Kwantung Army

[Siberian Rifleman]

Wondering if you guys have any info on the Kwantung Army ? I know they were in Manchuria, and that they have millions of men. What I'm interested is like which battles did they fought ? Also you guys have any info on the Kwantung Army in China ? Like the battles ? :) Anything would be helpful :)

[Commando Jordovski]

They had the Kwantung Army or Guandong Army.
They were units of the Imperial Japanese Army that originated from a Guandong garrison established in 1906,.... to defend the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway.
They were initially composed of a regular army division and a heavy siege artillery batallion, both stationed within the Kwantung Leased Territory.

Their Army in 1941 consisted largely augments of 700,000.

The Army fought against the Red Army of the Soviet Union at Zhanggufeng in 1938 and Nomonhan in 1939. Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, many troops were mobilized to the Pacific islands from Manchuria. When the Soviet Red Army invaded into Manchuria in August 1945, the Army retained approximately 600,000 soldiers. To cope with the Soviet invasion, the Army planned to form the defence line near the capital of Manchuguo, but the Emperor of Japan Hirohito ordered them to surrender before the main defensive engagement took place.

[Siberian Rifleman]

They had the Kwantung Army or Guandong Army.
They were units of the Imperial Japanese Army that originated from a Guandong garrison established in 1906,.... to defend the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway.
They were initially composed of a regular army division and a heavy siege artillery batallion, both stationed within the Kwantung Leased Territory.

Their Army in 1941 consisted largely augments of 700,000.

The Army fought against the Red Army of the Soviet Union at Zhanggufeng in 1938 and Nomonhan in 1939. Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, many troops were mobilized to the Pacific islands from Manchuria. When the Soviet Red Army invaded into Manchuria in August 1945, the Army retained approximately 600,000 soldiers. To cope with the Soviet invasion, the Army planned to form the defence line near the capital of Manchuguo, but the Emperor of Japan Hirohito ordered them to surrender before the main defensive engagement took place.

Thanks Jordovski :) That really surprises me... I heard that the Kwantung Army was the pride of the Japanese Empire. Yet they surrendered most of it to the Russians... Did they ever return to Japan ? Or did they remain in Russia to work as slave labours ?

[Commando Jordovski]

I think alot of them did Return to Japan, but some weren't.


by the way, you talked about your history teacher or something in another room, which tells me your still in school, which year may i ask ?

[Firefly]

Well I suppose the japanese came out of it better in the end than they would have if the Soviets had been allowed to opress them as well. The Soviet invasion into manchuria was nothing more than a land grab. Stalin wasnt interested in war with Japan, in fact Japan may have survived longer if they had declared war on the Soviets in 1941. Most of the US aid that saved the Soviets in ww2 came through Vladivostok in US ships registered as Soviet ones. If Japan had declared war they could have helped the Germans and themselves by stopping this aid and forcing the US to rely more on the Norther Atlantic route and the Iranian route.

Slightly off topic but releveant to the end of the war I think.

[Timbo in Oz]

It is my understanding also that the invasion of Manchuria by Russia did play a role in hastening the use of both weapons.

OTOH as a liberal-lefty on some things I do find this tendency to take up hindsight positions is execrable, amoral and silly too.

I remember meeting a young American who had a big problem with Lincoln for being basically a racist! I'd just been to Washington my ist time.

well yes in late 20c terms, yes, BTA a significant minority of Americans still ARE!

[savoy6]

I agree with Chevan, the A-bombs were mainly dropped to impress/scarry USSR.



Why is it in every post here lately coming out of Russia..the Soviet army or the Soviet goverment is the reason that everything in the war happened?...Given the russians late,.....VERY late, entry into the war in the Pacific, I doubt that that figured into why we dropped the bombs except in a very limited ,secondary sense.Truman was a very pragmatic person who was usually interested in solving the problem in front of him at the moment..at the time,that was the impending invasion of Japan with an estimated 200,000 US casualties for the intial stages of the invasion.The Japanese had already shown themselves to be willing to fight to the last man ,woman and child at Saipan and Okinawa, and had been quite public about the fact that they would make the Allies pay for every inch of Japanese soil....
i don't know it maybe saved many lives but it destroyed 2 towns killed too much people and even now that act affects you because of radiation, years after people were dieing because of radiation. there would be less casaulites if the allies atacked japan.japan would have kapitulated because italy,3.reich and other countries did
No, they wouldn't have.....surrendering the country was completely abhorrent to the Japanes culture and mindset.For thousands of years the Japanese had been unconquered in their island home and they would have fought to the death for it....The only reason they did give up was because the Emperor ordered it...

[Egorka]

as for the japanese... much of you suppositions about the great influence of the soviets rolling an experienced mechanized army over an ill equipped and poorly organized kuantung army and how they were ready to take over the entire east is...well..suppositional bullshit....

The way you wrote it sure does sound like bullshit.

I am not claiming that USSR was the main force that defeated Japan (and I think Chevan think so neither), but the Kwantung Army was the best Japanese force in August 1945.
And considering your insight in to the Japanese psychology we now know for sure that they did their 110% to defended Japan.

Would you care to elaborate on "ill equipped and poorly organized" thing, please?


The ovens. Do you have an idea for how long can an oven continiously burn bodies before its reflective bricks would start fall down and the oven would had to be repared?

[savoy6]

ill equipped and poorly organized
the Kwantung Army was the best Japanese force in August 1945.

the kwantung army was nearly the only organized japanese army left at that point..lol..

large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas.parts of it had been recalled for the defence of the home islands as well.also you can't compare the japanese mech units,what little they had, with an experienced soviet army armed with things like the T34/85 and the SU122.the japanese armor was outmoded within the first couple of years of the war.and they had outmoded artillery and little or no AT guns.it's just that most UK and US units in the far east had little or no priority of supply before the war and were very under trained and under equipped.the reason the UK lost at singapore was because of their inability to understand or deal with the speed of the japanese advance down the malay peninsula.the same thing happened in the oil rich dutch east indies where a very poorly equiped dutch army constabulary force was speedily dealt with by japanese paras and naval landing troops.though the japanese weapons and equipment were outmoded for most of the war their early sucesses were based mainly on a concentration of force against weaker units and their abilty to move more quickly than their opposition.
I am not claiming that USSR was the main force that defeated Japan (and I think Chevan think so neither
maybe not, but what is coming through seems to be a belief that the A-bombs were dropped more to impress the soviets than to hasten the end of the war.also ,from both of you guys statements you seem to be of the opinion that the US spent the last year of the war doing more to get set to fight the russians that it was to invade japan.public opinion in america after the nazi surrender was of a "let's beat these japs by any means neccesary and get our boys home" variety.for the planners who were looking at such huge losses for an invasion the A-bomb was a stand off godsend.you have to remember that very few people knew about the manhattan project even after the first test bomb was set off.many of the PTO planners didn't even know there was such an item until right before it was dropped.


as for the bricks....hmmmmm.. i not able to give you an exact time figure but i know that the crematorium in the mortuary i worked in for a time had been in regular use for almost 50 years with no need to redo the interior bricks.though i don't think the nazis were planning on the "final solution" taking that long...

[Egorka]

savoy6
the kwantung army was nearly the only organized japanese army left at that point..lol..
So you mean that there was no organised military unit available for the defence of Japanese homeland? Nice to know! Otherwise it is a funny picture you draw. In Japan itself there were no good units but the Japanese would fight like hell and cause USA immense casualties. In Manchuria, on the other hand, there was an organised army but they were sissies and could not provide resistance.


large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas.parts of it had been recalled for the defence of the home islands as well.also you can't compare the japanese mech units,what little they had, with an experienced soviet army armed with things like the T34/85 and the SU122.the japanese armor was outmoded within the first couple of years of the war.and they had outmoded artillery and little or no AT guns.it's just that most UK and US units in the far east had little or no priority of supply before the war and were very under trained and under equipped.the reason the UK lost at singapore was because of their inability to understand or deal with the speed of the japanese advance down the malay peninsula.the same thing happened in the oil rich dutch east indies where a very poorly equiped dutch army constabulary force was speedily dealt with by japanese paras and naval landing troops.though the japanese weapons and equipment were outmoded for most of the war their early sucesses were based mainly on a concentration of force against weaker units and their abilty to move more quickly than their opposition.

So, have you looked at the OOB for the Kwantung army in August 1945? What is your conclusion?

[Rising Sun*]

In fact they tryed to surrender through the Stalin but its obviously Washington could let them it on political reasons.


I don't think so.

The Soviets frustrated Japanese attempts to negotiate a surrender through the USSR; strung out Japan without letting the other Allies know about the Japanese approaches (although the other Allies got a certain amount of information about them from decoding Japanese traffic); and then declared war on Japan in the dying moments of the war against Japan, to Japan's considerable surprise, and when Japan was unable to defend itself.

On 20 June the Emperor on his own initiative called the six council members to a conference and stated that it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands. He asked what the council thought of that idea. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister stated that they fully concurred with the Imperial view and that such steps were then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the ministers expected they would be able to send a special ambassador to Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain but they hoped he could be sent before the Potsdam conference. Sakomizu testified that after this expression from the Emperor, Suzuki decided he could stop the war; when he returned from the conference he told Sakomizu "Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say."

After that the Government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye to Moscow if he were persona grata. On 10 July the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and said, "As it is now early July should not our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow without delay?" Since Soviet Ambassador Malik was ill in Tokyo and the conversations there were not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and Sato was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia's denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.

In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but


--7--

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if it were unfavorable they concluded that their only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the United States.
On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued. In their deliberations on that statement, which began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabinet had any objections to ending the war. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai felt that the declaration must be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, whether they liked it or not. The War Minister and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discussion centered around first the future position of the Emperor, second the disposition of war criminals, and third the future form of Japan's "national polity".

On 6 August in the midst of these discussions an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Early reports to Tokyo described very great damage, but the military did not think it was an atomic bomb until President Truman's announcement and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 August Suzuki and Togo conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The military side still however could not make up their minds to accept it.

These differences continued to be examined and hope of favorable word from Russia had been all but abandoned when very early in the morning of 9 August the news arrived that Russia had declared war. Although considerable pessimism had prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotiations, the Government was not prepared for war with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any effective counter-plan. Suzuki calculated that he had a choice of resigning or taking immediate positive action, which could be either declaring war on Russia and continuing until the whole Nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam Declaration. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/JapansStruggle/index.html

[Rising Sun*]

So, have you looked at the OOB for the Kwantung army in August 1945? What is your conclusion?

I have.

It wasn't impressive.

Common sense alone tells us that the Japanese were hardly likely to leave crack units and top troops facing the USSR where there was no fighting there from 1941-45 when they were fighting for their lives and nation elsewhere. They didn't leave them there. They sucked the guts out of the Kwantung Army and left it a shell of poor troops with little support by the time the USSR attacked. I'm not diminishing the excellent planning and execution of the Soviet attack, but it wasn't an equal fight by any means.

Surprise was the essential element in the Soviet
offensive plan. [12-37] The Russians successfully deployed
30 divisions to western Manchuria without Japanese
awareness. [10-1] Deception and surprise was achieved by
heavy reliance upon night movement, utilization of assembly
areas far removed from the border and simple but strict
measures such as instructing senior Soviet officers to not
wear rank insignia and to use assumed names.[10-1] The 6th
Guards Tank Army left all tanks, self-propelled artillery
and vehicles behind in Czechoslovakia and picked up new
equipment manufactured in Soviet Ural factories. [7-52]
This extraordinary effort resulted in the Soviet Union's
ability to field a force in the Far East comprised of 11
combined-arms armies, one tank army and three air armies.
Thus, without discovery by the Japanese at the start of war
with Japan, the Russian Army fielded 1,577,725 men, 26,137
guns and mortars, and 5,556 tanks and self-propelled
artillery pieces. [9-62] The Air Force possessed 3,800
aircraft while the Soviet Navy (Pacific Fleet and Amur River
flotilla) had distinct superiority on the seas (600 fighting
ships as touted by Gorelov) and an additional 1500 A/C. [l2-
38] This vast array of men and arms gave the Russians a
2.2:1 ratio advantage in men, 4.8:1 in artillery and tanks
and a 2:1 advantage in aircraft. [10-29]
The threat which kept 40 Soviet divisions, including
two tank divisions, from the European front was the
Kwangtung Army. In existence since 1919, the Kwangtung Army
was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]
Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.
By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.
The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland. Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which
withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border. This
also removed the Kwantung Army's 1st Tank Division, the last
armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) The result left the
Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self (its most
seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of
1944). [9-63]
This drain on the strength of the Kwangtung Army
required a drastic change in the defense plan against the
Soviet Union. The Japanese formerly planned to defend along
the northern and eastern Manchurian border areas, the
expected Russian avenue of approach. They believed the
western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable
Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the
natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains.
Accordingly, the Japanese had 17 fortified areas covering
the assumed approaches into Manchuria over a 1,000 kilometer
stretch in the northern and eastern border regions. [12-37]
Due to the extreme reduction in strength and armaments,
the Kwangtung Army adopted a new operations plan in May
1945. It called for a delaying action along the border,
withdrawal to subsequent prepared defensive lines and
finally to a stronghold area in southeastern Manchuria for a
final defensive action approximately 650 kilometers from the
northern and western borders. [10-34]
The Kwangtung Army believed that the terrain, long
distances involved and determined Japanese resistance would
weaken the attacking Soviet forces by the time they reached
the final defensive positions and their advance would be
stopped and possibly subjected to a decisive counterattack.
In this plan only one-third of the Japanese Army would be
positioned on the border and the remainder deployed in
depth. [10-34]
In order to prevent the Russians from discovering their
alarming weakness in Manchuria, the Kwangtung Army mobilized
reservists and new recruits to form new divisions and
brigades to maintain the appearance of a formidable fighting
force. In early July 1945, the Kwangtung Army was expanded
from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions.
Unfortunately for the Kwangtung Army, more than one-fourth
of its entire combat force was mobilized only ten days prior
to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9
brigades). [4-63] One of two very weak tank brigades was
not formed until July 1945, and both brigades were far
removed in south central Manchuria. [9-63]
The Japanese IGHQ and Kwangtung Army had not heeded the
lessons learned at Nomonhan. In the Summer of 1945, their
army had no artillery larger than 75 mm, few tanks, no
rockets, nor any modern anti-tank weapons. The newly formed
149th Infantry Division did not have a single piece of
artillery in its possession when war commenced! [9-63]
Ammunition and weapons were in such short supply the
Japanese resorted to arming soldiers with bamboo spears.
[18-154] Of the 24 divisions in the Kwangtung Army, the
Japanese themselves rated only seven or eight to be combat
effective. [9-63] In fact, eight of their infantry
divisions were rated at being only 15% combat effective
while all nine independent mixed brigades were rated at 15%
combat effectiveness or less. [18-161]
By August 1945, the Kwantury Army had pieced together a
combat force of 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft,
most obsolete. Discounting Japanese forces in South
Sakhalin, Korea and the Kuriles, the Soviets faced an
inexperienced army totalling little more than 710,000 men.
[10-29]
In May 1945, the Japanese commenced their unit
redeployments and construction of fortifications and
barriers to conform with the new defense plan. [18-134] The
Japanese problem and "Achilles heel" was simply that their
troop redeployments and military construction projects were
underway and incomplete when the Russians attacked on 9
August 1945. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm

[Egorka]

I don't think so.

The Soviets frustrated Japanese attempts to negotiate a surrender through the USSR; strung out Japan without letting the other Allies know about the Japanese approaches (although the other Allies got a certain amount of information about them from decoding Japanese traffic); and then declared war on Japan in the dying moments of the war against Japan, to Japan's considerable surprise, and when Japan was unable to defend itself.


I do not get it... When you talk about possible invasion of Japan by US you clame enormous losses could be inflicted to the Americans due to ferosiousness of the Japanese fighters.

But when you are talking about the best regular Army that the Japanese had left, you say "was unable to defend itself".

So on the islands japanese showed hell to US marines, but in Manchuria they were sissies? Are there different breeds of Japanese available?

Contradictione muy grande!

[Rising Sun*]

I do not get it... When you talk about possible invasion of Japan by US you clame enormous losses could be inflicted to the Americans due to ferosiousness of the Japanese fighters.

But when you are talking about the best regular Army that the Japanese had left, you say "was unable to defend itself".

So on the islands japanese showed hell to US marines, but in Manchuria they were sissies? Are there different breeds of Japanese available?

Contradictione muy grande!

Where did I say anything about the best regular Army that the Japanese had left facing the Soviets. Or anyone?

The Kwantung Army facing the USSR weren't sissies, but they were generally very poor troops with lousy artillery, armour and air support. Because the best of everything had been drawn off them for years to fight the real war s in the Pacific and Burma theatres, and then at the end their remaining strengths were pulled out to defend the home islands.

The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.

As I said earlier, I'm not trying to diminish the great success of the very brief Soviet engagement with Japan, but it wasn't anything like what the other Allies had been doing for several years beforehand, nor did it contribute a great deal to the defeat of Japan.

[Rising Sun*]

I do not get it... When you talk about possible invasion of Japan by US you clame enormous losses could be inflicted to the Americans due to ferosiousness of the Japanese fighters.

Contradictione muy grande!

I don't recall saying anything about that, either.

I've based my opinions on what the Allies, which in this case is really the Americans, estimated as losses because that is what encouraged them to use the atom bombs.

[Rising Sun*]

Originally Posted by Rising Sun*
I don't think so.

The Soviets frustrated Japanese attempts to negotiate a surrender through the USSR; strung out Japan without letting the other Allies know about the Japanese approaches (although the other Allies got a certain amount of information about them from decoding Japanese traffic); and then declared war on Japan in the dying moments of the war against Japan, to Japan's considerable surprise, and when Japan was unable to defend itself.

I do not get it... When you talk about possible invasion of Japan by US you clame enormous losses could be inflicted to the Americans due to ferosiousness of the Japanese fighters.

But when you are talking about the best regular Army that the Japanese had left, you say "was unable to defend itself". So on the islands japanese showed hell to US marines, but in Manchuria they were sissies? Are there different breeds of Japanese available?

Contradictione muy grande!

Just to clarify that point about Japan being unable to defend itself, I was referring to the Soviet attack in the dying minutes of the war against Japan.

So far as defeating Japan goes, it ranks roughly with someone watching a bloke get the shit kicked out of him by a big gang until he's unconscious and moments away from bleeding to death, and then running in and giving the victim a kick in the head and claiming responsiblity for his death.

[savoy6]

egorka,
you seem to think that somehow the condition of the kwantung army is a corolation with how much the japanese people would have resisted the allied invasion of the home islands. the japanese people have a history of resisting invasions with every resourse availiable,whether military or civilians.every person possible was mobilized to resist the 2 attempts by the mongols to invade.
what we are stating is the fact that the kwantung army was a paper tiger by the end of the war and no match for the soviets that rolled through it in the closing days of the war.the reason the emperor surrendered the nation was to prevent the destruction of the japanese nation by either A-bomb or invasion.the last few days before the surrender saw a junta of nationalistic officers actually attempt a coup of sorts to prevent the surrender by trying to make the emperor a captive in his palace,and not make the announcement he had recorded.they saw it as a greater shame to surrender and save the people then to have the nation sacrifice itself against the allies.luckily they were stopped by retainers loyal to the emperor who hid the recording and got it into the hands of the right people to get it broadcast....
oh, and thanks for the backup info rising sun....with 2 jobs i just didn't have time to find the background info..lol..

[Rising Sun*]

oh, and thanks for the backup info rising sun

Semper fi. :D Even if we're not Marines.

This current thread is related
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?p=100196&posted=1#post100196

[Egorka]

Just to clarify that point about Japan being unable to defend itself, I was referring to the Soviet attack in the dying minutes of the war against Japan.

So far as defeating Japan goes, it ranks roughly with someone watching a bloke get the shit kicked out of him by a big gang until he's unconscious and moments away from bleeding to death, and then running in and giving the victim a kick in the head and claiming responsiblity for his death.

Right. I agree it was like that. The main reason USSR joined in was to secure its interests. The minor reason ws also that the were obliged to do it 90 days after the Germany's capitulation and USA actually wanted them to do it (remember the our Potsdam discussion).

But I also guess that you can kind of see at least a tiny reason in that some Soviet/Russian peope say the same thing about western front in Europe.

I am not claming that USSR did any very sizeable impact on the defeat of Japan if we look at the whole was period, though USSR inpact at the moment it joint the war was very significant. Japan was practicaly defeated. Japan had only chance if they could hold Manchuria. Because it was practicaly the only source of many crusial raw materials. And even then it was too weak. Maybe Japanese could try some political intrigue or something. But! It is absolutely another thing when it comes to the specific battle where RKKA crushed Kwantung army.

My main message is that Kwantung army lost not because it was weak, but because RKKA was strong. Essentially RKKA defeated a normal regular Japanese army, which was NOT worse than that fighting on the islands against Americans. And before you start arguing with me lets settle the first bit in this equation: see the next post :)

[Egorka]

Ok , guys! Savoy6 and Rising Sun!

Before we start talking about the strenght of the force that oposed RKKA in Manchuria in August 1945, lets settle one thing.

The question:
Do you agree that the Kwantung army was mentaly set to fight until the end, just like they did on the islands and just like they would do it in case of the Japan's invasion?
If possible keep you answers short... :) Just to keep the pace...

[Rising Sun*]

The question:
Do you agree that the Kwantung army was mentaly set to fight until the end, just like they did on the islands and just like they would do it in case of the Japan's invasion?

I don't know.

I'd assume so as a fair part of the Kwantung Army was transferred outside China and presumably followed the usual Japanese customs in warfare in the Pacific.

But the Kwantung Army had always been a distinct entity, in many respects running its own show, and wasn't used to fighting the sorts of battles that were standard in the Pacific, so I don't know if it had a different culture to the rest of the IJA.

[Digger]

Pre war the code of Bushido was instilled heavily into any man serving with the JIF, and in almost all cases these troops, airmen, sailors showed a fanaticism that defied belief.

By August 1945 the Kwantung Army had very few of these well trained, indoctrinated troops. For the most part the greener soldiers did not, could not have had the same level of training and indoctrination as their predecessors. While the Soviet attack blew them away, there were cases where Japanese resistance was fierce, if not suicidal.

I doubt whether the Kwantung Army was made of sterner stuff, they would have altered the result.

Regards digger.

[Rising Sun*]

I am not claming that USSR did any very sizeable impact on the defeat of Japan if we look at the whole was period, though USSR inpact at the moment it joint the war was very significant.

The USSR's biggest contribution to the defeat of Japan didn't involve firing one shot. It was holding large Japanese forces against it for the duration of the war, which prevented them being employed elsewhere.

My main message is that Kwantung army lost not because it was weak, but because RKKA was strong. Essentially RKKA defeated a normal regular Japanese army, which was NOT worse than that fighting on the islands against Americans. [/I]

The Japanese troops the Russians fought in 1945 couldn't be compared with the Japanese troops who fought in the Pacific and Burma, nor with the Kwantung Army that existed in 1941.

For a start, the Russians never fought the IJN's Special Naval Landing Force (=Japanese Marines), who were outstanding, and vicious, troops.

By the time the Russians got involved, Japan's best soldiers had generally been killed by the other Allies or were isolated around the Pacific. Just as importantly, its best generals and other officers had largely gone the same way.

If the Russians faced Japanese troops of the same quality that the other Allies fought up to the end of 1945, and especially the Japanese troops who secured all Japan's early gains and who had to be defeated by the other Allies to reach the home islands, and even allowing for the superior numbers and weapons the Russians had, they would not have had such an easy victory. Nor necessarily any victory at all, by the time Japan surrendered.

[Egorka]

To both Digger and Rising Sun,

Pre war the code of Bushido was instilled heavily into any man serving with the JIF, and in almost all cases these troops, airmen, sailors showed a fanaticism that defied belief.
By August 1945 the Kwantung Army had very few of these well trained, indoctrinated troops.
We have not reached the military training yet. We will talk about it later. We will see when sertain divisions were formed and so on. For now we are trying to establish common understanding on the mental setting of the soldiers in Kwantung army. Why do you claim that the japanese soldiers serving in Kwantung army were less eager to die for their country than those one on the islands or the main land?

For the most part the greener soldiers did not, could not have had the same level of training and indoctrination as their predecessors. While the Soviet attack blew them away, there were cases where Japanese resistance was fierce, if not suicidal.
I doubt whether the Kwantung Army was made of sterner stuff, they would have altered the result.

Again, wait with training. The indoctrination, as you call it, did not come from the army service. It came from the up bringing in sertain cultural evironment. It is a process that it normaly in place from the birth. I could equaly say that they were indoctrinated to sacrifise them self even before they joint the army.

So to wrap it up, you have no grounds to say that the japanese soldiers in Kwantung army were less determined to die for Japan than those on the islands or those on the main land. Agree?

[Rising Sun*]

To both Digger and Rising Sun,

So to wrap it up, you have no grounds to say that the japanese soldiers in Kwantung army were less determined to die for Japan than those on the islands or those on the main land. Agree?

Whether they were equally, less, or more determined to die than any other Japanese troops doesn't matter.

They simply were not first rate troops.

Focusing on the quality of the troops and their willingness to die ignores two more important factors. The Russians had massive superiority in armour and airpower, which ensured that even against first rate troops the Russians were bound to win.

Soviet air superiority was virtually absolute.In any case, if individual Japanese planes did take off from their airdromes,Russian fighters almost instantly shot them down. Superiority of Soviet aviators was ensured by three basic factors: quantity (the USSR had manymore warplanes; quality (Soviet fighters, attack planes and bombers possessed much higher tactical and technical characteristics; and, finally, Russian pilots, who had acquired enormous combat experience in battles with theGerman “Luftwaffe”, proved to have much higher flying skills.
http://www.fegi.ru/prim/flot/flot1_13.htm

To which might be added the fact that Japan had lost almost all of its battle experienced, and even battle inexperienced but well trained, pilots. Hence the kamikazes, because they could at least fly a plane into a ship even if they lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo it.

Against inferior Japanese troops, Russia's superiority in every respect just meant that Russia got a quicker and easier victory.

[Rising Sun*]

Egorka

A point that needs to be made is that while the USSR didn't contribute anything directly to the sustained fight against Japan 1941-45 and didn't contribute anything to Japan's many and important military defeats during that time, its attack on Japan at the end of the war made an important contribution to Japan's decision to surrender, in conjunction with the dropping of the atom bombs.

The USN had Japan blockaded and was pretty much running a turkey shoot around the Japanese coasts by August 1945. Japan had been defeated or isolated on land everywhere else. It knew it was going to lose the war well before August and had started looking for a negotiated peace. The Russian attack was the final piece in putting a noose around all of Japan, with the prospect of a Russian invasion of the home islands through Manchuria becoming an alarming possibility when Russia attacked around the same time that the two atom bombs were dropped.

It's impossible to know whether Japan would have surrendered just because of the atom bombs (I think it would have, if only because they threatened destruction of the home islands), but the Russian declaration of war and rapid advance in Manchuria certainly had a significant impact on the Japanese leadership and encouraged it to surrender, in the realisation that it was doomed on all fronts.

[Egorka]

Egorka

A point that needs to be made is that while the USSR didn't contribute anything directly to the sustained fight against Japan 1941-45 and didn't contribute anything to Japan's many and important military defeats during that time, its attack on Japan at the end of the war made an important contribution to Japan's decision to surrender, in conjunction with the dropping of the atom bombs.

The USN had Japan blockaded and was pretty much running a turkey shoot around the Japanese coasts by August 1945. Japan had been defeated or isolated on land everywhere else. It knew it was going to lose the war well before August and had started looking for a negotiated peace. The Russian attack was the final piece in putting a noose around all of Japan, with the prospect of a Russian invasion of the home islands through Manchuria becoming an alarming possibility when Russia attacked around the same time that the two atom bombs were dropped.

It's impossible to know whether Japan would have surrendered just because of the atom bombs (I think it would have, if only because they threatened destruction of the home islands), but the Russian declaration of war and rapid advance in Manchuria certainly had a significant impact on the Japanese leadership and encouraged it to surrender, in the realisation that it was doomed on all fronts.

Thank you for comforting me, Rising Sun. I appreciate it.

[Egorka]

Whether they were equally, less, or more determined to die than any other Japanese troops doesn't matter.
WHAT?! It does not matter? Do I even need to comment on it?

They simply were not first rate troops.
We will deal with the technical side of the problem in the next step.

Focusing on the quality of the troops and their willingness to die ignores two more important factors. I am not focusing on it. I am just doing it step by step. One builds a house sequentially, right?

The Russians had massive superiority in armour and airpower, which ensured that even against first rate troops the Russians were bound to win.
http://www.fegi.ru/prim/flot/flot1_13.htm
The russians superiority is not the same as Kwantung army was bad. But! We will deal with it in the next step.

To which might be added the fact that Japan had lost almost all of its battle experienced, and even battle inexperienced but well trained, pilots. Hence the kamikazes, because they could at least fly a plane into a ship even if they lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo it.

Against inferior Japanese troops, Russia's superiority in every respect just meant that Russia got a quicker and easier victory.
Again, lets wait a bit.

First I want us agree on the mental state of the Japanese soldiers in Kwantung army.

[Chevan]

as for the japanese... much of you suppositions about the great influence of the soviets rolling an experienced mechanized army over an ill equipped and poorly organized kuantung army and how they were ready to take over the entire east is...well..suppositional bullshit....the soviets did not have the equipment neccesary for a full scale invasion of japan


Who do tells you about full scale invasion?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_August_Storm
On August 18, several amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there would already be Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden and undeniable establishment of Soviet sovereignty.

The Red army had enought forces to landing on the Sakhalin.
And be sure they have enough power to land at the Hakkaido as it was planned at the first time befor the capitulation of Japane.

.also,since you obviously have spent little or no time in japan itself..you would not understand the simple facts of how deep national pride in that country goes.

Are you Japanese to spread about the depth of its national feeling?
i/m sure not so .....
Leave you feeling comments aside.
As far as i know the national feeling of Japane was based at the devotion to the Imperor and on the cult ineviolability of homelands.
Actualy they were the fanatic as much as they could ignored the mass victims among the civils during the terrible firebombing of Tokio in march of 1945( the victims were much worst then even after the bombing of Hiroshima).
They could be enought fanatic to send kamikaze to die...This was in the limits of their "love" and national felings toward the motherlands. Becouse the mothelands was a holy for them.
But they NEVER could lost its Imperor ( who was like a alive god for the Japanes) and its matheland.
So I will NEVER believe that Japanes should not surrender in the august when they had learned the USSR declared the war for them.
So ONLY a stupid idiot could continie the war becouse in this way they could lost everything ( and imperor and homelands) if the Red Army together with the Allies would sturmed the Homeislands and inevitably ( inspite of possible great casulates) captured it.
The way of your thinking is just a tupical after-war popular point among the USA politicans who prefered to use the public execution for the Japane ( on own egoistic political purposes) instead of the diplomatic means that could find the way to get the japanes ( who in fact already lost the war in war sence) the normal way to surrender with the analogical demands like they have to accept after the Red Army attacked the Kwantung army in 8 august.
Thus without the terrible a-bombing and bloody landing operations we could finished this war by the full surrender of Japane ( with the only conditiond of saving the institute of Imperor)

contrary to your opinion, i don't think of the japanese as "suicidal idiots". i don't confuse fanatic nationalism with idiocy.to this day all ,at least all the ones i saw there,of the nation's war memorials only speak of how the west ,and the US in particular,left the japanese no choice but to attack all of asia...

Wel i would like to hear more about how did the USA forced Japane to attack all of asia.Would you so kind please;)

also to this day the japanese goverment,unlike the germans, has NEVER apologized for any of the atrocities that its armies commited during the war....NEVER....
from forced comfort women,the rape of nanking,the murder of hundreds of thousands of philipinos during the battle for manila,to their live desections of POWs as part of there bio-warfare program,etc.,etc..

Well sure the Japanes atrocities above the other asian nations were even the worst then the Nazy's.
So what ?
Does it means you wish to say the USA drope the a-bombing for the revenge for killed chineses?
this is one of the things that i hate about the internet in the last few years..people can put out the most illogical and under- or un-informed opinions out there and since its on the internet it must be true....it's why i can't stand wikipedia as a source...

Your firstly read the post about the fat from the bodies that supported the fire in oven ,befor the telling about illogical points of other members.


Cheers.

[Chevan]

The Soviets frustrated Japanese attempts to negotiate a surrender through the USSR
Not so.

After that the Government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye to Moscow if he were persona grata. On 10 July the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and said, "As it is now early July should not our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow without delay?" Since Soviet Ambassador Malik was ill in Tokyo and the conversations there were not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and Sato was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia's denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.

In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but



You brought a good text , tanks Rising Sun
But this text ignored the some importaint events during the Potsdam conference.
Actually the Stalin recieved the telegram from the Tokio in 11 jule where they asked him to be the negotiators in Japane surrender.
Stalin was not against this idea but he was forced to wait till the Potsdam conference of allies.
The USA certainly knew about japanes attemps towar the Moscow and this was absolutly unaccesable neither for them nor for the Britain.
Just imagine the situation: Both US and UK has spend a lot of time and resourses to finished the japane but this insolent Imperor wish to surrender to the Stalin :D
Therefore both US and UK made all possible to prevent this attempts.
They pull out the UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER that they knew was 100% unacceptable for the Japane.
So the continie of war was INEVITABLE as it wished the UK/US.
Knowing it Stalin, desided not to leave the allies and continie the war on its own purposes ( and he was right thus he could to take the whole China for itself).
So the reason why Stalin has refused the Japanes surrender was not his will, but the demand of allies.
This is very importain ADDITION.

[Chevan]

The Kwantung Army facing the USSR weren't sissies, but they were generally very poor troops with lousy artillery, armour and air support. Because the best of everything had been drawn off them for years to fight the real war s in the Pacific and Burma theatres, and then at the end their remaining strengths were pulled out to defend the home islands.

Egorka right Rising Sun in here.
The Kwantung Army was the strongest army of Japane in the august of 1945.
Becouse after the battle for Okinawa the Japane losed practically all of the rest of its Pacific army. So they simply had no other large army except of Kwantung in the august of 1945.;)

The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.

Do not compare please the Japanes army in 1942 and in august 1945.
this is like to compare the Wermacht in the summer of 1942 on the with the pitiful rest ot it during the battle for the Berlin.;)
Actually the Japanes resistance in China was not so fierce like it was for the allies. But you absolutly wrong that the Red army did not faced the seriouce enemy as the fanatics and kamicadzes.Moreover the great problem was the Japanes forsed areas where they used the suicidal mashin-gunners who was was riveted by chain to the his machine gun.


http://www.revolucia.ru/kvantun.htm
The Japanese Armed Forces rested on the rich material, food and raw resources of Manchuria and Korea and in the Manchurian industry, which produced entire necessary for their life and combat activity in essence. On the territory, occupied by troops of Kwantung army, it find by 13 700 km of iron and 22 thousand km of motor roads, 133 airfields, more than 200 landing fields - a total of are more than 400 airport points, 870 large military storages and well equipped military posts.
In Manchuria on the boundaries with THE USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic Japanese militarists created 17 fortified areas, of them 8 - in the east against the Soviet littoral. Each fortified area occupied 50 - 100 km along the front and to 50 km into the depth. Their destination - not only strengthening of defense, but also the creation of more advantageous conditions for concentration and developing the troops. The line of the boundary fortified areas consisted of three positions.
Four fortified areas were built in Korea and one against North Sakhalin. The islands of Kurile bank were covered coast artillery batteries, sheltered into the ferroconcrete construction, and by the military garrisons, provide ford with developed lasting defensive installations.
So the power that Red Army has faced in the august of 1945 were the much stronger that for instance the allias in Okinawa. And just the soviet experience and the power lets to continie the hight temp of offencive in spirit of the germans blizkrige.

As I said earlier, I'm not trying to diminish the great success of the very brief Soviet engagement with Japan, but it wasn't anything like what the other Allies had been doing for several years beforehand, nor did it contribute a great deal to the defeat of Japan.
This is like the war with Germany. When the allies had not anything like what the Red Army had been doing for the several years ;).

[savoy6]

So the power that Red Army has faced in the august of 1945 were the much stronger that for instance the allias in Okinawa. And just the soviet experience and the power lets to continie the hight temp of offencive in spirit of the germans blizkrige.


WTF????do you not understand the difference between forces in a staff OOB and the actual forces on the ground?you can have all the fortified defence zones that you want and maybe even have the structures for them built but it's meaningless when the forces manning them are under strength and inexperienced....sorry man...i'm going by the US Navy's post war intelligence analysis survey of japanese preparations for the home island defence that included hundreds of interviews with former japanese staff officers and commanders.all of the analysis showed that,just as RS has pointed out,they had very little troops laft to man the defence areas.also,don't even attempt to compare short hop landings around a peninsula(korea) that the soviets already held areas just north of,or short distance trips to close islands like the kuriles to the allies putting together invasions fleets consisting of thousands of vessels and hundreds of thousands of men and them sailing these across vast expanses of the pacific,getting objectives on time and on target, to pull off success after success...

This is like the war with Germany. When the allies had not anything like what the Red Army had been doing for the several years
now this....this proves exactly what you guys are all about with this constant stretching of the facts....the soviets did more to win the war than the allies......whatever.
did the soviet people suffer greatly during the war? hell yes...no one is arguing the sacrifices made by millions of the soviet people.did soviet tactics used for a large portion of the war have anything to do with these losses?...hell yes...what do you think happens when you put 10,000 guys on 3000 tanks and then charge them into fixed enemy positions.?..yeah, you take the position but at what cost?what happens when you enforce a policy of scortched earth against both your civilian population and a rapidly advancing enemy that you can't stop?tens and hundreds of thousands starve to death..heading soldiers into german fire with machine guns behind them?it takes no leadership to stick a gun in someones back and tell them to charge or else...motivating free peoples to do it is another thing.

[Rising Sun*]

The Kwantung Army was the strongest army of Japane in the august of 1945.

No way. The best remaining available troops; all the elite formations; and by far the largest number of troops (with about 2 million Japanese Defence Army troops in addition to the IJA) were in Japan to defend the home islands against the imminent invasion by the Allies other than the USSR

The Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.
By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.

The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland.

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border.

This also removed the Kwantung Army's 1st Tank Division, the last
armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) T

The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self

its most seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of
1944. [9-63]
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm

[Egorka]

Savoy6:
now this....this proves exactly what you guys are all about with this constant stretching of the facts....the soviets did more to win the war than the allies......whatever.
Exactly - WHATEVER!

Savoy6, you do not even try to answer on a simplest issue about the motivation of Japanese soldiers in Kwantung army.

If you noticed this forum is about communication between people. And communication in most of the world means speaking and listening. You only speak out.

I want to hear why japanese in Manchuria were less eager to die for Emperor, than japanese in Guadalcanal?
What objective arguments can you bring to light EXCEPT your personal opinion?

[Rising Sun*]

I want to hear why japanese in Manchuria were less eager to die for Emperor, than japanese in Guadalcanal?



Eight of the twenty four divisions and seven of the nine infantry brigades, comprising over one quarter of the total Japanese manpower in Manchuria, were mobilized only 10 days before the Soviet attack, in a desperate all-out mobilization of all Japanese males in Manchuria (most of them previously deferred as over age or for other reasons).
Raymond L Garthoff, The Soviet Manchurian Campaign August 1945, Military Affairs (Journal of the Society for Military History), 1969 (October), p312, at 313 If you have access to JStor you can view it here
http://www.jstor.org/view/00263931/di962670/96p09204/1?frame=noframe&userID=83ac042d@latrobe.edu.au/01cce4406900501bdbe28&dpi=3&config=jstor

The article also notes that most of those divisions were at about 11,000 to 15,000 instead of the usual 23,000, and badly unbalanced in composition.

These were not the well-trained, seasoned, battle hardened, fit, well-supplied, first rate Japanese troops on Guadalcanal or that the Allies fought elsewhere in the Pacific and Burma.

The Japanese on Guadalcanal actually weren't that keen on all dying for the Emperor, which is why they pulled out when they were defeated rather than hurl every last man at the Americans.

Who knows whether the Kwantung Army were prepared to die on the same basis as other Japanese troops? It wouldn't matter in most cases, because they were going to get killed through inexperience, lack of training, lack of support, and lack of leadership anyway.

[Rising Sun*]

First I want us agree on the mental state of the Japanese soldiers in Kwantung army.

I want to hear why japanese in Manchuria were less eager to die for Emperor, than japanese in Guadalcanal?
What objective arguments can you bring to light EXCEPT your personal opinion?

There is a very simple way to evaluate the willingness of Japanese troops in Manchuria to die. Better still, it involves only your favourite way of comparing things.

Numbers.

How many Japanese troops were committed to Guadalcanal? About 38,000. How many were killed? About 24,000 to 28,500. How many were taken prisoner? About 1,000.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/Guadalcanal/USMC-M-Guadalcanal-A.html
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm

How many Japanese troops were committed to fighting Russia in Manchuria in August 1945? I’m not sure. How many were killed? I don’t know. How many were taken prisoner? Most of them.

Sure, Japan surrendered, but if these supposedly fierce troops were so set on dying rather than bearing the shame of surrender they would all have committed suicide. The fact that most of them survived doesn’t suggest that they were all that keen on keeping alive the supposed tradition of dying rather than surrendering, does it? Which is pretty much what you expect of troops on a beaten side fighting a pointless action in the dying days of a lost war.

Again, the troops the Russians fought in Manchuria in 1945 cannot be compared with first rate troops anywhere in the IJA at any time.

[Egorka]

Rising Sun,

You previously quoted this text http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Do you find it reliable and trustworsy? Can we use it as a base that represents your position?

[Rising Sun*]

Not so.

The situation was a lot more complex than whether or not the Soviets frustrated Japan's peace feelers towards America. Japan was playing its own game to split the Soviets and US for its post-war benefit, as outlined in the interesting article from which the following quotes come.

Concerning Japan's "abrupt" capitulation, most studies ascribe it to the shock of either the atomic bombs or the "surprise" attack by the Soviet Union, or both, followed by the "sacred" decision by Emperor Hirohito.1 An orthodox lesson of the Pacific War is that Japan should have surrendered to the United States earlier, to save hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties.2 Had Japan done so, however, the United States would have taken over the entire sphere of Japan's continental empire and become a dominant power in the region, perhaps imposing harsh constraints on defeated Japan. That was not what Japan desired. Japanese leaders saw a need to investigate the best way to leave the war, and, as this article will show, they calculated an end game for the nation by staking its survival on the future of East Asia after the empire's collapse. para 1

It was the Soviet Union that gave Japan strategic versatility in exiting the world war. The Soviet entry into the war during its last phase is portrayed simply as a betrayal to Japan in light of the Neutrality Pact. Conversely, the Imperial Japanese Army and government have been criticized for wasting time in hoping for the Soviets to help broker peace with the United States. Such vilification of the Soviet Union, however, has obfuscated a complex strategy Japan adopted toward the Soviets. A body of little-known and rarely used documents, kept since 1941 by Japanese military leaders, diplomatic officials, and scholars and journalists of international relations, reveals that these Japanese did not adhere to any hopes for Moscow to mediate peace with the United States.4 Neither did they hold onto a naïive anticipation for a break-up of the Moscow-Washington Grand Alliance, which would supposedly bring Japan its preferred terms for surrender. On the contrary, these Japanese were firmly convinced of eventual Soviet abrogation of the Neutrality Pact and entry into the war. They meticulously studied the possible timing of a Soviet attack and the manner of subsequent collapse of Japan's colonial empire, specifically the Soviet impact on postwar East Asia. In their perceptions, the Soviet Union possessed an ability to achieve a balance of power against the United States in a postwar world. Moreover, the Soviet presence would, they hoped, prevent the United States from establishing hegemony in East Asia and recreating it solely in its image. And ultimately, the Soviet influence in East Asia would restrain harsh U.S. control of post-surrender Japan. para 3

Obviously, as the Japanese policymakers read this article in Tokyo, they knew Japan could not "bargain" for its defeat with either the Soviet Union or the United States. A two-front war against both the United States and the Soviet Union was looking like an impossible scenario; the Soviet attack alone would be the end of Japan's war in Asia and the Pacific. However, Japan's surrender tactic was now to have the United States and the Soviet Union compete against each other in their planning for the future of East Asia. Thus Japan's plan for surrender and beyond, both politically and militarily in the Eurasian context, was made assuming a Soviet attack beginning in Manchuria and assessing its impact on the United States. In fact, by mid-April 1945, when the Imperial Headquarters acknowledged the rapid reinforcement of Soviet forces in the Far East, the Army War Operations Plans Division made no recommendations for preparations for counterattack. Instead, it made the following observation: the key to accomplishing the goal of the Greater East Asian War was to predict precisely when the Soviet attack would occur and to complete by then a quick and proper response and measure concerning it. The "quick and proper response and measure" seems, in this context, to mean Japan's surrender. But nowhere in the observation did it hint that Japan should do so before the Soviet attack.60 para 32

From a different perspective, the Japanese also saw that a Soviet thrust into Manchuria would play havoc with Chinese politics, specifically defusing the momentum gained by the CCP, and also preventing an otherwise victorious China from becoming a threat to postwar Japan. The aforementioned Japanese "offer" of its Manchurian interests to the Soviet Union was meant to deter U.S. hegemony in China. Now the anticipated Soviet attack on Manchuria would have two effects: not only hamper such U.S. ambitions but also crush any hope for a GMD-CCP united front. para 36

In the last phase of World War II, Japan was investigating the best way for the empire to collapse in a new configuration of power and searching for the best strategy toward the Soviets while observing the spatial and temporal origins of the Cold War in Asia. Once the war was over, defeated Japan quietly withdrew into a niche, away from the new rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, and devoted its resources to the nation's reconstruction. It seems that Japan survived and recovered in the way these Japanese wartime strategists hoped. para 50
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/koshiro.html

[Rising Sun*]

On the general question of whether the atom bombs ended the war, the article quoted in my last post
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/109.2/koshiro.html suggests that Japan was looking for a Soviet attack to end the war and simply did not factor the possibility of atom bombs into their calculations. It also suggests that the Soviet attack on Manchuria was a necessary pre-condition to Japan's surrender.

It's an interesting article that alters the conventional view of the impact of the atom bombs, and of the impact of the Soviet entry into the war. If nothing else, it should make it worthwhile for Chevan and Egorka to get out of bed today. :D

One of the biggest problems in understanding Japan's conduct is that most of the relevant writings before, during and after the war are in Japanese and rarely translated. Many of the English versions are excerpts in analyses by Westerners looking at events primarily from the Western perspective. It's hard to get the sort of analysis in English of Japanese documents and thinking that the linked article provides, unless one subscribes to some rarefied academic journals.

[Rising Sun*]

Rising Sun,

You previously quoted this text http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
Do you find it reliable and trustworsy? Can we use it as a base that represents your position?

Egorka

I can do better than that as I’ve borrowed David Glantz’s August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria which is one of the sources for the Global Security link figures, although there still seem to be some large gaps in the figures.

At p.29 he provides Soviet estimates before the attack of 713,000 Japanese troops in the Kwantung Army; 170,000 Manchukuoan Army; and 44,000 Inner Mongolian forces. In note 1 to Ch. 11, at p.229, he says that Soviet estimates of casualties and prisoners fall short of the 713,000 troops Japan claimed in Manchuria and North Korea.

In note 1 to Ch. 11 he says Japan estimated 21,000 Japanese troops were killed but, as Japan lost all Kwantung Army records, this is based on demobilization figures while unit battle accounts show heavier losses. The Soviets say 84,000 Japanese were killed. Glantz also says that Manchukuoan casualties accounted for a significant part of Japanese losses, along with an indeterminate number of Japanese reservists and civilians who fought in garrisons alongside Japanese soldiers. Japan estimated Soviet casualties at 10,000, while the Soviets say their casualties were 32,000 of which 8,000 were killed.

No Japanese figure is given for Japanese taken prisoner but the Soviets say they took about 594,000 Japanese prisoner.

I've seen post-surrender POW figures around 600,000 elsewhere but I can’t recall the source. I don't know whether the auxiliaries (Manchukuoan Army and Inner Mongolian forces) were treated as POW's and included in any figures, but as the Manchukuoan casualties were included in Glantz’s Soviet casualty figures I assume that the same goes for POW’s.

On Glantz’s figures, we get a maximum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 927,000 deployed against the Soviets, so:

927,000
- 84,000 killed (including unknown number of civilians and reservists)

843,000 (+ or - unknown number of civilians and reservists)
- 594,000 POW

249,000 unaccounted for.

The 249,000 unaccounted for might be troops who avoided capture; troops who went over to the Nationalist or communist Chinese forces; or troops who never existed in the first place. Or a combination of all of the above.

Taking 249,000 ‘unaccounted for’ from the maximum figure of 927,000 gives a minimum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 678,000.

On the wider question of willingness to die for the Emperor, Glantz concludes at p. 184 that some Japanese units fought very well, including “death units” which caused Soviet awe by throwing their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks.

However, Glantz also says that cease-fire rumours disrupted Japanese operations. He also notes at p.185 that, because of confusion at high command levels and conflicting orders, many units withdrew from battle. Such unwillingness to fight and withdrawal from battle were not features of any other battles in which the Japanese engaged with the other Allies.

[Chevan]

No way. The best remaining available troops; all the elite formations; and by far the largest number of troops (with about 2 million Japanese Defence Army troops in addition to the IJA) were in Japan to defend the home islands against the imminent invasion by the Allies other than the USSR

Oh common, the 2 million Japanese Defence Army were mostly from a worker from a reserve and teenagers - this could not be the "elite" (and army at a common sence).
I rather think the so called "elite" Japane army was fully distructed in the previous battles.
You wrote
By the time the Russians got involved, Japan's best soldiers had generally been killed by the other Allies or were isolated around the Pacific. Just as importantly, its best generals and other officers had largely gone the same way.

The Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces.

That's right the Manchuria with occupated Korea and China was the last resource and breadbasket for the Japane.
Therefore its defence was critacally improtaint for the defence of Japane in the strategic-war sence.
However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.

Oh tell us the "definition" of Japane elite division in Kwantung Army please.
Was this the division that killed a most of Chinese guerrilas and raped a a most of women?
Becouse as it told mst savoy6 large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas

By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942.
Oh yea, it was found reduced half ;)
According to the russian military archives datas in the august the Kwantung army had:

http://www.cultinfo.ru/fulltext/1/001/008/060/322.htm
the 1st front (3-4 and the 5th of army),
the 3rd front (the 30th and 44-4 armies),
the 17th front (34-4 and 59-4 armies),
independent (4th) army,
two (2-4 and the 5th) air forces and Sungariys military flotilla.
Furthermore, to it were operationally subordinated army Manchjo-Go, troops of internal Mongolia (prince de Van) and Sungary's army group.
In the composition Kwantung army. and the subordinated to it troops were counted 37 infantry and 7 cavalry divisions, 22 infantry, 2 tank and 2 cavalry brigades (only 1 million. 320 thousand people), 1155 tanks, 6260 artillery of different calibers, 1900 aircraft even 25 ships

Not bad "reducing" after 1942 up to the 1 320 000 peoples.:)

The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor.

But this 'manpower" was able to bring the 35-30% of casulites for the US trops in the battles for Okinawa and Ivo Jima being the severely deficient in aircraft,engineer support, communications and armor. And without the Any tanks.

What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.

Yes those 'few" (about 1000) tanks were too weak agains T-34 but it was a enought seriouse when crashed US troops in Birma and Britains in Malaya.Right?
Becouse the Japanes easy tanks was a enough good in the jungles.

The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland.

Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border.
Aha? all the "elite" divisions.;)
Have you a exact number , quantity and names of those divisions to check how much they were "elite"?

This also removed the Kwantung Army's 1st Tank Division, [b]the last
armor division in Manchuria.[b]
Oh really?
The LAST tank divisions were removed into Japane in march but ... they forgot its 1000 tanks in Manchjuria ,that were suddenly found in august.

The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self

Nevertheless the 1/4 part of its "shadow" made a nightmare for the USA marines in the Okinawa and Ivo Jima.

You know Risin Sun i have to conclude you are capable to find the "sorces" that contradicts at the your previous posts.

[Chevan]

The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.
This is a nonsence.
The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the 1938-39 at the borders conflicts like in the like of Halkin-Gol
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkin_Gol
The 30 000 of Kwantung Army ( the most experienced Japane army at that time has tryed to capture the some of the soviet lands.)
But they were crushed..
For the comparision:
The 36 000 of Japanes were enough to crush the 85 000 British garrison in the febriary of 1942 in the Battle of Singapore.
And only 75 000 of Japanes were enought to capture the whole Bataan with its 150 000 garrison at that time.

[Chevan]

This could explaine the increased the quantity of Kwantung Army befor the august of 1945.

http://volk59.narod.ru/Manchuria.htm
In spite of the efforts of the Japanese to concentrate as much as possible troops on the islands strictly of empire, and also in China south of Manchuria, Japanese command paid attention to Manchurian direction, especially after during April 1945 the Soviet Union officially declared, that the Soviet-Japanese pact about the neutrality more was not urgent.
For this very reason from the 9 infantry divisions remaining themselves in Manchuria at the end 1944 the Japanese to August 1945 unrolled 24 divisions and 10 brigades.
True, for organizing of new divisions and brigades the Japanese could use only the untrained draftees of low-order ages and limited suitable elder ages - such in summer of 1945 was called 250 thousand, which comprised more than half of personnel of Kwantung army.
Don't forget that the mostly teenages were in Japane Home Defence Army also at that time.

[Chevan]

On Glantz’s figures, we get a maximum figure for the Kwantung Army plus auxiliaries of 927,000 deployed against the Soviets, so:

927,000
- 84,000 killed (including unknown number of civilians and reservists)

843,000 (+ or - unknown number of civilians and reservists)
- 594,000 POW

249,000 unaccounted for.

The 249,000 unaccounted for might be troops who avoided capture; troops who went over to the Nationalist or communist Chinese forces; or troops who never existed in the first place. Or a combination of all of the above.


Oh Look at that Egorka ;)
Our friend Rising Sun has bagan to like a mathematic ;)
Yes you right Rising Sun.
Well indeed the 249 000 unaccounted are proved nothing.
This could be the simple teenagers form native population ( Cinese, korean and mongolian) who were send at the their houses after the war as it was for the kid-members of FolKsturm after the battle of Berlin.
Or you right this could be the part of former Kwantung soldiers who avoided the encirclement and went out of the soviet zone of occupation.

[Firefly]

In what previous battles were the Japanese forces in China destroyed?

[Chevan]

They were not destroed , they were particulary redused durin the Pacific war.
But then were made up till the august 1945 mostly from of teenagers.

[Egorka]

Guys! Wait for me! I also want to be part of the quarrel! :D

Ok, now seriously. Since I was the one who brought this topic up I want you to listen to my supposition.

1. I did not mean to claim that Kwantung army was all that elite and that they all were skilled like paratroopers. My first claim is that they were one of the best REMAINING land forces available to Japan in August 1945. It is true that USA/UK inflicted huge damage to IJA and many of the best soldiers and officers were lost. But it is "normal" after so many of fighting. Germany had exactly the same situation. For that matter USSR too.

2. When we talk about strength of Kwantung army we should always remember to what TASK this force was assigned. The expected task of Kwantung army in 1941 could only be attack - therefore it was supplied accordingly. In Sommer 1945 the task turned up side down to DEFEND against USSR attack.
We know that different military units perform differently in attack and defence. F.ex. the relative lack of tanks was not as big obstacle for japanese in defense as in the offense. So my claim is that Japanese had very reasonable resources for DEFENSIVE action. The size of the japanese forces was very reasonable for leading defensive war.

3. Japanese COULD stop the advance of soviet army IF they planed and placed their forces accordingly. F.ex. they could relativly easily with very small force complitely block the tank armies of the Trans-Balkal Front when they had to cross Grand Khinghan Mountains to secure positions on the central Manchurian plain. The Japanese did not do it because they were GROSSLY DECEIVED by the Soviets. The similar situation was in Normandy, as some of the best German troops were concentrated at Pa-De-Cale.

4. This DECEPTION was done across all 3 "dimentions": TIME of the attack, PLACE of the attack and the AMOUNT OF FORCES in the attack. Almost like in Normandy.

5. Japanese Suprime comand WAS SURE that the soviet attack will be repulsed successfuly! This means they we sure that the soviet attack would at least stall. Why did they need it to stall? See next point.

6. After stalling of the initial Soviet attack when the front line stabilises, Japanese planned to use BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPON ON MASS SCALE. They had very large quantities of this wepons produced, stored and ready for deployment in Manchuria. The special porcelan shells were armed with the viruses and could easily be used IF there was a stable front line.

7. On top of that the terrain across which the RKKA had to move was UNTRAFFICABLE. In the west: "They believed the western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains."
In the North and East: "In addition to the two major river crossings, 150 kilometers of spurs descending from the Lesser Khinghan Mountains and vast stretches of marshland on both sides of the rivers were significant obstacles." and "Under the worst weather conditions possible, the Russians initiated an offensive under the cover of darkness approaching from areas thought impassable by large troop ormations."
So please no la-la-la about an easy terrrain. The terrain was the BEST FOR DEFENCE and WORST FOR OFFENSE!

8. And this one is about bushido code that applied to the japanese Kwantung army soldiers just as much as for other units! They were following it! And the reason why they did not kill them self is well explained in the link on GlobalSecurity.org. The one you Rising Sun provided.

The rough conclusion: The Kwantung army was crushed because of (most important first):
- DESEPTION and CAMUFLAGE
- SUPERIOR STRATEGY and TACKTICS
- SUPERIOR FORCES

and NOT because of WEAKNESS and EASY TERRAIN FOR RUSSIANS.

Loving you even more! ;)

[Rising Sun*]

Guys! Wait for me! I also want to be part of the quarrel! :D

Ok, now seriously. Since I was the one who brought this topic up I want you to listen to my supposition.

1. I did not mean to claim that Kwantung army was all that elite and that they all were skilled like paratroopers. My first claim is that they were one of the best REMAINING land forces available to Japan in August 1945. It is true that USA/UK inflicted huge damage to IJA and many of the best soldiers and officers were lost. But it is "normal" after so many of fighting. Germany had exactly the same situation. For that matter USSR too.

2. When we talk about strength of Kwantung army we should always remember to what TASK this force was assigned. The expected task of Kwantung army in 1941 could only be attack - therefore it was supplied accordingly. In Sommer 1945 the task turned up side down to DEFEND against USSR attack.
We know that different military units perform differently in attack and defence. F.ex. the relative lack of tanks was not as big obstacle for japanese in defense as in the offense. So my claim is that Japanese had very reasonable resources for DEFENSIVE action. The size of the japanese forces was very reasonable for leading defensive war.

3. Japanese COULD stop the advance of soviet army IF they planed and placed their forces accordingly. F.ex. they could relativly easily with very small force complitely block the tank armies of the Trans-Balkal Front when they had to cross Grand Khinghan Mountains to secure positions on the central Manchurian plain. The Japanese did not do it because they were GROSSLY DECEIVED by the Soviets. The similar situation was in Normandy, as some of the best German troops were concentrated at Pa-De-Cale.

4. This DECEPTION was done across all 3 "dimentions": TIME of the attack, PLACE of the attack and the AMOUNT OF FORCES in the attack. Almost like in Normandy.

5. Japanese Suprime comand WAS SURE that the soviet attack will be repulsed successfuly! This means they we sure that the soviet attack would at least stall. Why did they need it to stall? See next point.

6. After stalling of the initial Soviet attack when the front line stabilises, Japanese planned to use BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPON ON MASS SCALE. They had very large quantities of this wepons produced, stored and ready for deployment in Manchuria. The special porcelan shells were armed with the viruses and could easily be used IF there was a stable front line.

7. On top of that the terrain across which the RKKA had to move was UNTRAFFICABLE. In the west: "They believed the western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains."
In the North and East: "In addition to the two major river crossings, 150 kilometers of spurs descending from the Lesser Khinghan Mountains and vast stretches of marshland on both sides of the rivers were significant obstacles." and "Under the worst weather conditions possible, the Russians initiated an offensive under the cover of darkness approaching from areas thought impassable by large troop ormations."
So please no la-la-la about an easy terrrain. The terrain was the BEST FOR DEFENCE and WORST FOR OFFENSE!

8. And this one is about bushido code that applied to the japanese Kwantung army soldiers just as much as for other units! They were following it! And the reason why they did not kill them self is well explained in the link on GlobalSecurity.org. The one you Rising Sun provided.

The rough conclusion: The Kwantung army was crushed because of (most important first):
- DESEPTION and CAMUFLAGE
- SUPERIOR STRATEGY and TACKTICS
- SUPERIOR FORCES

and NOT because of WEAKNESS and EASY TERRAIN FOR RUSSIANS.

Loving you even more! ;)

Egorka,

An intelligent and comprehensive analysis, although I don't agree with it as a full explanation.

I think that, cutting through all the detail about how many troops were there, terrain and so on, the main factors that caused defeat were that the Japanese were caught in the process of moving their troops to better defensive positions; the Japanese high command was timid and confused; and most of all the Soviets were better troops; better equipped; and better led.

Glantz notes that because of various deficiencies in equipment, training and leadership the Japanese considered none of the largely new Kwantung divisions facing the Soviets combat ready and some divisions only 15% ready. (p.33) Against them was a highly professional Soviet force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war, leading some of the best Soviet units. "The Manchurian operation qualified as a post-graduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in Western Russia in 1941."(p.184)

I've found a copy of Glantz's book here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp but it seems to lack the page references in the hard copy I've been using.

[Rising Sun*]

Oh common, the 2 million Japanese Defence Army were mostly from a worker from a reserve and teenagers - this could not be the "elite" (and army at a common sence).

I didn’t say that the JDA were elite troops. It was mentioned in addition to the other catergories I mentioned.

I rather think the so called "elite" Japane army was fully distructed in the previous battles.

Thus reinforcing my point that the Kwantung Army facing the Soviets in 1945 were not first rate troops.

That's right the Manchuria with occupated Korea and China was the last resource and breadbasket for the Japane.
Therefore its defence was critacally improtaint for the defence of Japane in the strategic-war sence.

Maybe not. See my posts # 96 and 97

Oh tell us the "definition" of Japane elite division in Kwantung Army please.
Was this the division that killed a most of Chinese guerrilas and raped a a most of women?
Becouse as it told mst savoy6 large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas

In August 1945 there were no elite divisions in the Kwantung Army.
In 1941 there were quite a few. Where do you think the troops used in the southward advance came from?

By August 1945 the Kwantung Army was focused on the Soviet threat. The Central China Expeditionary Army was organised more as an anti-guerilla army.

Oh yea, it was found reduced half ;)

Yes, it was. As is clear from the context, this refers to the end of 1944. Forces were built up again in 1945.

According to the russian military archives datas in the august the Kwantung army had:

Not bad "reducing" after 1942 up to the 1 320 000 peoples.:)

Those figures probably refer to full strength units in the Japanese OOB. As Glantz notes some divisions with nominal strengths of 20,000 had as many as 18,000 men; most had 12,000 to 16,000; and some had as few as 9,000. (p.26)

But this 'manpower" was able to bring the 35-30% of casulites for the US trops in the battles for Okinawa and Ivo Jima being the severely deficient in aircraft,engineer support, communications and armor. And without the Any tanks.

There is no comparison between those Pacific campaigns and Manchuria. The battle areas were compact at Okinawa and Iwo Jima compared with Manchuria; the IJA was contained on islands with no room to manouevre; the defensive strategy on both islands was to dig in and make the attacker pay dearly for every inch of ground, which is exactly what happened, and exactly what didn’t happen in Manchuria as shown by the widths of front, depths of advance, and rates of advance shown in Appendix 3 here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp.

Yes those 'few" (about 1000) tanks were too weak agains T-34 but it was a enought seriouse when crashed US troops in Birma and Britains in Malaya.Right?
Becouse the Japanes easy tanks was a enough good in the jungles.

This is a meaningless comparison. Japanese tanks generally weren’t decisive in the Pacific jungles; generally they were facing infantry without armour or with limited armour; and they never faced anything like the number and quality of tanks the Russians employed in Manchuria.

Aha? all the "elite" divisions.;)
Have you a exact number , quantity and names of those divisions to check how much they were "elite"?

I have the exact number, 16, and names of the those divisions.

Four divisions, 11th, 25th & 57th Infantry and 1st Armoured, were removed from the Kwantung Army to the home Islands in March 1945, being the last of 16 first line divisions taken from the Kwantung Army in 13 months. Edward J Drea, Missing Intentions, Japanese Intelligence and the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria, Military Affairs, 1984, p.66, at p.67 & n.17 Drea records the previous units as:


July 1944

1st and 8th Infantry Divisions and 2nd Armoured Division to Luzon.
24th Infantry Division to Okinawa

The 24th, a [heavy] triangular division with three regiments, three battalions per regiment, and three companies per battalion, was organized and equipped for strategic warfare against mechanized and well-armed Russian forces of the sort the IJA clashed with at Nomonhan in 1939. It had abundant combat support units, with artillery, engineer, transport, and reconnaissance elements organic at regimental level. Each regiment, battalion, and company had its own artillery unit, and each battalion also boasted an antitank gun company. The transport regiment included three motor transport companies. In a word, the 24th, with its firepower, mobility, specialization, and consistent triangular structure was fashioned for large-scale operations with another modern army. http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Huber/Huber.asp#14

June 1944

9th Infantry Division to Okinawa
28th Infantry Division to Miyakojima
68th Infantry Division to Taiwan (subsequently Leyte)

February 1944

29th Infantry Division to Guam
14th Infantry Division to Palau

Unspecified dates 1944 - 45

12th, 23rd, & 71st Infantry Divisions to Philippines and Taiwan


Oh really?
The LAST tank divisions were removed into Japane in march but ... they forgot its 1000 tanks in Manchjuria ,that were suddenly found in august.

What is the basis for this figure, apart from Soviet estimates?

Nevertheless the 1/4 part of its "shadow" made a nightmare for the USA marines in the Okinawa and Ivo Jima.

As they would for Russian troops in exactly the same situation.

You know Risin Sun i have to conclude you are capable to find the "sorces" that contradicts at the your previous posts.

I don’t know what this is supposed to mean. Is there something wrong with continuing to educate myself? I don’t have a problem in changing my view when evidence is produced to alter it, nor do I confine myself just to sources to prove a particular point of view.

I’m interested in learning more about the history of the war, not just in trying to prove that Russia always fought the biggest, baddest, meanest enemy and virtually won the war all by itself while the other Allies just fiddled about on the edges.

[Chevan]

I didn’t say that the JDA were elite troops. It was mentioned in addition to the other catergories I mentioned.

JDA was not troops in the common sence. It was like a germans folksturm - rather voluntares than the experienced troops.

Thus reinforcing my point that the Kwantung Army facing the Soviets in 1945 were not first rate troops.

No , this is just proves the mistaken points of savoy6 that the Kwantung Artmy fought ONLY with China's guerrials.
In this perspective your point about "elite"divisions that were sended to the home islands is also controversials.
How could they be "elite' if whole their work was to kill the civilians and patrtisans?

In August 1945 there were no elite divisions in the Kwantung Army.
In 1941 there were quite a few. Where do you think the troops used in the southward advance came from?

i.e. do you wish to say that all Japanes about 5 million army was given from the Manchguria in the 1941?;)


Those figures probably refer to full strength units in the Japanese OOB. As Glantz notes some divisions with nominal strengths of 20,000 had as many as 18,000 men; most had 12,000 to 16,000; and some had as few as 9,000.
Indeed the Glats in his work
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp
is not discussed the soviet datas.
He wrote
Composition of Forces Facing the Soviets in the Far East
Personnel: 1,217,000
Weapons:
Tanks 1,155
Guns 5,360
Aircraft 1,800
Forces:
Japanese 993,000 (Manchguria 773 000 + Korea,Sachhalin, Kuril islands garrison 280 000)+ Auxiliary 214,000 (170 000 of Manchikko Army +44 000 of inner Mongolia forces) = 1 217 000 of mens.

There is no comparison between those Pacific campaigns and Manchuria. The battle areas were compact at Okinawa and Iwo Jima compared with Manchuria; the IJA was contained on islands with no room to manouevre; the defensive strategy on both islands was to dig in and make the attacker pay dearly for every inch of ground, which is exactly what happened, and exactly what didn’t happen in Manchuria as shown by the widths of front, depths of advance, and rates of advance shown in Appendix 3 here http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/glantz3/glantz3.asp.

Well conditions were the same - the total shortage of everything by the Japanese and the absolut war superiority of allies and Soviet.
True, the tactic was a different - the allies used the its airforces and the ship artillery, the soviets used its power armoured armies and artillery.
But the infantcry of allies and soviet were in the simular situation - they faced the suicidal troops, that was ready to die.
BTW the Red Army has a casulates about 12 000 of perished - at lest it could be conpared with casulated of Americans in the battle of Okinawa.

This is a meaningless comparison. Japanese tanks generally weren’t decisive in the Pacific jungles; generally they were facing infantry without armour or with limited armour; and they never faced anything like the number and quality of tanks the Russians employed in Manchuria.

Perhaps their tanks were not so good las the T-34, but the the japanes easy tanks were much better as the armoured car role and agains the infantry. So even having the 57-mm and mashin-gun gun they could be the problem for the soviet infantry and transport escorts.

I have the exact number, 16, and names of the those divisions.

But you still did not say what does mean the "elite " divisions for the Kwantung Army ;)
And tell me please what the was the reason to call for instance the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions from your list was the more "elite" then the 24 other divisions that faced the Red Army in august?

What is the basis for this figure, apart from Soviet estimates?

And do you have another datas exept the soviet estimetes?
BTW David Glantz is fully agreed with it.
Moreover this figure give us the Wiki also.
So does it mean the Wiki is soviet too?

As they would for Russian troops in exactly the same situation.

That's absolutly rigt
The Red Army faced the simular fanatics in the Mahcguria and only the powerfull and quick soviet offensive has halped the achive the success.

I don’t know what this is supposed to mean. Is there something wrong with continuing to educate myself? I don’t have a problem in changing my view when evidence is produced to alter it, nor do I confine myself just to sources to prove a particular point of view.

I’m interested in learning more about the history of the war, not just in trying to prove that Russia always fought the biggest, baddest, meanest enemy and virtually won the war all by itself while the other Allies just fiddled about on the edges.

I've told you where you get a controversial points - For the first time you have proved the Kwantung army was a too weak thet was busy ONLY in the fight with guerrilas - then you suddenly called a 16 divisions like "elite". Where is the logic my Friend?
The login in the emotions i think.
You tryed to prove the Kwantung Army was the weaker then the other Japanes troops- but here is a some of intersting contraductions in here.
How do you think whey the Ruswelt wished so much the joing the Red Amry to the fight with Japane in the Mancguria if the Kwatung Army were the "pitful shadow of itself" as you wrote.
Why did need to sucriface the China to the Stalin. (becouse the allies sertainly knew - Stalin would get the China for himself). If the Kwantung Army was a so weak why the American marines after the capturing Okinawa ( where they fought with "real" enemy) don't wish to crush the "the pitfull rest" 1 million og Japanes in the Manchguria and China.?;)

[Rising Sun*]

No , this is just proves the mistaken points of savoy6 that the Kwantung Artmy fought ONLY with China's guerrials.
In this perspective your point about "elite"divisions that were sended to the home islands is also controversials.
How could they be "elite' if whole their work was to kill the civilians and patrtisans?

No idea. I didn’t say anything about the Kwantung Army killing civilians and partisans. At post #100 you said “The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the 1938-39 at the borders conflicts like in the like of Halkin-Gol” The Japanese can’t be both the most experienced when fighting the Soviets and no good for much else the rest of the time.

do you wish to say that all Japanes about 5 million army was given from the Manchguria in the 1941?

No. From memory they took 12 of about 50 to 55 divisions from China.


No.
Indeed the Glats in his work
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/car...z3/glantz3.asp
is not discussed the soviet datas.

Yes.

See the notes to Table 1, which is based on Soviet sources.

You’re including troops outside Manchuria in South Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.

Well conditions were the same - the total shortage of everything by the Japanese and the absolut war superiority of allies and Soviet.

No way. The Japanese didn’t have a total shortage of everything at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, otherwise they wouldn’t have been so hard to defeat.

True, the tactic was a different - the allies used the its airforces and the ship artillery, the soviets used its power armoured armies and artillery.

No comparison. For a start, the Pacific campaign involved major amphibious assaults and associated naval battles. The USN as gun platforms were subjected to kamikaze air attacks that didn’t occur in Manchuria, because the Soviets had total air superiority. The USN got mauled at Okinawa in ways that land based artillery never would have.

But the infantcry of allies and soviet were in the simular situation - they faced the suicidal troops, that was ready to die.

No. Less than 10% of Japanese troops facing the Russians in Manchuria died. On your figure of 1,217, it was only 7% of Japanese troops. On Okinawa about 90% of the Japanese troops died. The same at Iwo Jima. Which brings me back to the point that no matter how much you and Egorka want to believe it, the troops fighting in the Pacific were much more determined to fight to the death than those in Manchuria. About 9 to 13 times more determined.

BTW the Red Army has a casulates about 12 000 of perished - at lest it could be conpared with casulated of Americans in the battle of Okinawa.

No way. Work out casualties as percentages of total Soviet and American forces in each campaign and you’ll see just how little similarity there is.

But you still did not say what does mean the "elite " divisions for the Kwantung Army.

No, and I’m not going to. You wanted numbers and names so you could check how elite they were. I’ve given you the information. If you want to dispute whether they were elite, first line, experienced, combat ready, trained, untrained or simply non-existent, you do the research.

And tell me please what the was the reason to call for instance the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions from your list was the more "elite" then the 24 other divisions that faced the Red Army in august?

Because, if you’ve been following the posts, you will know that the best divisions were pulled out of the Kwantung Army before August and what was left wasn’t very good or even combat ready. When you've researched the history of the long-established units taken from Manchuria and those that were raised rapidly from the remnants of other units and reservists and unfit men to replace them, you'll see the difference.

And do you have another datas exept the soviet estimetes?
BTW David Glantz is fully agreed with it.

Not with the figures you’ve presented of 1,217,000. He says 927,000.

Moreover this figure give us the Wiki also.

In that case it must be right, given Wiki’s great reputation for accuracy.

So does it mean the Wiki is soviet too?

No. Just that it’s as wrong as the figures you’ve been using.

That's absolutly rigt
The Red Army faced the simular fanatics in the Mahcguria and only the powerfull and quick soviet offensive has halped the achive the success.

You’re flogging a dead horse.

I've told you where you get a controversial points - For the first time you have proved the Kwantung army was a too weak thet was busy ONLY in the fight with guerrilas - then you suddenly called a 16 divisions like "elite". Where is the logic my Friend?

Logic? I never said a thing about the Kwantung Army fighting only guerillas, or anything to do with guerillas. You said it had the most experienced Japanese troops in 1938-39. You have the Kwantung Army in August 1945 being strong, when it's fighting the Soviets who always fight only the biggest and best of everything, and weak because it never had any elite units and was good only for killing civilians, at the same time.

The login in the emotions i think.

Not here, it’s not.

You tryed to prove the Kwantung Army was the weaker then the other Japanes troops- but here is a some of intersting contraductions in here.
How do you think whey the Ruswelt wished so much the joing the Red Amry to the fight with Japane in the Mancguria if the Kwatung Army were the "pitful shadow of itself" as you wrote.

I imagine because they were enemy troops and the conventional way of fighting a war is to defeat the enemy, without regard to their quality. I didn't see the USSR holding back when Germany was on its knees in 1945 and being defended by untrained old men and children.

Why did need to sucriface the China to the Stalin. (becouse the allies sertainly knew - Stalin would get the China for himself). If the Kwantung Army was a so weak why the American marines after the capturing Okinawa ( where they fought with "real" enemy) don't wish to crush the "the pitfull rest" 1 million og Japanes in the Manchguria and China.?

Because they left that to the Russians who, for all their marvellous military brilliance and world beating military, naval and air power, confined themselves to fighting essentially a land war on one front on one continent while the other Allies fought on land and sea all over the planet for the preceding four to six years, doing practically nothing of military value to the war effort but thereby enabling the Russians to get to the point in August 1945 where they could defeat the biggest and best Army Japan ever put in the field with the best Japanese equipment and limitless resources of Japan at the end of an exhausting war so that the Kwantung Army could be beaten by a platoon of Heroes of the Soviet Union using nothing but broomsticks and nail files produced in the USSR on the most advanced production lines in the world by workers fed from the boundless agricultural productive capacity of the USSR which didn’t need Lend Lease, support from the other Allies, or anything else to beat Germany and Japan single-handed, and frighten Italy into surrendering in the process.

I really don’t see any point to responding to further posts in the same vein. Like many other issues involving the USSR, this has just become a pointless and tedious pissing contest with no prospect of resolution upon any terms other than agreeing that the USSR won WWII and fought all the important battles while the other Allies did little more than cheer it on from the sidelines.

[Egorka]

Rising Sun:
No. Less than 10% of Japanese troops facing the Russians in Manchuria died. On your figure of 1,217, it was only 7% of Japanese troops. On Okinawa about 90% of the Japanese troops died. The same at Iwo Jima. Which brings me back to the point that no matter how much you and Egorka want to believe it, the troops fighting in the Pacific were much more determined to fight to the death than those in Manchuria. About 9 to 13 times more determined.

You amase me! I know there is nothing I could say that you would find unbiased. There is nothing I could tell you from Soviet sources that you would not deny. But here is a quote from the paper you reffered to. And it was writen in 1986 - there is no way it is prosoviet!


extract from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
The Soviet Army Offensive: Manchuria, 1945
CSC 1986

The continued combat impaired already poor
communications between Japanese headquarters and field
units. This delayed tramsmissions of cease-fire orders on
17 August 1945, during which time the Kwangtung Army was in
preparation for a counter attack in the southeast.
This atmosphere of confusion and anxiety by the Japanese was
intensified by the Japanese warrior code of Bushido (fight
to the death). Existing Army/Navy regulations expressly
prohibited servicemen from surrendering. Surrender was
considered shameful and dishonorable, subject to court-
martial and execution. To absolve the traditional stigma of
surrender and remove legal liabilities, IGHQ published an
order which stated that the nation and government of Japan
would not regard servicemen "delivered" to the enemy as a
result of the cease-fire order as having surrendered under
the old law. This had a tremendous psychological effect on
the Japanese soldiers... with no dishonor there was no reason
to commit suicide. On 19 August, the Kwangtung Army
transmitted this order to its field commands and the
Japanese capitulated everywhere.


Was there a similar "order which stated that the nation and government of Japan would not regard servicemen "delivered" to the enemy" issued during the last stages of battle for Okinava, for example?

[Egorka]

Rising Sun:
I really don’t see any point to responding to further posts in the same vein. Like many other issues involving the USSR, this has just become a pointless and tedious pissing contest with no prospect of resolution upon any terms other than agreeing that the USSR won WWII and fought all the important battles while the other Allies did little more than cheer it on from the sidelines.

So there is no way one can challenge a common Wester perseption without being accused of pulling blanket?
It is very sad that there is no intent to listen what so ever... Plus there is constant accusation of glorifying my country above others.
I understand that you are probably not accustomed to hear a determined opposition that would present soviet action in favorable light, but what is point of having this forum then?

[Rising Sun*]

I understand that you are probably not accustomed to hear a determined opposition that would present soviet action in favorable light,

I can assure you that I have become rapidly accustomed to it on this forum, which mimics Soviet chauvinism and revisionism on some other military forums.

The purpose of historical discussion is not to present past events in a way favourable to a given nation. That is just chauvinistic history at best and propaganda at worst.

I don’t have any difficulty in examining issues from different perspectives, or in acknowledging the Soviet contribution, such as at post # 79.

At posts #96 and 97 I volunteered an important and different assessment of the significance of the Russian attack in Manchuria in Japan’s strategic assessment of how to end the war on the best terms for Japan. Curiously, it has been completely ignored.

Perhaps because it takes away the glory of the Russian attack in crushing the massive, suicidal, magnificently equipped Japanese forces facing the Russians in August 1945, following the magical transformation of the Japanese forces from being good only for murdering civilians, following their magical transformation from being the best troops Japan had when Russia faced them in 1939.

Perhaps because it doesn’t come from the Russian archives which are the source of all truth and knowledge about WWII.

About all it did apparently was stimulate Chevan to say that I’m capable of finding sources that contradict my previous posts.

Chevan seems to find that remarkable, and worthy of comment. I don’t. The difference is that I’m trying to get a balanced perspective, not present Soviet or any other action in a favourable light. It’s the difference between an open and a closed mind.

but what is point of having this forum then?

To discuss and learn about the history of WWII in an attempt to get a balanced perspective on the myriad factors and events involved.

Not to engage in a chauvinistic contest to put one nation above another.

That’s how wars start.

[Chevan]

Come on , Risin Sun.
I have no intentions to insult you or to show the disrespect at the your knowlages.
But i think we are going around in here.
No idea. I didn’t say anything about the Kwantung Army killing civilians and partisans. At post #100 you said “The Soviet army WAS the first who faced the most experienced Japanes troops in the