Which nationality had the best navy in the War?

[jnd2089]

Which nationality had the best navy?

I would say America because of the naval-air superiority

[SS Tiger]

I say America too, for the same reason. They had lots of carriers and used them well.

[HG]

US, allthought the Japs also had great carriers and some were better advanced than that of the US, but the US carriers proved they were the best.

Henk

[DerMann]

Well at different times in the war, different countries had different naval strengths. In the begining of the war (1941/42) the Japanese had an excellent force of battleships and carriers, and the US had lost most of her fleet except for her carriers. Same thing with Germany and Britain (the whole Bismark thing).

[SS Tiger]

Well at different times in the war, different countries had different naval strengths. In the begining of the war (1941/42) the Japanese had an excellent force of battleships and carriers, and the US had lost most of her fleet except for her carriers. Same thing with Germany and Britain (the whole Bismark thing).

That makes the U.S. Navy the best, they had alot of their fleet destroyed and yet they still pulled the war around. The also quickly launched a counterstrike against Japan, which was quite a feat to pull off.

[Topor]

Whilst the USN had carriers capable of carrying a greater number of aircraft, their design left them vulnerable to bombs & kamikazes.
RN carriers had 4" armoured flight decks, which proved resistant to both, whereas the USN carriers had wooden decks. This saving in weight allowed the greater number of aircraft.
In general, RN ships of all types were better armoured, with a consequent decrease in the tonnage of offensive equipment carried.
IIRC, the RN also stipulated greater division of internal space than the USN, making damage control easier.

[pdf27]

IIRC, the RN also stipulated greater division of internal space than the USN, making damage control easier.
Maybe so, but the USN were better at damage control than the RN. By the end of the war USN destroyers were surviving hits that would have sunk cruisers from any other nation.

[PLT.SGT.BAKER]

I would say USN, I heard the USN is saying it might adopt the DD(X)
more info here on DD(X)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DD%28X%29

[HG]

The Jap navy were a great and very advanced navy, but was not used right and thus it lost. The US navy were used to its full potention and thus was such a great navy.

Germany did not have the numbers to do much damage or to take on the Royal Navy.

Henk

[Firefly]

IIRC, the RN also stipulated greater division of internal space than the USN, making damage control easier.
Maybe so, but the USN were better at damage control than the RN. By the end of the war USN destroyers were surviving hits that would have sunk cruisers from any other nation.

After the Coral Sea battles I think the US Navy went into damage control overdrive and succeeded as you say.

I think overall the US Navy came out as the best Navy in the world, after all they had the steepest learning curve.

Thats not saying that other Navies were bad, until 1944 the Japanese were much better at Night fighting, but a lack of a decent Radar negated this. The Japanese were also fuel, skilled manpower and building ability strapped.

Instead of attacking Pearl harbour the Japanese may have gained more by waiting for the US Fleet to sail to the defence of the Phillipenes.

Now there is a what if!

I am very surprised that the Japanese Navy is not getting second place here as I think in a straight clash between the RN and IJN there would have been no contest in 1941/42.

[pdf27]

I am very surprised that the Japanese Navy is not getting second place here as I think in a straight clash between the RN and IJN there would have been no contest in 1941/42.
Not so sure about that - remember the RN had 3 oceans to cover, the USN 2 and the IJN 1. In a straight fight (1 ocean only) the RN will be initially handicapped by the lack of modern carrier aircraft before steamrollering the Japanese once the UK gets it's arse in gear. Remember UK industrial output is something like 4 times that of Japan at this point in time, and shipbuilding, aircraft production, etc. are all much higher than Japan. Provided the RN can avoid getting all sunk in the first few weeks (and Somerville did rather well in 1943 or so) the RN should win easily.

[Panzerknacker]

From 1939 to 1943 Britain, from 1943 to 1945 USA.

[Kevin]

In Europe; Germany with the submarines and in the pacific; the us

[Nickdfresh]

The Jap navy were a great and very advanced navy, but was not used right and thus it lost. The US navy were used to its full potention and thus was such a great navy.

Germany did not have the numbers to do much damage or to take on the Royal Navy.

Henk

The Japanese were initially undefeatable in "night fighting." But eventually, the USN was able to equal, then surpass them, at fighting at night...

[Crab_to_be]

Having cast my vote, it's level pegging between the RN and the USN.
For me, the decision is based on the following consideration:

To defeat the UK, Germany needed to stage an invasion of the British mainland. This required control of the sea. To gain control of the sea in the face of oppostion by the Home Fleet, the Luftwaffe required control of the air, which leads to the Battle of Britain - some of you may have heard of this. In the meantime, the RN was also securing Britain's sea lines of communication across the globe. That's plantery scale Force Projection, and back in the 1940s too.

The linchpin is the strength of the RN in home waters - the Germans could not hope to oppose it without Air Supremacy (Air Superiority would have been insufficient in the face of the poor German anti-shipping ability). This left the Germanss having to face the Battle of Britain and experience their first strategic defeat.

[Mophat]

I think the Kriegsmarine (German navy) they (i think) were the first ones to build the u-boats which were one of the deadliest weapons at the beginning of the war. And especially with the Bismark and i forgot the other big battleship that went out with the bismark. They made many many mistakes and didnt use those battleships right.

[HG]

I think the Kriegsmarine (German navy) they (i think) were the first ones to build the u-boats which were one of the deadliest weapons at the beginning of the war. And especially with the Bismark and i forgot the other big battleship that went out with the bismark. They made many many mistakes and didnt use those battleships right.

There were only two ships who broke into the atlantic and it was the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen. The othe big ships in the German Navy were the Tirpitz/Bismarck and the Scharnhorst & Gneisenau. The carriers were the Graf Zeppelin.

The German Navy were just out gunned and ill prepaired. The US did have the best Navy, but I also love the German navy and I give them their credit.

The Jap Navy were also great, but used it incorrectly and made many stupid misstakes.

Henk

[Keith.Brigstock]

As an Army man not all that keen on things that float there just a means to get the army to its place of work. However it has to be the Royal Navy they were the only Navy to have to fight across the world for 5 years. While they may not have had the best ships in the world, in fact a lot where ex US cast offs its not ships that make a navy its the men and you average RN sailor was defiantly the best and has been since Nelsons Day.

One thing on the ships the US aircraft carrier was with out doubt the biggest and carried the most aircraft, but they had wood decks while the RN carriers had armoured decks. The USN paid dearly for this oversight.

If you need to look at shear blood sweet and tears of a navy look at the list of ships that took part in the relief of Malta that was real bravery.

http://freespace.virgin.net/gordon.smith4/NAVAL1939WW2RNLosses.htm


Please look at this site it list all British War ships lost during WW2

Just one thing for our US allies if you ask an American when did you join the war he will answer December 1941 if you ask a us Navy vet the same question you will get an answer considerably earlier than that god bless them for that.

[pdf27]

One thing on the ships the US aircraft carrier was with out doubt the biggest and carried the most aircraft, but they had wood decks while the RN carriers had armoured decks. The USN paid dearly for this oversight.
Ummm... not as badly as you might think. The US carriers had MUCH larger air groups, so were hit much less often than the RN carriers would have been had they been operating independently (as it was, they were rarely attacked). Furthermore, while they could continue operating after an attack, all of the RN carriers attacked by Kamikazes were scrapped postwar due to the cumulative damage - something that did not happen to the USN carriers. It is also worth noting that the RN have not built an armoured carrier since.

[VonWeyer]

In this order...America, Britain, Japan.

[redcoat]

From 1939 to 1943 Britain, from 1943 to 1945 USA.
Have to agree, in the early part of the war the RN despite its problems was the most powerful navy, but after that, thanks to a colossal building programme by the USA, the USN was at the wars end the supreme naval power.

[George Eller]

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One thing on the ships the US aircraft carrier was with out doubt the biggest and carried the most aircraft, but they had wood decks while the RN carriers had armoured decks. The USN paid dearly for this oversight.

Just one thing for our US allies if you ask an American when did you join the war he will answer December 1941 if you ask a us Navy vet the same question you will get an answer considerably earlier than that god bless them for that.

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Hi Keith,

I'm not sure that it was an oversight.

I have the Battlefield documentary series and remember some comments made concerning the damage control systems of American carriers prior to the battle of Midway.

Battlefield: The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle (Time-Life)
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_v/102-3240256-7489714?url=search-alias%3Dvhs&field-keywords=Battlefield%3A&Go.x=10&Go.y=12

I believe this documentary series was produced in Britain.

I replayed the parts from the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.

...All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier's decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen...

... Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.

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Some related information:

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/archive/index.php/t-165.html

IDonT quote: 10-08-2005, 07:21 PM
The Forrestal and Enterprise fires on the Vietnam war was primarily the result of ordinance and jet fuel from aircraft that was already parked on the deck. They were being prepared to be lauched. IN no way were both vessels under threat of sinking.

When a carrier is about to be under attack, USN standard procedure is
1.) Lauch all the aircraft
2.) Flood the JP5 fuel lines with CO2

This is carrier ops 101, learned the hardway in World War II.

What you are proposing is an ambush on an unprepared carrier at sea. This is a highly unlikely scenario. During war time scenario, carriers always have an AEW bird in the air.

IF such a scenario were to happen, US damage control teams are very good. Check USS Franklin. US were able to save the ship.

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bd popeye quote: 10-08-2005, 07:29 PM

The flight decks of WW 2 USN CV's were not armoured. I served on the USS Hancock in '74-'75. The Hancock was comissioned in 1944. The flight deck was made of teak wood laid over about 1" thick steel plating. Not amour. The wood on the flight deck was covered by an epoxy coating called no-skid.

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http://www.network54.com/Forum/256293/message/1152917251/I+have+a+couple+of+questions....

Reading a new book regarding the battle of Samar... (Hornfischer's "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors")

I understand from reading, the need for the wood flight decks (I didn't know before) due to the explosive fuel vapors around metal; did these decks wear quickly and how were they cleaned? I imagine the spilled fuel and oil, soaking into the wood could make as volatile of a situation as dangerous as dropping a metal tool on a metal flight deck.

I don't understand a 'needle-ball" other than it was used for airplane orientation..

(For those of you who are wondering what interested me in this particular book, Dad's T was in CTU 79.5.2.)

http://www.network54.com/Forum/256293/message/1152923401/The+decks+were+cleaned+by...

...what was called Holy Stone. Composed of sandstone. This information is complimentary of my good friends, Fred and Webster.

http://www.network54.com/Forum/256293/message/1152934944/master+and+commander+of+the+scrubbin+rock
teak decks been scrubbed holy stones since day one, theres an exelent shot of this very activity going on
in the movie [Master and Commander] , I cant imagine what kind of labor it would have taken to do a carrier deck. or battleship deck.
BB

http://www.network54.com/Forum/256293/message/1152990907/Answer
The wood planking did get saturated with aircraft fluids. It did receive a stain finish when installed to darken it. later years it was covered with Non-Skid. Water would get underneith and corrode the steel plate and it would leak when it rained. yes we did have a leaky roof as the Flight Deck is refered to as the "Roof".If you Google the USS Oriskany you will find the wood planking had to be removed and disposed of at great expense because of petroleum and PCB's in the wood.
Sherry only those Battleship sailors Holy Stoned decks which was TEAK over steel.

SeaBat, the Needle is the Turn Rate indicator and the Ball is the Artificial Horizion.

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Holystone
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holystone

Holystone is a soft and brittle sandstone that was formerly used for scouring and whitening the wooden decks of ships. It was used in the British and American Navy for scrubbing the decks of sailing ships.

The term may have come from the fact that 'holystoning the deck' was traditionally done on one's knees, as in prayer. [1]

According to one source holystoning was banned in the US Navy in 1931 as it wore down the decks (and with the demise of teak decked battleships became unnecessary)[1]. However, a photo on the US Navy's Navsource photo archive of the USS Missouri) purports to show Navy Midshipmen holystoning the deck of the USS Missouri in 1951 (albeit in a standing position)[2] A Time Magazine article (June 8, 1931) discusses the end of holystoning (archive article (fee) ) in the US Navy.

John Huston's 1956 film Moby Dick (IMDb Entry), and most recently Peter Weir's 2003 film "Master and Commander: Far Side of the World" (IMDb Entry), shows sailors scrubbing the deck with holystones. Holystoning is referenced in Richard Henry Dana's 1840 classic novel Two Years Before the Mast in what he calls the "Philadelphia Catechism": [3]

“Six days shalt thou labor and do all thou art able,
And on the seventh—holystone the decks and scrape the cable.”

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From: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi, Checkmark Books, 1998, p 20.
The Japanese had a policy of not storing aircraft on deck, a practice that the US Navy adopted before the war, and embraced enthusiastically during it. As a result, US carriers of comparable size usually could operate as many as 65% more aircraft (90-100 as against 55-65). British carriers tended to have smaller aircraft capacity (55-65), due to a decision to provide relatively heavy armor. In compensation, British carriers were much more survivable ships.

A second critical factor in carrier effectiveness, and more important than carrier size, was the ship's capacity to carry avgas (aviation fuel) and fuel, which determined operational endurance. While this was, of course, partially connected to the size of the vessel, once again policy decisions and design were a factor. In consequence, US carriers tended to have greater fuel capacity than either Japanese or British ones, which meant American carriers could generate more missions between trips to the barn.

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I plan to post more within the next few days - including an article on the British Pacific Fleet. ...Well, it's getting late.

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[George Eller]

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01
http://img168.imageshack.us/img168/6417/britishpacificfleet01jc0.jpg

http://img329.imageshack.us/img329/8824/britishpacificfleet02hh3.jpg

http://img329.imageshack.us/img329/5999/britishpacificfleet03xz3.jpg

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/6694/britishpacificfleet04dr8.jpg

From Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt. Col. Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, DSO, MC, MA, H.S. Stuttman Inc. Publishers, 1978, Volume 17, pp 2368-2380

(CONTINUED BELOW)

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[George Eller]

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(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
02
http://img329.imageshack.us/img329/2571/britishpacificfleet05fo0.jpg

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/562/britishpacificfleet06hu5.jpg

http://img168.imageshack.us/img168/6643/britishpacificfleet07ti9.jpg

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/9053/britishpacificfleet08xp2.jpg

From Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt. Col. Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, DSO, MC, MA, H.S. Stuttman Inc. Publishers, 1978, Volume 17, pp 2368-2380

(CONTINUED BELOW)

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[George Eller]

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(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
03

http://img329.imageshack.us/img329/8119/britishpacificfleet09sr8.jpg

http://img329.imageshack.us/img329/9370/britishpacificfleet10ud4.jpg

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/8495/britishpacificfleet11in0.jpg

From Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt. Col. Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, DSO, MC, MA, H.S. Stuttman Inc. Publishers, 1978, Volume 17, pp 2368-2380

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/9960/britishnavaljackqb9.jpg

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SEE ALSO:

British Pacific Fleet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Pacific_Fleet

http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/Ships/BPF/Britishpacificfleethomepage.html

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/38308.pdf

http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Navy-c24.html

http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/kamikaze/books/related/eadon/index.htm

http://www.answers.com/topic/british-pacific-fleet

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4017.pdf

http://www.dive-bombers.co.uk/Task%20Force%2057.htm

http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/general/pacfleet.html

http://www.royalnavyresearcharchive.org.uk/SLINGER/SLING-12.HTM

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[ArmyDude1973]

the u s a did how ever i read some say that as well then the said germany did in the first part of ww2 but what i dont think he knows is that germany had no carries at the time thy started to bild one near the end of ww2 then they sank it so that the u.s.a or russia could not take it i found out about at strange military.com this site also have some weapons of ww2 and some wild pic i hope i could help and give this site on here and if not sorey

[angform]

i must said the US Navy, because the air superiority that came from their carriers

[Erik]

Thats kinda harsh... no mention of the RCN in the poll (even in the ()'s in the 'other' option). This despite the RCN being the 3rd largest Allied Naval force in the world behind the US and UK.

[Gen. Sandworm]

Thats kinda harsh... no mention of the RCN in the poll (even in the ()'s in the 'other' option). This despite the RCN being the 3rd largest Allied Naval force in the world behind the US and UK.

Most ppl tend to lump Canada into the UK commonwealth forces. Which is right and wrong. Sorry to say the huge effort Canada put forth in WW2 tends to get overlooked by default.

[Digger]

In the beginning of the war-1939 I believe the RN was just shaded by the Japanese Imperial Navy. The USN would be third, though large in terms of numbers much of their equipment required modernization.

War losses gradually eroded the RN strength, so by the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese Imperial Navy was the best and probably maintained that lead until the Battle Of Midway. Thereafter the USN was the superior navy in most categories.

Regards Digger.

[redcoat]

In the beginning of the war-1939 I believe the RN was just shaded by the Japanese Imperial Navy. The USN would be third, though large in terms of numbers much of their equipment required modernization.
The strength of the RN in 1939 was as follows
15 capital ships
7 aircraft carriers
15 heavy cruisers
46 light cruisers
181 destroyers
54 escort ships

Japanese navy 1941
10 capital ships
8 aircraft carriers
18 heavy cruisers
20 light cruisers
108 destroyers

The Japanese navy was far stronger than the RN in terms of the amount of aircraft its navy could deploy, it was however fatally weaker in both the amount of ASW vessels it could deploy, and its ASW tactics.

[Timbo in Oz]

there some very good articles on the web (i'll look!) about the tactical, service life, and strategic costs to the RN of this design decision.

here they are

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-042.htm



IIRc the articles do fairly set out the reasons behind the decision, I would also add that the RN's best AA predictor system for high angle medium and heavy gun AA fire - in the late 1930's - was, at the very least flawed, and perhaps the carrier designers knew of this waekness aginst high level bombers and dive bombers.

IIRC the whole ship could easily be seriousy damaged by a single hit, even by close nera misses, warping the entire hull. this has as the articles show, quite serious 'all of ship' effects.

Summing up the USN was the first navy to get - anti aircraft and carrier issues understood, as a 'whole'.

their directors were already good by 1939 and only got better. their Hudon gun if maintained well was a good weapon for its period. and they had ONE medium calibre/DP gun, the 5/38! yes, I know about the 5/25" but it fired the same shells, at least!

I forget how many MC/DP guns the RN had but there were 4 calibres, 4", 4.5", 4.7", and 5.25", and several different guns within the 4 and 4.7's at least and differnt ammo for EACH. And, half of them were not DP's either no AA ability!


For thos reason alone I think USN should come first, closely followed by the RN for its overall effort considering itsparlous stae by 39, and its ASW development, which the USN basically picked up on.

I think the IJN comes a plain third due to its excellent performance early on, against which are the failure to use convoy, and not using its subs effectively.

[Timbo in Oz]

there some very good articles on the web (i'll look!) about the tactical, service life, and strategic costs to the RN of this design decision.

here they are

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-042.htm



IIRc the articles do fairly set out the reasons behind the decision, I would also add that the RN's best AA predictor system for high angle medium and heavy gun AA fire - in the late 1930's - was, at the very least flawed, and perhaps the carrier designers knew of this waekness aginst high level bombers and dive bombers.

IIRC the whole ship could easily be seriousy damaged by a single hit, even by close nera misses, warping the entire hull. this has as the articles show, quite serious 'all of ship' effects.

Summing up the USN was the first navy to get - anti aircraft and carrier issues understood, as a 'whole'.

their directors were already good by 1939 and only got better. their Hudon gun if maintained well was a good weapon for its period. and they had ONE medium calibre/DP gun, the 5/38! yes, I know about the 5/25" but it fired the same shells, at least!

I forget how many MC/DP guns the RN had but there were 4 calibres, 4", 4.5", 4.7", and 5.25", and several different guns within the 4 and 4.7's at least and differnt ammo for EACH. And, half of them were not DP's either no AA ability!


For thos reason alone I think USN should come first, closely followed by the RN for its overall effort considering itsparlous stae by 39, and its ASW development, which the USN basically picked up on.

I think the IJN comes a plain third due to its excellent performance early on, against which are the failure to use convoy, and not using its subs effectively.

[George Eller]

there some very good articles on the web (i'll look!) about the tactical, service life, and strategic costs to the RN of this design decision.

here they are

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-042.htm



IIRc the articles do fairly set out the reasons behind the decision, I would also add that the RN's best AA predictor system for high angle medium and heavy gun AA fire - in the late 1930's - was, at the very least flawed, and perhaps the carrier designers knew of this waekness aginst high level bombers and dive bombers.

IIRC the whole ship could easily be seriousy damaged by a single hit, even by close nera misses, warping the entire hull. this has as the articles show, quite serious 'all of ship' effects.

Summing up the USN was the first navy to get - anti aircraft and carrier issues understood, as a 'whole'.

their directors were already good by 1939 and only got better. their Hudon gun if maintained well was a good weapon for its period. and they had ONE medium calibre/DP gun, the 5/38! yes, I know about the 5/25" but it fired the same shells, at least!

I forget how many MC/DP guns the RN had but there were 4 calibres, 4", 4.5", 4.7", and 5.25", and several different guns within the 4 and 4.7's at least and differnt ammo for EACH. And, half of them were not DP's either no AA ability!


For thos reason alone I think USN should come first, closely followed by the RN for its overall effort considering itsparlous stae by 39, and its ASW development, which the USN basically picked up on.

I think the IJN comes a plain third due to its excellent performance early on, against which are the failure to use convoy, and not using its subs effectively.
-

Thanks for the info and links Timbo.

Very informative. I found the articles from your links to be extremely interesting:

Were Armored Flight Decks on British Carriers Worthwhile?
by Stuart Slade and Richard Worth
Updated 14 June 2002
Armor Protection on American and British Carriers
©2000 Stuart Slade
The Armored Box: The War's Verdict
©2002 Richard Worth
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-030.htm

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Kamikaze Damage to US and British Carriers
by Tony DiGiulian
Updated 21 November 2006
US Carriers
British Carriers
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-042.htm

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[Rising Sun]

Which nationality had the best navy?



The nation with the winning navy.

[AllHailCesar]

The nation with the winning navy.

I guess it doesn't get any simpler than that.

[Rising Sun*]

This thread reminds me of an oddity that I read somewhere.

Who had the largest navy in WWII?

The US Army, by raw number of ships. Obviously not by offensive naval capacity, but apparently by war's end the army had a huge number of transports etc, primarily in the Pacific.

[HG]

Japan used her navy for the wrongly. Her carriers did not use tactics that were as great as the US navy and she also used her subs wrongly. After Pearl Harbor the US navy used tactics that would prove not the best planes or ships will win a battle, but the way you use them.

[alephh]

Well, US navy was the biggest, but I don't think that producing a lot of stuff makes navy "good". There is lot of ice in the north pole, but that doesn't make it "best" at anything. There are many cases when US navy bombed inaccurately ie.

I have to vote for UK for several reasons: individuals were good (lot of naval-tradition) from sailors to leaders, and both tactics and strategy were pretty solid (they had to make pretty difficult decisions since they had many theaters to consider), keeping their spirits up against bigger and stronger enemy.


_

[kallinikosdrama1992]

i think they had the best battleships and also they had better aircraft carriers against the japs or the german . because this two axis forces had good navy forces

[overlord644]

i'd say the british protection of the channel is enough to earn my vote especially when you consider that most of americas naval battles in the pacific were won largely because of actions in the air

[Drake]

My vote goes to the USNavy. It faced and defeatet most of the might of a sizeable and capable opponent. When it comes to (major) UK opponents Germany didn't have much of a Navy (besides E and Uboats, we kinda seem to like those, just like panzers :D) and Italy is well, Italy.

[Rising Sun*]

My vote goes to the USNavy. It faced and defeatet most of the might of a sizeable and capable opponent. When it comes to (major) UK opponents Germany didn't have much of a Navy (besides E and Uboats, we kinda seem to like those, just like panzers :D) and Italy is well, Italy.

Maybe there are two separate topics here.

Who had the best navy on paper?

Who did the best with the navy they had?

The answers to both questions shifted as the war progressed, but much attention could be devoted to the Italian and French navies in the early part of the war, on both questions.

The French can point to political factors inhibiting the use of their naval power after Vichy. Italy has fewer excuses.

The RN still stands out until early 1942 as fighting everyone on the Axis side, in various seas and oceans. Germany was the only other one to venture much outside the Mediterranean during the same period, which involves much more than simple tactical moves but also reflects the economic power of the combatants and their access to fuel oil, supply ships, supply ports etc.

Germany's U boat war was perhaps the most successful and least successful sustained naval campaign. It threatened Britain's survival, but lacked the resouces to strangle Britain before the US entered the war.

What nowadays is too often ignored is the effect of the German commerce raiders in the early part of the war. They had some significant victories by any standards, and more so for civilian ships converted to covert fighting ships.

One of Japan's many great failings, flowing from its outdated warrior concepts, in waging a long war was its failure to identify and target commercial shipping, while its own commercial shipping was being steadlily sunk by the Allies.

[alephh]

US victories are based on intelligence and airbattles.

Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to? (Oh yes, Pearl Harbor, that didn't end so great for US).

Japan had already battled almost a decade in WWII (lost many great solders, overstretched it resources) before it faced US. I do not see any greatness required to destroy tired enemy who doesn't have any real natural resources and who is fighting many many enemies.


_

[alephh]

Germany's U boat war was perhaps the most successful and least successful sustained naval campaign. It threatened Britain's survival, but lacked the resouces to strangle Britain before the US entered the war.

What nowadays is too often ignored is the effect of the German commerce raiders in the early part of the war. They had some significant victories by any standards.

I think commerce raiders have suffered because U-boats have taken up all the (navy related WWII) headlines.

It's easy to "forgot/overlook" German Navy achievements in WWII. They had very very limited resources (For starters Germany had very limited natural resources, and most of those went to ground forces and Luftwaffe). And they faced powerful experienced enemy in Royal Navy. And their codes were broken from time to time. Considering all that: they did great.

German surface fleet had pretty impossible problem to solve: Tiny force needed to be effective without risks!


_

[George Eller]

US victories are based on intelligence and airbattles.

Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to? (Oh yes, Pearl Harbor, that didn't end so great for US).

Japan had already battled almost a decade in WWII (lost many great solders, overstretched it resources) before it faced US. I do not see any greatness required to destroy tired enemy who doesn't have any real natural resources and who is fighting many many enemies.
_
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Your last statement...really, come on. Japan had been fighting China since 1937. I doubt Japan suffered any significant naval losses against China. At the start of serious hostilities, Japan was a naval juggernaut, hardly a "tired enemy". They had prepared for war years in advance and were quite experienced. Japan's navy excelled in night fighting capabilities and their "Long Lance" torpedo was the most advanced in the world. Need I mention the quality of their naval aviators.

Intelligence and airpower remain as key factors in waging war, if you can achieve superiority in both, then all the better. "All's fair in love and war".

BTW, American submarines sank more total tonnage of Japanese ships than did all American surface ships combined.

Interestingly, prior to the war, the Japanese had a pretty intricate network of spies operating in the Pacific regions that they attacked or invaded (Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, etc.)

The Japanese interest in naval airpower started long before WWII. They were impressed as observers at Billy Mitchell's anti-ship bombing demonstrations in 1921.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell#Anti-ship_bombing_demonstration

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell#Promoting_air_power
In 1922 Mitchell met the like-minded Italian air power theorist Giulio Douhet on a trip to Europe and soon afterwards, an excerpted translation of Douhet's The Command of the Air began to circulate in the Air Service. In 1924, Mitchell's superiors sent him to Hawaii, then Asia, to get him off the front pages. Mitchell came back with a 324-page report that predicted future war with Japan, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. His report, published in 1925 as the book Winged Defense, foretold wider benefits of an investment in air power:

"Those interested in the future of the country, not only from a national defense standpoint but from a civil, commercial and economic one as well, should study this matter carefully, because air power has not only come to stay but is, and will be, a dominating factor in the world’s development."

The book was little read outside the air power community.

Particularly, after the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which limited Japan to a ratio of three battleships to every five of the US Navy and British Royal Navy, Japan saw the aircraft carrier as a means of offsetting their numerical disadvantage in battleships. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty#Effects
The US had six carriers at the start of the war, not including the old CV-1, Langley, as she had been converted to a seaplane carrier (AV-3) in 1936 to allow for the completion of Wasp (CV-7). After the Washington Treaty terminated, the US laid down six new carriers, starting with Hornet (CV-8) (a repeat Yorktown) and Essex (CV-9) (the first of a new class). Japan converted incomplete battleship Kaga and battlecruiser Akagi to aircraft carriers to conform to Washington Naval Treaty. These conversions provided much needed experience and helped to build future classes of aircraft carriers. Japan had ten carriers at the start of the war.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was pretty evenly matched.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea
The battle is considered a tactical victory for Japan since the United States carrier USS Lexington was lost, while Japan only lost the light carrier Shōhō in the battle. At the same time, the battle was a strategic victory for the Allies because the Japanese abandoned their attempt to land troops to take Port Moresby, New Guinea. The engagement ended with no clear victor, but the damage suffered and experience gained by both sides set the stage for the Battle of Midway one month later.

The Japanese had numerical superiority in carriers at the Battle of Midway.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
During the battle, the United States Navy defeated a Japanese attack against Midway Atoll, losing one aircraft carrier and one destroyer, while destroying four Japanese carriers and a heavy cruiser.

The battle was a decisive victory for the Americans, widely regarded as the most important naval engagement of the Pacific Campaign of World War II. The battle permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), particularly through the loss of over 200 naval aviators. Both nations sustained losses in the battle, but Japan, industrially outstripped by America, was unable to reconstitute its naval forces while the American shipbuilding program provided quick replacements. By 1942 the United States was three years[citation needed] into a massive ship building program that sought to expand the Navy to a size superior to Japan's. As a result of Midway, the Japanese were faced with naval inferiority within months as this created a steady flow of aircraft carriers and other ships of the line. Strategically, the U.S. Navy was able to seize the initiative in the Pacific and go on the offensive.

I have the Battlefield documentary series and remember some comments made concerning the damage control systems of American carriers prior to the battle of Midway.

Battlefield: The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle (Time-Life)
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_v/102-3240256-7489714?url=search-alias%3Dvhs&field-keywords=Battlefield%3A&Go.x=10&Go.y=12

From the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.


...All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier's decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen...

... Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.

From: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi, Checkmark Books, 1998, p 20.

The Japanese had a policy of not storing aircraft on deck, a practice that the US Navy adopted before the war, and embraced enthusiastically during it. As a result, US carriers of comparable size usually could operate as many as 65% more aircraft (90-100 as against 55-65). British carriers tended to have smaller aircraft capacity (55-65), due to a decision to provide relatively heavy armor. In compensation, British carriers were much more survivable ships.

A second critical factor in carrier effectiveness, and more important than carrier size, was the ship's capacity to carry avgas (aviation fuel) and fuel, which determined operational endurance. While this was, of course, partially connected to the size of the vessel, once again policy decisions and design were a factor. In consequence, US carriers tended to have greater fuel capacity than either Japanese or British ones, which meant American carriers could generate more missions between trips to the barn.

(CONTINUED BELOW)

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[George Eller]

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(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)

As far as Pearl Harbor goes, it was a Japanese surprise attack on a neutral country. They failed to sink any American aircraft carriers as none were in port. Also, the Japanese failed to destroy Pearl Harbor's fuel storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than did loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year.

As to the eight American battleships that were sunk at Pearl Harbor, six were raised from the harbor's shallow waters, then repaired and refitted to more modern standards. In retrospect, had any of the battleships been engaged at sea and sunk in the open waters of the Pacific, I doubt that the US Navy would have been able to salvage them.

Five of those six rebuilt American battleships participated in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history when they took part in the destruction of Japanese Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura's fleet (of "Southern Force") at the Battle of Surigao Strait.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Surigao_Strait#Battle_of_Surigao_Strait
...As they passed the cape of Panaon Island, they ran into a deadly trap set for them by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships (Mississippi, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, all but the Mississippi having been resurrected from Pearl Harbor)

...The Battle of Surigao Strait was, to date, the final line battle in naval history. Yamashiro was the last battleship to engage another in combat and one of very few to have been sunk by another battleship during World War II. This was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to cross the T of its opponent, enabling the U.S. ships to bring all their firepower to bear on the Japanese ships.

Battle of Leyte Gulf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf
Battle of Surigao Strait
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Surigao_Strait#Battle_of_Surigao_Strait

The six American battleships that were salvaged and modernized following the attack on Pearl Harbor:

http://img87.imageshack.us/img87/1749/01ussnevadagw3.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nevada_%28BB-36%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Pennsylvania_%28BB-38%29

http://img85.imageshack.us/img85/8775/03usstennesseeyw0.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Tennessee_%28BB-43%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_California_%28BB-44%29

http://img87.imageshack.us/img87/7978/05ussmarylandbo2.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Maryland_%28BB-46%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_West_Virginia_%28BB-48%29

SEE ALSO:

Imperial Japanese Navy Page
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm

The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy
http://www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90607&postcount=22

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[HG]

Japan had a great design of Battleships and their late Aircraft carriers were very advanced could do great damage if used correctly, but their were no aircraft and the Yamato lacked in many things and were not used to its full advantage.

I think that Japan's naval warfare during WW2 were poor. They used everything after Pearl Harbor very poorly. They US navy did great things and used everything they had by using their ships and aircraft for their roles they were intended for.

The German navy just did not have the numbers and Hitler actually did not really care about the navy. The channel dash was a great plan and everything were used to make it great. The U-Boats just never had the numbers to do what they tried to do.

The Italians sucked at naval warfare and the morale in their navy was poor and they did not care.

The US did not just have the numbers, but they had the skill to make their naval warfare great.

[Nickdfresh]

US victories are based on intelligence and airbattles.

Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to? (Oh yes, Pearl Harbor, that didn't end so great for US).

Yes. Look up the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.

Japan had already battled almost a decade in WWII (lost many great solders, overstretched it resources) before it faced US. I do not see any greatness required to destroy tired enemy who doesn't have any real natural resources and who is fighting many many enemies.


_

I guess having the "Enigma" code doesn't count against the British? Nor outnumbering the Kriegsmarine in every significant sea battle?

You're just nitpicking, and it's nonsense...

[pdf27]

Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to?
Ummm... surely this is a point in favour of the USN? Only the dumb get into battles they're going to lose!

[Rising Sun*]

-
Japan's navy excelled in night fighting capabilities

But they were at a significant disadvantage in night fighting against the USN while the USN had radar from the end of 1942 and the Japanese didn't deploy it widely in the IJN until a year later. This gave the USN a distinct advantage at Midway and Coral Sea.

Need I mention the quality of their naval aviators.

In the early part of the war the Japanese airmen were generally superior to the Americans, and to the other allies, as well as usually having superior machines, but that gradually changed as the Japanese didn't adapt their training system to produce pilots more quickly in the numbers required to replace their losses, while the Americans produced larger numbers of well trained pilots so that, probably by somewhere in 1943, it tipped the balance in America's favour.

One major reason for the evolution of kamikaze pilots later in the war was that the Japanese pilots were capable of flying their plane into a ship, but most lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo ships with the accuracy that Japanese pilots had early in the war.

[George Eller]

But they were at a significant disadvantage in night fighting against the USN while the USN had radar from the end of 1942 and the Japanese didn't deploy it widely in the IJN until a year later. This gave the USN a distinct advantage at Midway and Coral Sea.

In the early part of the war the Japanese airmen were generally superior to the Americans, and to the other allies, as well as usually having superior machines, but that gradually changed as the Japanese didn't adapt their training system to produce pilots more quickly in the numbers required to replace their losses, while the Americans produced larger numbers of well trained pilots so that, probably by somewhere in 1943, it tipped the balance in America's favour.

One major reason for the evolution of kamikaze pilots later in the war was that the Japanese pilots were capable of flying their plane into a ship, but most lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo ships with the accuracy that Japanese pilots had early in the war.
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Well, I was referring to the IJN at the start of hostilities after Pearl Harbor. That goes for night fighting capabilities and pilot quality. As mentioned earlier the Japanese Navy lost some 200 of their best pilots at Midway. The air battles in the Solomons also whittled away at Japan's qualitative edge. And eventual fuel shortages curtailed pilot training time.

I think it also reflected the values of the opposing sides. The Japanese had been indoctrinated to serve their emperor who was worshiped as a god. The individual was of little consequence and was expected to sacrifice himself for the emperor if need be. Therefore, there was less consideration for the safety of the individual. I think this mindset was also reflected in their earlier aircraft design. Japanese planes had the edge in agility, but at the sacrifice of armor protection to reduce weight, and they lacked the self-sealing fuel tanks of their American counterparts. Japanese pilots were less likely to survive once their planes were hit.

In the United States, the rights of the individual were cherished and human life more valued. And I think that this was reflected in American aircraft design. Greater consideration was given to pilot safety. Although, initially not as maneuverable as their Japanese counterparts, American planes were more rugged and survivable. They also tended to carry more firepower.

The Japanese pilot was more likely to die after his plane was hit, whereas the American pilot stood a greater chance of bailing out and living to fight another day. This combined with their different approaches to pilot training that you explained above, in the end proved the American system to be superior.

See the thread on Japanese Navy Aircraft
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4081
Particularly the excerpts from: Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Eric M. Bergerud, Westview Press, 2000
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90810&postcount=2
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90811&postcount=3
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90812&postcount=4
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90813&postcount=5

And as you say radar did eventually negate the Japanese night fighting capabilities. Although on occasion radar could go down as with the battleship USS South Dakota (BB-57) at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Washington_%28BB-56%29
USS Washington (BB-56), the second of just two North Carolina-class battleships...has the distinction of having served the entire Pacific War without losing a man to hostile action, and only being hit once by enemy ordinance: a 5" shell that passed through her radar antenna without detonation. There were some close calls, as she was exiting the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, several Japanese "Long Lance" torpedoes detonated in her wake. Several Washington sailors died in minor accidents and she was involved in a collision with Indiana in 1943.

Washington is also one of two US modern battleships to fight in a battleship duel, which was the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The only other battleship versus battleship engagement of the entire Pacific Theatre was Leyte Gulf in 1944. Washington is also the only one of her contemporaries to sink an enemy battleship in warfare, Imperial Japan's Kirishima.

(The other battleship engagement being Battle of Surigao Strait Involving six old US battleships) - see: http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111228&postcount=47

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal
Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal#Second_Naval_Battle_of _Guadalcanal.2C_November_14.E2.80.9315
Low on ships, Admiral William Halsey, Jr., detached the new battleships USS Washington and USS South Dakota, of Enterprise's support group, together with four destroyers, as Task Force 64 under Admiral Willis A. Lee to defend Guadalcanal and Henderson Field. It was a scratch force; the battleships had only operated together for a few days, and their four escorts were from four different divisions—chosen simply because, of the available destroyers, they had the most fuel. The U.S. force arrived in Ironbottom Sound in the early evening of November 14 and began patrolling around Savo Island. The U.S. warships were in column formation with the four destroyers in the lead, followed by Washington, with South Dakota bringing up the rear. At 22:55 on November 14, radar on the South Dakota and Washington began to detect the ships of the Japanese force near Savo Island around 18,000 m range.

...Washington passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on Ayanami with her secondary batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, South Dakota suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go into series, making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable. However, she continued to follow Washington towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when Washington changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. South Dakota tried to follow but had to turn to right to avoid Benham which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her an easy target for the Japanese.

Receiving reports of the destruction of the U.S. destroyers from Ayanami and his other ships, Kondo pointed his bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were now heading towards each other.

Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, South Dakota was targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including Kirishima, beginning about 00:00 on November 15. Although able to score a few hits on Kirishima, South Dakota took 25 medium and one large-caliber hit, some of which did not explode, that completely knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to try to steer away from the engagement. All of the Japanese torpedoes missed. Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage to South Dakota as to, "render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent." South Dakota's crew casualties were 39 killed and 59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo's lookouts.

The Japanese ships had continued to concentrate their fire on South Dakota and none had detected Washington approaching to within 9,000 yards. Washington had been tracking a large target for some time but had refrained from firing since there was a chance it could be South Dakota. The ship had not been able to track South Dakota’s movements because she was in a blind spot in the Washington’s radar and could not raise her on the radio to confirm her position. When the Japanese illuminated and fired on South Dakota, all doubts were removed as to which ships were friend or foe. From this close range, the Washington suddenly hit Kirishima with at least nine main battery shells, causing heavy damage and setting her aflame. Kirishima was hit below the waterline and suffered a jammed rudder, causing her to circle uncontrollably to port.

At 00:25 Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to converge and destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships still did not know where Washington was located, and the other surviving U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. Washington steered a northwesterly course towards the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged South Dakota. The Japanese ships finally sighted Washington and launched several torpedo attacks, but by adroit maneuvering by her captain, Washington avoided all of them and also grounded his ship in shallow waters. At length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break contact and retreat from the area about 01:04, which the Japanese ships complied with by 01:30.

SEE ALSO:
USS South Dakota (BB-57)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_South_Dakota_%28BB-57%29

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[Rising Sun*]

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I think it also reflected the values of the opposing sides. The Japanese had been indoctrinated to serve their emperor who was worshiped as a god. The individual was of little consequence and was expected to sacrifice himself for the emperor if need be. Therefore, there was less consideration for the safety of the individual. I think this mindset was also reflected in their earlier aircraft design. Japanese planes had the edge in agility, but at the sacrifice of armor protection to reduce weight, and they lacked the self-sealing fuel tanks of their American counterparts. Japanese pilots were less likely to survive once their planes were hit.

In the United States, the rights of the individual were cherished and human life more valued. And I think that this was reflected in American aircraft design. Greater consideration was given to pilot safety. Although, initially not as maneuverable as their Japanese counterparts, American planes were more rugged and survivable. They also tended to carry more firepower.

The Japanese pilot was more likely to die after his plane was hit, whereas the American pilot stood a greater chance of bailing out and living to fight another day. This combined with their different approaches to pilot training that you explained above, in the end proved the American system to be superior.

All good points, and all true.

Putting it in simplistic terms, the Japanese thought it was weak and offensive to the warrior spirit to armour their planes (somewhat curious in view of the Samurai use of armour), while the supposedly weak Americans used armour and survived to defeat them.

I can't think of the exact episode, which I read somewhere ages ago, but it illustrates the difference in Japanese and American thinking, on a number of levels. An American submarine made a number of risky approaches to some island in the Pacific to rescue a downed American airman and faced solid Japanese fire. Ultimately it succeeded. Subsequently a Japanese commander said he couldn't understand why the American submarine crew would risk themselves and their boat repeatedly to save just one person.

That translates into a point I think I've made in some other forgotten thread, which is that the Japanese medical services which were as good as any up to WWI were relegated to the background in WWII. The nationalist idiots running the IJA were obsessed with the notion that 'spirit' could overcome hunger, disease and the enemy, and that illness reflected a weak spirit. Billions of tiny little mosquitoes who didn't speak IJA Japanese proved them wrong on that point in any number of places, along with lousy field hygiene and other stupid resistance to modern science. All the more remarkable in a nation which which had all the skills and knowledge to equal its enemies, if it had been allowed to flourish as a democracy instead of being suppressed by the nationalists whose outdated martial spirit took it to war, and defeat.

Applying that just to Japanese aircraft, the single spar wing of the so-called Zero gave it immense strength, but the idiots running the show wouldn't put armour in it to give the pilot, long to train and precious to lose, the same chance of surviving.

Also on armoured planes, my recollection is that there was a lot of resistance to it in the RAF early in the war, more from the hierarchy than the pilots, I think. Can't recall exact reasons but I think it was more do with cost and reduced performance than anything else.

[Egorka]

Subsequently a Japanese commander said he couldn't understand why the American submarine crew would risk themselves and their boat repeatedly to save just one person.

Just a quick comment on this.
Last year the Danish battalion had to defend a local police station in Musa-Kaleh in south Aghanistan for a month a so.
One day a dane was hit by a hostile sniper in beck of his head. He was taken to a room for laying bondages, but as possibility for the serious medical treatment of the injured all but existed in the stronghold in the middle of the hostile territory, Danes called for a British Helicopter. The rule is that the injured has to be deliverd within 1 hour to the main hospital at Camp Bastion.
But despite the requests the Brits said that they are not going to risk a choper for one such a seriously wounded man who has no chances of survival. The Danes kept asking for help for several hours but the answer remained - NO.

Finaly one of the Danish officers called up one of the Americans officers he had personal connection to. And they got the American choper to fly the wounded to the hospital.

Result: The wounded survived but remaines cripled for the rest of his life. The Dnaes were pissed by such a treatment.

[Rising Sun*]

Just a quick comment on this.
Last year the Danish battalion had to defend a local police station in Musa-Kaleh in south Aghanistan for a month a so.
One day a dane was hit by a hostile sniper in beck of his head. He was taken to a room for laying bondages, but as possibility for the serious medical treatment of the injured all but existed in the stronghold in the middle of the hostile territory, Danes called for a British Helicopter. The rule is that the injured has to be deliverd within 1 hour to the main hospital at Camp Bastion.
But despite the requests the Brits said that they are not going to risk a choper for one such a seriously wounded man who has no chances of survival. The Danes kept asking for help for several hours but the answer remained - NO.

Finaly one of the Danish officers called up one of the Americans officers he had personal connection to. And they got the American choper to fly the wounded to the hospital.

Result: The wounded survived but remaines cripled for the rest of his life. The Dnaes were pissed by such a treatment.

There were numerous instances in Vietnam of American, and other, chopper pilots being weak on going anywhere near hot spots (one of which contributed to a major Australian cock up because the Aussie commanders on an air recce couldn't persuade the American pilot to get low enough to view the ground properly, so an LZ was identified which wasn't able to be landed on when the assault choppers arrived) and also outstandingly brave, to the point of being foolhardy (which resulted in some Australian troops believing American chopper pilots would fly through the gates of hell to load wounded Aussies or get supplies to them under fire, and being unwilling ever to hear a bad word said about American chopper pilots) . Those were instances of individual character by the pilots.

The British one in Afghanistan sounds more like a decision made independently of a pilot.

[Firefly]

After reading through all of this I have a few observations.

1. The US Navy didnt always engage with more numbers. Midway for one. Corall Sea another. Many other engagements.

2. Japanese nightfighting was superior to the US despite Radar up until late 1943. We only have to witness countless engagements in the Slot of Gaudalcanal to appreciate this. At the end of the GC campaign, yes the US Navy was better at night.

3. In 1941, the Japanese Navy was perhaps the best in the world, especially the Naval Air Arm. Its crews were extremely well trained and they had in the Kate, Val and Zero a combination of excellent aircraft which out ranged all allied carrier and all land aircraft [multi engined bombers excluded].

Where the Japanese fell down was their obvious lack of mass production for carriers and aircraft compared to the US and UK and in their training programme, which just did not produce the quality needed at the time.

SO the question is worded wrongly. WHo had the best Navy in ww2? Anti Submarine, well thats the Brits, no doubt. Overall by 1945, the US, again no contest. 1941, the Japanese win hands down.

As with all questions, the answers can be all to subjective I think.

[Nickdfresh]

I agree with all of the above. Asking questions like this thread topic is a bit overweening. Most of the navies listed above were well trained and had similar capabilities on some level. I'm not saying that the US Navy was "better" because its personnel were anymore capable, but the US simply had more which made it the most powerful. And of course, like the RN or the IJN, they had traditions and much culture in seafaring which allowed for a stable cadre on which to expand after wartime mobilization.

The USN, like the Royal Navy, was constantly improving in certain areas and its crews were extremely efficient at the various facets of warfare, such as the all important (but yet unmentioned) damage control and firefighting for instance. And yes, codebreaking is part of Naval warfare proficiency. Not just the ability to break the codes, but also the ability to disseminate and exploit the information is a key element.

Prior to the Battle of Midway, for instance, the USN had in fact partially broken the Japanese code, but not to the extent they could read traffic in real time (I might be wrong about that) and the Japanese still maintained a certain discipline in their communications making it hard to predict their exact intentions. Prior to the battle, the US Navy codebreakers had to use a ruse to figure out the next Japanese target, suspected to be the Marine garrison on the critical US base of Midway Island, but as of yet unconfirmed. I believe the Japanese term for Midway, "AI", was cracked when the US garrison was told to send a message they were low on water, as the desalinisation machine had broken down - to be sent in an uncoded transmission to Hawaii. The Japanese then sent out a transmission that AI was running low on fresh water, thereby allowing the US Navy to concentrate what forces they still had against the Imperial Navies invasion fleet. SIGNIT is just another dimension of warfare, on sea, land and air...

[alephh]

You're just nitpicking, and it's nonsense...

LOL

So you don't think all those say "US Navy is the best because it's the biggest" are sort of doing the same? ;-D

I'm just trying to talk at the same level %-D ;-D

My point being:

In most cases US Navy was superior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear victory is a sort of failure for them.

In most cases Kriegsmarine was inferior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear defeat is a sort of great victory for them.

US build 349 destroyers, Japan 63 destroyers. (US had to face Germany, but Japan had to face UK). Cruisers: 48 vs 9. So, US was, what, something like 500% stronger.

Add to that the fact that Japan was lacking many natural resources and it had to enlist younger and younger men, etc etc etc.

Considering how easy the "setup" was for the US Navy, I just cannot call them great, best or something like that.


And, one has to remember that by being selective in a proper way (whatever that is), one gets people interested and they do (their own) research and actually learn something - and it annoys them to post messages on the forum ;-D


_

[Nickdfresh]

LOL

So you don't think all those say "US Navy is the best because it's the biggest" are sort of doing the same? ;-D

I'm just trying to talk at the same level %-D ;-D

But I didn't say any navy was "the best." As I think I've also said that this thread premise was weak.

I just find your comparisons faulty logical and devoid of any real factual, unbiased comparisons...

My point being:

In most cases US Navy was superior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear victory is a sort of failure for them.

But yet you inferred that the Royal Navy was in some ways superior to the US Navy, yet they usually shared the advantages in numbers and intelligence.

And it was a US Navy ship that captured a U-Boat, and thereby helped further gain the intelligence advantage.

On 4 June 1944, a hunter-killer group of the United States Navy captured the German submarine U-505. This event marked the first time a U.S. Navy vessel had captured an enemy vessel at sea since the nineteenth century. The action took place in the Atlantic Ocean, at Latitude 21-30N, Longitude 19-20W, about 150 miles off the coast of Rio De Oro, Africa. The American force was commanded by Captain Daniel V. Gallery, USN, and comprised the escort Carrier Guadalcanal (CVE-60) and five escort vessels under Commander Frederick S. Hall, USN: Pillsbury (DE-133) Pope DE-134), Flaherty (DE-135), Chatelain (DE-149), and Jenks (DE-665). As a result of the American attack on U-505, the German crew abandoned the boat after setting scuttling charges and pulling plugs to sink the submarine. Then Pillsbury sent its motor whaleboat to the circling submarine where Lieutenant (junior grade) Albert L. David, USN, led an eight-man party on board. Despite the probability of U-505 sinking or blowing up at any minute and not knowing what form of resistance they might meet below, David and his men clambered up the conning tower and then down the hatches into the boat itself. After a quick examination proved the U-boat was completely deserted (except for one dead man on deck - the only fatality of the action), the boarders set about bundling up charts, code books, and papers, disconnecting demolition charges, closing valves, and plugging leaks. By the time the flood of water had been stopped, the U-boat was low in the water and down by the stern. Lieutenant David was awarded a Medal of Honor for his role in this operation.
From: http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq97-1.htm

In most cases Kriegsmarine was inferior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear defeat is a sort of great victory for them.

LOL Nice semantics. So they have an excuse to lose now, despite the fact that they were considered the cream of the German crop, and had the largest most efficient submarine force? And I think they were clearly defeated having failed to prevent Allied landings anywhere and serving as little more than a nuisance by the end of 1943...

US build 349 destroyers, Japan 63 destroyers. (US had to face Germany, but Japan had to face UK). Cruisers: 48 vs 9. So, US was, what, something like 500% stronger.

So? What good did that do for them when they were in battles and were in fact outnumbered by the Japanese, and the US Navy's "intelligence" advantage was hardly a real asset during the battle since it was not "real time intelligence." In battles such as the Coral Sea, Midway, and Leyte Gulf, the "intelligence advantage" went out the window often when the battle started...

And intelligence warfare is part of Naval warfare. Is a service having a shitty intelligence function make them somehow a better navy, or gives them an excuse to fail?

And the numbers provided are useless as a direct comparison when you consider the fact that the US Navy was fighting a two ocean war, supporting amphibious and air support operations the Mediterranean and European theaters as well as against the Japanese...

Add to that the fact that Japan was lacking many natural resources and it had to enlist younger and younger men, etc etc etc.

No. That's why they invaded the Pacific Rim, to get natural resources. They failed to defend their sea lanes...

Considering how easy the "setup" was for the US Navy, I just cannot call them great, best or something like that.

Well, the point is that one cannot judge "the best," but yet you seem to indicate that the Kriegsmarine or the Royal Navy were "better" despite having their advantages as well.

And isn't it a challenge for a large navy to maintain a certain quality level while undergoing massive expansion, in skill sets such as firefighting, gunnery, and aviation?


And, one has to remember that by being selective in a proper way (whatever that is), one gets people interested and they do (their own) research and actually learn something - and it annoys them to post messages on the forum ;-D


_
Well, I'm glad you've learned something.:)

[George Eller]

LOL

US build 349 destroyers, Japan 63 destroyers. (US had to face Germany, but Japan had to face UK). Cruisers: 48 vs 9. So, US was, what, something like 500% stronger.

_

I don't know where alephh gets his figures from, but they seem to be way off.

Also, the US and Royal Navies operated across the globe, whereas the Imperial Japanese Navy focused on certain regions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Because of their size and the vastness of the areas in which they operated, the US and Royal Navies also faced the greater logistical challenge IMHO.

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World War II aircraft carriers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_aircraft_carriers_of_Japan
24 Japanese carriers

World War II battleships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_battleships_of_Japan
12 Japanese battleships

World War II cruisers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_cruisers_of_Japan
50 Japanese cruisers

World War II destroyers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_destroyers_of_Japan
106 Japanese destroyers

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Ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Ships_of_the_Imperial_Japanese_Navy

World War II naval ships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_naval_ships_of_Japan

Imperial Japanese Navy of World War II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_of_World_War_Two

Order of battle:
Imperial Japanese Navy Warships at time of Pearl Harbor Attack in December 1941:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_of_World_War_Two#Order_of_b attle

List of ships of the Japanese Navy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_Japanese_Navy#Battlecruisers

Naval ships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Naval_ships_of_Japan

Imperial Japanese Navy Page
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm

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The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/

HyperWar: US Navy in World War II
http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/index.html

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Partial repeat of one of my previous posts on this thread:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111226&postcount=46

I have the Battlefield documentary series and remember some comments made concerning the damage control systems of American carriers prior to the battle of Midway.

Battlefield: The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle (Time-Life)
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_v/102-3240256-7489714?url=search-alias%3Dvhs&field-keywords=Battlefield%3A&Go.x=10&Go.y=12

From the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.


...All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier's decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen...

... Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.

From: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi, Checkmark Books, 1998, p 20.

The Japanese had a policy of not storing aircraft on deck, a practice that the US Navy adopted before the war, and embraced enthusiastically during it. As a result, US carriers of comparable size usually could operate as many as 65% more aircraft (90-100 as against 55-65). British carriers tended to have smaller aircraft capacity (55-65), due to a decision to provide relatively heavy armor. In compensation, British carriers were much more survivable ships.

A second critical factor in carrier effectiveness, and more important than carrier size, was the ship's capacity to carry avgas (aviation fuel) and fuel, which determined operational endurance. While this was, of course, partially connected to the size of the vessel, once again policy decisions and design were a factor. In consequence, US carriers tended to have greater fuel capacity than either Japanese or British ones, which meant American carriers could generate more missions between trips to the barn.

ALSO:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111228&postcount=47

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[Nickdfresh]

Yeah. I think I heard that at The Battle off Samar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#Battle_off_Samar) during the Leyte Gulf campaign, despite making some bear catastrophic errors, a small contingent of US escort carriers and destroyers fended off an attack of a much stronger Japanese surface strike force of cruisers and battleships. Despite the fact that the aircraft on the carriers were armed for strikes on land targets and submarines only....

At The Battle of Surigao Strait (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#Battle_of_Surigao_Strait), the US Navy successfully "crossed the T (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossing_the_T)" for the last time in a major naval engagement.

The American sailors involved certainly had some benefits in material and intelligence support. But they also had every bit the luck and skill of their adversary too...

[Corporal Punishment]

At the oustet of the war it was the Japanese who had the most powerful navy afloat. It was modern and well trained, but more importantly its commanders understood the power of the aircraft carrier; something US commanders failed to grasp even after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The USA of course with its superior manufacturing might was able to produce more ships in a year than Japan could produce during the entire war and once the American machine was cranked up, there's was no way Japan could keep up.

[overlord644]

At the oustet of the war it was the Japanese who had the most powerful navy afloat. It was modern and well trained, but more importantly its commanders understood the power of the aircraft carrier; something US commanders failed to grasp even after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The USA of course with its superior manufacturing might was able to produce more ships in a year than Japan could produce during the entire war and once the American machine was cranked up, there's was no way Japan could keep up.

i dont think we can discount americas reliance on the aircraft carrier too much since it was the US's main method of figting the war in the pacific

[Corporal Punishment]

i dont think we can discount americas reliance on the aircraft carrier too much since it was the US's main method of figting the war in the pacific

But only because it's all we had left in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.The US Navy learned the value of carriers pretty quick. Prior to the attack the US Navy didn't believe an aircraft carrier could go toe to toe with a battleship. Battleships were considered to be the most formidable weapon on the high seas and carriers were assigned to a supporting role. Even after the Japanese left the battleships of the Pacific fleet lying at the bottom of Pearl Harbor the Navy didn't believe it. Pearl Harbor was a fluke, an ambush and in any other situation they didn't think a carrier could stand up to a battleship.
By the time the Battle of the Coral Sea was over I think the US Navy understood the power of the aircraft carrier pretty well.

[Nickdfresh]

At the oustet of the war it was the Japanese who had the most powerful navy afloat. It was modern and well trained...

There's not question that the Imperial Japanese Navy was top notch, both innovative, trained and disciplined with a long history of maritime experience in which to draw on...

...but more importantly its commanders understood the power of the aircraft carrier; something US commanders failed to grasp even after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The USA of course with its superior manufacturing might was able to produce more ships in a year than Japan could produce during the entire war and once the American machine was cranked up, there's was no way Japan could keep up...

...But only because it's all we had left in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.The US Navy learned the value of carriers pretty quick. Prior to the attack the US Navy didn't believe an aircraft carrier could go toe to toe with a battleship. Battleships were considered to be the most formidable weapon on the high seas and carriers were assigned to a supporting role. Even after the Japanese left the battleships of the Pacific fleet lying at the bottom of Pearl Harbor the Navy didn't believe it. Pearl Harbor was a fluke, an ambush and in any other situation they didn't think a carrier could stand up to a battleship.
By the time the Battle of the Coral Sea was over I think the US Navy understood the power of the aircraft carrier pretty well.

You see this is where you lose me a bit as it's a clear oversimplification. The US Navy was indeed heavily invested in the theory of carrier warfare, and they had been since the 1920s. I don't think any service ever did more research and practice in light of the advent of air power. The US Navy largely pioneered dive bombing for instance. In fact, I recall it's a German military attache that procured a US Navy dive bomber in which was used to conduct theory practicums which led to the advent of the Stuka, after observing US Naval pilots and their skill in hitting point targets such as ships. Much of the Luftwaffe tactical air support doctrine by the late 1930s and they use of pinpoint accurate strikes via dive bombers as a means of delivery forward artillery support largely devolved from this. Again, a lot of this is off the top of my head, so forgive any errors.

All armed services of the periods had their reactionary admirals and generals that believed in the primacy of the battleship or horse-calvary or whatever. But many of the Japanese ideas on the use of air power were in fact derived from observing US Naval exercises. And the IJN was far from abandoning the battleship or surface warfare themselves, as I'll think you'll note. I think you'll also note that despite the supposed naval belief in the primacy of the battleship, the US Navy still had carriers and a significant assets devoted to naval aviation which made the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway possible...

[Nickdfresh]

I would also like to add that even though Pearl Harbor is thought to be a massive Japanese victory showing the end of the battleship and Japanese cutting edge thinking regarding the use of air power (despite the fact that it was surprise attack conducted against an essentially, though not totally, peacetime military), it was also a large military blunder (by the Japanese as well as the Americans). The strikes failed to destroy critical US fuel and supply depots, enabling the "damage control" assets of the US Navy to rebuild and to eventually refloat its shattered ships and facilities...

[George Eller]

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USN Carriers vs IJN Carriers
The Pacific 1942
(Duel 6)

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/title_detail.php/title=T2482~ser=DUE~per=~view=extract

US NAVY CARRIER DOCTRINE

Following World War I, during which the British Royal Navy had demonstrated the utility of embarking aircraft on ships, including aircraft carriers, the US Navy realized that naval aviation was an instrumental part of modern naval operations. Fearful of falling farther behind the British, the US Navy received funding for the conversion of a collier into an aircraft carrier in July 1919. This experimental carrier was followed by the first fleet carriers in 1927. Upon first entering service, US Navy carriers' primary task was to support the battle fleet. Carrier aircraft would provide reconnaissance and spotting for the battle fleet while denying those advantages to the enemy. Spotting was viewed as especially important as aircraft could observe the fall of fire and radio corrections. Carriers were also expected to protect the airspace over their own fleet, thus denying the enemy the advantages of long-range spotting and scouting.

Gradually, the US Navy developed the carrier's role into an independent offensive platform. Early carrier aircraft were unable to carry torpedoes large enough to cripple or sink a capital ship, and although bombs could be carried, they posed no real threat to ships maneuvering at speed to avoid attack. However, in the 1920s, the offensive capability of carrier aircraft was greatly increased by the development of dive-bombing, which for the first time, allowed maneuvering ships to be struck with some degree of accuracy. Capital ships with heavy deck armor were still immune from attack, but carriers, with their unarmored flight decks, had now become very vulnerable to aerial attack.

Reflecting the premise that carriers could not withstand significant damage, US Navy doctrine increasingly separated the carriers from the battle fleet to prevent their early detection and destruction by the enemy. The primary task of the carrier was now to destroy opposing carriers as soon as possible, thus preventing their own destruction and setting the stage for intensive attack on the enemy battle fleet. To maximize the carrier's striking power, standard US Navy doctrine called for the launch of an entire air group at one time. In order that an entire “deck load” strike be launched quickly, it was necessary to have the entire strike spotted on the flight deck.

Early in the war, US Navy carriers each had a permanently assigned air group. Each of the assigned squadrons carried the hull number of the ship it was assigned to. For example, Lexington's fighter squadron was numbered VF-2, her dive-bombers VB-2, her scout bombers VS-2, and her torpedo squadron VT-2. After July 1938, air groups were known by the name of the ship. Thus, the squadrons listed above comprised the Lexington Air Group. By mid-1942, the entire air group was numbered to match its parent ship's hull number. With few exceptions, the permanence of the squadrons within an air group lasted through the battle of Midway. After that, due to carrier losses or squadron exhaustion, carriers could have a mix of squadrons from two or three air groups. As such, when Enterprise engaged in the battle of the Eastern Solomons in August 1942, her air group had its original fighter and dive-bomber squadrons as well as the scouting squadron from the sunken Yorktown and the torpedo squadron from the damaged Saratoga.

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Midway: Sheer Luck or Better Doctrine?
by Thomas Wildenberg
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/sheerluck_midway.htm

Partial quotes from much larger article:


While the U.S. Navy was busy experimenting with the carrier-versus-carrier duels that would so heavily influence its future battle doctrine, the Japanese were still struggling to perfect their carrier doctrine. Sidetracked by the war in China, Japanese naval aviators made little progress in working out an effective strategy for dealing with enemy flight decks. Like their American counterparts, the Japanese expected aerial operations to precede the “decisive” clash of battleships that both sides predicted would determine the outcome of the next war. Unlike the Americans, however, they failed to anticipate the importance of carrier-based scouting, concentrating entirely on the attack mission. No scouting units were assigned to the Japanese carriers, and little emphasis was placed on this important aspect of carrier warfare. Reconnaissance was relegated to a few floatplanes, which would be catapulted from accompanying cruisers. The Japanese also overlooked or failed to develop the deck park, relying instead on the hangar deck to store and prepare aircraft for flight. On the Japanese carriers, aircraft capacity was determined by the size of the hangar, not of the flight deck, as was the case for the Americans. The disparity in aircraft-handling procedures and search strategies resulted in substantial differences in the makeup of the typical air group deployed by the two sides.

...As can be seen from table 2, the U.S. Navy, because of its innovative use of the deck park, was able to deploy more planes per carrier. Each carrier operated with seventy-two aircraft, on average, organized into four squadrons: one fighter (VF), one scout (VS), one bombing (VB), and one torpedo (VT). The Japanese, on average, operated with just sixty-three aircraft, organized into three twenty-one-plane squadrons: one fighter, one carrier attack, and one bombing.

The VS squadron on American carriers and the preponderance of scout bombers in air groups attest to the significance the Americans placed on scouting. The exercises of the early 1930s had pointed to the need for a fast, well armed scout plane that could not only find the enemy carrier but attack its flight deck. Heeding the advice of the aviators, the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics began to develop a series of scout bombers that evolved into the SBD, a plane that proved to be a superb dive-bomber as well as an effective scout...

...In the U.S. Navy, the main question was the positioning of carriers with respect to the main body of the fleet. Although the carrier task force had become a regular feature of exercises, the Navy’s battleship admirals continued to insist that carriers remain with the battleships for mutual support. At issue was the survival of the carriers, which were now considered essential for fleet air defense. Tying the carriers to the slow battleships was the kiss of death, according to the Navy’s airmen, who argued “that evasive movements at high speed were a carrier’s best protection against attack.” The Americans continued to experiment until the fleet moved to Hawaii in 1940; by then, carriers had become the center of the cruising formation when operating with the fleet. The question of the carriers’ position within the fleet’s force structure—both its physical location and tactical function—was not fully resolved in the U.S. Navy until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when carriers became its preeminent striking force by default. When hostilities commenced, however, all the pieces were in place for the deployment of a number of carrier task forces, complete with heavy escorts of cruisers and destroyers, and accompanied in every instance by an oiler for logistic support.

(CONTINUED BELOW)

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[George Eller]

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(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)


...Though the multicarrier attack was a brilliant tactical innovation, it did not challenge the concepts underlying the IJN’s overall strategy of overpowering the U.S. Navy by destroying its battle line at sea. When the Combined Fleet sailed for Midway at the end of May 1942, the battleship remained the centerpiece of Yamamoto’s strategy for dominating the Pacific. “For all his lip service to the principle of the offensive and to naval air power,” he “still . . . visualized the battleship as the queen of the fleet.” As part of the operation, Yamamoto hoped to draw out remnants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet so that it could be engaged in the “decisive battle” that still remained the focus of Japanese naval strategy. Instead of using his battleships in direct support of his carriers (as suggested by Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi), Yamamoto stationed the three powerful dreadnoughts of the Combined Fleet far to the rear, to surprise and destroy any American surface force bold enough to attempt to interfere with the invasion of Midway

Langley’s crew invented the deck park, the crash barrier, flight-deck teams in jerseys of various colors, and a host of other innovations that radically changed the way operations were conducted.

While the First Air Fleet (designated the “Mobile Force” in this operation) was steaming in what would prove to be its highly vulnerable box formation toward Midway, the three carriers (Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet) available to the commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Area at the end of May 1942, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, sortied from Pearl Harbor. They steamed in two task forces, the tactical units that had come to dominate U.S. naval operations since 7 December 1941. Unlike its adversary across the Pacific, the U.S. Navy’s love affair with the battleship now rested in the mud of Pearl Harbor, where a number of its cherished “battlewagons” were being laboriously salvaged. Though Nimitz still had a strong force of battleships (Task Force 1 comprised Pennsylvania, Maryland, Colorado, Idaho, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Mississippi), he chose not to deploy them; they would only slow the carriers down and would require screening ships that were needed more elsewhere. Nimitz also deployed a number of submarines for the defense of Midway; however, they too would not be a factor in the battle, the outcome of which would be determined by airpower alone.

The outcome of the battle of Midway was decided, and the fate of the IJN was sealed, at precisely 10:22 AM on 4 June 1942, when the first of three squadrons of American dive-bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise attacked the First Air Fleet as it was preparing to launch its own planes against the U.S. carriers. The American planes struck the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu in quick succession, setting all three ablaze within three minutes. The surviving Japanese carrier, Hiryu, quickly retaliated. After an exchange of air strikes that afternoon, Hiryu was burning from stem to stern, while its opponent, Yorktown, was dead in the water, without power. Hiryu sank the next day. Yorktown survived long enough to be taken under tow but then was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine.

The different paths of carrier development taken by the Japanese and American navies led to differences in carrier doctrine—differences that had a tremendous impact once the two forces were engaged. First and foremost of these was the American airmen’s obsession with locating the enemy’s carriers first so they could be struck first. This principle became sacrosanct in U.S. carrier doctrine as soon as commanders realized that the best way to achieve air supremacy was to attack the opposing carrier before it had a chance to get its own planes in the air. Once launched, such a strike would be almost impossible to fend off, since (prior to the introduction of radar) there was virtually no way to detect approaching enemy planes or direct fighters to intercept them. Although the Japanese understood this principle, they made no attempt to find an adequate means of locating the enemy’s carriers. As Mark Peattie aptly points out, success “depended not only upon the time required for carriers to launch their attack squadrons but, even before that, upon finding the enemy first.”

That the lack of a carrier-borne capability for scouting (reconnaissance, in Japanese naval parlance) contributed greatly to the demise of the Japanese carriers was affirmed by Akagi’s former air officer, Mitsuo Fuchida. As Fuchida explained, writing in 1955, Japanese carrier forces were devoted entirely to the attack mission. There were no organic scouting units of any appreciable size in the Japanese navy, and very little emphasis was placed on this important aspect of carrier warfare: “In both training and organization our naval aviators [devoted] too much importance and effort . . . to attack.” Reluctance to weaken the carriers’ striking power led to a single-phase search plan that was insufficient—in Fuchida’s opinion—to ensure the carriers’ security. “Had Admiral [Chuichi] Nagumo [the commander of the Mobile Force] carried out an earlier and more carefully planned two-phase search . . . the disaster that followed might have been avoided.”

The second doctrine-based difference was the predominance of the scout/dive-bomber on the American side. This type was unique to the U.S. Navy and could both locate and attack an enemy carrier. The effectiveness of the scout/dive-bomber (particularly the superb SBD, which outflew, outdove, and outbombed the Japanese Val) was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt at Midway.

Last, but certainly not least, was the adoption of the deck park and the associated handling procedures devised by American airmen to maximize the number of aircraft that could be operated at one time from an aircraft carrier. This system enabled the U.S. Navy to operate more aircraft per carrier than its Japanese counterparts and thus to fly almost as many aircraft as the Japanese at Midway, with one less carrier. The deck park allowed a second dive-bombing squadron (though bearing the VS designation) to be added to each carrier’s air group. It was one of these squadrons, VS-6 from the Enterprise, that made up for the lost planes from the Hornet, which failed to locate the enemy carriers. The extra squadron allowed the United States to strike three carriers at once, leaving just one. The outcome at Midway would have been very different had VS-6 not been present.

SEE ALSO:

US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1922-45: Pre-War Classes
http://books.google.com/books?id=QNtKa7PxJvgC&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=%22us+navy+carrier+doctrine%22&source=web&ots=l1SauVv88C&sig=ccKZM5MaUw_vcB-5j7L3GU9uRks#PPP1,M1

US Navy Aircraft Carriers 1922-45: Pre-War Classes - Review
http://www.armorama.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=Reviews&file=index&req=showcontent&id=1212

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[Moreheaddriller]

Well the jap navy was good but they weren't used strategically correct so i would have to go with the us

[W MENARD]

Hi

It seems that a lot of people have forgoten about the Royal Canadian Navy.
The RCN joined the fight as soon as Britain declared war on Germany. The RCN was providing convoy escorts trying to get much needed supplies to Britain as soon as the war started. The convoy escorts encountered terrible conditions in the North Atlantic and were escorting convoys during the worst of the U Boat attacks. The RCN also escorted supplies from Scapa Flow in Scotland to Murmansk in Russia. At the end of the war the RCN was the largest navy in the world.

Ironsides

[Moreheaddriller]

ah yes the RCN a extremely good navy but it was simply never given credit where credit was due

[32Bravo]

There's not question that the Imperial Japanese Navy was top notch, both innovative, trained and disciplined with a long history of maritime experience in which to draw on...


The Japanese did what they always do, improve on someone elses idea.

The raid on Taranto was the inspiration for the assault on Pearl Harbour

The Royal Navy had seven aircraft carriers in operation at the start of World War 2. This provided a considerable advantage over enemy forces. The supierority and effectiveness of aircraft carriers was demonstrated in several naval engagements.

HMS Illustrious launched a long-range strike on the Italian fleet at Taranto. This operation incapacitated three of the six battleships in the harbour at a cost of two of the 21 attacking Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers.http://www.killifish.f9.co.uk/Malta%20WWII/Taranto.htm

The Japanese and the Germans had both been developing and preparing their forces for war while the rest of the world had been dis-arming.

http://www.royal-navy.org/warships/type-11.php

[105]

In the Pacific the American Navy. In the Atlantic and Mediterranean the Royal Navy. So you could almost call it a tie between the two.

[32Bravo]

Interesting pic of the White-ensign, George. Just as a point of interest, it was Nelson's personal standard, and was adopted by the RN to honour him after his exploits and death at Trafalgar.

The R.N., even today, refer to the nelson spirit and enthuse it into their personnel from day one.

[cimot_cool]

I would have to say the USN.
IMO...USN have over 50% of the entire worlds combat value.

[A_rod]

I am very intrigued by this thread, and while I am not an expert on WWII by a long shot I have read on the subject at length and feel that I have a better than average graps of the subject.

When discussing who had the better navy (over-all it was not the US) Germany, Japan, and England each in its own way had far better designs, experience and "other" qualities that the US lacked.

The one thig the US did have was the industrial strength, Technology, resources and a almost unlimited workforce. This allowed the US to build more, ships and planes as well as substain losses that neither of the other powers could hope too substain. If you think about it, it does no side good to have say one superior battleship or carrier while your opponet can bring to force 4-5 capital ships. The war was really won on Attrition especially in the pacific, Japan after Midway had no hope of competing against the US in numbers alone not to mention the technology factor.

Yamamoto himself stated at the attack on Peral Habor, " I can cause havoc in the Pacific for a year and a half after that I can not gurantee anything".

HE unlike the powers to be in Japan had visited the US and knew of its indutrial might. i thing when talking about who had the best Navy this has to be factored in. I think overall the Germans had the best navy, but lacked suffient quanties of ships and deep/open ports to operate from.

[herman2]

I think the German navy service men did not wear the swastika as part of their uniform unlike all other branchs of the military. Would someone know if this is true and if so, why?

[Major Walter Schmidt]

They had Reichseagles on their uniforms which meant they did have haukenkreuz on them.
http://www.diggerhistory.info/images/uniforms4/Kriegsmarine.jpg

[flamethrowerguy]

THE FRENCH, because they sunk themselves in Oran in 1940!

[imi]

flamethowerguy: :D
I vote for first period to Germany,in the last USA

[flamethrowerguy]

flamethowerguy: :D
I vote for first period to Germany,in the last USA

Comprehensible, imi. But I am afraid the germans have never been much of a seafaring people throughout history...

[imi]

In the first period the Uboots are working well!
see the Hungarians,we have only a big lake,but we compensate the hungarian girlz :)

[flamethrowerguy]

Yeah, I'd love to see myself on the Balaton on an inflatable mattress peeking out the hungarian girls at the shore. But I guess my wife would not cope at all...

[imi]

flamethowerguy:therefrom You read the menucard,not sure You will eat ;)

[flamethrowerguy]

flamethowerguy:therefrom You read the menucard,not sure You will eat ;)

Yes, something like "Look, but don't touch..." or "Watch the menu card but dinner is served at home...".

[namvet]

ill go with the USN also. although out gunned and out manned at the start the tide turned here because of the industrial output of th US (which took time ) to overpower the Japs in quantity and quality. the Doolittle raid was crucial. it proved to American workers going into the war plants that Japan could be attacked with a very minimum of everything.
why the built those carriers with wooden decks is beyond me. best resource available???? well they turned into BBQ pits when Japanese planes hit them. we learned our lesson for our British friend after the war and went with steel or iron decks. we also got the idea of the angled flight deck from the British as well. and it still works today..............

[Major Walter Schmidt]

(in the pacific) Japan had the advantage for a sshort war but the US was better suited for a long war because it can produce ships better.

[pdf27]

we learned our lesson for our British friend after the war and went with steel or iron decks. we also got the idea of the angled flight deck from the British as well. and it still works today..............
Errr.... not exactly. The USN went to steel decks postwar for structural reasons (it gets very difficult to physically build big carriers without doing so), while the RN abandoned armoured deck carriers halfway through the war and never considered building them afterwards. It should be noted here that all the RN armoured carriers hit by Kamikazes had to be scrapped as constructive total losses immediately postwar - they were badly warped by the damage, and could not be repaired.

In any case, the armoured deck concept came about because the RN could only get their hands on a very few, poorly performing aircraft prewar so had to design their carriers based around this - and so had to assume they would take a battering. The USN carriers carried about 3 times the air group for the same size carrier - largely as a result of the lack of armour - and were operationally a great deal more effective as a result.

[George Eller]

ill go with the USN also. although out gunned and out manned at the start the tide turned here because of the industrial output of th US (which took time ) to overpower the Japs in quantity and quality. the Doolittle raid was crucial. it proved to American workers going into the war plants that Japan could be attacked with a very minimum of everything.
why the built those carriers with wooden decks is beyond me. best resource available???? well they turned into BBQ pits when Japanese planes hit them. we learned our lesson for our British friend after the war and went with steel or iron decks. we also got the idea of the angled flight deck from the British as well. and it still works today..............
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Here are some posts from earlier in this thread concerning the policies of wood vs armored flight decks on carriers:


http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90493&postcount=19

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http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90607&postcount=22

from the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.

...All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier's decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen...

... Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.

When a carrier is about to be under attack, USN