How lives might have been saved on D-Day

[overlord644]

i was watching saving Private Ryan the other day and i had a thought, why weren't smoke screens deployed on the D-Day landing beaches? I know they were used during other landings in the Pacific. Then not long after the though also occured to me that there may have actually been smoke deployed on the beach and i've never noticed so my real question is

Why was smoke not deployed on the d-day beach-heads

or

Why was said smoke so ineffective

[pdf27]

Probably because hitting a beach at dawn is hard enough without obscuring all navigational features with smoke. Smoke isn't bulletproof after all...

[redcoat]

i
Why was smoke not deployed on the d-day beach-heads

or

Why was said smoke so ineffective
It was used to protect the flanks of the invasion fleets.
It couldn't be used on the beaches because;
a) the smoke would cause mass confusion amongst the landing craft.
b) It would obscure the beach obstacles exposed by the low tide
c) it would prevent any close support from naval vessels.

[Man of Stoat]

The biggest lifesaver on D-Day would have been for the American commander to deploy the DD Sherman tanks correctly, rather than sinking them a few miles from the beaches.

[bwing55543]

What I find surprising is how the Allies had so many casualties on D-Day despite having air superiority.

[Man of Stoat]

Why is it surprising? Almost none of the casualties were caused by enemy air power.

Another way lives could have been saved: the rockets designed to crater the beach in the American sector should have been fired at the correct distance to actually hit the beach rather than attempting to crater the sea instead.

[Nickdfresh]

But smoke(grenades - colored) WAS used on D-Day (I presume we're talking about Omaha Beach here) - to "illuminate" bunkers and other targets by some very courageous soldiers for the USN & RN destroyers that nearly beached themselves providing direct fire in a desperate but successful attempt to help save the landing.

The problem with Omaha was it was simply the worst beach to land on geographically speaking. The seawalls effectively contained tactical movement within a kill-box so those that survived the murderous gauntlet of MG42, mortars, and cannon fire then had to face significant obstacles, both man made and natural before they could counterattack. Also, it (though somewhat disputed) is said that the aerial bombardment completely missed the beach for erring on the side of caution, the AAF dropped their bombs too far inland because the US landing forces were obscured by the elements (something smoke wouldn't have helped with much :) )

The Naval bombardment wasn't much better as most vets of that battle (and I've personally spoken with one) reported no cover from bomb and shell craters being present...

[Nickdfresh]

I think it must also be said that a factor in the US casualties suffered on Omaha would be that their opposition, unlike most of the second-rate German Atlantic Wall garrisons, many of whom were combat-hardened veterans capable of sustaining themselves in combat beyond the initial overrunning of the beaches.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_352nd_Infantry_Division

http://www.omaha-beach.org/US-Version/352/352US.html

[pdf27]

For what it's worth I've walked Omaha beach and there is no comparison between it and the British beaches further East (I've not been to Utah beach). The beach is utterly dominated by some very high dunes immediately inland of it (less than 100m from the high tide mark), and there are really only one or two ways off the beach for anything but infantry. The current road in goes down what is virtually a canyon, and there are cliffs at either end of the beach which enfilade it. In comparison the British and Canadian beaches have no real headlands at either end, there is no high ground for some distance behind the beaches and no real obstacles to moving off the beach.

[overlord644]

yeah i even did some research after my initial post and someone raised a good point when they said that smole would get in the way if allied observation planes reporting to eisenhower on the battle, however this also raises the question on why there was not more close air support from allied fighters during the landings

[pdf27]

Have you ever seen an infantry action from a distance? It's horrendously confusing - it's bad enough when you're plugged into the platoon radio net, close up with eyes on. Providing "more" close air support is simply a command and control issue - and you're limited by the available number of forward air controllers, number of available radio frequencies, etc. Extra aircraft are the easy bit.

[Rising Sun*]

Smoke can be more of a hindrance than a help to ground troops, especially when combined with aerial bombing, as U.S. Major General Lesley McNair found out while observing Operation Cobra in France on 25 July 1944.

Mc Nair was warned by USAAF commanders that bombing close to their own troops, as McNair wanted, would lead to the bombing zone spreading with each successive wave as smoke and dust obscured the intended target area, so that it was likely they'd bomb into their own lines sooner or later. Mc Nair didn't accept their advice and insisted on bombing close to his own lines.

Maybe he realised that the USAAF commanders were right, a few seconds before he was killed by a USAAF bomb.

I think his death gives the USAAF the distinction of killing the highest ranking US army officer to be killed in action in Europe.

[Nickdfresh]

yeah i even did some research after my initial post and someone raised a good point when they said that smole would get in the way if allied observation planes reporting to eisenhower on the battle, however this also raises the question on why there was not more close air support from allied fighters during the landings

How would dazed and confused American soldiers call in, and direct, close air support on such a narrow stretch of land (beach) using 1940s technology without getting themselves blown to even more hell than they already were? They barely had any radio contact with the fleet and virtually all command and control had broken down on Omaha...

In any case, they were able to get direct naval gunfire support via colored smoke, and that was far better than tactical air strikes circa 1944...

They didn't have laser guided bombs, son.

And the time delay of info flowing to Ike was very wide gap indeed...

[overlord644]

i do understand the problem with relaying radio transmissions to the naval fleet, but you'd think even a p-51 just circling the beach would be able to tell the difference from a struggling allied soldier and a machine gun nest, and also as mentioned before wouldn't colored smoke work well?

[pdf27]

but you'd think even a p-51 just circling the beach would be able to tell the difference from a struggling allied soldier and a machine gun nest
Not a ghost of a chance. It's hard enough on the ground at close range.

[Rising Sun*]

i do understand the problem with relaying radio transmissions to the naval fleet, but you'd think even a p-51 just circling the beach would be able to tell the difference from a struggling allied soldier and a machine gun nest, and also as mentioned before wouldn't colored smoke work well?

What pdf27 said.

Also the problem that a P51 was too fast for arty observation and fighter pilots weren't trained artillery observers.

[Nickdfresh]

Not to mention that the large concrete block houses and bunkers would be largely immune to bombs and rockets carried by small aircraft...

Small pre-landing tactical strikes using napalm might have helped, but then again, so would have actually hitting the targets in the initial air strikes and naval gunfire, most of the heavies (12" & 14" shells) "went over the bluffs"...

Only direct naval gunfire from the fleet's destroyers, often directed by soldiers throwing smoke grenades in front of German emplacements, was effective at this point. The heavier battleships and cruisers continued to provide indirect fire over the bluffs preventing reinforcement and retreat of the Germans, and knocking out heavier anti-ship batteries...

The first destroyer to begin direct fire support was the USS McCook captained by Lt.Cmdr. Ralph "Rebel" Ramey, out of desperation at observing the first waves being wiped out, used the 5-inch guns to blast positions on the Veirville exit draw and tear it open. She also provided cover for successive waves of landing craft both literally as Higgins boats initially hid behind her and then with her guns. At 0950, Adm. C.F. Bryant, commander of the gunfire support group, called in the destroyers over the radio, "Get on them man!" The destroyers, some scrapping bottom, joined the fray including the USS Carmick, the Shrubrick, and the Shatterlee. Most thought that the destroyers had "saved the day." Most fired from between 500-1200 rounds of 5-inch ammunition and were able to precisely fire on German pillboxes, bunkers, gun-emplacements, trenches, and obstacles and were invaluable to the soldiers essentially reorganizing themselves into ad hoc units moving up the bluffs...

*Info. from D-Day: June 6, 1944 by Stephan Ambrose, Simon & Schuster (p.387-389)

[Firefly]

When you compare dDay to other battkes, perhaps lives were saved. Compare it to the Hurtgen Op or the Scheldt say and the casualty figures aint that bad. Sure the casualties were higher on some beaches but all in all I think the Allies had a good well worked out plan for the 1st day. Dieppe comes to mind somehow when thinking about this.

[Carl Schwamberger]

When you compare dDay to other battkes, perhaps lives were saved. Compare it to the Hurtgen Op or the Scheldt say and the casualty figures aint that bad. Sure the casualties were higher on some beaches but all in all I think the Allies had a good well worked out plan for the 1st day. Dieppe comes to mind somehow when thinking about this.

What firefly said...

Balakowskis recent book on Omaha Beach is recomended. There is another long out of print book 'The Far Shore' by Rear Adm. Ellsberg which hs a excellent description of most of the key events of that morning. Ellsberg was also involved in the establishment of the prefabricated Mulberry harbor, and his book is very usefull for understanding that aspect.

The casualties on Omaha Beach were bad compared to the other four landing areas 6 June, but certainly not the worst of WWII assualts. the primary reason for the problems were: 1. Failure in fire support. 2. A much stronger German unit moving into that sector in May. Had the fire support worked as anticipated the better quality German unit would have meant little. Had the previous weak infantry battlaion occupied that ground the failure of the fire support would have been less noticable.

Fire Support Failure

1. The heavy bomber attack missed its release point by several seconds. The overcast was low and the lead bombardier was releasing by time of flight from a backup aim point at sea. He was concerned that he would hit the landing craft so he hesitated. The 300 to 400 five hundred pound bombs hit fields inland and killed a few cows.

2. Preliminary Naval Gun Fire. This started at the earliest light a little over thirty minutes before the first landing craft entered the surf line. From the examples on many other amphbious assualts in WWII this was inadaquate vs the defense on Omaha Beach. The volume of fire of the ships available was not suffcient to Neutralize, or even Suppress the defenders. by contrast the British who landed a hour after the US had 90 minutes of NGF on their beaches. I also suspect insuffcient armor piercing ammunition was used by the heavy ships. In the Pacific it was found in 1943 that a significant part of the ammo mix had to be AP in order to damage deep earthworks and concrete structures.

3. Rocket Bombardment. A barrage of several thousand 128mm rockets (5 inch) was launched just a few minutes before the first landing craft touched the beach. Insuffcient training, haze, and rough water spoiled the range estimates of the rocket boats. Most rockets hit in the surf & further out.

4. A group of L5 spotter planes for NGF observation were lost or delayed while evading Allied antiaircraft fire. These were needed to for accurate fires on the German arillery positions inland. With those delayed for several hours the German artillery support was not effectively countered.

5. The DD tanks (two battalions) and the two artillery battalions mounted in DWKU vehicals were launched in rough water. More than half of those vehicals were sunk. About 30% of the DD tanks made it ashore and none ahead of the infantry as planned. Those at did land straggled ashore with the second & third wave as their landing craft crews brought them to the surf line.

6. Failure of the Naval Gun Fire communications network. The delay of the spotting aircraft was part of this. Casualties amoung the Spotting Teams in the first wave was next. As the teams took heavy casualties they were dispersed and the radios lost along the beach. Some nfantry commanders attempted to direct NGF, but alternate methods had not been adaquately trained for. When the infantry commanders tried to spot targets over their radio frequencys/networks the HQ stations aboard the ships did not understand the problem and had insuffcient training to pass on the call for fire to the support ships. The problems of the infantry radio network of course did not help either.

In the Pacific it had been learned through bitter experince that calls for NGF had absolute priority during the assualt phase. If the NGF radios were not working then any radio available had to siezed to relay the call for fire. And, all radio operators and CP staff had to understand how to relay the NGF call to the appropriate station. They also learned oter radio messages had to be interruped to give right of way to the NGF calls. Fewer breakdowns in NGF communication occured in the Pacifc due to this extra training.

Other Problems

As mention above the plan was to capture the exits roads which passed through the gullys or draws first. These were apparently well covered by the defense and the infantry that attempted to enter them failed. Eventually some of the comanders found the bluffs had some weak points and they were able to advance up the face of the bluffs.

The First Divsion was a well trained & veteran unit. The 28th Divsion had practically no veterans and its training was average. The 28th suffered much higher casualties and advanced slower.

Smoke

This is tricky. If in exactly the right location at precisely it aids the attack. Otherwise it is useless or worse. There was one smoke screen that aided the assualt. On the far left flank of the beach some dense brush caught fire and the smoke concealed a intact infantry company that came ashore there. In addition to a intact company the wire & mines were thinner and there were fewer defense positions covering that sector.

By 7:30 an hour after the first wave, NGF communications begain to restore. In some cases by visual signal instead of radio. The handfull of tanks that made it ashore begain to have their effect, a few infantry groups had made it to the bluffs and begain picking off defense positions. A German officer who survived testified that by 8:00 many of the forward positions were no longer responding to signals. A regimental commander reported at 8:30 that his casualtys from the NGF prevented any further counter attacks by his command. These and other remarks from the German side suggest things were bad all around.

[Rising Sun*]

In the Pacific it had been learned through bitter experince that calls for NGF had absolute priority during the assualt phase.

Thanks for that detailed factual exposition of the many problems on D Day.

In relation to the quote above, might it be that one of the significant problems on D Day was that the Allied troops were well trained but, in general, quite green while in the Pacific there was a much higher proportion of battle hardened troops and a lot more experience of amphibious assaults which, by mid-1944, made the Pacific commanders and troops more adept at such assaults?

[Nickdfresh]

I think for an attack like that, maybe it was better to have green troops. I'm pretty sure that may have been the thinking of senior commanders...

[Rising Sun*]

I think for an attack like that, maybe it was better to have green troops. I'm pretty sure that may have been the thinking of senior commanders...

Maybe.

But battle hardened troops will always do a lot, lot better than green troops.

The trick is to have enough battle hardened officers, NCO's and OR's sprinkled among the green troops to make the supposedly green units work well.

[Carl Schwamberger]

At Omaha Beach the US Aarmy 1st & 29th Divsions attacked side by side. The 1st Div assualt echelon did a little better than the 29th, but both had the same problem with the NGF radio communications. The 1st had been in a a couple amphibious operations in the Mediterrainan, so one would expect them to do much better at maintaining the critical NGF. Perhaps they did not have direct control over the NGF Spotting teams and their communications? Usually the USN controled the NGF network. The rest of the fire support they had very little control over. 1st Army HQ was responsible for the overall plan & one would expect a better show from them. Bradley & many of his staff officers, and subordinate commanders & staff, werre veterans of the Mediterrainian campaigns. You would think they had learned more from Torch, Husky, Avalanche... After all Bradley commanded a corps in Husky.

In the Pacific the island assuallts were planned and executed by the same half dozen corps staff. Turn over of individuals was less withing HQ and expertise and accumulated knowledge not dispersed across dozens of divsion & corps HQ. Only late in 1944 did the number of army level combat HQ in the Pacific expand to more than three. This arrower HQ base muxt have kept the expertise concentrated. I also suspect the US Marines were less wedded to 'sticking to doctrine' than the US Army was and adapted a bit better.

[overlord644]

another thing about d-day was, why were amtracks not used? i know they were used in the pacific and i think that alot of lives could have been saved by avoiding the whole "murder hole" ordeal

[pdf27]

Probably a beach gradient thing, coupled with production capabilities. Many attols in the pacific have a coral reef some distance away from the beach, meaning troops landed by boat have to wade a hell of a long way under fire to hit the beach. Amphitracks are invaluable there. That isn't true of any of the Normandy beaches. If landing craft are a limiting factor (and they were - there just weren't enough Higgins boats to invade France before 1944) then the same applies to Amphitracks. Limited supplies would save far more lives in the Pacific, so they were sent there.

Not sure what you mean by "murder hole" - you mean dismounting out of the front of a landing craft? Amphitracks would probably have been even worse, particularly as the troops wouldn't even have the dubious cover of 4ft of water but would be out in the middle of the killing area (beach) sticking out like a dog's wotsits.

Ultimately getting off a beach unscathed requires some form of effective cover from fire and some form of mobility. Cover from fire can be in the form of hard cover, fire support to suppress incoming fire or even sufficiently effective cover from view. That means organic armoured support, more NGFS than you can shake a stick at and concentration of force. The latter two are a communications problem rather than an equipment problem.

In other words, the best way to save lives on D-Day is to invent the transistor 20 years early.

[overlord644]

murder-hole is the opening of the LCVP door, when the ramps would land, soldiers exiting through this narrow exit would often be riddled with bullets, hence the term "murder hole"

i am also aware of the logistics problem of getting the amphtracks, i'm just suprised that they wouldnt just stop from making the LCVP's to amphtracks in factories since they were alot safer because the exit was facing away from the machine guns and they could drive onto shore, although i suppose that its alot easier to unload jeep and such into an LCVP

[pdf27]

Duration is pretty minimal when you're in the surf line, particularly at low tide. The amount of aimed fire coming in your direction is generally a lot lower than appreciated, mainly because any fire coming your way feels like it's aimed at you.
Amphitracks are however one big target all the way up. Only the later versions were effectively armoured against rifle-calibre ammunition, and none of them had overhead cover. They carried less and required more work to build than Higgins boats, weakening your first wave if you used nothing but them.

One other thought - could they have got through the beach obstacles? The allies landed at low tide to give the engineers a chance to blow their way through the minefields and obstacles below the high water mark. It may well be that the tracks couldn't drive through these without being destroyed.

[Firefly]

another thing about d-day was, why were amtracks not used? i know they were used in the pacific and i think that alot of lives could have been saved by avoiding the whole "murder hole" ordeal

Tanks werent ever going to be good on Omaha because of the shingle, its not there now, but was there aplenty then.

[overlord644]

Tanks werent ever going to be good on Omaha because of the shingle, its not there now, but was there aplenty then.

my post had nothing to do with tanks

even if amphtracks couldn't bring troops very far it sure would have beet swimming through 10 feet of water

[pdf27]

Given that the draft of a Higgins boat is 2ft 2in forward, I think you're talking b*llocks.

[overlord644]

b*llocks.

what??

[Nickdfresh]

It's British for testicles, actually more synonymous with "bullsh!t" in US speak...:)

[pdf27]

It's British for testicles, actually more synonymous with "bullsh!t" in US speak...:)
I believe you meant to say "English" there - "British" isn't a language.:D

[Carl Schwamberger]

Tanks werent ever going to be good on Omaha because of the shingle, its not there now, but was there aplenty then.

The value of the tanks in the first wave was in their ability to see & destroy the pill boxes & gun bunkers. The did not need to cross the seawall, or dunes, ect.. to do this. The intent was the DD tanks would land a couple minutes ahead of the infantry and cover them with direct fire on the enemy positions. On the other four beaches most of the DD tanks made it ashore as intended and covered the initial waves of infantry and engineers with fire. Once the infantry & engineers had prepared the way the tanks advanced off the beach.

The small handfull of tanks that did make it ashore on Omaha beach were able to suppress & destroy a few of the German gun positions, but the numbers were to small to do the entire job. The destroyers that fired from just beyond the surf line were substituting for the drowned tanks. The same for the surviving engineer teams that infiltrated to the flanks of the gun bunkers and destroyed them.

[Nickdfresh]

I believe you meant to say "English" there - "British" isn't a language.:D

Or blabbering cockney-speak, more accurately. :lol:

[Nickdfresh]

The value of the tanks in the first wave was in their ability to see & destroy the pill boxes & gun bunkers. The did not need to cross the seawall, or dunes, ect.. to do this. The intent was the DD tanks would land a couple minutes ahead of the infantry and cover them with direct fire on the enemy positions. On the other four beaches most of the DD tanks made it ashore as intended and covered the initial waves of infantry and engineers with fire. Once the infantry & engineers had prepared the way the tanks advanced off the beach.

The small handfull of tanks that did make it ashore on Omaha beach were able to suppress & destroy a few of the German gun positions, but the numbers were to small to do the entire job. The destroyers that fired from just beyond the surf line were substituting for the drowned tanks. The same for the surviving engineer teams that infiltrated to the flanks of the gun bunkers and destroyed them.

But the destroyer's 5" guns were far more effective that the 75mm's on the Sherman DDs. The real problem is that the German positions were mostly untouched by the pre-invasion bombardment, and anti-tank guns would have just knocked out any tanks just like they did a lot of landing craft. In fact, I think the few Shermans that made it ashore were quickly put out of action.

I once heard probably the worst graphic WWII story from a soldier that landed at Omaha. His Higgens boat was heading to the beach when his platoon was showered with the blood, internal organs, limbs, heads, and equipment of the boat next over, which had been hit by an 88mm shell. The tanks weren't going to fair any better...

In point of comparison, I believe one of the British beaches themselves had a problem with a singular German anti-tank gun, in perfect firing position, that held them up for hours despite having far more DD tanks present on the beach.

But of course, they were able to flank the gun as infantry could freely move into the cottages and use them for cover...

[pdf27]

Or blabbering cockney-speak, more accurately. :lol:
I thought you said "blathering" not "blabbering" for a minute there. Cue Ironman flashbacks!

[Carl Schwamberger]

But the destroyer's 5" guns were far more effective that the 75mm's on the Sherman DDs.

Correct, but the destroyers did not fire effectively for nearly two hours, until after communications (visual signals and radios) begain to be restored. Unlike the tanks the destroyers could not identify the specific targets from their greater range on their own. The tanks that made it ashore on all the beaches werre close enough to spot the locations of the MG & cannons.

The real problem is that the German positions were mostly untouched by the pre-invasion bombardment, and anti-tank guns would have just knocked out any tanks just like they did a lot of landing craft. In fact, I think the few Shermans that made it ashore were quickly put out of action.

On the other four beaches the tanks came ashore in large enough numbers to overwhelm most of the defenses. Many were destroyed, but they destroyed enough MG and gun bunkers that the infantry/engineers could advance more or less on schedule. Aside from most of the tanks making it ashore on the other beaches they came in ahead of the infantry/engineers as planned, and so were able to effectively cover them with fire. On Omaha Beach the surviving tanks came in fifteen to twenty minutes after the first wave of infantry/engineers. They straggled ashore in very small groups, rather than entire battlaions crossing the beach within a few minutes. Even those few survivng tanks took out their share of the defenders.

I once heard probably the worst graphic WWII story from a soldier that landed at Omaha. His Higgens boat was heading to the beach when his platoon was showered with the blood, internal organs, limbs, heads, and equipment of the boat next over, which had been hit by an 88mm shell. The tanks weren't going to fair any better...

In point of comparison, I believe one of the British beaches themselves had a problem with a singular German anti-tank gun, in perfect firing position, that held them up for hours despite having far more DD tanks present on the beach.

But of course, they were able to flank the gun as infantry could freely move into the cottages and use them for cover...

Still the tanks across that beach and the others did their job despite losses. Any assualt agaisnt prepared defenses is likely to be a bloodly event and there will be many small failures. The overall sucess of the tanks on the other four beaches was just one part of their general sucess. On Omaha Beach the failure of the tanks to reach the shore in usefull numbers was just one part of the fire support plan that failed across the board.

Had the two tank battalions not been lost in the rough water over 110 tanks would have crossed the surf some ten minutes ahead of the first infantry wave, while the last of the naval gun fire wa still falling. As it was less than thirty straggled ashore twenty minutes behind schedule, and after the naval gunfire had shifted off the beach and front of the bluffs.

[Nickdfresh]

I thought you said "blathering" not "blabbering" for a minute there. Cue Ironman flashbacks!

:D

Now, if all the landing forces had only had M-2 Carbine assault rifles! ;)

[Nickdfresh]

Correct, but the destroyers did not fire effectively for nearly two hours, until after communications (visual signals and radios) begain to be restored. Unlike the tanks the destroyers could not identify the specific targets from their greater range on their own. The tanks that made it ashore on all the beaches werre close enough to spot the locations of the MG & cannons.


Of course they didn't, it was an ad hoc plan formed out of desperation and intuitiveness. The kind of thing that wins battles...

And little radio communication was needed initially. Smoke grenades could mark targets, or "paint" them, far more effectively. So could the flashes of German weaponry once the fog lifted..

And the tanks probably would have been blasted by 88s...

On the other four beaches the tanks came ashore in large enough numbers to overwhelm most of the defenses. Many were destroyed, but they destroyed enough MG and gun bunkers that the infantry/engineers could advance more or less on schedule. Aside from most of the tanks making it ashore on the other beaches they came in ahead of the infantry/engineers as planned, and so were able to effectively cover them with fire. On Omaha Beach the surviving tanks came in fifteen to twenty minutes after the first wave of infantry/engineers. They straggled ashore in very small groups, rather than entire battlaions crossing the beach within a few minutes. Even those few survivng tanks took out their share of the defenders.

But that's not a fair comparison. Resistance, though intense at some of the other beaches initially, was quickly overwhelmed not just by tanks by infantry manuveuring in what were more often than not cottages along the sea shore. Omaha was unique in that it was not in a populated area and it has been established that the geography of the beach, such as the seawall and the bluffs, and the overall quality of the Wehrmacht 352d ID was as much a hinderance as anything. Yes, more tanks would certainly have helped. But there were still a significant number of obsticles that remained uncleared due to the German fire. So, how far could the tanks have moved anyways? They'd have been sitting ducks, just like the infantrymen were...

Still the tanks across that beach and the others did their job despite losses. Any assualt agaisnt prepared defenses is likely to be a bloodly event and there will be many small failures. The overall sucess of the tanks on the other four beaches was just one part of their general sucess. On Omaha Beach the failure of the tanks to reach the shore in usefull numbers was just one part of the fire support plan that failed across the board.

Had the two tank battalions not been lost in the rough water over 110 tanks would have crossed the surf some ten minutes ahead of the first infantry wave, while the last of the naval gun fire wa still falling. As it was less than thirty straggled ashore twenty minutes behind schedule, and after the naval gunfire had shifted off the beach and front of the bluffs.

Agreed, but I doubt many more tanks would have made it onto the beaches than already did otherwise. And that number of DD-tanks sounds very high to me. I can't recall the numbers, but I think from memory is was more like 50 or so that were launched against the beach initially. Where are you getting these numbers from?

And the Naval gunfire nary touched the beach due to poor visibility and the fear of short rounds hitting the landing vessels...

[Nickdfresh]

Upon further review, I can only find sources (The BBC) stating that the US 741st and three more were "landed dry."..

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/archaeology/excavations_techniques/marine_dday_underwater_04.shtml

http://www.d-daytanks.org.uk/diary/june6.html

[Nickdfresh]

In any case, there is no single factor or explanation as to why the initial casualties on Omaha were heavy. Several factors such as fog and smoke obscuring the targets, DD-tanks "floundering" in rough seas (and it is now believed they would have sunk regardless of where they were launched as the same thing happened to several Higgens boats), and the geography which hindered tactical movement were all factors...

Omaha was a "perfect storm" of bad luck and German skill. And out of six beaches, at least one was bound to have been problematic...

[redcoat]

Or blabbering cockney-speak, more accurately. :lol:
No its not stupid cockney ryming slang, its an old Anglo-Saxon word.

[Nickdfresh]

You do realize that my post was completely "tongue-in-cheek?"

[Firefly]

I believe you meant to say "English" there - "British" isn't a language.:D

I believe he meant to say British slang as it is used by more than just the English in the UK although it is obviously in English, if you et my drift.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Of course they didn't, it was an ad hoc plan formed out of desperation and intuitiveness. The kind of thing that wins battles...

And little radio communication was needed initially. Smoke grenades could mark targets, or "paint" them, far more effectively. So could the flashes of German weaponry once the fog lifted..

Absolutely wrong. Radio communications in WWII amphibious assualts were essential from the moment the first wave left their assembly areas to run in to the shore. The fire support channels, particulalry the Naval Gun Fire channel have to be continually functional if the landing force is to quickly break the defense, keep casualties to acceptable levels, advance inland on schedule, and bring in the following landing groups in a organized manner. NGF ship stations were too far off shore to spot specific smoke grenades or other visual signals for effective fires. From my own training in this I can say that visual signals alone are not "more effective" than with functional radio signals. Its far slower, less precise, and extremely difficult to coordinate visual signals on a landing beach of divsion size, or two divsions as in the case of Omaha Beach.

Spotting gun flashes from even two or three thousand yards is difficult. Again i can attest to this from persoanl experince. Where the enemy is camoflages, or masked with embrasures and berms or walls it becomes nearly impossible. While eventually some weapons can be located at those ranges it is not possible to obtian the level off effective fires. for that someone has to get in under 1000 meters and be able to transmit target locations rapidly and accurately.

The destroyers that were so helpfull after 0900 hours had to leave their NGF stations 5000+ yards off the beach and run up to the surf line. they could not get in under 2000 yards until the tide had risen enough to allow that. Even with the rising tide they were still bottoming. They also were in intermittiant radio contact by then and were not depending exclusively on visual signals.


And the tanks probably would have been blasted by 88s...

Eh, I've already answered this one once as well


But that's not a fair comparison. Resistance, though intense at some of the other beaches initially, was quickly overwhelmed not just by tanks by infantry manuveuring in what were more often than not cottages along the sea shore. Omaha was unique in that it was not in a populated area and it has been established that the geography of the beach, such as the seawall and the bluffs, and the overall quality of the Wehrmacht 352d ID was as much a hinderance as anything. Yes, more tanks would certainly have helped. But there were still a significant number of obsticles that remained uncleared due to the German fire. So, how far could the tanks have moved anyways? They'd have been sitting ducks, just like the infantrymen were...


Infantry manuvered on Omaha beach through dense brush on the left flank, and across the less well defended bluffs, rather than through the draws as originally planned. They would have had a easier time of it with 100+ tanks landing ahead of them rather than less than thirty a half hour late.

As I wrote earlier the purpose of the DD tanks was not to manuver inland imeadiately, but to suppress the enemy weapons positions during the first critical minutes for the first wave of infantry/engineer companys. this is how the leading tanks fuctioned on the other beaches, and in the Pacific in 1944. The tanks in the lead wave were to destroy the enemy defenses directly at hand, not rush off instantly to the Green Fields Beyond. They were to accompany the assualt as the engineers cleared the obstacles. Not drive off & leave the assualt behind.


Agreed, but I doubt many more tanks would have made it onto the beaches than already did otherwise. And that number of DD-tanks sounds very high to me. I can't recall the numbers, but I think from memory is was more like 50 or so that were launched against the beach initially. Where are you getting these numbers from?

On my shelf here are Max Hastings 'Overlord' and Adm Ellsbergs 'The Far Shore'. I'd also recomend John Balikoskis recent book on Omaha Beach. Each of the two US divsions assualting Omaha Beach had a tank battalion configured for DD landing and a artillery battlion carried in DUKW vehicals. The latter were to follow the first wave in by a few minutes and provide the initial artillery support. The independant tan battalions of the US Army in 1944 were equiped with a little over 50 M4 tanks. I've not seen any evidence the fourth company of light M5 tanks were equipped as DD tanks. I'm unsure if the assualt tank platoon was so equipped, tho this would make sense. Even if the assualt platoon and bn HQ tanks were not DD equipped the six tank companys of the two battalions still provide 100+ tanks


And the Naval gunfire nary touched the beach due to poor visibility and the fear of short rounds hitting the landing vessels...

The initial NGF program included thirty minutes of fires on the beach. Only the last few minutes ocurred while the first wave were anywhere near the beach. "Short rounds" or a fear of did not cause the NGF program to be lifted or shifted early. Surviving Germans describing being hit by the NGF. Visability was a marginal issue. Landmarks were adaqate and there were other navigation aids provided for backup. The inital NGF program was oriented to the terrain and suspected targets, not from spotting targets by the shipsThe usual dawn haze was not enough to interfere with a preplanned fire program.

[Carl Schwamberger]

If you go to this web site:

http://www.trimaran.com/d-day/

panoramic views of the various beaches as they look today can be had.

[Nickdfresh]

Absolutely wrong. Radio communications in WWII amphibious assualts were essential from the moment the first wave left their assembly areas to run in to the shore. The fire support channels, particulalry the Naval Gun Fire channel have to be continually functional if the landing force is to quickly break the defense, keep casualties to acceptable levels, advance inland on schedule, and bring in the following landing groups in a organized manner.

I think you're taking what I say far out of context. Of course radio communications are necessary. However, what's your point here? They had the standard complement of radios and the landing forces were decimated by fire. The main problem was that the command and control on the beach had broken down as units were decimated and left leaderless, forcing troops to form their own ad hoc units to reform, often times with privates in charge and NCOs and buck sergeants taking over as company commanders...

The absence of, by and large, a coherent communications with the beach did not prevent follow on fire from hitting German defenses...

NGF ship stations were too far off shore to spot specific smoke grenades or other visual signals for effective fires.

Not true! The destroyers could clearly mark targets once the smoke from the brush fires had cleared. There really wasn't too much in the way of camouflage for concrete fortifications such as blockhouses, bunkers, and slit trenches. At that point, fire was academic...

From my own training in this I can say that visual signals alone are not "more effective" than with functional radio signals. Its far slower, less precise, and extremely difficult to coordinate visual signals on a landing beach of divsion size, or two divsions as in the case of Omaha Beach.

I didn't say they were "more effective." They were effective enough in that dire situation. And again, I'm sure what your point is. I never said, "they should have thrown their radios in the English Channel because they were useless junk." I merely meant that soldiers were able to overcome their severe limitations imposed on them by other means. Furthermore, I don't recall saying that there were "no" radios on the beach, and there was in fact some radio communications. There was also individual heroics of marking or "illuminating targets" with colored smoke, as indeed, even describing where to shoot with pin-point, non-area targets could be quite confusing via radios alone. And the German infantry positions were essentially area targets that could be observed from the ships...

Spotting gun flashes from even two or three thousand yards is difficult. Again i can attest to this from personal experince. Where the enemy is camoflages, or masked with embrasures and berms or walls it becomes nearly impossible. While eventually some weapons can be located at those ranges it is not possible to obtian the level off effective fires. for that someone has to get in under 1000 meters and be able to transmit target locations rapidly and accurately.

Maybe, but the naval personnel were highly trained in fire observance and correction, which is a major function in naval warfare. Isn't it?

The destroyers that were so helpfull after 0900 hours had to leave their NGF stations 5000+ yards off the beach and run up to the surf line. they could not get in under 2000 yards until the tide had risen enough to allow that. Even with the rising tide they were still bottoming. They also were in intermittiant radio contact by then and were not depending exclusively on visual signals.

I never said they were relying "exclusively on visual signals."

Eh, I've already answered this one once as well

You did? The Germans still had untouched anti-tank and other gun emplacements, as well as obstacles that were untouched, as the beach lacked the shell holes the infantry and armor were expecting to use as cover...

Infantry manuvered on Omaha beach through dense brush on the left flank, and across the less well defended bluffs, rather than through the draws as originally planned. They would have had a easier time of it with 100+ tanks landing ahead of them rather than less than thirty a half hour late.

Of course they would. But the the plan had fallen apart, partially due to heavy German resistance and several other factors. Most of the DD tanks did make it ashore out of the 112 or so, but they were landed later, all but two of the DD-tanks "floundered" (about 27) and the two (or four I think) that floated ashore or were landed were quickly out of action.

The rest fared a little better. But did so as much by the reduction of German defenses as by their own firepower...

As I wrote earlier the purpose of the DD tanks was not to manuver inland imeadiately, but to suppress the enemy weapons positions during the first critical minutes for the first wave of infantry/engineer companys.

this is how the leading tanks functioned on the other beaches, and in the Pacific in 1944. The tanks in the lead wave were to destroy the enemy defenses directly at hand, not rush off instantly to the Green Fields Beyond. They were to accompany the assualt as the engineers cleared the obstacles. Not drive off & leave the assualt behind.

Obviously. I don't believe I've ever disputed that. Why would tanks drive inland without infantry support into enemy positions?

On my shelf here are Max Hastings 'Overlord' and Adm Ellsbergs 'The Far Shore'. I'd also recomend John Balikoskis recent book on Omaha Beach. Each of the two US divsions assualting Omaha Beach had a tank battalion configured for DD landing and a artillery battlion carried in DUKW vehicals. The latter were to follow the first wave in by a few minutes and provide the initial artillery support. The independant tan battalions of the US Army in 1944 were equiped with a little over 50 M4 tanks. I've not seen any evidence the fourth company of light M5 tanks were equipped as DD tanks. I'm unsure if the assualt tank platoon was so equipped, tho this would make sense. Even if the assualt platoon and bn HQ tanks were not DD equipped the six tank companys of the two battalions still provide 100+ tanks

You're correct in that roughly 112 tanks were slated to land in the first waves of assault, of this, 27-sank and radioed full stop to the follow on units, which were landed almost right on the beaches. The the armor did play a part, and despite Omaha's initial miseries, it was one of the key beaches for the "break out" and it's troops actually ventured in farther than any other beachhead I believe...

And M-5's would have been useful, but they were primarily a recon tank...

The essential problem is that the armor, and the troops, started out too far from the shore (5km I think) to avoid German fire on the way in. Of course this contributed to the disaster. But the opening naval artillery barrage and bombing raids largely missing the German defenses, although they did isolate the defenders somewhat.

And let's give some credit to the Wehrmacht defenders, of mostly the 352ID, who had some excellent fortifications and were skilled and professional - perhaps more so than the defenders of the other beaches...

The initial NGF program included thirty minutes of fires on the beach. Only the last few minutes ocurred while the first wave were anywhere near the beach. "Short rounds" or a fear of did not cause the NGF program to be lifted or shifted early. Surviving Germans describing being hit by the NGF. Visability was a marginal issue. Landmarks were adaqate and there were other navigation aids provided for backup. The inital NGF program was oriented to the terrain and suspected targets, not from spotting targets by the shipsThe usual dawn haze was not enough to interfere with a preplanned fire program.

Not true. Testimony from USAAF bombardiers had the target largely overcast and they were unable to bomb accurately, so they released their ordinance inland to err on the side of caution. In addition, the initial bombardment lit grass fires which concealed the German positions in their smoke until after the fires had burned off.

Of course some positions were hit, but the effect was marginal...

[Nickdfresh]

Maybe.

But battle hardened troops will always do a lot, lot better than green troops.

But green troops will do things (specifically take risks) that battle hardened men may not do...

[The trick is to have enough battle hardened officers, NCO's and OR's sprinkled among the green troops to make the supposedly green units work well.

Agree wholeheartedly...

[overlord644]

well lets not forget its this green recklessness that keeps the army going, as awful as it might seem its often the green troops that volunteer for patrols, and i think i heard a statistic once that said that like 80% of all MOH winners were green

of course none of this would help on Omaha beach....

[HAWKEYE]

One post mentioned the use of Amtracs and how going out the back would have been better. I'm pretty sure, though I've no real reference books specifically on them, that the amtracs of that time did not have rear ramps. You had to climb over the sides, they would have gotten the troops up to the seawall in groups better but there was no going out the back door. Anyway the Pacific theatre had the lock on those.

Many of the German gun emplacements were situated to fire down the beach and not out to sea, these were very well hidden from the naval forces off shore and had to be pointed out to the destroyers one by one. These made it very unhealthy for armor on the beach.
I do think that the commanders who ordered the DD tanks off the ramps too far out should have faced a court of inquiry.

[redcoat]

. it was one of the key beaches for the "break out" and it's troops actually ventured in farther than any other beachhead I believe...


The Canadians from Juno beach hold that honour, they had advanced to Bayeux, about 21 kilometres inland, by midnight on the 6th June.

[Nickdfresh]

The Canadians from Juno beach hold that honour, they had advanced to Bayeux, about 21 kilometres inland, by midnight on the 6th June.

Initially, but after several days and weeks, the farthest penetration was from the Omaha beachhead...