commi - the dastard "democrats" are much worsen then them.

Yeah, but in prewar times was a life level very higher than in age of communists. We were advanced like a France, GB and other western states. Collectivisation destroyed agronomy in all eastern block, but in such advanced country as Czechoslovakia it was catastrophe.

This is a old fary tells of the YOUR nationalist.The simular tells i heared from Russian nationalist - the Tsar Russian was a greates state in the world that evil commies have destroyed.
Indeed the Czechoslovakia was the greates East European state even during the Soviet era.
The communists at least saved the Czehoslovakia.
The Democrat have teared it into the two pieces.
So lucky you now?;)
the Czech and Slovakian republic is nothing with comparition with Britain and France.
And you are wrong about collectivisation.
Althought collectivisation in 1930 has began from nasty things - this let the USSR to create the very power heavy industry that later has SAVED our state from the GErmans invasion (coz we have really mass productions of aircraft ,tanls and artillery).
Besides i know for the sure that there were as bad collective farmers as the enough succesfull ones.All depends form a personal management.

I know about the bas reality' That's just it why comunists must be punnished.

Yea ... you punish the simple communist while YOU dastard "democrats" enjoy the their power now.
Go on dude;)

Kato

11-21-2007, 04:20 AM

But your people have voted for them- so why is guit that such bastards are in a power;)
Righ ,thaey have no political convictions, and want just a money and power.
But why do you want to punish not them , but simple peoples around you who are not in the power but who believe in the equal of social rights and its ideals?They are at least honest and didnot changed their convictions in aim to get the power.
No you see while you want to punish commi - the dastard "democrats" are much worsen then them.

Those who can win democratic elections are to possess ample financial, media and often administrative resources.
Actually in post-communist states the only candidates who have possessed all these things are former communist party bureaucrats and security service officers. So

This is a old fary tells of the YOUR nationalist.Indeed the Czechoslovakia was the greates East European state even during the Soviet era.
The communists at least saved the Czehoslovakia.
The Democrat have teared it into the two pieces.

It is just the evidence that multinational states collapse as a rule.

And you are wrong about collectivisation.
Althought collectivisation in 1930 has began from nasty things - this let the USSR to create the very power heavy industry that later has SAVED our state from the GErmans invasion (coz we have really mass productions of aircraft ,tanls and artillery).
Besides i know for the sure that there were as bad collective farmers as the enough succesfull ones.All depends form a personal management.

It is not true. Collectivisation in 1930 was the mere liquidation of sound peasants who can potentially oppose to the Soviets. But it was not the essential source for financing the creation of the powerful heavy industry.

The main sources were the export of mineral resources and the free slave labour of millions of Gulag prisoners

Yea ... you punish the simple communist while YOU dastard "democrats" enjoy the their power now.
Go on dude;)

The most of the democrats in the Eastern Europe are former communists.
They just changed their image according to the global fashion. I would not speak about simple communits, I have not heard about activities of organisations that claim to be communist in the Czech Republic.

Chevan

11-21-2007, 04:41 AM

Those who can win democratic elections are to possess ample financial, media and often administrative resources.
Actually in post-communist states the only candidates who have possessed all these things are former communist party bureaucrats and security service officers. So

So it right be to PUNISH them - the former communists who today look as democrats, right?
Not the simple peoples ( mostly oldest) who still believe in the communist ideals

It is just the evidence that multinational states collapse as a rule.

Yea... so look for the USA man.
There live over 250++ nationalities today . Strange why it did not collapes;)
The "rule" is the ONLY for the dastard greedy nationalist leaders who want a more power for themself. But not for the normal states.

It is not true. Collectivisation in 1930 was the mere liquidation of sound peasants who can potentially oppose to the Soviets. But it was not the essential source for financing the creation of the powerful heavy industry.

The main sources were the export of mineral resources and the free slave labour of millions of Gulag prisoners

No again.
The primary aim of collectivisation was to get the MONEY and products for the INDUSTRIALISTION.
And you know it Kato.Coz the first positive resault of the collectivisation in Ukraine was Donbass, Dneproges, a hundreds of newest Greats plants and ets .

The most of the democrats in the Eastern Europe are former communists.
They just changed their image according to the global fashion. I would not speak about simple communits, I have not heard about activities of organisations that claim to be communist in the Czech Republic.
Well so What do communist Jan mean in Czech republic in this way?

Kato

11-21-2007, 04:55 AM

So it right be to PUNISH them - the former communists who today look as democrats, right?
Not the simple peoples ( mostly oldest) who still believe in the communist ideals

I don't think there are persons (especially oldest) who still believe in the communist ideals in the Czech republic. It is the case with the former republics of the USSR but this phenomenon will soon disappear. Communism is dead.

Kato

11-21-2007, 05:13 AM

The primary aim of collectivisation was to get the MONEY and products for the INDUSTRIALISTION.
And you know it Kato.Coz the first positive resault of the collectivisation in Ukraine was Donbass, Dneproges, a hundreds of newest Greats plants and ets .

After collectivisation the USSR turned from the main exporter of agricultural products into main importer of them. So any strategic benefits are very dubious. Besides the profits from the export of some potatoes and wheat is miserable in comparison with the export of mineral resources.

Dneproges, a hundreds of newest Greats plants were mainly built by slaves from Gulags and it reduced the expenses greatly.

Egorka

11-21-2007, 06:03 AM

After collectivisation the USSR turned from the main exporter of agricultural products into main importer of them. So any strategic benefits are very dubious. Besides the profits from the export of some potatoes and wheat is miserable in comparison with the export of mineral resources.

Kato, the collectivization actually increased the productivity of agriculture in USSR. At expences of other things amongst which are the lives.

1928 - 470 grain Kg/year; produced by 50 mill. pesants.
1937 - 430 grain Kg/year; produced by 30 mill. pesants.

source: "Драма самоуничтожения", Вадим Кожинов (http://stalinism.ru/repressii/drama_samounichtozheniya.html).
"Но вернемся во вторую половину 1930-х годов. Выше было сказано о тогдашнем впечатляющем сдвиге в сфере промышленности. В сельском хозяйстве дело обстояло гораздо скромнее, —уже в силу изложенных только что причин (промышленность зависит от местоположения страны в значительно меньшей степени, чем сельское хозяйство). И в последнее время постоянно высказывается мнение, что сельское хозяйство в тот период было менее эффективным, чем в нэповское время, ибо население росло быстрее, чем урожаи зерновых. Так, по подсчетам Л.А.Гордона и Э.В.Кло-пова. на душу населения в 1928 году приходилось 470 кг зерна (на год), а в 1938-м — 430 кг. Однако эти стремящиеся к объективности авторы тут же сообщают, что в первом случае перед нами результат труда "50—55 млн. крестьян-единоличников", а во втором — всего "30—35 млн. колхозников и рабочих совхозов" (цитата по "Гордон Л.А, Клопов Э.В. Что это было? Размышления о предпосылках и итогах того, что случилось с нами в 30— 40-е годы.—М.,1989,с.б4.", с.80), — то есть на 40% меньше."

The point is that the harvest prior to collectivization was a little bigger, but it was generated by many more people. So after collectivization an average peasnt produced almost 2 times more grain. There was a shift in the population - people moved into towns or were forcibly relocated into other areas to work in the industry.

Kato

11-21-2007, 07:27 AM

Kato, the collectivization actually increased the productivity of agriculture in USSR. At expences of other things amongst which are the lives.

1928 - 470 grain Kg/year; produced by 50 mill. pesants.
1937 - 430 grain Kg/year; produced by 30 mill. pesants.

source: "Драма самоуничтожения", Вадим Кожинов (http://stalinism.ru/repressii/drama_samounichtozheniya.html).
"Но вернемся во вторую половину 1930-х годов. Выше было сказано о тогдашнем впечатляющем сдвиге в сфере промышленности. В сельском хозяйстве дело обстояло гораздо скромнее, —уже в силу изложенных только что причин (промышленность зависит от местоположения страны в значительно меньшей степени, чем сельское хозяйство). И в последнее время постоянно высказывается мнение, что сельское хозяйство в тот период было менее эффективным, чем в нэповское время, ибо население росло быстрее, чем урожаи зерновых. Так, по подсчетам Л.А.Гордона и Э.В.Кло-пова. на душу населения в 1928 году приходилось 470 кг зерна (на год), а в 1938-м — 430 кг. Однако эти стремящиеся к объективности авторы тут же сообщают, что в первом случае перед нами результат труда "50—55 млн. крестьян-единоличников", а во втором — всего "30—35 млн. колхозников и рабочих совхозов" (цитата по "Гордон Л.А, Клопов Э.В. Что это было? Размышления о предпосылках и итогах того, что случилось с нами в 30— 40-е годы.—М.,1989,с.б4.", с.80), — то есть на 40% меньше."

The point is that the harvest prior to collectivization was a little bigger, but it was generated by many more people. So after collectivization an average peasnt produced almost 2 times more grain. There was a shift in the population - people moved into towns or were forcibly relocated into other areas to work in the industry.

I don't think one should take Soviet statistics as credible one. The fact is that
the Soviet Union was not able to satisfy its own needs in food-stuffs in the following decades after collectivisation.

Chevan

11-21-2007, 07:28 AM

Kato

11-21-2007, 08:06 AM

Again wrong Kato.
Listen what tells Egorka.
The collective farms in the late of the 1930 were ALREADY able to feed the whole USSR WITHOUT import.
Th new soviet cities population rised by very greats temps and the state needs a more agricalture products that could provide ONLY collective farm ( that has began to use the first tractors in that period).

The collective farms are the best examples of agricultural failures. The backward tzar Russia had been one of the main exporter of agricultural goods in the world without any tractors or other vehicles. There were rediculous Soviet campaigns when city dwellers were forced to work on the fields as farmers in to gather at least some harvest.

So the increase of the Soviet Industry was possible ONLY due to Collectivisation - coz the USSR had simply no any investitions from the West for this. The collectivisation WAS the SINGLE sourse of the USSR to creat the OWN industry and develop own resources i that time.

I don't see connections between the destruction of agriculture with the mass killing of peasants and development of industry

The ONLY in the 1970 USSR has begin the export of the Canadian wheats coz the different economical reasons - it was cheaper to buy the whear then to increase the own production that still much uneffective
As you know the climate of the USSR is not the so good as the Canadian and American one.

I don't agree. Canada has suitable climate for agriculture only in the regions near the US border. The US climate with its annual hurricanes leaves much to be desired for agriculture as well while the USSR had Ukraine, Belarus, European Russia, Kuban with excellent climate The Soviet problems was in collectivisations, mass murders of farmers, poor business management.

And you NEVER WILL GET the equal harvest per unit of square in for instance Texas and in Kuban.

Don't be pessimistic. It is not the fault of weather or climate.

Egorka

11-21-2007, 08:58 AM

I don't think one should take Soviet statistics as credible one. The fact is that
the Soviet Union was not able to satisfy its own needs in food-stuffs in the following decades after collectivisation.
IThe stats are OK in this respect.
And again I said about efficiency, not about brutto production.
The efficiency of collectivised agricultural sector increased by factor 2.
Это означает, что производительность труда выросла весьма значительно: на одного работающего в 1928 году пришлось 1,4 тонны зерна, а в 1938-м —2,4 тонны. Разумеется, это было немного в сравнении со странами с более "благополучным" сельским хозяйством. Но и говорить об "упадке" сельского хозяйства в это время (как многие сейчас делают) нет оснований, ибо один работающий производилв 1938 году на 70% больше зерна, чем в 1928-м.

And BTW USSR exported 2 mill. tonns of grain in 1940.

"Война и геополитика". Кожинов Вадим Валерьянович. (http://whiteworld.ru/rubriki/000111/001/01062015.htm)
В высшей степени наглядно предстает геополитическая сущность войны в составленных накануне нее, 23 мая 1941 года, «Общих указаниях группе сельского хозяйства экономической организации «Ост«» (то есть «Восток»). Одно из главных «общихправил» сформулировано так:

«Производство продовольствия в России на длительное время включить в европейскую систему», ибо «Западная и Северная Европа голодает... Германия и Англия (да, и Англия! — В. К.)...нуждаются в ввозе продуктов питания», а между тем «Россия поставляет только зерно, не более 2 млн. тонн в год... (Наш урожай 1940 года — 95,6 млн. тонн. — В. К.). Таким образом, определяются основные направления решения проблемы высвобождения избытков продуктов русского сельского хозяйства для Европы (заметим: Европы в целом! — В. К.)... Внутреннее потребление России... должно быть снижено настолько, чтобы образовались необходимые излишки для вывоза» (цит. по кн.: «Преступные цели гитлеровской Германии в войне против Советского Союза. Документы, материалы. М.1987, с. 250, 251).

Egorka

11-21-2007, 09:18 AM

Don't be pessimistic. It is not the fault of weather or climate.
The weather plays a paramount role in agriculture... :roll:
It make a bit of difference if you collect 1 or 2 harvests per year...

Jan Fiala

11-21-2007, 12:11 PM

the Tsar Russian was a greates state in the world that evil commies have destroyed.

Haha, Russia has always been unadvanced. Our state was really advanced. You can't compare Czechoslovakia in 30's and russia in 30's.

Indeed the Czechoslovakia was the greates East European state even during the Soviet era.

Since 19th century we had most advanced industry in central Europe. Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Collectivisation of agronomy mean nationalization of soil, waste of resources, no private ownership, soil erosion... simply katastrophe...

h2so4

11-21-2007, 03:40 PM

Jan.....
You seem to be, a naive boy!!!!

The human change!!!!!.... Ok!..... You have time.... But no misapplication!

I see....

You believe, that you have find oll the responds.....

Listen to me..... search again from the beginning....

Perhaps ther you can find same hope

And now to our theme:.... ZHUKOV!

Librarian

11-21-2007, 09:35 PM

Sorry for my pretty late reaction, honorable ladies and gentlemen, but this week is completely fulfilled with different professional obligations. But, never mind that – let’s go to our slightly irrupted topic!

It is just the evidence that multinational states collapse as a rule.

Excuse me for my interference, but not necessarily, honorable Mr. Kato – Switzerland still represents a bold example that country that contains more than one national entity is not obligatorily susceptible to different nationalist challenges from within its own borders, especially if societal groups contained by the state do have an explicit and definitive supra-national identification.

…this phenomenon will soon disappear. Communism is dead.

Not inevitably, my dear Mr. Kato. Since he came down from the trees, man has faced the problem of survival not as an individual, but as a member of a social group. His continued existence is testimony to the fact that he has succeeded in solving the problem, but the continued existence of want and misery, even in the richest of nations, is evidence that his solution has been, at best, a partial one. Yet man is not to be severely censured for his failure to achieve a Paradise on Earth. It is hard to wring a livelihood from the surface of this planet. It is only because man is a socially cooperative creature that he has succeeded in perpetuating himself at all.

But the very fact that he has to depend on his fellow man has madethe problem of survival extraordinarily difficult. Man is not an ant, conveniently equipped with an inborn pattern of social instincts. On the contrary – he is pre-eminently endowed with a fiercely self-centered nature. If his relatively weak physique forces him to seek cooperation, his untamed unconscious drives constantly threaten to disrupt his social working partnerships.

In early societies the struggle between aggression and cooperation is taken care of by the environment – when the specter of starvation looks a community in the face the pure need for self-preservation pushes society to the cooperative completion of its daily tasks. But in an advanced community, this tangible pressure of the environment is lacking. When man no longer works shoulder to shoulder in tasks directly related to survival, when tree quarters or more of the population never touches the tiled earth, enters the mines, or builds something with its own hands, the perpetuation of the human animal becomes a remarkable social feat.

So remarkable, in fact, that society’s existence hangs by a hair. A modern human community is at the mercy of thousand dangers: if its farmers should fail to plant enough crops, if its railroad men should take into their heads to become bookkeepers or its bookkeepers should decide to become oceanologists, if too few should offer their services as miners, farmers, candidates for engineering degrees, nuclear physicists… in a word, if any of a thousand intertwined tasks of society should fail to get done, modern industrial life would soon become hopelessly disorganized. Every day the human community faces the possibility of breakdown – not from the forces of nature, but from sheer human unpredictability.

Classicistic wisdom claims that development of an astonishing game in which society assures its own continuance by allowing each individual to do exactly as he sees fit – providing that he follows a central guiding rule, will be sufficient to resolve the aforementioned problem. The name of the game is the market economy, and the rule is deceptively simple: each should do hat was to his best monetary advantage. In the market economy the lure of the gain steers each man to his task. And yet, although each was free to go wherever his acquisitive nose directs him, the interplay of one man against other results in the necessary tasks of society getting done.

Unfortunately, it is by no means clear that all the jobs of the society – the dirty ones as well as the plush ones – will be actually done, or that unequal access to productive resources will be able to assure necessitated degree of production, or that system will allow to all its members to play the game on the equal basis for valued rewards. Even today millions of people, in practically all parts of the world, have found reason to complain about the shape of their lives, and not a few of them have, from time to time, set up some sort of social movement, of protest, or reform to change existing societal fabric. Throughout history there have been men and women who imagined different societal alternatives, who thought about restructuring their societies in terms that they conceived of as better than any current arrangements. When people become dissatisfied with their current situations, thus compelled to change them, there is a plethora of alternative courses of action that are completely open. Different forms of more egalitarian social movements are then, at least sociologically, completely possible.:)

I don't think one should take Soviet statistics as credible one. The fact is that
the Soviet Union was not able to satisfy its own needs in food-stuffs in the following decades after collectivisation.

Well, fortunately we do have some highly credible American sources. So here they are:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/SSSR-agricultureproduction.jpg

Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, by Sherman Kent [third edition] – (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1963) – p. 261

The crux of the agricultural problem was not the collectivization, but productivity per acre, deeply dependant upon adequate mechanization and chemization of agriculture. Agricultural corporations - the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union in farming production - actually represented a direct copy of the highly inventive American organizational patent from 1932, aimed to handle the giant farms as specific factories, with enclosed production and different "inputs" (such as pesticides, feed, fertilizer, and fuel) and "outputs" (corn, chickens, pigs, and so forth). The goal was to increase yield and decrease costs of production, typically by exploiting economies of scale, with factual employment of workers-like, wage-earning personal of different profiles (harvesters, drivers, veterinarians, manual workers, accountants, etc.). This goal transformed the Soviet countryside from millions of small peasant holdings to a consolidated pattern of fewer than 50.000 centrally controlled operating units.

Despite significant transformations in early 1970’s, the bulk of the Soviet agricultural production represented a direct copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, with some 26.000 giant farms – averaging 14.750 hectares (36.000 acres), plus so called state farms with average 6070 hectares (15.000 acres) occupying 97% of Soviet farmland. Some 38 million private plots of farm and city families made up the remaining 3 %.

Constant lack of sizable capital inputs for adequate machinery and chemicals (estimated lack of tractors for adequate soil preparation in 1956 was 200.000 units over 65 HP!) as well as ideologically driven abhorrence toward applied genetics in hybrid seeds production actually represented the main causes for the misbalances in the Soviet agricultural production.

International economics in the first half of the XX century were dominated by the brake in the fundamental unity of the old, known world, and the rise of two sharply polarized social and productive systems each of which was all but controlled by a giant. Not since the apogee of the Imperial Rome has any one sovereign community in the Western World risen to a position of such overwhelming superiority as the United States. Even Britain at the time of her industrial and commercial supremacy a hundred years ago never achieved such preponderance of power. And at the opposite pole the Soviet Union has an even more crushing power. The USSR has, with hardly any outside help, in merely 25 years of unparalleled effort not merely transformed itself from a mainly primitive peasant economy into the second largest Industrial Power equipped with every miracle of science and technology – from jet engines to hydrogen bombs – but initiated a completely new system of economic organization at fundamental variance with what was before. By her exertions USSR has proved the possibility of the conscious planning of supra-national economic destinies. The vast effort required and the constant, historically confirmed fear of armed attack led to policies – indeed to the rise of a whole system – which evoked apprehension, disapproval and hatred abroad.
Behind these struggles and antagonisms there were looms in both political spheres, with a fundamental problem of dealing with production, with transformation of primitive farming into an efficient provider of food for the growing population of both East and West. The old Malthusian problem of over-population and the forcing-down of living standards was once again posed for the majority of the human race.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/AnnualIncomePerCapita-1938.jpg

Woytinsky and Wojtynsky: "World Population and Production", New York, 1953

Sorry, honorable ladies and gentlemen - forced break of the page, the text i have entered is too long (12.745 characters)... to be continued.:roll:

Librarian

11-21-2007, 09:37 PM

PART II

The first successes of the Soviet experiment in economic planning were noticeable. Yet that experiment could not have started at a less propitious moment. Soviet Union had to rely on the export of primary produce to obtain the desperately lacking basic machinery to prime the pump of functional industrial construction. At the very point of launching the first of a series of industrialization plans these prices collapsed on the world market. Thus more and more had to be squeezed out of the country in order to obtain a shrinking amount of machinery from abroad. Additional problem was represented by the verity that the increase in Soviet production was slow in maturing.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/USSR-manufacturingcapacity.jpg

"Industrialization and foreign trade", League of Nations, (1945) p.13

In orther to overcome the difficulties encountered with the agricultural production, a wholesale collectivization of land was launched. The result was a collapse of the agricultural production. However, the collectivization, actually made possible an increase in supplies available to towns, thus it laid the foundation of the success of the drive for the industrialization. This was momentous: there can be no doubt that industrial production grew at a pace unparalleled even during the explosive expansion of the United States. As previouslu shown table shows, within a decade the Soviet Union, starting from a primitive state, emerged from the ordeal as the second largest industrial power of the world. The technical and economic achievement of the Soviet production was soon amply confirmed by the Russian capacity to resist German attack. Even the carnage of their administrative elite in the late 1930’s did not altogether stop expansion – it was merely reduced to a level roughly equal to that of the best years of the non-Soviet world.

Books suggested for further reading:

H. Arndt: The economic Lessons of the 1930’s (Chatham House, 1944)

P. T. Ellsworth: The international economy (Macmillan, New York, 1950)

Donald Marsh: International tTrade and Investment (Harcourt & Brace, New York, 1951)

A. Bergson: Soviet Economic Growth (Peterson & Co., Evanston Illinois, 1955)

National and International Measures to Maintain Full Employment (U.N.O., 1950); Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Areas (U.N.O., 1951)

Thomas Ballogh, The Dollar Crisis (Blackwell, 1949)

Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Indeed, honorable Mr. Fiala? How strange that these brochures for a Czech car named Tatra 600, or "Tatraplan" were printed in English, and distributed in Birmingham - United Kingdom…:eek:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Tatraplan1948.jpg

Tatraplan – Export Sales Brochure, British

...or that this nice Czechoslovakian car, named Škoda, more precisely Škoda 1102 Convertible, produced in more than 80.000 units was exposed for sale for 5505 Dutch Guldens at auto show in Amsterdam, April 26 1950.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda1102-Amsterdam.jpg

Škoda 1102 Convertible, International Automobile Salon, 1950

Pretty strange for a country that produced only tractors and weapons for USSR, isn’t it?:)

Panzerknacker

11-21-2007, 10:13 PM

Nobody want to talk about Generals anymore ?

OK.

Closed until I can split the off topic post.

Panzerknacker

11-23-2007, 08:00 AM

All right, thread splited from "favorite russian general" and reopened.

Please avoid any kind of "inflamation".

Firefly

11-23-2007, 07:31 PM

Well done PK...

Jan Fiala

11-25-2007, 08:39 AM

Quote:
Since 1948 we made only tractors and weapons for USSR.

Indeed, honorable Mr. Fiala? How strange that these brochures for a Czech car named Tatra 600, or "Tatraplan" were printed in English, and distributed in Birmingham - United Kingdom…

Word "only" was hyperbolic, i mean five-year plans, major part of indusry were waepons, tractors(and other farm machinery and vehicles), simply heavy industry no matter the needs of market. Tatraplan was one of the best Czech post-war cars(with 603, 813 and some cars made in 50's). Other cars made in age of communists (Škoda 1000, 100, 105, 120...)were perturbative, poor quality cars...

Kato

11-25-2007, 11:38 AM

The crux of the agricultural problem was not the collectivization, but productivity per acre, deeply dependant upon adequate mechanization and chemization of agriculture.

Nothing of the sort. Before collectivisation the USSR was the main exporter of agricultural production with the same problems of adequate mechanization and chemization but after collectivisation the agricultural output started to decline.

Agricultural corporations - the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union in farming production - actually represented a direct copy of the highly inventive American organizational patent from 1932, aimed to handle the giant farms as specific factories, with enclosed production and different "inputs" (such as pesticides, feed, fertilizer, and fuel) and "outputs" (corn, chickens, pigs, and so forth).

The Soviet Union had a different ideological and economic system opposing to the one of the US. So if it had really tried to copy something it would have had to begin with converting state property into private one and not vice versa.

The goal was to increase yield and decrease costs of production, typically by exploiting economies of scale, with factual employment of workers-like, wage-earning personal of different profiles (harvesters, drivers, veterinarians, manual workers, accountants, etc.).

The goal was to prevent the possibity of "counter-revolution" and crack down nationalism. This goal was openly declared in the communist party meetings and its official documents

Despite significant transformations in early 1970’s, the bulk of the Soviet agricultural production represented a direct copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, with some 26.000 giant farms – averaging 14.750 hectares (36.000 acres), plus so called state farms with average 6070 hectares (15.000 acres) occupying 97% of Soviet farmland. Some 38 million private plots of farm and city families made up the remaining 3 %.

To make some copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, the USSR had to be a capitalist state.

And at the opposite pole the Soviet Union has an even more crushing power. The USSR has, with hardly any outside help, in merely 25 years of unparalleled effort not merely transformed itself from a mainly primitive peasant economy into the second largest Industrial Power equipped with every miracle of science and technology – from jet engines to hydrogen bombs – but initiated a completely new system of economic organization at fundamental variance with what was before.

It is tendatious interpretation.

Bolsheviks inherited the industrial basis of the Russian Empire. Yes, the industry of the Russian Empire wasn't the most powerful in the world but it rather closely followed the national industries of the leading countries. As to
primitive peasant economy, one may object that nearly all the European states ( even France and partly Germany) had peasant economies ( majority of the population involved in agriculture) in the 1920s.

The words "with hardly any outside help" are also wrong because the USSR concluded trade, economic and political agreements with all the leading countries and it wasn't economicly isolated.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/AnnualIncomePerCapita-1938.jpg

Woytinsky and Wojtynsky: "World Population and Production", New York, 1953

Any foreign statistics of AnnualIncomePerCapita and Production indicators can be generared on the basis of the Soviet statistics. Foreign institutions were simply unable to make up surveys in such a closed country like the USSR.

But even if these figures were adequate, they are just general indicators that can't give the idea about the proporion of national wealth distributed among ordinary population and retained by the state that pay miserable sallaries, owned all the means of production and even the living premises of its citizens.

Egorka

11-26-2007, 09:02 AM

Enjoy!

Czech Peoples Army photo album. (http://tiomkin.livejournal.com/692876.html)

pdf27

11-26-2007, 01:55 PM

Cheers for that Egorka. Nice photos, even if they don't show the Czechs being able to do much more than march badly...

Jan Fiala

11-26-2007, 02:05 PM

Some better photos of our (Czech) army:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwE2wY8YOGU

tankgeezer

11-26-2007, 02:12 PM

Enjoy!

Czech Peoples Army photo album. (http://tiomkin.livejournal.com/692876.html)
Thanks!I enjoyed the photos immensely, but #15 with the 3 tanks, and infantry, I hope it was staged for the photo, as that tight little group is just what the NATO forces would have been hoping for in a war. Without range finders, (doesnt look like they are equipped) they would be easy prey for ranging equipped Nato tanks.

pdf27

11-26-2007, 05:11 PM

Some better photos of our (Czech) army:
Umm... nice photos but that's got to be one of the worst videos I've ever seen on YouTube - the pictures change in time with the music, but so fast you can't actually take in the contents to any meaningful level of detail. Also, they're pre-1938, so aren't all that relevant to the topic of "Hard Facts about Communism"...

Nickdfresh

11-26-2007, 07:30 PM

Enjoy!

Czech Peoples Army photo album. (http://tiomkin.livejournal.com/692876.html)

Interesting pics.

Incidentally, does The Czech Republic still produce variants of the T-80 MDT?

Jan Fiala

11-27-2007, 11:07 AM

Also, they're pre-1938, so aren't all that relevant to the topic of "Hard Facts about Communism"...

No it isn't, but its also Czech army. Egorkas's photos of post-war army are not relevant too.;)

pdf27

11-27-2007, 01:22 PM

Egorkas's photos of post-war army are not relevant too.;)
I dunno. I mean, ensuring your vassal states (sorry, I mean "fraternal socialist allies", slip of the tongue there) are so incompetent militarily that they can't pose a threat to you sounds like an awfully typical communist tactic to me...

Dani

11-27-2007, 02:27 PM

I dunno. I mean, ensuring your vassal states (sorry, I mean "fraternal socialist allies", slip of the tongue there) are so incompetent militarily that they can't pose a threat to you sounds like an awfully typical communist tactic to me...

LOL A good one pdf!! You are entirely right.

Jan Fiala

11-28-2007, 01:20 PM

...can't pose a threat to you sounds like an awfully typical communist tactic to me... .

I don't understand. Please type by easy english, because "...can't pose a threat to you sounds like ..."this phrase is not unambiguously transferable.

Dani

11-28-2007, 01:43 PM

[...]this phrase is not unambiguously transferable.

Would you be so kind to use plain English? Now is my turn to stare and stare at your post.;)

pdf27

11-28-2007, 05:32 PM

I don't understand. Please type by easy english, because "...can't pose a threat to you sounds like ..."this phrase is not unambiguously transferable.

What I was saying was that a typical communist tactic was to ensure that nobody else could pose a threat to whatever communist country was currently the most powerful (in this case Russia). Therefore, pictures showing the Czechoslovak army during communist times as not being very good are relevant to the topic.

Egorka

11-29-2007, 05:30 AM

Rising Sun*

11-29-2007, 06:35 AM

F.ex. the evil communists in attempt to free the enslaved West European workers from the decadant capitalists floud accross the peacefull European planes pillaging and raping everything that showes any sign of being alive.

That was the Soviet doctrine.

NATO, having learnt from the more ruthless approach of the Soviets during WWII, decided to be even more ruthless if WWIII broke out.

Field instructions were to rape anything, preferably but not necessarily female, with a pulse or, failing that, recently warm.

Consequently, all NATO units were equipped with secret equipment to keep warm, or just warm up in cold weather, communist sheilas.

Since the end of the cold war, these secret items have now been released for general use.

They are commonly known as patio (or in Spanish puta ) heaters.

Egorka

11-29-2007, 06:45 AM

By the way!
Guys I have a question. What was the NATO's war doctrine (I hope it is a right word) in case of a military conflict wit the Warsaw pact countries?
I mean what was the ground army prepared to do in case the hot war breaks out?

F.ex. the evil communists in attempt to free the enslaved West European workers from the decadant capitalists flooding accross the peacefull European planes pillaging and raping everything that showes any sign of being alive.

So what were the NATO armies supposed to do? Stay or move? What was the rough plan to neutralise the attacker?

Man of Stoat

11-29-2007, 07:12 AM

NATO had no "first strike" doctrine (unlike the Soviets...), and one of the key assumptions was that there would be an escalation followed by war (NATO tanks, for instance, were not bombed up with ammunition while the eastern counterparts were).

It was also assumed that tactical nukes would have been deployed relatively early on, and we had these marvellous things called nuclear demolition mines which were to be placed at important locations (many West German bridges were built with a cavity for one) to give the third shock army the good news.

Now, had the Soviets attacked outside of working hours on a weekend they would have been facing only largely British and American units, the Dutch, Danes, and Germans having gone home for the weekend...

It was essentially assumed that the first line of defence would be neutralised by the superior numbers of the Reds...

Rising Sun*

11-29-2007, 07:18 AM

Dani

11-29-2007, 07:30 AM

A legend for the others and not for the almighty staff:D
Obviously I can see posts deleted by both of you.;)

Man of Stoat

11-29-2007, 07:37 AM

Try this thread for an interesting discussion:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=80202/postdays=0/postorder=asc/start=0.html

Rising Sun*

11-29-2007, 07:53 AM

A legend for the others and not for the almighty staff:D
Obviously I can see posts deleted by both of you.;)

Fair enough, but couldn't you let Egorka wonder about my supernatural powers for a while. :D

Rising Sun*

11-29-2007, 08:02 AM

Try this thread for an interesting discussion:

http://www.arrse.co.uk/cpgn2/Forums/viewtopic/t=80202/postdays=0/postorder=asc/start=0.html

An alternative view is that the so called Cold War started well before WWII and that WWII (and the Spanish Civil War) merely interrupted it, and allowed the Soviets as the only organised agents of communism to expand much further than they ever could have hoped while ringed by the rabidly anti-communist parties to the Tri-Partite Pact, which foolishly destroyed their anti-communist aims by military adventurism in what became WWII.

Nickdfresh

11-29-2007, 08:10 AM

Egorka

11-29-2007, 08:14 AM

NATO had no "first strike" doctrine (unlike the Soviets...),
Could you, please, elaborate on this or give me some links to read?

and one of the key assumptions was that there would be an escalation followed by war (NATO tanks, for instance, were not bombed up with ammunition while the eastern counterparts were)
...
It was essentially assumed that the first line of defence would be neutralised by the superior numbers of the Reds...

That is not really what I asked about.

Lets say:

Reds attack.
NATO parries the first blow stopping the Reds advance.
Then what? What do NATO land forces do? Stay same place? Counter attack?

Man of Stoat

11-29-2007, 08:15 AM

Rising Sun, read further into that thread and there's some interesting discussions on nuclear demolition mines and other cold war weaponry

Man of Stoat

11-29-2007, 08:17 AM

Igor, presumably counter-attack at least until the tactical nuclear wasteland which is now the inner German border.

Egorka

11-29-2007, 08:19 AM

I am a legend.

I responded to your post #44 with my post #43 ten minutes before you posted #44.

Do not trifle with me, for I am the Big Thing of Infinite Knowledge and Power. :D
You are not a legend, unfortunately. But an unescapable reality... and my nemesis.
I asked a serious question and you got to attack it with your humor... ;)

Egorka

11-29-2007, 08:23 AM

NATO's doctrine went from "defense in depth" to "Air Land Battle 2000" in the late 1980s. The basic overall strategy premise was to quickly cut off and attempt to rout Warsaw Pact thrusts into the West with armor to disrupt the offensive...
That is parrying the first strike.
Do you mean that after the initial Red's attack the NATO forces whould just hold the line?

Egorka

11-29-2007, 08:27 AM

Igor, presumably counter-attack at least until the tactical nuclear wasteland which is now the inner German border.
:) Only until the border? Is it really how the NATO's counter strike was planned? IThat is what I wanted to find out with my question. Do you have any refferences/links on this matter?

Man of Stoat

11-29-2007, 08:55 AM

No idea, actually, there must be a book about it somewhere though

Egorka

11-29-2007, 09:04 AM

No idea, actually, there must be a book about it somewhere though

Ok. What about this one: "NATO had no "first strike" doctrine (unlike the Soviets...), "

Where was the NATO's "no first strike" doctrine defined? How do you know that Soviet's did nave "first strike" doctrine?

pdf27

11-29-2007, 01:14 PM

Of course, only communists are capable of such behavious... no one else... I am being sarcastic here , in case it not clear... :)
Oh, not in the least - most empires act like that with "native" troops they don't fully trust, see for instance the way the Indian army was officered and equipped prior to WW2.
However, the point I was trying to make in there was that during the Cold War the communist states tended to behave like this (military forces more competent than those directly loyal to Moscow or Peking being regarded with extreme suspicion), but that with a handful of exceptions the US was always encouraging it's allies to become more effective militarily.

Egorka

11-29-2007, 06:07 PM

However, the point I was trying to make in there was that during the Cold War the communist states tended to behave like this (military forces more competent than those directly loyal to Moscow or Peking being regarded with extreme suspicion), but that with a handful of exceptions the US was always encouraging it's allies to become more effective militarily.
I am not saying that this point makes no sense. To certain degree it was true. But I think the extend of this is normaly much overestimated.
The east european socialist countires were only partly controlled by the USSR's goverment. They had a great deal of freedom to dowhat the local burocrats wanted.

Anyways, do you have any specific info about how Soviet goverment kept down the development of other East European armies?

And by the way, what was that you saw in that booklet about Czheck army that showed it's incompetence?

Nickdfresh

11-29-2007, 07:06 PM

That is parrying the first strike.
Do you mean that after the initial Red's attack the NATO forces whould just hold the line?

No. Think German invasion of France in 1940, only, this time, NATO plays the part of the French that are cutting off the overextended and exposed supply lines of the German salient rather than allowing themselves to be cut off and annihilated in set piece battles...

An over simplistic take of my amateurish knowledge of tactic's, but I think that's pretty much it...

Of course, the Soviets were never much about logistics; one of the problems they had after invading Afghanistan...

Nickdfresh

11-29-2007, 07:10 PM

Igor, presumably counter-attack at least until the tactical nuclear wasteland which is now the inner German border.

Only if everything else failed. NATO became a bit more optimistic towards the end of the Cold War...

Some ever estimated that the qualitative advantage in AFVs gave NATO an overall advantage of 1.1 to 1 in tanks, even though the Soviets vastly outnumbered them...

Firefly

11-30-2007, 04:17 AM

Of this all is a wee bit mute as Soviet battle plans always included liberal amounts of Nuclear and biological weapons. So any wr scenario would have quickly turned into global annihilation.

Egorka

11-30-2007, 04:20 AM

Of this all is a wee bit mute as Soviet battle plans always included liberal amounts of Nuclear and biological weapons. So any wr scenario would have quickly turned into global annihilation.
What Soviet battle plans? Do you have any refferences?

pdf27

11-30-2007, 08:44 AM

I am not saying that this point makes no sense. To certain degree it was true. But I think the extend of this is normaly much overestimated.
Indeed - it was clearly in the Soviet interest that the Warsaw pact states were at least partially competent militarily. However, the Brezhnev doctrine (that Soviet troops would intervene militarily in those Warsaw Pact states that didn't behave themselves as judged from Moscow) requires that these Warsaw Pact troops be unable to stand up against the Red Army in a straight fight.

The east european socialist countires were only partly controlled by the USSR's goverment. They had a great deal of freedom to dowhat the local burocrats wanted.
Agreed. My perception is that Moscow set limits within which they were allowed to pretty much do what they wanted. Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in the early 1980s demonstrated what would happen if they went outside these limits and tried to form their own policies.

Anyways, do you have any specific info about how Soviet goverment kept down the development of other East European armies?
General, not specific. Examples would be the way that manufacture of Main Battle Tanks outside the Soviet Union was always of slightly older designs - Poland for instance started producing T-72 derivatives (with slightly less advanced armour than the Russian model) at a time when the Soviets were starting to make the T-80.

And by the way, what was that you saw in that booklet about Czheck army that showed it's incompetence?
I wasn't claiming incompetence, rather that about all you can tell from the photos is that their marching wasn't up to scratch. The photos from in the field are blatantly posed - there is no way an army would act like that facing real opposition and survive very long.

http://pics.livejournal.com/tiomkin/pic/0001238g
Tanks right next to each other with a handful of infantry running behind. Looks great, but there is no way you would do that in reality. The tanks have come through a very large piece of open ground (which any defender would select as their "killing area"), there are too few infantry to provide any meaningful support, and the tanks are so close together that they're a dream target for artillery.

http://pics.livejournal.com/tiomkin/pic/00013f4g
The infantry are getting out of their armoured carrier having apparently just crossed a ridge line (rather than getting out in dead ground where they won't be shot). They also appear to be carrying their full marching order straight into a firefight, rather than just their fighting order.

http://pics.livejournal.com/tiomkin/pic/00014ch8
Camouflaged gun positions, but with a blindingly obvious white road leading up to them? What the f***?

Personally, I think these shots were all set up by the local propaganda service, and don't represent in any way the reality of the army. Which is what I was trying to say in the first place.

Egorka

11-30-2007, 02:23 PM

Personally, I think these shots were all set up by the local propaganda service, and don't represent in any way the reality of the army. Which is what I was trying to say in the first place.
Exactly! :) Which makes all your reasonable points like "tanks right next to each other" and "with a blindingly obvious white road leading up to them" irrelevant, I am afraid... :)

Egorka

11-30-2007, 02:44 PM

There have been mentioned American financial help programs in this and other threads.
Having sertain respect and acknoledging positive impact on other countries that that help provided I, nonetheless, would like you to take a look at this scan from the book "Hvad-Hvem-Hvor 1964" printed in Denmark. It is a yearly facts collection catalog that is being issued every year up until these days.

I would like to show you 2 scans from that book.

The first one shows the Foreign Aid provided by the USA and USSR to other countries during the period of 1955-1959.
USA - green, USSR - red. The size of the figures represent the amout of help. As you may see the USA's help is larger, but the USSR's help is also very sizeable. I would gess Soviet aid is about 1/3 of the USA's or so.

In the low left corner the diagramm for the USA foreighn air for the period 1945 - 1962, split on military aid (brown) and civil aid (yellow).

http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2092/2075305133_2a0afb3b8a_m.jpg
click to enlarge (120kb) (http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2092/2075305133_c5dc35628f_o.jpg)
.
The second one is desposition of the West and East forces in the early 1960s.
In the left dowd corner you can see the balance between different forces.
The Soviets have certain overal quantitative advantage but are probably lacking in quality. And if you also remember that USA by 1964 had 5 times more nuclear charges than USSR (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:US_and_USSR_nuclear_stockpiles.svg), then the the balace forces will be more or less apparenet.

http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2348/2076091608_e91ffefde0_m.jpg
click to enlarge (180kb) (http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2348/2076091608_f984cad1ff_o.jpg)

It is not the world's best source of info but interesting nonetheless.

pdf27

11-30-2007, 03:57 PM

Exactly! :) Which makes all your reasonable points like "tanks right next to each other" and "with a blindingly obvious white road leading up to them" irrelevant, I am afraid... :)
Sorry, you misunderstand me. I was trying to show that the photos were propaganda shots to support my original contention that they were "Nice photos, even if they don't show the Czechs being able to do much more than march badly...".
What I meant by that is that they didn't provide any useful information beyond the fact that the Czech army was marching slightly out of step in one parade.

Egorka

11-30-2007, 05:24 PM

This photo album was dedicated to 30 years anyversary of the Czheck People's Army. Issued by the "Beuro for Political Propaganda" in 1975. So what else do you want? It is a retorical question... :)

pdf27

11-30-2007, 07:40 PM

Sadly I don't speak Russian and judging by the script all the comments on that page were in Russian. Bit tricky for me to figure that one out then...

Jan Fiala

12-01-2007, 07:28 AM

Czheck People's Army

Please type word "Czech" in correct form. Until 1993 our army was called Czechoslovakian People Army (Československá lidová armáda - ČSLA).

These color photos of CSLA are of course propagandistic.

Rising Sun*

12-01-2007, 08:17 AM

Tanks right next to each other with a handful of infantry running behind. Looks great, but there is no way you would do that in reality. The tanks have come through a very large piece of open ground (which any defender would select as their "killing area"), there are too few infantry to provide any meaningful support, and the tanks are so close together that they're a dream target for artillery.

Not to mention that the tanks are running straight ahead.

Easy targets.

Support? One or two rifleman per tank? Hardly worth an attack, is it?

The infantry are getting out of their armoured carrier having apparently just crossed a ridge line (rather than getting out in dead ground where they won't be shot). They also appear to be carrying their full marching order straight into a firefight, rather than just their fighting order.

There are all sorts of reasons for leaving a vehicle in a hurry, many not tactically ideal, but having spent a bit of time in the back of Saracens among other beasts that aren't that dissimilar to the vehicle above, I can say that if you can get your troop / section whatever it's called out of it in a sufficient hurry with your weapons and webbing to form a firebase to respond to a serious, well planned and well executed attack and or before your vehicle gets brewed up, you are doing well.

If you can get full marching order into a Saracen, never mind out of it in a hurry, you're a champion.

And I recall this with some clarity as a trooper in a Saracen going over a shabby rural bridge prominently signed that it was rated at about one fifth of the weight for the vehicle, while a certain officer who liked to present himself as heroic stood on the roadside, after carefully leaving the Saracen we were in before giving his heroic order to cross the bridge to add to his heroic reputation for deeds of derring do. None of which involved him risking his shrivelled little nuts.

Funny thing is, it was about that time that I resolved that if in the highly unlikely event the army was sufficiently stupid to send us to war, Captain X was going to be my first target, closely followed by Corporal Y if he didn't wake up to himself. Even funnier, much of my whole armoured unit came independently to pretty much the same view, although not always involving the same targets.

Librarian

12-04-2007, 07:19 PM

So sorry, honorable ladies and gentlemen – I have had some urgent official duties. Nevertheless – here are my replies:

Word "only" was hyperbolic, i mean five-year plans, major part of indusry were waepons, tractors(and other farm machinery and vehicles), simply heavy industry no matter the needs of market. Tatraplan was one of the best Czech post-war cars(with 603, 813 and some cars made in 50's). Other cars made in age of communists (Škoda 1000, 100, 105, 120...)were perturbative, poor quality cars...

Indeed, my dear Mr. Fiala – hyperbolic it surely was, to say it mildly. But this utterly fair answer of yours testifies that a strong devotion not to be huddled in an appealing, comfortable, and so sorrowfully widespread cocoon of intellectual hibernation is highly vivid, and that fact deserves an unrestrained public admiration. I wish you many happy returns! :D

Additionally, allow me, please, just a few tiny remarks about some common mistakes connected with Czechoslovakian production of material goods. It has to be mentioned that industrial production in your country was very well balanced and truly diversified – list of industrial products encompassed more than 76000 different commodities, starting with airplanes and concluding with crystal water glasses – with a rationally calculated aggregate supply rate of all goods.

On the subject of your conclusion with reference to the quality of Czechoslovakian post-war cars, I have to say that I am in complete agreeableness with you regarding qualities of Tatra 600 Tatraplan. However, by my personal opinion, the best car produced by renowned Tatra národní podnik – Kopřivnice is the following one:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/TatraJK2500-6.jpg

Tatra JK 2500

This magnificent prototype was made in 1956. Alas, it never came to production. What a pity for this miracle on wheels, constructed by talented engineer Mr. Julius Kubinsky, and completely capable to achieve maximum speed of 207km/h (130mph).

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/TatraJK2500-5.jpg

Tatra JK 2500 – Czechoslovakian automobile challenge for the eminent Alfa Romeo 6C 2500

And no, my dear Mr. Fiala – those other cars that have been produced in communist age were not poor quality ones – on the contrary, they were capable to do their transportation tasks reasonably well It is less known that, for example, Škoda 440 Spartak successfully and profitably entered even a choosey and conceited US market, and effectively passed all US governmental attestations.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda440USA.jpg

Škoda 440 – Spartak, US commercial

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda1000MBNorwegian.jpg

Škoda 1000 MB – Norwegian Trailer

Unlike Japanese and some European cars imported into US during the late sixties and early seventies, Škoda’s were not junk cars with, for example, multiple brakes failures and a rust weakened chassis, like Datsun 240 Z, or horrifying exemplars of constructive irresponsibility in the North American car production, like domestic junk-small cars – Chevy Vega and Firenza, Chrysler’s Omni and Horizon, or Ford Pinto and Bobcat. Yes, I know, my dear Mr. Fiala – Škoda was not a substitute for the Mercedes Benz, but you are too young to be acquainted with the fact that, for example, US born Ford Pinto was widely known back there in the States as Ford’s rolling Molotov Cocktail, catching fire and trapping occupants when hit from the rear. And you also don’t know that officially proven fact was that Ford knew of the danger but bowed to its accountants who figured it would cost less to stonewall each future death and burn injury then to recall and redesign the fuel tank. But don’t worry, if you wish this old fool will inform you about immortal achievements in an industry known for its dishonesty and exaggerated claims.:roll:

You don’t have to believe this, but those "commie" engineers in Mlada Boleslaw were, as a matter of fact highly original. This construction, for example, with internal code HF55-57100 RS, was pronounced the Engine of the Year in a 1000-1300ccm category by notorious Swiss auto-magazine "Automobil Revue – Revue Automobile" and employed in Skoda "1101 typ 968" coupé.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda1100DOHC-92HP.jpg

Skoda HF55-57100 RS – 1100 ccm, 4 cylinder DOHC, compression ratio 12,2:1 - 92 HP

Another fine example of the Czechoslovakian designing ingenuity was this Skoda "Super Sport 1100" from 1971 - a sport coupè with liftable roof and with the engine of the "S-110R" (1107 ccm, 80 HP at 6000 RPM, maximum speed of 180 km/h).

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda1107SuperSport.jpg

Skoda Super Sport 1100

Not even to mention this anticipated "BMW and Alfa-Romeo competitor", the one and only Škoda 720.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda720-3.jpg

Škoda 720 (4 cylinder, 1997 ccm OHC engine, 160 HP/6000 RPM, 210Nm/5000 RPM) - Alfa z Boleslavi

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Skoda760Alfa.jpg

Škoda 720

Poor quality cars? No, my dear Mr. Fiala – just a vast quantity of uncertain information environments about Czechoslovakian cars. That’s all. ;)

And yes – please, reconsider some possibilities for the change of that unambiguous message in your signature. Although our distinguished colleagues here are most probably not familiar with the meaning of that inscription "Smrt komunistum" (Death to communists), I am sure that aforesaid proclamation is not very popular among them.

In the meantime, as always – all the best! :)

Librarian

12-04-2007, 07:32 PM

Nothing of the sort. Before collectivisation the USSR was the main exporter of agricultural production with the same problems of adequate mechanization and chemization but after collectivisation the agricultural output started to decline.

The main problem with this normative stance of yours, my dear Mr. Kato is the fact that the USSR was even larger exporter of agricultural products (primarily grain) after the collectivization. If you don’t believe this just take a look upon this diagram:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/USSRgrainexports.jpg

Grain Export, USSR
(Nove, A.: An Economic History of the USSR. Penguin Books, 1990.)

As we all know from our curriculum in Macroeconomics, if domestic aggregate demand of a given country is sufficiently suppressed due to different socio-economic reasons, mainly manifested in inadequate price-wages level, consequential misbalance in aggregate supply-aggregate demand equilibrium always will be balanceable by overseas export of domestic goods, no matter how immensely or exiguously production level of specified material goods actually is situated within the country.

So what actually happened? In 1928 Stalin began a series of five year plans to industrialiye the country. The aim of the five year plans was to build up heavy industry (steal, coal, machinery). Under the plans completely new, previously completely unregarded areas of the Soviet Union were developed. New industries such as energy, chemicals, and the production of military equipment were successfully established.

While over 1500 new factories and several new cities were built under the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932), the plan was completed at great cost to the Soviet people. To industrialize the country, the plan needed great amounts of money and equipment, which the war-devastated country did not have. The only way to obtain the necessary money and industrial machinery demanded by the plan was to increase the country’s exports of grain, timber and minerals to the West, unfortunately at a time when grain prices were very low because of the depression in the West. Now more grain would have to be exported to pay for the same quantity of equipment.

To keep up industrialization more capital was needed. To obtain it Stalin ordered more grain to be squeezed from the country. Since the end of the WW1 western per capita production of the basic starches, the "stuff of life" has risen by more than one fourth in industrialized West, it - alas! - declined in the Soviet Union, due to insufficient capital investments in agricultural production.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/USSR-GrainYield.gif

Wheat yield, Russia/USSR and North Dakota, 1885–1990.
(A Reassessment of the Soviet Industrial Revolution, Robert C. Allen)

The quickest way to do this was to nationalize the land and to move the peasants onto collective farms, where very limited amounts of modern machinery, so desperately needed for augmentation of the domestic production, were available. Consequences of this effort are observable on the previously presented graph.

This process began in the autumn of 1929. By February of 1930 all peasant households, including livestock, were collectivized. Unfortunately, collectiviyation unleashed wide and ferocious resistance. It sounds completely insane, but peasants even slaughtered their livestock and burnt their crops rather then surrender them to the state. The number of horses, for example, declined from 4.4 million in 1928 to 2.6 million by 1933. Cattle declined in the same period from 8.6 to 4.4 million. Soviet agriculture had always been short of draught animals. The production of tractors was in its infancy and could not replace completely needed animal power, besides, due to heavy operating conditions they were constantly braking down, without sufficient amount of spare parts for repairs. And to add to all these difficulties, a drought hit the country. It began in late 1931 and it was the most severe in the steppes.

The factors that have been mentioned previously contributed to the so called Great Famine of 1932-1933. However, it has to be mentioned that even in succeeding years, when modern agricultural equipment was available in greater quantities, problem of insufficient grain yield persisted.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Yieldperacre.jpg

Average Grain Yield

Western grain yield per acre has swelled from a pre-WW2 average of a little over 1200 lbs to a 1960 average of well over 2000 lbs, while Soviet yield has virtually marked time, rising from 740 to 775 lbs. Of course, proper solution was envisioned, but in early 1950’s accent was set on reconstruction of the urban and production facilities.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Agro-chemizationDDR.jpg

Effects of Agrochemization upon wheat Yield- DDR, vicinity of Malchin, Mecklenburg

Because the USSR has been unable to raise output per acre due to insufficient capital investments in irrigation and chemization, because of reinforced obligations toward rebuilding the country’s towns and villages that had been destroyed in the WW2, it tried to increase its total agricultural output by bringing more acres into use.

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/USSR-VirginLandScheme.jpg

Virgin Land Scheme

However, Khrushchev’s 100-million acre “Virgin Land Scheme" (Included in the dark outlined at right) has suffered three straight droughts (another indeed brilliant example of the importance of irrigation, as a capital investment in agriculture)! These marginal lands were intended to concentrate on wheat, while the older and richer farmlands to the West were intended for more intensive, previously neglected industrial crops. That chapter of the Soviet agricultural production, however, that is a completely different story… :)

Sorry, honorable ladies ang gentlemen - another brake of the post. This is the very reason: The text that you have entered is too long (13447 characters). Please shorten it to 10000 characters long.

Oh, no problem - to be continued...:roll:

Librarian

12-04-2007, 07:33 PM

The Soviet Union had a different ideological and economic system opposing to the one of the US. So if it had really tried to copy something it would have had to begin with converting state property into private one and not vice versa.

On the contrary, my dear Mr. Kato – industrial development of the Soviet Union represents a bold example that issues of ideology and ownership are absolutely irrelevant factors in a scientifically based system of material production. :D

The most magnificent but generally unspeakable story of the XX century is the historical fact that in the first two decades of it progressive intellectuals in two completely different part of the world actually enlarged on the XIX century identification of technology and scientific rationality with the fulfillment of the immanent American and inherent communistic dream. The new century, both in Russia and America seemed to offer bold new prospects, vistas previously hidden in the pessimistic and chaotic nineties.

Such optimism was grounded in the view that the newly emerging industrial state and the corporate organization of production could be directed by man’s rationality to bring a social reformation where poverty, injustice, superstition, and class conflict would be abolished. While representatives of American Progressivism - today almost completely forgotten American social movement - disagreed with European socialists over whether Her Majesty the State, or Her Highness the Corporation represented the proper institution to organize the new, rationally based human society, they agreed that only centralized nation-wide direction under the guidance of experts could assure what Herbert Croly termed the "true promise of American life – the promise of the Allmighty Providence that we have not gathered together here in vain, just to share our misery, but to produce material abundance for ourselves".

One logical conclusion of the implications of progressivism, and scientific management of the society, found its clearest expression in the writings of an American socialist – Thorstein Bunde Veblen. Contrasting the rationality he saw in mechanical industry with the chaos and selfishness he found in finance capitalism, he became a devastating critic of business enterprise.

Veblen believed that technology was creating values counter to those of conspicuous waste, which governed the leisure classes. He preached that possessing a concern for the community’s material welfare, as well as an instinct for efficient workmanship, scientists and engineers are capable to offer hope for a better social order. Veblen concluded with a call for engineers to control the economy, to clean the political system of corruption and to make it responsive to the needs of community.
]
It sounds pretty strange, my dear Mr. Kato, but although American Progressives and Russian Bolsheviks disagreed on precisely what the national needs were, they shared the conviction that politics had become thoroughly corrupt, dominated by greedy bosses and weak, incompetent elected officials. Such man either exploited the community in their own right or were fronts for the self-interested Robber Barons of big business.

American populist school of thought intended to expand direct democratic participation in politics. Russian view was to shorten the ballot and expand the power of the executive administration. The intellectuals generally favored the latter approach.:roll:

In the reformed state they envisaged, the exercise of decision-making power would be largely removed from the corruption of policies or the mercy of fortune, and transferred to expert public servants. The experts, once and for all divorced from political vicissitudes could then freely exercise their rationality – the very basis of the efficient production. They would be able to efficiently administrate the planning activities of the state, and to bring trained intelligence to social problems in a manner that mere politicians were incapable of doing.

In the reformed state he envisaged, the exercise of the apolitical, scientific knowledge about different factors of production will produce a rapid industrial development, higher standard of living and satisfaction of human material needs.

Yes, I know, my dear Mr. Kato - all this sounds pretty strange, but fortunately we have some firm evidence that never officially recognized, but always strapping mutual affection between the USA and the USSR actually was able to triumph over those fabricated societal differences amid them. Please, just read these lines:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Sovietdevelopment1.jpg

Modern Mechanix, 1935 – Soviet Development 1

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Sovietdevelopment2.jpg

Modern Mechanix, 1935 - Soviet Development 2

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Sovietdevelopment3.jpg

Modern Mechanix, 1935 - Soviet Development 3

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Sovietdevelopment4.jpg

Modern Mechanix – Soviet Development 4

Holly Smoke, my dear Mr. Kato - the world's largest automobile plant? In the Soviet Union? In 1930? Designed and engineered by The Austin Company in Cleveland, from the US of A? Constructed under Austin engineers supervision by thousands of Russians? For which Austin was paid in solid gold? This sounds like the stuff of legend and myth - yet it is all true, and the history is indeed more remarkable than all the bits of the story passed down to us.

As part of his first Five-Year Plan to industrialize the USSR., Stalin sought to develop the Soviet auto industry, and he determined that the country needed a modern plant to produce automobiles for the Soviet Union. And yes again, my dear Mr. Kato - the model he chose was the production line of Henry Ford, the ultimate capitalist! In 1929 Ford signed an agreement to sell the Soviets plans, specifications and methods for design and production of trucks and cars and to provide vehicle parts for assembly in the first years of the plant's operation as well!

For design and construction of the plant, the Soviets turned to The Austin Company, which had just completed the Pontiac Six factory, the largest auto plant in the world at that time. Austin's task was to design and manage construction of both a factory capable of producing 140.000 vehicles a year, as well as a model socialist city (sic!) for 35.000 workers and their families - all within 18 months.

To supervise construction of the plant and workers city, Austin sent 20 engineers (several with their families!) to Nizhny Novgorod, a city on the Volga and Oka Rivers 250 miles east of Moscow. Construction began in May 1930 and was completed in November 1931 - an amazing feat for which Austin was paid $1,550,000 in gold - a payment that saw the company through the lean years of the Great Depression. The Austinites returned home, and in January 1932, the first Model A rolled off the production line.

Do you still think that undefeatable ideological and economic societal divergences are so overwhelmingly fundamental in this world of ours, my dear Mr. Kato? If so – think again. You see, previously presented historical miracles are not the unaccompanied ones! ;)

To be continued...

Librarian

12-04-2007, 07:48 PM

The goal was to prevent the possibity of "counter-revolution" and crack down nationalism. This goal was openly declared in the communist party meetings and its official documents...

Sorry, my dear Mr. Kato, but as far as I am capable to read and to understand Russian language, explicitly manifested social goal, presented in this most important party document - Programme of the RCP(B) - first published in 1930, explicitly declares this:

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/RKPB-Program-Agro-aspect1.jpg

Programme of the RCP(B) toward agricultural development- page one

"After the abolition of private property in land and after the almost completed expropriation of the landowners and the promulgation of a law on the socialization of the land, which regards as preferable the large-scale farming of commonly-owned estates, the chief task of Soviet power is to discover and test in practice the most expedient and practical transitional measures to effect this."

"The main line and the guiding principle of the R.C.P. agrarian policy under these circumstances still remains the effort to rely on the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the countryside. They must first and foremost be organised into an independent force, they must be brought closer to the urban proletariat and wrested from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and petty-property interests. The organisation of Poor Peasants’ Committees was one step in this direction; the organisation. of Party cells in the villages, the re-election of Soviet deputies to exclude the kulaks, the establishment of special types of trade unions for the proletarians and semi-proletarians of the country-side-all these and similar measures must be effected without fail. As far as the kulaks, the rural bourgeoisie, are concerned, the policy of the RCP is one of decisive struggle against their attempts at exploitation and the suppression of their resistance to Soviet socialist policy."

"As far as the middle peasant is concerned, the policy of the RCP is one of a cautious attitude towards him; he must not be confused with the kulak and coercive measures must not be used against him; by his class position the middle peasant can be the ally of the proletarian government during the transition to socialism, or, at least, he can remain a neutral element. Despite the unavoidable partial failures and waverings of the middle peasant, therefore, we must strive persistently to reach agreement with him, showing a solicitous attitude to all his desires and making concessions in selecting ways of carrying out socialist reforms. In this respect a prominent, place must be given to the struggle against the abuses of those representatives of Soviet power who, hypocritically taking advantage of the title of Communist, are carrying out a policy that is not communist but is a policy of the bureaucracy, of officialdom; such people must be ruthlessly banished and a stricter control established with the aid of the trade unions and by other means."

Insofar as concerns measures for the transition to communist farming, the RCP will test in practice three principal measures that have already taken shape-state farms, agricultural communes and societies (and co-operatives) for the collective tilling of the soil, care being taken to ensure their more extensive and more correct application, especially in respect of ways of developing the voluntary participation of the peasants in these new forms of cooperative farming and of the organization of the working peasantry to carry out control from below and ensure comradely discipline."

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/RKPB-Program-Agro-aspect2.jpg

Programme of the RCP(B) toward agricultural development- page two

"The RCP food policy upholds the consolidation and development of the state monopoly, and does not reject the use of co-operatives and private traders or the employees of trading firms, or the application of a system of bonuses, on the condition that it is controlled by Soviet power and serves the purpose of the better organization of the business. The partial concessions that have to be made from time to time are only due to the extreme acuteness of need and never imply a refusal to strive persistently to implement the state monopoly. It is very difficult to implement it in a country of small peasant farms, it requires lengthy work and the practical testing of a number of transitional measures that lead to the goal by various ways, i.e., that lead to the universal organization and correct functioning of producers’ and consumers’ communes that hand over all food surpluses to the state."

Finally allow me just one tiny remark. By Stalin’s own admission, the Kulaks (word Kulak means fist and refers to the richer peasants), had little to do with economic considerations. The Kulaks supplied only a fifth of the grain usually used in the soviet countryside. "Dekulakization" was primarily intended to rid the countryside of those most likely to organize and lead resistance to forced collectivization.
(Russia, Then and Now, by Phillis A. Arnold & david J. Rees, (Arnold Publishing – Springfield Missouri), 1993. – p.124.

To make some copy of the American intensive agricultural schematics, the USSR had to be a capitalist state.

Alas, not necessarily, my dear Mr. Kato. Factual production methods used in agricultural production in different countries fortunately always were, and still are completely independent from socio-political structure of those countries. Straightforward application of scientific methods and technological processes is contributing greatly to the augmentation of the net agricultural production of the world even today, regardless

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/InternationalHarvester-theAmericanW.jpg

Harvesting line of International Harvester wheat combines, Topeka, Kansas - USA

http://i10.photobucket.com/albums/a137/Langnasen/Rostselymash-Don1500.jpg

Harvesting line of Rostselymash Don 1500 wheat combines, Pokrovskoye, Donetska Oblast, USSR

You don't believe that? No problem. For example, specific types of cheese have long been associated with definite geographic and thus socioeconomic regions. New scientific developments have enabled United States manufacturers to reproduce these specific cheeses successfully. It sounds almost incredibly, but American manufacturers have been so successful in imitating Swiss cheese (the whole secret actually was embedded in a curd lifting process from a vat, and the application of the specific micro-organisms which produce the wholes in cheese) that the Swiss producers have joined together to fight the very efficient American competition! :D

Introduction of the insulated tank trucks and railroad cars (US patent from 1952), capable to keep milk cold and to speed it safely from dairy farms to city dairy plants, resulted in a great enlargement of the "milkshed" – the area from which a city can obtain its milk, without much more costly condensation, evaporation or powdering procedures. Yet again, socio-economic structure of the given country is completely irrelevant in this case too. (Duncan, A. O: Food processing – Atlanta, Turner E. Smith and Co. – p. 133)

Effects of the Machinery upon Wheat production, for example are totally independent from the socio-economical structures as well – the invention that revolutionized the wheat industry was the reaper, invented by Cyrus McCormick in 1831. This device not only simplified harvesting, but enormously increased the area which a farmer might plant. Today the combine which includes both a reaper and a thresher, makes it possible for the proucer to work wheat areas many times the size of those prior to this invention.

As stated in a truly magnificent report of Mr. Herb Plambeck, Farm Director from the WHO Station in Des Moines, Iowa – who actually have visited USSR in 1962, all Soviet planting practices, administration of nutrients, weed elimination procedures, disease and insect management, irrigation patterns and harvesting techniques, as well as storage operationalization actually represented a slightly modified reproduction of the contiguous American patterns.

If you are interested for this highly intriguing matter, my dear Mr. Kato, I am recommending you some highly accurate and very carefully crafted pieces of painstaking quantitative and qualitative research, but in the very same time also some provocative studies about one of the most perplexing episodes in European history – the history of the development of the Soviet Agro-corporation.

Those significant scientific works were created by two highly renowned Ukrainian scientists, academic work (PhD thesis) by Mr. Volodimir Antonovich Plyotinskii: "The Agro-corporation Down of Communism" (Плютинський Володимир Антонович: Агропромислова корпорація "Зоря