Which you think was the worst operation of the Allied forces .

[kallinikosdrama1992]

My opinion is that the worst operation was operation market garden , because to many troopers died or captured and the main objective wasn't achieved

[pdf27]

Lots of people dying for no success doesn't narrow it down very much on either side. You're going to have to define "worst" far more accurately, but for starters pick any one off the following list.

From the point of view of the troops on the ground:

Kohima/Imphal - British & Indian troops cut off on a single hilltop for several weeks, a couple of battalions against most of a division.

Sieges of Stalingrad and Leningrad - classical meat grinder type sieges, with the defenders having to spend blood liberally while starving to death in order to keep the lines intact.

Battle of Sutjeska - the partisans were outnumbered 7:1, with no armour or air support, fighting an enemy who would not take prisoners and even massacred captured wounded and medical staff.

In terms of planning incompetence:

Fall of France in 1940 - the French army was effectively shattered simply because the command staff panicked and couldn't regain control. That cost them 100,000 dead in a few weeks.

Fall of Singapore - all of the above, as well as complacency and racism, assuming that the Japanese were inferior. I would be inclined to include the sinking of Force Z (HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse) under this heading and nominate it as the worst cock-up of the war.

Barbarossa - the early battles of encirclement in 1940. Immense quantities of Soviet men and equipment captured because Stalin wasn't thinking. This nearly cost them the war.

[Chevan]

Barbarossa - the early battles of encirclement in 1940. Immense quantities of Soviet men and equipment captured because Stalin wasn't thinking. This nearly cost them the war.
You are getting into a tangle pdf.;)
Barbarossa was started in 22 june 1941.
BTW it was not a Stalin who was responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Soviet Western district in Belarussia , but the general Pavlov who have not executed the order of Hight command to make troops ready for combat in 18-20 june.
In other fronts - Southern and Northern -the German succes wan't so impressive coz Soviet command in there acted enough professionaly.

[alephh]

1) Operation Barbarossa - Several Soviet commanders wanted to put their ground/airforce/naval troops in high alert, but Stalin refused that, like he refused flying over 100km in the german side of the border, and sometimes even shooting at germans without a permit.

2) Fall of France: Soldiers, tactics, leaders... everything was so disunited.

3) Operation Market Garden: Way too risky. And a lot of intelligence information about german units was simply ignored because it didn't fit to the plans.


_

[pdf27]

You are getting into a tangle pdf.;)
Barbarossa was started in 22 june 1941.
Dammit, good spot. I plead finger trouble.

BTW it was not a Stalin who was responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Soviet Western district in Belarussia , but the general Pavlov who have not executed the order of Hight command to make troops ready for combat in 18-20 june.
In other fronts - Southern and Northern -the German succes wan't so impressive coz Soviet command in there acted enough professionaly.
Umm... yes, to an extent. Thing is, Stalin was still responsible for the attitude of "hold at all costs" and the refusal to trade space (the one thing Russia had a hell of a lot of) for time, manpower and materiel (two of which Russia was critically short of in 1941, and the third (manpower) they may have had plenty of but that attitude is kind of hard on the poor bastards on the ground).

3) Operation Market Garden: Way too risky. And a lot of intelligence information about german units was simply ignored because it didn't fit to the plans.
To be fair, that intelligence information was IIRC coming out of a net that the Allies had only just realised had been almost totally taken over by the Germans. Thus any information they got from intelligence sources will have a very hard time being believed - and if it entails changing the whole plan, human nature is to try to wish it away.

I'm not arguing that Market Garden wasn't a collossal cockup, but rather that compared to some other ones it's a relatively small one (forces involved and casualties small compared to some campaigns, and the operation did in fact achieve most of it's objectives). I'd also say you're picking out the wrong errors - placing the DZs so far from the objectives was the one error that cost the operation, had they been dropped closer the US paratroopers could have captured their bridges in time to let the Guards Armoured division get to Arnhem more or less in time. Furthermore the British paratroopers would have been able to commit substantial forces to holding the bridges in Arnhem (and indeed capturing them in the first place) rather than as they did leaving a small group (company size?) to hold the bridges and use the rest of the force to hold the airhead.
These weren't exactly new concepts - the seizure of Pegasus bridge for example is a picture-perfect example of how to seize a bridge using airbourne forces, and was done several months before the planning started for Market Garden. However, the planners simply ignored this experience - and their troops paid the penalty.

[overlord644]

id say market garden was probably the worst planned, being thrown together fairly quickly and at the expense of general pattons speedy advance. The british dropzones were in crappy locations far from there objectives near arnhem. Also the armors execution was less than spectacular.

[Gen. Sandworm]

Depends all on how you look at it. Operation Jubilee or the raid on Dieppe was a complete disaster however if that had not been launched then Operation Overload would have had many more problems. Alot more dead bodies on the Normandy beachs.

Sometimes you just have to learn as you go!

[Carl Schwamberger]

The several attacks on the German Gustav Line in Italy in 1943-44. A lot of Allied casualties for little gain. Then there was a British attack on some Greek island, which was entirely repulsed with heavy losses.

Dieppe may qualify as 'Worst Planned' .

1.Having one of the brigades attack the foritfied port frontally was down right ignorant. It ran contrary to British practice for the previous several centuries. US Army amphibious doctrine called for the landing to occur adjacent to a port & it be captured from the landward side. Nothing original in this, its been the standard practice by most armys. The Roman navy routinely used that technique. I guess the Greeks, Phonecians, & even the Sumerians understood that principle. A few months later in Torch a British naval unit tried exactly the same thing (with a borrowed US Ranger battalion) in Operation Reservist. The entire combined landing force of US & British was killed or captured by the French. I supose if there is a leasson there it is 'Dont violate a proven principle of the last 5,000 years'.

2. Lack of adaquate & coordinated air support. The RAF took the opportunity to fight a air superiority battle over Western Europe during the Dieppe landing. But the tactical bombing support was not suffcient and not well controled. The British had already learned many hard lessons about coordinating air and ground operations in France & Africa & air/ground ops were arleady far better run in Africa than at Dieppe. Just why those leassons were not applied at Dieppe is worthy question.

3. As a exercise in running battalions across a beach Dieppe had little to offer. Over a dozen divsion & corps sized practice exercises had been run in the US already. A dozen more were scheduled when Dieppe occured, and other combat landing operations were getting under way in the Pacific. For the problems of timing landing waves, boat loading, navigation aids, naval gunfire support, command details, and supply Dieppe had little to offer the experince already accumulated.

4. A lack on unity of command seems to have been a problem in the execution of Jubilee. This is another ancient principle that seems to have been neglected in the specific case. Nothing new there.

I dont know the deep details of Jubilee, But have often wondered why it was executed in such a amaturish way in violation of many well known principles of amphibious ops.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Does "Allied" include the Soviet army & airforces? They had some less than sucessfull ops as well.

[pdf27]

1.Having one of the brigades attack the foritfied port frontally was down right ignorant. It ran contrary to British practice for the previous several centuries. US Army amphibious doctrine called for the landing to occur adjacent to a port & it be captured from the landward side. Nothing original in this, its been the standard practice by most armys. The Roman navy routinely used that technique. I guess the Greeks, Phonecians, & even the Sumerians understood that principle. A few months later in Torch a British naval unit tried exactly the same thing (with a borrowed US Ranger battalion) in Operation Reservist. The entire combined landing force of US & British was killed or captured by the French. I supose if there is a leasson there it is 'Dont violate a proven principle of the last 5,000 years'.
To be fair to the planners, this one isn't as dumb as it sounds. One big thing had changed since all previous attacks on ports, and that is simply that the side being attacked now had the ability to demolish the port, rendering it useless. Furthermore, modern armies could no longer live off the land, they had to be supplied. Thus, capturing a port quickly - and before it could be wrecked - was suddenly a very major imperative, which a slow and deliberate attack from the flanks and inland side would not achieve. Operation Overlord was critically dependent on having an intact port available from an early date, and as such there was interest in how feasible it would be to capture one. The Dieppe (and later St Nazaire) raids demonstrated that it was just about possible to capture a harbour, but that it would be prohibitively expensive in casualties and that it would be unwise to bet the entire operation on capturing the port facilities in time. Hence the development of the Mulberry harbours - had the Dieppe raid proved it was practical to capture a port by storm, these would almost certainly not have been needed.

[overlord644]

also a main assault on a deepwater port such as la harve or cherbourg (not recommended because the allies might have been trapped on the penninsula like battan) when done on a large enough scale may have worked, however even if the plan went off perfectly there is a good chance that the port may have been destroyed beyond use (such as antwerp)

[Gen. Sandworm]

Does "Allied" include the Soviet army & airforces? They had some less than sucessfull ops as well.

Not offical allies but I think it fits into this category. As the old saying goes "The enemy of my enemy is my friend!" So if you have something feel free to post it.

[Carl Schwamberger]

To be fair to the planners, this one isn't as dumb as it sounds. One big thing had changed since all previous attacks on ports, and that is simply that the side being attacked now had the ability to demolish the port, rendering it useless.

Ports have been demolished & otherwise made unusable as far back as one cares to search. Explosives have been available for this since Medival times and the Phonicians or ancient Chinese would start by burning the city supporting the port. Poisioning the wells and killing the population reduces the usability of a ancient port as well. I'm not speculating here. Such actions are descibed in many ancient historys.

Furthermore, modern armies could no longer live off the land, they had to be supplied. Thus, capturing a port quickly - and before it could be wrecked - was suddenly a very major imperative, which a slow and deliberate attack from the flanks and inland side would not achieve. Operation Overlord was critically dependent on having an intact port available from an early date, and as such there was interest in how feasible it would be to capture one.

The ability of ancient armys to 'live off the land' is often exaggerated. Its possible for brief periods during favorable conditions to find some food, but most armys that are cut off from a organized supply service starve quickly. Particularly in the winter & early spring. Securing a location to shelter the support ships has always been a critical consideration for a army entering a coast. Even if it is just a beach for dragging rowboats onto. For most well equipped and organized armys a regular anchorage, buildings for shelter, and a population for labor are essential for sustaining operations ashore, and leaving again.

Thus, capturing a port quickly - and before it could be wrecked - was suddenly a very major imperative, which a slow and deliberate attack from the flanks and inland side would not achieve.

Fast & furious around the flank works better than slow & methodical, but both are better than straight into the enemys strongest defense.

The Dieppe (and later St Nazaire) raids demonstrated that it was just about possible to capture a harbour, but that it would be prohibitively expensive in casualties and that it would be unwise to bet the entire operation on capturing the port facilities in time.

I dont see either as proving any such thing. In nether case did the landing force assualting the harbor from the sea have any realistic chance of securing the place. Jubilee was not needed to prove what the Royal navy alrready knew from the previous three centuries of global operations. Its always been unwise to count on sailing straight into a potientially hostile port. In one millenia its high powered cannon, in another its spears and boiling oil. Either way its never a great idea to attack a defended port directly from the sea.

Hence the development of the Mulberry harbours - had the Dieppe raid proved it was practical to capture a port by storm, these would almost certainly not have been needed

The idea of using prefabricated artificial harbors long predates the Dieppe raid in British planning.

http://www.combinedops.com/Mulberry%20Harbours.htm

Adm Ellsbergs account 'The Far Shore' gives a bit of background of the early development of what became the Mulberrys. He also has one of the rare refrences to the Quiberon Bay prefabricated facility that was never used.

Beyond all that one can find the use of prefab docks ect.. a far back as Roman times for littoral operations. Great engineers those Romans.

[Carl Schwamberger]

also a main assault on a deepwater port such as la harve or cherbourg (not recommended because the allies might have been trapped on the penninsula like battan) when done on a large enough scale may have worked, however even if the plan went off perfectly there is a good chance that the port may have been destroyed beyond use (such as antwerp)

As the Allies learned in the Mediterrainian campaign the German held ports were invariably destroyed long before the Allied army came into sight. The descriptions of the ruin of Napoli rival anything in NW Europe. Fortunatly both the Royal Navy the USN had salvage engineers that were up to the tasks and engineer and Construction Battalions suffcient to support them. It is truly amazing that Napoli was able to handle 20,000 tons of cargo a day just a few weeks after its capture.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Not offical allies but I think it fits into this category. As the old saying goes "The enemy of my enemy is my friend!" So if you have something feel free to post it.

For some reason I've always thought of the USSR as one of the 'Allies', despite being born in the depths of the Cold War (1954). Unfortunatly I'm not a student of the Eastern Front so I cant offer much. Was there a 1942 operation called "Mars' that failed to accomplish much? Perhaps the worst operation of the eastern front would be the 1941 offensive plans in the HQ safes of the Soviet frontier armys. The German assualt made those useless, but when the orders from STAVKA came thats what the RKKA army commanders had: attack plans for charging into Poland & East Prussia. In terms of scale it was a large one.

[Nickdfresh]

You are getting into a tangle pdf.;)
Barbarossa was started in 22 june 1941.
BTW it was not a Stalin who was responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Soviet Western district in Belarussia , but the general Pavlov who have not executed the order of Hight command to make troops ready for combat in 18-20 june.
In other fronts - Southern and Northern -the German succes wan't so impressive coz Soviet command in there acted enough professionaly.

Um, Stalin forbid his generals to "provoke" the Germans by deploying their units --even when they knew the attack was imminent. Some generals actually quietly countermanded the orders from Moscow..

[albatrosdva]

I think Anzio was a fun little aside to the war in Italy. Had great promise and was quickly made into a happy little stalemate.

[Jagdpanther]

market garden

[redcoat]

market garden
If you think this was the worst..you really do need to learn more about WW2 :roll:

[Jagdpanther]

it was one of the worst but not the worst.

[redcoat]

it was one of the worst but not the worst.
Its not even close to being one of the worst.
It was costly in losses for the Paratrooper units and it didn't achieve its main objective of outflanking the Rhine, but it advanced the front line by nearly 90 miles in this sector and it cut off the German forces north of the Scheldt.

This operation cost the Allies 17,000 casualties ( mostly British). In two US operations at around the same time it took the US First Army over 35,000 casualties to take the Huertgen Forrest ( a bunch of trees of little strategic value) and Patton's 3rd Army over 50,000 battle casualties to advance 50-60 miles in 3 months during the campaign around Metz ( but failing to break through the Seigfried Line)

All 3 operations were set backs for the Allied campaign in late 44, but for some reason its only the Market Garden operation that is highlighted

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hurtgen_Forest

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

[Rising Sun*]

Its not even close to being one of the worst.
It was costly in losses for the Paratrooper units and it didn't achieve its main objective of outflanking the Rhine, but it advanced the front line by nearly 90 miles in this sector and it cut off the German forces north of the Scheldt.

This operation cost the Allies 17,000 casualties ( mostly British). In two US operations at around the same time it took the US First Army over 35,000 casualties to take the Huertgen Forrest ( a bunch of trees of little strategic value) and Patton's 3rd Army over 50,000 battle casualties to advance 50-60 miles in 3 months during the campaign around Metz ( but failing to break through the Seigfried Line)

All 3 operations were set backs for the Allied campaign in late 44, but for some reason its only the Market Garden operation that is highlighted

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hurtgen_Forest

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

Thanks for that info, which changes what little I know about Market Garden outside the usual generalities which are of gloriously courageous failure, but which from your info seem to ignore its tactical and strategic value.

Is there an interesting contrast between Patton's modest rate of advance and the oft heard American complaints about the slow British advance, especially where British armour was involved?

This, from your link to the US Army Command and General Staff College, doesn't exactly enhance Patton's reputation, does it?

Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and still others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach ulcers. The G2 also identified a new series of German formations designated volksgrenadier divisions. (See Figure 1.) These hastily constituted divisions numbered only 10,000 men each and possessed only six rifle battalions; in theory they were to be provided with extra artillery and assault guns to compensate for the quantitative and qualitative inferiority of their infantry. Two to 3 panzer divisions faced Third Army in a mobile reserve role, but these units had managed to bring only 5 or 10 tanks apiece out of the retreat across France. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

[gumalangi]

I know about Market Garden outside the usual generalities

Hollywood man,.. hollywood,...

look at band of brothers,.. i like the movie,. but,..

however becouse of hollywood as well,. some genuine US military achievements could be mistaken as exagerrated fiascos,..

[Rising Sun*]

however becouse of hollywood as well,. some genuine US military achievements could be mistaken as exagerrated fiascos,..

I think Hollywood more often managed to convert genuine fiascos into exaggerated US military achievements. ;)

As for what the US government did, and does, with them ...... :rolleyes:

[Nickdfresh]

Its not even close to being one of the worst.
It was costly in losses for the Paratrooper units and it didn't achieve its main objective of outflanking the Rhine, but it advanced the front line by nearly 90 miles in this sector and it cut off the German forces north of the Scheldt.

This operation cost the Allies 17,000 casualties ( mostly British). In two US operations at around the same time it took the US First Army over 35,000 casualties to take the Huertgen Forrest ( a bunch of trees of little strategic value) and Patton's 3rd Army over 50,000 battle casualties to advance 50-60 miles in 3 months during the campaign around Metz ( but failing to break through the Seigfried Line)

All 3 operations were set backs for the Allied campaign in late 44, but for some reason its only the Market Garden operation that is highlighted

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hurtgen_Forest

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/gabel3/gabel3.asp

The Huertgen Forest, and I agree it was an absolute debacle, is largely ignored only because it was eclipsed by the Ardennes Offensive or "Bulge." But it should not be as the idea of handing over to the increasingly immobile Heer the astronomical US advantages in mobility and firepower are wholly unforgivable. The premise was idiotic and I can only surmise that the American general involved in the operation believed he could achieve something of a tactical surprise along the lines of "Sickle Cut." But it should have been called operation "Self Knacker."

Market Garden was certainly not the greatest in terms of casualties and certainly there was some positive outcomes to the battle despite the disappointment of failing to achieve the objectives of a cataclysmic puncture of the Third Reich's Western defenses guarding the Ruhr. I would add even a heroic, moral one of the paras stand. But it was clearly a lost opportunity. If the Guards had at least tried to break through, it very well could have spelled an earlier end to the conflict...

But yes, it would have been difficult and resulted in serious Allied casualties. But it was far from impossible nor implausible...

I would add Monty's failure in his attention to detail in the proper clearing the Scheldt Estuary at the start as one of the Allies' most serious blunders. This delayed the proper deep water port the Allies desperately needed -- and Market Garden did have an impact as it devolved his attentions and turned Antwerp into a bit of an after thought, and an unforgivably sloppy one...

Many of Patton's problems around the Metz involved fuel and supply shortages of the broad front strategy, and yes, diversion to Market Garden operations...

[redcoat]

Is there an interesting contrast between Patton's modest rate of advance and the oft heard American complaints about the slow British advance, especially where British armour was involved?


In his famous General Order Number 98, issued the day after the end of the war, Patton stated that his Third Army 'had advanced further in less time than any other army in history'-just over 1,300miles in 281 days

He seems to have forgotten about Monty and his Eighth Army, they advanced from El Alamein to Tunis, a distance of 1,850 miles, in 201 days ;)

ps, To be fair to Patton, the terrain around Metz was totally unsuitable for the type of mobile warfare he was fond of.

[Nickdfresh]

In his famous General Order Number 98, issued the day after the end of the war, Patton stated that his Third Army 'had advanced further in less time than any other army in history'-just over 1,300miles in 281 days

He seems to have forgotten about Monty and his Eighth Army, they advanced from El Alamein to Tunis, a distance of 1,850 miles, in 201 days ;)

Perhaps Patton's twice being kicked in the head by an Army mule in the '30s effected his perceptions? :)

[Warpig]

You are getting into a tangle pdf.;)
Barbarossa was started in 22 june 1941.
BTW it was not a Stalin who was responsible for the catastrophic defeat of the Soviet Western district in Belarussia , but the general Pavlov who have not executed the order of Hight command to make troops ready for combat in 18-20 june.
In other fronts - Southern and Northern -the German succes wan't so impressive coz Soviet command in there acted enough professionaly.

The soviet troops would not be ready for combat either by 18-20 june 1941 or 18-20 june 1942.

The average russian trooper was a peasant who barely knew how to hold a rifle, a third of professional officers was dead via Stalins purges and replaced with people who often were even illiterate.

There existed no defence plans, logistics of the army were horribly tangled to a point where a tank regiment could be housed in some village and their tanks in another twenty miles away.

Its worth to add that the russian army of 1941 was basically an uncoordinated horde which did not act professionally on ANY front, the lesser successes of North and South army groups come from the fact that they had less equipment and by 1942 they were drained even further to a point where the major part of siege of Leningrad was conducted without any tanks.

The very survival and victory of Russia comes from three factors, Russians could and did trow men and equipment at Germans squandering lives at a horrible rate but slowing the Germans in the process.

Hitler meddling with his field commanders.

Stalin line which while overrun did slow down the Germans and provided an important breathing space.

Attributing any sort of professionalism to an incompetent horde of 1941 that was the red army is downright wrong, the russian defence of 1941 was the largest show of incompetence in history of worlds warfare and is redeemed only by the courage of the individual russian soldier.

So yes i go with russian defence of 1941.

[Nickdfresh]

While there is some truth to the above, I think there is also some exaggerations as well. Your characterizations of the Red Army are a bit silly, certainly there were some good officers and leadership despite Stalin's purges. And the Red Army generals even kept the doctrine of "Deep Battle" alive despite serious threats not only to their careers, but their lives as well.

Parts of the Red Army, as well as elite NKVD troops, fought stubborn, intractable battles and certainly held up the Wehrmacht. The Ostheer projected itself to have been in Moscow by November I think, but fierce holding actions, even with the massive losses the Red Army suffered, did slow down the Germans and bought time for the withdrawal of industry to the east and for reinforcements to be transferred from the Western districts. Hitler deserves some blame as do the Heer generals, who failed to have the Army ready for an earlier offensive that probably should have happened in May or even April. But the Red Army "peasant" soldiers also deserve credit for as often as not fighting fiercely in tactical engagements..

[Warpig]

While there is some truth to the above, I think there is also some exaggerations as well. Your characterizations of the Red Army are a bit silly, certainly there were some good officers and leadership despite Stalin's purges. And the Red Army generals even kept the doctrine of "Deep Battle" alive despite serious threats not only to their careers, but their lives as well.
My characterizations of the Red Army are supported by history, i do not claim that every single russian soldier and officer was an incompetent, i do however claim that vast majority of them were, also as far as russian officers even the best were not comparable to their german counterparts squandering lives and equipment needlessly.

Parts of the Red Army, as well as elite NKVD troops, fought stubborn, intractable battles and certainly held up the Wehrmacht.
Which is ascribed to both the great courage of the russian soldier as well as the massive amount of men and material russians could afford to lose and did lost.

The fact that delaying actions were fought and successed in such a delay is not testimony to any sort of skill present at the time in the Red Army but to the numbers available.


The Ostheer projected itself to have been in Moscow by November I think, but fierce holding actions, even with the massive losses the Red Army suffered, did slow down the Germans
Russians had the advantage in tanks more than twelve to one, more than thirty to one in trucks, more than twenty to one in artillery, Germans attacked using PZ IIs and Czech tanks, let me reitarate, any semi competent force would have squashed the Germans at these odds, Blitzkrieg or not.

There is no escaping the fact that the russian army was a mob rather than an effective fighting force, both Finnland and the offensive of 1941 prove it by sheer statistics.

and bought time for the withdrawal of industry to the east and for reinforcements to be transferred from the Western districts. Hitler deserves some blame as do the Heer generals, who failed to have the Army ready for an earlier offensive that probably should have happened in May or even April...

The offensive would have succeded either way since Russia had milions of soldiers and weapons but no actuall army, Hitler with his meddling ruined one chance he had to effectively occupy Moscow which at that point could and would break the russian people and most importantly it would break Stalin.

[Rising Sun*]

Fall of Singapore - all of the above, as well as complacency and racism, assuming that the Japanese were inferior. I would be inclined to include the sinking of Force Z (HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse) under this heading and nominate it as the worst cock-up of the war.

I don't know about the Force Z aspect.

This is off the top of my pointy little head, but my recollection is that Tom Phillips for all his belief in the immunity of battleships from being sunk from the air was rather careful to try to organise air cover but it wasn't forthcoming from Singapore command, and that he altered his intentions because of it. And that his force would have survived, or had a much better chance of survival, if it had been available.

As for the fall of Singapore, that was caused long before in London by failing to provide even a reasonable part of the resources which were known to be necessary and by hamstringing Percival by stopping him going into Thailand to ensure that Britain was seen as the victim to avoid upsetting American support. Percival's plans were capable of denying Malaya to the Japanese, but Churchill's political plans ensured the loss of Malaya.

The British / Commonwealth operation in Greece, for predictably pointless political purposes as seen with Churchill's characteristically dangerous military clarity, was a far bigger cock up than Malaya, for similar military reasons to Malaya and largely revolving around the absence of air support which was known to be necessary.

I'd exclude Malaya / Singapore from this topic as I think there's a difference between an operation launched by a nation, such as Greece, and for which its planners are fully responsible and a defensive action responding to an operation initiated by another nation, such as the loss of Malaya.

[Ashes]

The offensive would have succeded either way since Russia had milions of soldiers and weapons but no actuall army, Hitler with his meddling ruined one chance he had to effectively occupy Moscow which at that point could and would break the russian people and most importantly it would break Stalin.

The old Moscow or bust theory has been debated since the end of WW2 and no doubt will continue long after we've all karked it.:D

Whether or not Hitler would have taken Moscow and won the war if he had continued the advance to it after the "Battle of Smolensk" is one of the big "what ifs" of military history.

On one hand some say [especially the defeated German Generals, which is natural I guess] the capture of Moscow would destroy the Soviet Regime. They argued that Moscow was the political and logistical hub of European Russia, and if it was taken, the Russians would not be able to continue the war west of the Urals.

Others like Glantz take a different view.

On the decision to move on Kiev rather than press on to Moscow. Glantz seems to think that by doing this the Germans threw away their best chance of staging a decisive victory but he adds that it was a very slim chance. There was a chance that the Germans would have suffered a defeat far greater than the one incurred at the Battle of Moscow in December 1941.

[BearMgk]

I don't know about the Force Z aspect.

This is off the top of my pointy little head, but my recollection is that Tom Phillips for all his belief in the immunity of battleships from being sunk from the air was rather careful to try to organise air cover but it wasn't forthcoming from Singapore command, and that he altered his intentions because of it. And that his force would have survived, or had a much better chance of survival, if it had been available.

As for the fall of Singapore, that was caused long before in London by failing to provide even a reasonable part of the resources which were known to be necessary and by hamstringing Percival by stopping him going into Thailand to ensure that Britain was seen as the victim to avoid upsetting American support. Percival's plans were capable of denying Malaya to the Japanese, but Churchill's political plans ensured the loss of Malaya.

The British / Commonwealth operation in Greece, for predictably pointless political purposes as seen with Churchill's characteristically dangerous military clarity, was a far bigger cock up than Malaya, for similar military reasons to Malaya and largely revolving around the absence of air support which was known to be necessary.

I'd exclude Malaya / Singapore from this topic as I think there's a difference between an operation launched by a nation, such as Greece, and for which its planners are fully responsible and a defensive action responding to an operation initiated by another nation, such as the loss of Malaya.


In 1943 the Greek War Relief Association published a book of editorials, cartoons, articles and letter about the heroism of the Greeks in World War Two, first against Mussolini and then against Hitler. Though the book is long out of print these articles remind us of the days during the war when the world seemed such a dark place, and then the Greeks gave us hope. When the Italians invaded Greece it seemed as if yet another country would fall to the Axis powers. But the Greek army defied the expectations of the world and chased the Italian Army back into Albania. It was the first sign that Mussolini and Hitler could be beaten and their victory inspired the world.

[Warpig]

The old Moscow or bust theory has been debated since the end of WW2 and no doubt will continue long after we've all karked it.:D

Whether or not Hitler would have taken Moscow and won the war if he had continued the advance to it after the "Battle of Smolensk" is one of the big "what ifs" of military history.

On one hand some say [especially the defeated German Generals, which is natural I guess] the capture of Moscow would destroy the Soviet Regime. They argued that Moscow was the political and logistical hub of European Russia, and if it was taken, the Russians would not be able to continue the war west of the Urals.

Others like Glantz take a different view.

On the decision to move on Kiev rather than press on to Moscow. Glantz seems to think that by doing this the Germans threw away their best chance of staging a decisive victory but he adds that it was a very slim chance. There was a chance that the Germans would have suffered a defeat far greater than the one incurred at the Battle of Moscow in December 1941.

German victory is arguable and purely theoretical, what remains a fact is that a force less than 50% of soviet size with much worse and much less equipment overran a gargantuan force in what was the largest and most humilitating defeat in history.

[pdf27]

It was the first sign that Mussolini and Hitler could be beaten and their victory inspired the world.
Uh huh. Because the Italians hadn't already been slapped stupid by the British in the desert in 1940/41, right?
The first time the Greeks did anything more to inconvenience the Italians than the terrain was already doing was the 14th of November 1940.

The British counteroffensive in the Western Desert was launched on the 8th of December, and by the 15th they had taken 38,000 prisoners and 400 artillery pieces. By the end of the offensive in February 1941, they had taken 115,000 prisoners (over 75% of the Italian forces in North Africa) and 1300 guns for a cost of 500 dead and 1300 wounded.

I would suggest that merely holding an enemy who the British were comprehensively thrashing at the same time is unlikely to "inspire the world".

[Ashes]

German victory is arguable and purely theoretical, what remains a fact is that a force less than 50% of soviet size with much worse and much less equipment overran a gargantuan force in what was the largest and most humilitating defeat in history.

Not to sure about that ''force less than 50% of soviet size'' either.
In manpower on the eve of Barbarossa on the German/Russian front, I think it was close to parity, although the Soviets had a big advantage in armour and aircraft.

True, that the Wehrmacht had huge successes in the first 6 months of the war, but the problem for the Germans, was that wasn't the end of the Red Army by a long shot.

It reminds me of a historian who once said in comparing the Brits and the Germans efforts in warfare ''the British lost a lot of battles but won the wars, the Germans won a lot of battles and lost the wars''

And it was little wonder that the Wehrmacht, [with the best trained and led army in the world at that time,] ran rings around the Red army, which was more or less a large hamstrung, poorly positioned, badly led Army, still trying to recover from the officer purges, with hopeless commissars like Mekhlis interfering at every turn, and of course Stalin overseeing everything, much to the detriment of everyone.

[Warpig]

Not to sure about that ''force less than 50% of soviet size'' either.
In manpower on the eve of Barbarossa on the German/Russian front, I think it was close to parity, although the Soviets had a big advantage in armour and aircraft.
Not be vague, Germany and friends had approximately 4 milion 300 thousand troops against russsian force of about 3 and a quarter milion, Russians did however have a further 1mlion 800 thousand troops deeper in the Soviet Union as well as about two milion reservists concentrated in various places between the Stalins line and the Ribbentrop-Molotov line, these men were civilians who needed to be armed and organised but they were already concentrated.

In tanks and armored vehicles Russia outnumbered the Germans 3 to 1, same in airplanes, from around 15.500 russian aircraft approximately six thousand were modern machines so its still 2000 more than the numbers available to Luftwaffe.

As far as guns are concerned Russians had approximately 25% more but this number does not include both stationary and field guns stationed in various strongpoints in and before Stalin's line which would make a disparity even greater.

True, that the Wehrmacht had huge successes in the first 6 months of the war, but the problem for the Germans, was that wasn't the end of the Red Army by a long shot.
Nazi commanders stated clearly that they can and will break the Red Army but it will not happen in one summer, as long as the Generals had it their way they massacred the Red Army, then came mr unhappy aka Adolf Hitler ordering various meaningless operations which cost him the victory.

As for the Red Army by the end of 1945 there was perhaps half a milion actuall soldiers and another time that number makeshift troops, the Red Army was almost broken and another such summer would break it if not for Hitler.

It reminds me of a historian who once said in comparing the Brits and the Germans efforts in warfare ''the British lost a lot of battles but won the wars, the Germans won a lot of battles and lost the wars''
However there are, in retrospection reasons which we can pinpoint, in this particular case the reason was Adolf Hitler.

And it was little wonder that the Wehrmacht, [with the best trained and led army in the world at that time,] ran rings around the Red army, which was more or less a large hamstrung, poorly positioned, badly led Army, still trying to recover from the officer purges, with hopeless commissars like Mekhlis interfering at every turn, and of course Stalin overseeing everything, much to the detriment of everyone.

Some time before that the Finns who while brave and determined were ceirtanly not on Wehrmacht level and had a very small and poorly equipped army firmly spanked a gigantic russian force, during the invasion of Poland russian forces struggled under Grodno for three full days losing over ahundred armored vehicles unable to capture a city defended by a regiment worth of troops.

There is no escaping the fact that the Red Army was inept and incompetent to the extreme.

[michammer]

Singapore. Along with the loss of Force Z a MAJOR setback - and embarrassment -for the British. The loss of Tobruk was also a bit of a shambles.

[michammer]

Then there was a British attack on some Greek island, which was entirely repulsed with heavy losses.


IIRC, that was Leros.

[Nickdfresh]

...
In tanks and armored vehicles Russia outnumbered the Germans 3 to 1, same in airplanes, from around 15.500 russian aircraft approximately six thousand were modern machines so its still 2000 more than the numbers available to Luftwaffe.

...

These flood of Soviet tanks and aircraft were obsolete types. Had the Red Army been placed on high alert rather than its commanders fearing removal and court martial in they in anyway cause a "provocation" to the Germans, they may have put up a stiffer fight. Some did anyways, disguising preparations that against Stalin's implicit orders, as local training alerts and exercises. And in many ways, the effectively barracks ridden Soviets fared little worse than the Poles, the French, and the low countries did before them...

Some time before that the Finns who while brave and determined were ceirtanly not on Wehrmacht level and had a very small and poorly equipped army firmly spanked a gigantic russian force, during the invasion of Poland russian forces struggled under Grodno for three full days losing over ahundred armored vehicles unable to capture a city defended by a regiment worth of troops.

There is no escaping the fact that the Red Army was inept and incompetent to the extreme.

The Finns were tops in training and motivation and were fighting a battle on their home turf that suited their Army; a woodlands fight in the middle of winter that favors the army with less mobility and firepower. One that dispersed the strengths of the Red armor cadres...

[Nickdfresh]

The old Moscow or bust theory has been debated since the end of WW2 and no doubt will continue long after we've all karked it.:D

Whether or not Hitler would have taken Moscow and won the war if he had continued the advance to it after the "Battle of Smolensk" is one of the big "what ifs" of military history.
...

I agree that there is a pretty big mug filled with "hindsight" in the ex-German generals epilogues on the battles....

But the Wehrmacht would have had an urban winter quarters had they seized Moscow. One that would have reduced the deprivation of their under-equipped army that had too endure winter in bunkers --and dwellings that they confiscated from the unlucky Russian citizens that were thrown out into the winter subzero temperatures, often robbed of their boots and jackets. And the readiness of the Heer panzers and vehicles also suffered in the open steppes, as mice got in them and chewed through the electrical wiring. The city may well have been a lightening rod in which to inflict heavy casualties on what would have been no doubt desperate Soviet efforts to retake the capital...

[Yurek]

The worst in my opnion is the remote guided bombers filled with explosives that was very dangerous considering it had tons of explosives on board and the way that it was operated was very primitive considering that the allies were desperate for an idea to destroy the V-3 weapon

[PANZERCOMMANDER]

With the Market Garden failure , it comes from Army Intel . not paying closer attention to the reports of 2x SS panzer Divs in the area for rest and refit. The drop zones were a tad distance away and they could have reached the bridge if the Germans on the ground waited to re-act, but after walking from the DZ's to the Bridge with a few friends just to see how long it would take, witha few refreshment breaks,.....yup a long way.... It was a bold plan , and the intell was good from the Dutch underground , but was pushed aside. The radios all worked well in line of sight, but dropped with the wrong components for long range comms.

[Nickdfresh]

...It was a bold plan , and the intell was good from the Dutch underground , but was pushed aside...

I believe I've read that the British strongly (correctly) suspected that the Dutch resistance had a traitorous double agent feeding intell to the Abwehr and disinformation to MI6 and the OSS. However, I think the said German mole had no access to, nor knowledge of, the operation...

[Ashes]

Not be vague, Germany and friends had approximately 4 milion 300 thousand troops against russsian force of about 3 and a quarter milion


But that's just the point, in the initial important frontier battles, the Wehrmacht had the superior manpower, had the advantage of surprise attack, plus knowing the the weakest places to strike with the strongest force, having recon flights detailing every Russian forward position and airfields for weeks leading up to the attack.

Because of Stalin's insistence that there was no German attack coming, the Red Army formations were not properly organised for defense and not even on heightened alert until a few hours before the Germans struck.




In tanks and armored vehicles Russia outnumbered the Germans 3 to 1, same in airplanes, from around 15.500 russian aircraft approximately six thousand were modern machines so its still 2000 more than the numbers available to Luftwaffe.


But it's amazing what a surprise preemptive attack can do to even the odds.The surprise attack destroyed a huge number of Soviet aircraft, many caught on the ground [over 2,000 on the first day alone, mainly fighters] Soviet aircraft were not properly dispersed and protected, making them easy targets for the Luftwaffe. As for the tank park, according to Erickson, almost one third needed major overhaul and almost a half required sizable refit.
But there were no reserve of spare parts or concentration of repair facilities, and except for a relatively few T-34's and K-1's, they were obsolete, and more importantly, badly used, the Red Army was just as inferior to the Wehrmacht in tank tactics as the Allies were in France.[as Nick pointed out]



Nazi commanders stated clearly that they can and will break the Red Army but it will not happen in one summer, as long as the Generals had it their way they massacred the Red Army, then came mr unhappy aka Adolf Hitler ordering various meaningless operations which cost him the victory.




There were many causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler was just one.

It amazes me that Hitlers mistakes are always trotted out as the excuse for the German defeat and Stalin's equally massive blunders are rarely mentioned.

On German mistakes a noted author wrote this.....................


''It is often asked could the Germans have won the war if they had not made certain mistakes.

The general answer I believe is that the Russians also made huge mistakes.

Which is the more absurd....to allow, with the wisdom of hindsight, an immaculate German campaign against a Russian resistance still plagued by those blunders and follies that arose in the heat and urgency of battle, or to correct both and to reset the board in an atmosphere of complete fantasy, of each side making the correct move like a chess text, when " white must win "? "



There is no escaping the fact that the Red Army was inept and incompetent to the extreme.


In the beginning, yes, but importantly, in the end, the most powerful army in the world.:)




I agree that there is a pretty big mug filled with "hindsight" in the ex-German generals epilogues on the battles....

But the Wehrmacht would have had an urban winter quarters had they seized Moscow. One that would have reduced the deprivation of their under-equipped army that had too endure winter in bunkers --and dwellings that they confiscated from the unlucky Russian citizens that were thrown out into the winter subzero temperatures, often robbed of their boots and jackets. And the readiness of the Heer panzers and vehicles also suffered in the open steppes, as mice got in them and chewed through the electrical wiring. The city may well have been a lightening rod in which to inflict heavy casualties on what would have been no doubt desperate Soviet efforts to retake the capital...


Yep, it's certainly something to ponder isn't it, ''if'' Guderian had got the green light from Hitler and made a bee line for Moscow and if he managed to take it, what would the outcome be when a highly centralised society losses it's centre?

Glantz suggests that the Russians would raise another army of 4 million men and take Moscow back again.

But as you say, at what cost?

[PsyWar.Org]

I believe I've read that the British strongly (correctly) suspected that the Dutch resistance had a traitorous double agent feeding intell to the Abwehr and disinformation to MI6 and the OSS. However, I think the said German mole had no access to, nor knowledge of, the operation...

The whole SOE agent network in the Netherlands had been taken over by the Abwehr from the very beginning, they called it the "England Spiel", the "English Game".

The disaster had only recently been discovered, so any intel coming from the Dutch resistance was subsequently mistrusted.

[Warpig]

But that's just the point, in the initial important frontier battles, the Wehrmacht had the superior manpower, had the advantage of surprise attack, plus knowing the the weakest places to strike with the strongest force, having recon flights detailing every Russian forward position and airfields for weeks leading up to the attack.
Thats quite wrong, what i have given were the initial numbers, by week 2 russians had five milion troops in the general area, add to this the fact that Wehrmacht stretched itself and you get spearhead units fighting well prepared positions, Germans virtually always faced 2;1 or greater odds.

Because of Stalin's insistence that there was no German attack coming, the Red Army formations were not properly organised for defense and not even on heightened alert until a few hours before the Germans struck.
The Red Army was not properly organised for any sort of action whether defensive or offensive.




But it's amazing what a surprise preemptive attack can do to even the odds.The surprise attack destroyed a huge number of Soviet aircraft, many caught on the ground [over 2,000 on the first day alone, mainly fighters] Soviet aircraft were not properly dispersed and protected, making them easy targets for the Luftwaffe. As for the tank park, according to Erickson, almost one third needed major overhaul and almost a half required sizable refit.
Thats true for Poland and France, not for Russia, there was ample time to organize defence after the attack, Wehrmacht had quite some ground to cover to get to the Stalins line, the problem was not in the airforce losses or the suprise but the lack of military organization whatsoever, russian army did not posses any procedures for rapid redeployments hence my earlier statement that it was an armed mob rather than an actuall army.

But there were no reserve of spare parts or concentration of repair facilities, and except for a relatively few T-34's and K-1's, they were obsolete, and more importantly, badly used, the Red Army was just as inferior to the Wehrmacht in tank tactics as the Allies were in France.[as Nick pointed out]
Russians had more T-34s and KVs than Germans all medium tanks together, while the Red Army was inferior in tactics it had massively more adequate machines, in Poland and in France during the battle with the british it was demonstrated that even inferior tactics can be effective when utilizing fine machines, what bites the russians in the arse is the complete lack of any organisation both in terms of logistics and deployments.

As for the rest of the thread, taking Moscow would further destroy what administration remained, Russia's problem was not the inferior tactics but the generally pitifull level of its army and lack of organisational skills and systems of the military administration.

[Crosshairs]

The Battle of the Bulge.

American soldiers were down to almost NO FOOD, low on ammunition, pretty much anything you can think of, they were low on it.
-The worst operation in World War II hands down because there was no real way to get the wounded out and to the field hospitals. No way for fresh supplies to be brought in, and/or fresh troops to help aide.

Had not Patton's divison stepped in, this could have been the worst DISASTER in World War II (although take into account the feelings of the troops inside the operation -- feelings that Patton's troops were not needed.) However, there is clear evidence that if patton hadn't helped out, it would have been bad. Cause I mean c'mon, can you really kill platoons of Germans by launching your helmets in the air? :cool: :mrgreen:

[Ashes]

Thats quite wrong, what i have given were the initial numbers, by week 2 russians had five milion troops in the general area, add to this the fact that Wehrmacht stretched itself and you get spearhead units fighting well prepared positions, Germans virtually always faced 2;1 or greater odds.


A few figures...........

Manpower strength of the Wehrmacht

1939 1.300.000
1940 5.600.000
1941 7.200.000
1942 8.600.000
1943 9.500.000
1944 9.100.000


Source: "The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich" by Richard Overy, and figures by David Glantz.

22 June 1941
Soviet: 3,680,000 on the front.
Axis: 3,117,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (in fact around 350,000) so a total of 3,867,000. To these forces the Hungarian and Slovak troops added after 26 June 1941.

11 September 1941
Soviet: 3,463,000 on the front.
Axis: 3,382,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (in fact around 306,000) so a total of 4,088,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.

1 November 1941
Soviet: 2,200,000 on the front.
Axis: 2,867,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+150,000 Romanians (finally a closer figure to the real one: 62,000 on the front+103,000 as occupation forces in Trans-Dnestra) so a total of 3,432,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.

1 December 1941*
Soviet: 4,197,000 on the front.
Axis: 2,767,000 Germans+400,000 Finns+140,000 Romanians (60,000 on the front+112,000 as occupation forces in Trans-Dnestra) so a total of 3,339,000 plus the Hungarian, Italian and Slovak expeditionary corps.

*From here on, the Red Army had a continuous numerical advantage over the Wehrmacht and its allies.

Red Army had 800,000 plus on the far Eastern front and about 250,000 facing the Finns.


From John Erickson in ''The Road to Stalingrad''

By November '41, the Red army was at its lowest ever ebb, 2.3 million, from the 4.7 mill who could be fielded in June 41.

At the beginning of Nov.'42 the Red Army numbered 6,124,000, with 5 million Axis forces deployed against them.

The Red Army, like the Wehrmacht, suffered from personnel shortages. German accounts frequently refer to the supposedly inexhaustible flood of Soviet troops and equipment, but Glantz and House reveal that this actually reflects the Soviets' ability to strip troops and equipment from other sectors of the front in order to achieve crushing superiority at breakthrough sectors. Time after time the Russians deceived the Germans regarding the site of upcoming Soviet offensives.
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=19656850796725

[Rising Sun*]

Thats quite wrong, what i have given were the initial numbers, by week 2 russians had five milion troops in the general area, add to this the fact that Wehrmacht stretched itself and you get spearhead units fighting well prepared positions, Germans virtually always faced 2;1 or greater odds.

So?

Even if that's true, which Ashes' post shows it's not, whose fault was it that the Germans attacked when they were outnumbered?

The attacker assesses the enemy; attacks; and bears the consequences of success or failure.

Being outnumbered in attack, even a beachhead attack which generally is the most difficult and the one where defender:attacker ratios usually matter most, didn't stop the Japanese winning in Malaya.

If the Germans had to stretch themselves by week 2, whose fault was that?

So the German spearhead units were fighting well prepared positions? WTF do you expect the defender to prepare? Papier mache castles?

Whose planning and / or execution was deficient if the Germans had to stretch themselves to fight exactly what even any military moron expects in an anticipated attack: well prepared defensive positions.

But earlier you said 'Germany and friends had approximately 4 milion 300 thousand troops against russsian force of about 3 and a quarter milion'. I gather from your latest post that this refers to the first week.

So?

WTF do you expect the defender to do but bring up more troops?

However, unless, on your earlier figures, the Soviets knocked off about 1,800,000 (40%) Germans and friends in the first week (which might have been expected to blunt the German advance), there was nothing like a 2:1 Russian:German advantage.

The Red Army was not properly organised for any sort of action whether defensive or offensive.

Doesn't that demonstrate even more the failure of German arms in attack or the success of Soviet arms in defence?

[herman2]

I agree with Warpig. I add also that the Germans were well suuperior in strategic combat abilities than the Russians. It was the logistics of sending supplies so far into Russia that caused the German downfall. If the supplies were available, Germany could of captured Russia. Germany moved faster than their supplies.

[Warpig]

So?

Even if that's true, which Ashes' post shows it's not, whose fault was it that the Germans attacked when they were outnumbered?

The attacker assesses the enemy; attacks; and bears the consequences of success or failure.

Being outnumbered in attack, even a beachhead attack which generally is the most difficult and the one where defender:attacker ratios usually matter most, didn't stop the Japanese winning in Malaya.

If the Germans had to stretch themselves by week 2, whose fault was that?

So the German spearhead units were fighting well prepared positions? WTF do you expect the defender to prepare? Papier mache castles?

Whose planning and / or execution was deficient if the Germans had to stretch themselves to fight exactly what even any military moron expects in an anticipated attack: well prepared defensive positions.
Stretching their forces was unavoidable, the distances involved and the fact that only a fifth of the German army was motorized or partly motorized means that you leave infantry and heavier artillery behind.

But earlier you said 'Germany and friends had approximately 4 milion 300 thousand troops against russsian force of about 3 and a quarter milion'. I gather from your latest post that this refers to the first week.

This refers to the outset of the campaign yes, approximately 3 weeks into the offensive Russia brought in the reserves which is portrayed in 5 milion dead/wounded/captured by winter 1941, note these figures as usually with soviet tabs of the time are severely downplayed, i will not attempt an actuall number but it was likely a lot bigger.

WTF do you expect the defender to do but bring up more troops?
I forwarded this to prove that ultimately Russia had a lot more troops despite the initial numerical disadvantage, the numerical superiority of the Wehrmacht and CO had a lot less troops as early as the first weeks.

However, unless, on your earlier figures, the Soviets knocked off about 1,800,000 (40%) Germans and friends in the first week (which might have been expected to blunt the German advance), there was nothing like a 2:1 Russian:German advantage.

That is such an extreme rubbish ... do you even learn history ? The total combat fatalities of the entire Axis during the entire war in the east were 900,000.

The losses of the initial offensive were less than 200000 men and that includes wounded, dead and missing from the entire Axis, these losses were minuscule when compared to what the Russians lost.

Doesn't that demonstrate even more the failure of German arms in attack or the success of Soviet arms in defence?

Uh no ? Because the German arms overrun pretty much every defensive position with inferior numbers and usually inferior equipment all the way untill they hit Moscow ?

[Egorka]

If the supplies were available, Germany could of captured Russia.If my grandmother had balls she would be my granddad...

[Egorka]

The total combat fatalities of the entire Axis during the entire war in the east were 900,000.
Where does this magnificent number come from?

[Warpig]

Where does this magnificent number come from?

Every history book. every publication about eastern front and i believe even rubbishpedia.

The total of captured men was over 4 milion of course but the dead were around 900 thousands, soviets give a much number but given that the romanian hungarian and italian tabs are consistent with the german body count i see no reason not to believe the german records.

[Egorka]

Every history book. every publication about eastern front and i believe even rubbishpedia.
Really? Are you absolutely positive?
Could you reffer to couple of them?

The total of captured men was over 4 milion of course but the dead were around 900 thousands, soviets give a much number but given that the romanian hungarian and italian tabs are consistent with the german body count i see no reason not to believe the german records.
Que?

"The German losses (KIA+MIA+POW) on all fronts":

http://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/33040.html
http://pics.livejournal.com/fat_yankey/pic/0005ckyf

Remarks:
red - Soviet
blue - German

The data is only for Werhmaht and SS, i.e. land forces, which were 90% of total losses.
The Eastern front gave about 95% losses until June 1944.
The number of German POW in Soviet captivity was very low before Stalingrad. The number of ALL POWs in Soviet hands was only 19.782 on 19/Nov/1942.

So, are you positive it was 900.000 dead Axis (That is Germans + all their allies, right?) on the Eastern front for the whole war?
On the other hand you have "every history book" on your side... It is a tough one...

So... according to you they were not killed and they were not taken prisoners... So why did they die? Malaria? Fell down the stairs? (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?p=125910#post125910)

[Rising Sun*]

If my grandmother had balls she would be my granddad...

That would certainly add an interesting new dimension to your granddad's memoirs. :D

[Rising Sun*]

That is such an extreme rubbish

Only because I was working with the figures you gave.

... do you even learn history ?

Not the way you present it.

[Nickdfresh]

Stretching their forces was unavoidable, the distances involved and the fact that only a fifth of the German army was motorized or partly motorized means that you leave infantry and heavier artillery behind.
...

So you're saying the Germans were incompetent? Much like their Red Army adversaries? But perhaps on a different level (of hubris)...

Not too mention that even the motorized contingent of Ostheer forces were relying on a large percentage (if not a majority) of French made trucks for their transport. :lol:

Sort of a Franco-equivalent of "Montezuma's Revenge!" ;)

[royal744]

I have to add General Macarthur's incredibly stupid decision to keep the US Army Air Force in the Philippines on the ground after her knew Pearl Harbor had been attacked and that he was within striking distance of Formosa. Naturally, the air force was destroyed on the ground.

[royal744]

So you're saying the Germans were incompetent? Much like their Red Army adversaries? But perhaps on a different level (of hubris)...

Not too mention that even the motorized contingent of Ostheer forces were relying on a large percentage (if not a majority) of French made trucks for their transport. :lol:

Sort of a Franco-equivalent of "Montezuma's Revenge!" ;)

The German army was far less mechanized than most folks think. Neither the English nor the Americans used horses for transport as did the Germans.

[HG]

Operation market garden put the cherry on the cake for me when it came with some of the worst.

[Ashes]

That is such an extreme rubbish ... do you even learn history ? The total combat fatalities of the entire Axis during the entire war in the east were 900,000.



A few more figures, refuting your 900,000 Axis deaths
on Eastern front figure.

Seeing a few of your posts on the Hitler insane thread, this will be the last time I answer obvious troll drivel.



Died on the Eastern front.
Germans only.

June 1941 25.000
July 1941 63.099
Aug 1941 46.066
Sep 1941 51.033
Oct 1941 41.099
Nov 1941 36.000
Dec 1941 40.198
Total 1941 302.495 (11,0%)

Jan 1942 48.165
Feb 1942 44.099
Mar 1942 44.132
Apr 1942 23.066
May 1942 38.099
June 1942 29.033
July 1942 38.066
Aug 1942 62.165
Sep 1942 45.033
Oct 1942 25.000
Nov 1942 31.198
Dec 1942 78.759
Total 1942 506.815 (18,4%)

Jan 1943 180.310
Feb 1943 68.330
Mar 1943 46.066
Apr 1943 16.000
May 1943 19.066
June 1943 13.066
July 1943 71.231
Aug 1943 59.198
Sep 1943 57.429
Oct 1943 53.264
Nov 1943 67.363
Dec 1943 49.330
Total 1943 700.653 (25,6%)

Jan 1944 70.330
Feb 1944 64.429
Mar 1944 93.660
Apr 1944 73.264
May 1944 48.363
June 1944 142.079
July 1944 169.881
Aug 1944 277.465
Sep 1944 70.561
Oct 1944 92.528
Nov 1944 45.363
Dec 1944 85.253
Total 1944 1.232.946 (45,0%)

Total 2.742.909


Losses per theater


Theater Dead %
Africa 16.066 0,3
Balkans 103.693 1,9
North 30.165 0,6
West 339.957 6,4
Italy 150.660 2,8
Eastern Front 2.742.909 51,6 %
(- Dec 1944)
Germany (1945) 1.230.045 23,1 %
Various 245.561 4,6 %
Total 4.859.056


POWs held by Dead % % of number imprisoned
France 34.033 0,6 3,6
UK 21.033 0,4 0,5
US 22.000 0,4 0,7
USSR 363.343 6,8 11,8
Yugoslavia 11.000 0,2 5,8
Various 8.066 0,2 4,7
Total deaths among POW 459.475

Total deaths 5.318.531
Source: "Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg" by Rüdiger Overmans

[Egorka]

That would certainly add an interesting new dimension to your granddad's memoirs. :D
Well, I do not want to reveal anything forehand... So you would have to read all of it if you want to find out... :)

[redcoat]

Operation market garden put the cherry on the cake for me when it came with some of the worst.
Here we go again :rolleyes:

[Cojimar 1945]

The numbers cited above for German fatalities on the eastern front sound too high. A count of German casualties up to the end of December 1944 lists less total combat deaths as well under 2,700,000.

[Ashes]

Don't think there will ever be a definitive number for German or Soviet casualties, but the median number for Germany is 3.5 million military dead.
If the figures for up to 80% of German casualties on the Eastern front are correct, it puts Overmans figures from the the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office fairly close.
.
Some of the higher estimates ....

Keegan 4,000,000 Total.
Kinder 4,000,000
Urlanis 4,500,000
Eckhardt 4,750,000

Lower estimates......

Encarta 3,500,000
Britanica 3,500,000
Ellis 3,250,000
Comptons 3,250,000
Harper Collins 2,850,000

MEDIAN 3,500,000

For German civilians...

MEDIAN 5,500,000




It's the same for the Soviets......

From Comptons 6,750,000
Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997);
Total Dead: 8,668,400
Ellis: 11,000,000
Britannica: 11,000,000

to Sokolov's new calculations: an eye popping 26.4M

Krivosheev 9,500,000 is very detailed.

MEDIAN 10 million.

For Soviet civilians...

MEDIAN 20 million.

[Firefly]

Every history book. every publication about eastern front and i believe even rubbishpedia.

The total of captured men was over 4 milion of course but the dead were around 900 thousands, soviets give a much number but given that the romanian hungarian and italian tabs are consistent with the german body count i see no reason not to believe the german records.

Being overtly aggressive in your posts and apparently deliberately trolling in others garners no favours here. Neither does it engender longevity here.

In short. Shape up or ship out. A good debate is healthy and within this a good bit of banter is to be expected.

What your doing is neither banter nor welcome here.

Check your PMs....