General Douglas MacArthur [Archive]

temujin77

07-03-2005, 12:03 PM

He was a 5 Star General not a politican.

I beg to differ. He was very much so a politician. Every move he had done in the Pacific Campaign were politically motivated. Some of them include:

1. Did you know he was working for a presidential nomination until the wrong kind of people (the extreme-right reactionaries) showed support for him?

2. Wading ashore at Leyte. There was absolutely no need for him to wade ashore at Leyte, except he knew he had a photographer on hand, so he chose to do so for the publicity.

3. The complete censorship of everything in his theater. All words about MacArthur must be good news, otherwise they are censored. All credits for victories went for MacArthur instead of the respective field commanders.

4. As SCAP, he brilliantly fought off the pressure to try Hirohito as a war prisoner, allowing him to occupy Japan with nearly total Japanese support.

5. Did you know he wrote just about all of the Japanese constitution?

There were too many incidences. Some perhaps out of his megalomania alone, but most are politically charged. As controversial as he was, he was doubtlessly a great politician in his own right.

If you are interested in MacArthur, I strongly recommend reading William Manchester's American Caesar.

LargeBrew

07-03-2005, 11:23 PM

McArtur may well have been a qusi megolomaniac with an ego the size of a house but Japan in particular owes him a debt in enabeling it to become a democratic nation and go on to being the techionological power house of the last 40 odd years.

Sturmtruppen

07-04-2005, 02:23 PM

mac arthur was great!,*my favourite american general (*vs the general patton,another military genius).

temujin77

07-04-2005, 09:42 PM

mac arthur was great!,*my favourite american general (*vs the general patton,another military genius).

I think you have chosen to idolize two of the most eccentric American generals in history :)

Jamminjustin

08-02-2005, 10:54 PM

mac arthur was great!,*my favourite american general (*vs the general patton,another military genius).

RIGHT ON MAN! I back u 110% on that statement :D

IronFist

11-22-2005, 01:26 AM

Are you sure you agree or just agree with the fame that both those generals recieve get even today. There are a lot more unknown commaders that did more but were never as praised as those two.

Twitch1

11-22-2005, 03:11 PM

In only my personal opinion Mac performed poorly when the chips were down and only later somewhat vindicated himself when the tide had turned and he had overwhelming superiority. :roll:

Gen. Sandworm

11-22-2005, 06:01 PM

In only my personal opinion Mac performed poorly when the chips were down and only later somewhat vindicated himself when the tide had turned and he had overwhelming superiority. :roll:

Well I might agree with that. But you have to admit that he was good. The invasion of Inchon during the Korean war was absolutely brillant and saved the S. Koreans asses

Bangor Fire 35

12-02-2005, 12:20 PM

wasn't there debate about him knowing of the attack on the phillipens and did nothing about it?

Nickdfresh

03-06-2006, 11:01 PM

MacArthur was overrated, and often took credit for his subordinates work...

Timbo in Oz

04-29-2006, 03:48 AM

First off, no Australian of my generation is anything other than grateful for the efforts in the pacific war by the USA.

In my reading of it, I wouldn't give the US Army's ground forces much of the credit, until the return to the Philippines.

A political general, and a hubris infected megalomaniac? You betcha arse. Everything said on this front in this thread above is true.

He may have been a brave man in ww1, but there is almost no evidence that he was in wwII. And he couldn't obey orders. The most valuable thing he ever did was to decide on the Garand.

Everything that came out of his HQ, from 1942 on, was predicated on the next Presidential election!

He was known to the Australian troops as 'Dugout Doug', and was renowned for avoiding the front line. And thus he ended up not having a clue about the realities, horrificly so in PNG.

The US's soldiers, and leadership, and thus Mac, did NOT perform well in PNG, not at all. Took them a long time to get any better.

G'warn read up about it. Might do you good.

Buna, Gona and Lae, ?? look them up!!

where the already exhausted Aussie soldiers, with Battalions below coy strength - who had fought their way across PNG via the Owen Stanley's, and didn't land - like the fresh Yank division's - within a few miles of the places above, did most of the fighting. ALLIED victories? I don't think so. Apart from logistics, that is.

The vast majority of the fighting on the ground in PNG - right to the end - was carried out by the Australians, news which still hasn't reached the USA it seems.

"allied troops" being the required newsspeak* from Mac's hq.

It was Australian infantry that broke the 'invincible' Japanese soldiery. NOT Dougie, or yr GI's, and well before Guadalcanal even began. Do try to get your heads around this.

One of the things that most puzzle me, and many other Aussies, is this adulation of Mac and Patton, two of the least admirable human beings I've ever studied, and only one of them a truly successful general.

Warmest,

Timbo

Firefly

04-29-2006, 12:02 PM

Well Timbo, I am inclined to agree with the gist of your statement. There were many political Commanders, I remamber reading about Mark Clark in Italy and any news had to be preceeded by the words 'With General Clarks's Army' or something like it.

One of the things that most puzzle me, and many other Aussies, is this adulation of Mac and Patton, two of the least admirable human beings I've ever studied, and only one of them a truly successful general.

Which one though?

Timbo in Oz

09-21-2006, 09:32 AM

Patton, who continued to perform well, in WWII!

Nickdfresh

09-21-2006, 04:03 PM

...
It was Australian infantry that broke the 'invincible' Japanese soldiery. NOT Dougie, or yr GI's, and well before Guadalcanal even began. Do try to get your heads around this.

One of the things that most puzzle me, and many other Aussies, is this adulation of Mac and Patton, two of the least admirable human beings I've ever studied, and only one of them a truly successful general.

Warmest,

Timbo

I have a bit of a problem with these statements. You make it sound as though the Australian Army somehow single-handedly broke, or exposed the weaknesses of, the Imperial Japanese Army. And BTW, I have nothing but the utmost respect for the Australian soldier, as being amongst the toughest, fiercest Allied troops of WWII. But, there were U.S. Marines at Wake Island as well as U.S. soldiers in the Philippines/Bataan that fought the Japanese to a standstill and inflicted heavy casualties, although in both cases they surrendered; but they only did so only after blooding the Japanese infantry and exposing them for what they were: fanatically brave and clever on the one hand, but also as "dangerous amateurs" --using outmoded offensive tactics and weapons, which made them terribly ineffective against a modern army in an open area permitting armored maneuver, or on the attack against fortified positions. The U.S. and Filipino Armies surrendered after they were cut off and exhausted most of their food and ammo. If the U.S. Navy had decided to take a very big risk, and had successfully relieved them by breaking the Japanese fleet blockade, they could have held out indefinitely.

But in fact, the Marines on Wake Island only surrendered AFTER THEY WERE WINNING and had successfully repelled the Japanese landings in one of the few times in history the defender repelled an amphibious assault! The Marine commander, in a horrendous mistake, believed his forces had been overrun because his communications were cut, and all he could see from his CP was Japanese flags flying all over the island (and a lot of Japanese corpes, which he couldn't see).

And I'm no fan of Gen. MacArthur. He was way overrated, pompous, imperious, schemingly political, and treated his immediate subordinates as if they were his personal pets. But, I'm not sure what you mean as far as Patton. I haven't read on him extensively, but I've never heard anything too negative, other than he was very stubborn and old fashioned in a sense, despite being one of the few Allied generals to see the full potential of armor.

Rising Sun

01-31-2007, 08:41 AM

I beg to differ. He was very much so a politician. Every move he had done in the Pacific Campaign were politically motivated. Some of them include:

1. Did you know he was working for a presidential nomination until the wrong kind of people (the extreme-right reactionaries) showed support for him?

And he realised he'd alienated, or risked alienating, some of his own support base by playing the reluctant candidate while trying to curry favour with his opponents in some of the most embarrassing correspondence ever written in the period.

2 Wading ashore at Leyte. There was absolutely no need for him to wade ashore at Leyte, except he knew he had a photographer on hand, so he chose to do so for the publicity.

He actually waded ashore twice, the first time having been missed by his spin doctors who realised the great photo opportunity and did it again, resulting in the famous picture.

3. The complete censorship of everything in his theater. All words about MacArthur must be good news, otherwise they are censored. All credits for victories went for MacArthur instead of the respective field commanders.

The best example of which is when he sent Gen. Eichelberger into the north Papuan campaign to rally the failed US troops at Buna and told Eichelberger to die there but if he won Mac would publish his name, as if this was some kind of immortal recognition of military skill. See Eichelberger's "Our Jungle Road to Tokyo". It shows how Mac valued publicity, but failed to understand that better men put no value in it.

4. As SCAP, he brilliantly fought off the pressure to try Hirohito as a war prisoner, allowing him to occupy Japan with nearly total Japanese support. I think you're agreeing with my understanding that this was a clever move, emanating from Mac's Asian experience and understanding, which enabled him to govern Japan when the alternative might have been ungovernable. The fact remains that Hirohito was a nasty littlle war criminal at the top of the tree but, like sundry others such as the Harbin crew he escaped what he deserved while others of lesser responsibility were tried.

If you are interested in MacArthur, I strongly recommend reading William Manchester's American Caesar.

Definitely. It gives the lie to many of the bad and good things said about Mac. I think Manchester, who fought in the Pacific and who recounted his own experiences in the semi-factual "Goodbye Darkness", is a pretty fair biographer of Mac but perhaps not the most objective or best informed on various details.

Rising Sun

01-31-2007, 10:03 AM

In my reading of it, I wouldn't give the US Army's ground forces much of the credit, until the return to the Philippines.

This ignores many great US ground force (I'm assuming 'ground force' includes USMC) successes from Guadalcanal to the various combined operations in PNG.

He may have been a brave man in ww1, but there is almost no evidence that he was in wwII.

There is a lot of evidence to the contrary. The man was a self-seeking, self-promoting, devious, lying skunk in many respects, but it is well-documented that, unlike many commanders of equal status, he went forward on a number of occasions in the SWPA campaign and exposed himself to enemy fire which he disregarded in the best traditions of leading from the front.

Everything that came out of his HQ, from 1942 on, was predicated on the next Presidential election!

I think you will find that most of it in that period was directed to establishing and consolidating his position as SWPA commander, with designs upon being appointed commander of everything west of California, trying to wrest control from the USN. The naked presidential political ambitions emerged later.

He was known to the Australian troops as 'Dugout Doug', and was renowned for avoiding the front line. And thus he ended up not having a clue about the realities, horrificly so in PNG.

See my earlier comment on his alleged cowardice. The 'Dugout Doug" title was actually conferred by US troops. As for lack of knowledge about the realities in PNG, he was right up there with his land commander, the Australian Gen Thomas Blamey. Neither of them had a clue about what their troops faced in PNG and both of them were political shits of the first order who could be relied upon to sacrifice their subordinate commanders to save their own skins. And both of whom did.

The US's soldiers, and leadership, and thus Mac, did NOT perform well in PNG, not at all. Took them a long time to get any better.

This is unfair to US troops in PNG. The biggest failure and biggest problem they faced was early on at Buna. The main problems there were poor training, poor equipment, poor supply, and poor leadership. The National Guard 32nd Division failed spectacularly at Buna for all those reasons, not because of any inherent deficiency in American men. They weren't any worse than the Australian 53rd Bn which failed on Kokoda. The main reason the Australian 39th Bn did so well on Kokoda is that its poorly trained ranks were reinforced with a good spread of battle-hardened 2nd AIF officers and NCO's who were the backbone of its ability and resistance. The 53rd Bn had a much lower rate of AIF reinforcements and performed much worse. The US National Guard 32nd Division, who were semi-trained militia like the 39th and 53rd Bns, didn't have any officers or NCO's with the same experience as the 39th Bn or the later AIF units which finally won Kokoda after getting a flogging by the Japanese. While the Australian 39th Bn performance on Kokoda is a great military feat (as is the Japanese advance), it is always ignored that Gen Eichelberger achieved an even greater feat in being put in command of the largely useless 32nd division (which is about ten times a bigger problem in size in rifle companies than a battalion like the 39th Bn and maybe a hundred or several hundred times bigger in overall issues) and, in the field in a very short time, converted some of them by outstanding leadership into a useful fighting force.

IIt was Australian infantry that broke the 'invincible' Japanese soldiery. NOT Dougie, or yr GI's, and well before Guadalcanal even began. Do try to get your heads around this.

Milne Bay was, as Field Marshal Slim noted, a huge morale booster after the run of Japanese victories as it was the first time that a Japanese landing force had landed, been defeated, and the survivors had been forced to evacuate, which is different to the first Wake Island event where the inferior US forces repulsed an attempted landing by some outstanding gunnery which discouraged the naval force from proceeding with the attempted landing.

Guadalcanal was actually raging while the Papuan campaign was running. It was fought by the USMC under POA American naval command rather than the Papuan fighting by, largely, Australian militia SWPA army command. Leaving aside the vigorous turf battles between Mac and Admiral King / Washington / Gen Marshall etc which expended more energy by Mac and his opponents than they ever devoted to fighting the Japanese, the fact is that the Americans actually won on Guadalcanal and were the first to expel the Japanese from a geographically distinct territory, although about a month after the primarily Australian victory at Buna - Gona -Sanananda in Papua.. Meanwhile the Australians, with various levels of American support, fought on in PNG for the rest of the war without ever expelling the Japanese. On the other hand, PNG tied up maybe 400,000 Japanese troops and killed maybe two thirds of them during the war, for which Mac and the other Americans should be bloody grateful they didn’t‘ have to confront on their way to Japan but they probably wouldn‘t have had to confront them as Japanese shipping tonnage went down dramatically during the war, not least because of US and Dutch submarine action which were based in Australia, so Japan wouldn't have been able to move them elsewhere ……….. in the end, it was all part of the same effort.

Rising Sun

01-31-2007, 10:38 AM

Chevan

01-31-2007, 01:42 PM

Just in case anyone thinks I think Mac was a great commander, I don't.

Anyone who knows the details of how he lost the Philippines knows what a loser he was.

He did well later, and seemed to do a lot better because of his great PR officers who knew how to meet his self-centred publicity demands, but when the chips were down in the Philippines when he had the chance and the duty to take steps which might, but probably would not have, altered the course of the war he was, frankly, no good.
I have to agree.
His flight from Corregidor and Bataan islands where he left its troops in march 1942 was a real cowardice. Later on politicals motives it was called like Roosevelt ordered him to leave the troops. After his "rmagic saving" the US troops was forced to capitulate in doth Islands.
The battle of Bataan where 150 000 US/Phillipinian troops losed the 75 000 Japanes army was the resault of MacArthur "command". The worst i think was the Battle for Corregidor where 12 000 US troops beeing in castle capitulated befor 2 000 japane garnison with some tanks.

Anothe "achivement" of MacArthur was in Korea where this madman asked the permission to use A-bomb agains nother koreans.
His personal ambitions and later the criticism of the U.S. Government became the reason for its ignominious resignation.

Cheers.

Rising Sun

02-01-2007, 04:15 AM

His flight from Corregidor and Bataan islands where he left its troops in march 1942 was a real cowardice. Later on politicals motives it was called like Roosevelt ordered him to leave the troops. After his "rmagic saving" the US troops was forced to capitulate in doth Islands.
The battle of Bataan where 150 000 US/Phillipinian troops losed the 75 000 Japanes army was the resault of MacArthur "command". The worst i think was the Battle for Corregidor where 12 000 US troops beeing in castle capitulated befor 2 000 japane garnison with some tanks.

In fairness to Mac, he resisted the orders to leave but eventually took the view that it was his duty to obey. He might have resisted harder if he didn't have the opportunity to save his wife and the son upon whom he doted.

Mac's worst failing during the Philippines campaign were failing to exercise command in the crucial early hours, and in particular failing to give the pre-determined orders to Gen Brereton to launch bomber raids on Formosa despite Brereton repeatedly seeking those orders. The end result was that on his own initiative Brereton ordered his planes into the air to avoid them being destroyed on the ground, but unfortunately the Japanese attacked while the bulk of his force was refuelling and destroyed half of his bomber force in the first strike. Given that these new planes had been sent to the Philippines to bolster its defences after the high command altered its original view that the Philippines wouldn't be defended beyond their original resources, this was a double loss. Mac duly rewarded Brereton by sacking him once they got to Australia, probably because he didn't want him around to remind people of Mac's gross failings.

An equally bad failing was the inexplicable positioning of about half his force's food supply in the path of the Japanese advance. The Japanese captured it and had extra food, while the defenders in Bataan and Corregidor were starving, which badly hampered their ability to fight and ensured the collapse of the defence earlier than it would otherwise have occurred.

An interesting sideline is that one of the reasons Tojo ordered Gen Homma to defeat the Fil / American forces rather than leave them bottled up and starving was because some American broadcasters and journalists were gloating publicly about the defence. Tojo couldn't abide the loss of face implicit in their gloating.

Another interesting sideline is that the Bataan death march was in many respects due to Japanese underestimates of the number of defenders and bad planning and administration by the Japanese rather than an overall policy of brutality, although that little creep Colonel Tsuji certainly did his best to implement a brutal policy and with a fair amount of success. http://www.philippine-scouts.org/Articles/TheCausesoftheBataanDeathMarchRevisited.doc

Nickdfresh

02-10-2007, 11:14 PM

...t was the first time that a Japanese landing force had landed, been defeated, and the survivors had been forced to evacuate, which is different to the first Wake Island event where the inferior US forces repulsed an attempted landing by some outstanding gunnery which discouraged the naval force from proceeding with the attempted landing.
...

You are incorrect. Japanese Marines did make landings on Wake Island, and they were savaged by the US Marine garrison. The first wave of Japanese Naval Infantry was almost completely wiped out. In fact, they raised the battle ensigns which confused the US commander (who had his communications cut) into thinking the Japanese were far more successful. He only realized most of the Japanese marines that raised the flags were dead after he decided to surrender.

Mac's worst failing during the Philippines campaign were failing to exercise command in the crucial early hours, and in particular failing to give the pre-determined orders to Gen Brereton to launch bomber raids on Formosa despite Brereton repeatedly seeking those orders. The end result was that on his own initiative Brereton ordered his planes into the air to avoid them being destroyed on the ground, but unfortunately the Japanese attacked while the bulk of his force was refuelling and destroyed half of his bomber force in the first strike. Given that these new planes had been sent to the Philippines to bolster its defences after the high command altered its original view that the Philippines wouldn't be defended beyond their original resources, this was a double loss. Mac duly rewarded Brereton by sacking him once they got to Australia, probably because he didn't want him around to remind people of Mac's gross failings.

Correct. But I believe MacArthur also failed to launch his fighters in the early, crucial hours after Pearl Harbor.

Laconia

02-10-2007, 11:36 PM

mac arthur was great!,*my favourite american general (*vs the general patton,another military genius).

McArthur should have been sacked for letting the Japanese destroy U.S. Airpower at Clark Field! He had a full 24 hrs notice after the attack on Pearl Harbor, yet he did not remove the planes to a safe airfield.

Nickdfresh

02-11-2007, 12:06 AM

Just in case anyone thinks I think Mac was a great commander, I don't.

Anyone who knows the details of how he lost the Philippines knows what a loser he was....

Not to mention Korea.

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 02:21 AM

You are incorrect. Japanese Marines did make landings on Wake Island, and they were savaged by the US Marine garrison. The first wave of Japanese Naval Infantry was almost completely wiped out. In fact, they raised the battle ensigns which confused the US commander (who had his communications cut) into thinking the Japanese were far more successful. He only realized most of the Japanese marines that raised the flags were dead after he decided to surrender.

If you re-read my post I think you'll find I'm correct. I was referring to the first attempted Japanese landing on 11 December 1941 which was repulsed by US land based guns damaging and driving off the invasion fleet before they landed. It was the only time that any Allied force managed that feat in WWII.

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 02:27 AM

Correct. But I believe MacArthur also failed to launch his fighters in the early, crucial hours after Pearl Harbor.

That is exactly the period I was talking about. MacArthur didn't get a second chance to lose half his air force (which at the time was the largest outside the continental USA) because he lost it on the first day of the war by going off the air.

Fighters weren't the issue. A substantial force of B-17's had been stationed there for the principal purpose of responding immediately if Japan went to war against America. Formosa was the intended target and bombers should have been launched within a few hours of Pearl Harbor.

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 02:37 AM

Not to mention Korea.

If Mac had been allowed to fight Korea the way he wanted, he might have won. He was opposed to the notion of a limited war, and was proved right in Korea and Vietnam. His view was that if you fight, you fight all-out to win. The politicians lost Korea, not Mac, just as they lost Vietnam. Admittedly there were wider international political considerations in each case, which only demonstrates the futility of "limited" wars, and which Mac ignored. Mac pushed his luck politically in Korea, but I think he was right so far as not fighting limited wars goes.

32Bravo

02-11-2007, 03:44 AM

Well, that seems to have exploded a few myths. Aching to see what you all will do to Patton and Montgomery. :)

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 04:54 AM

Well, that seems to have exploded a few myths. Aching to see what you all will do to Patton and Montgomery. :)

Monty's safe. He could be a petty little prick, like most famous generals, but he did his job well.

Patton is pretty safe too. He was a fighting general, and did his job well. The popular mind remembers him for that stupid slapping incident rather than the serious work he did in WWII, and more of which he would have done if not forced to be the commander of a diversionary army early in the advance from Normandy.

The differences between those two successful generals and Mac are that Mac had a spectacular failure in the Philippines which, courtesy of his carefully controlled censorship and personal publicity machine, was magically wiped from the popular mind and replaced by the "I shall return" rubbish. It never seems to enter the popular mind to ask why, if he was so bloody good, he didn't win while he was there the first time, having had years in command of the Philippines forces to prepare for the Japanese threat that planners had anticipated since the early twenties and having the best bomber force outside the US which was lost due to his early inaction and incompetence. That early inaction might well have been due to divided loyalties to his obligations as a US commander and his desires as a recent former Philippines supreme commander with strong links to the Philippines to refrain from action which might have dragged the Philippines unnecessarily into the war. Or maybe he was just in a blue funk, this being the first time he had had to deal with anything remotely on this scale.

During the SWPA Mac was, unlike his crucial early Philippines time, a very comptent commander. Contrary to the "Dugout Doug" slur he did not lack personal courage. To the consternation of his subordinates, he exposed himself unnecessarily to fire at various times in the SWPA campaign in the best traditions of leadership under fire. He probably genuinely cared for his men and did his best to make sure they were properly supplied. He also expected the best of his men, and would not accept less than consistently good performance from them or their commanders (none of which commanders ever got remotely near his lousy early performance in the Philippines).

I'm not sure that he was the brilliant general many admirers claim. He wasn't the only one bypassing Japanese garrisons on the way to Japan. It's also questionable whether the SWPA campaign was critical to the defeat of Japan, and whether the forces employed in it might have been better used in support of the central Pacific thrust.

Mac was also a petty, vindictive, self-seeking, self-aggrandising, power-seeking, publicity-seeking, relentlessly self-promoting and arrogant bastard who could always be relied upon to sacrifice someone else if he looked like being in trouble, while at the same time being loyal to those loyal to him. In other words, he was just a normal politician who, like many very senior commanders, just happened to be in uniform.

Anyone wanting a comprehensive and reasonably balanced (although not completely balanced) account of Mac should read William Manchester's "American Caesar". Manchester served as a US Marine in the Pacific and recounted his and his comrades' experiences in "Goodbye Darkness".

Chevan

02-11-2007, 05:48 AM

If Mac had been allowed to fight Korea the way he wanted, he might have won. He was opposed to the notion of a limited war, and was proved right in Korea and Vietnam. His view was that if you fight, you fight all-out to win..
Does it mean if Washington let him to use nucler wearpon against N.Korea in 1951 he could won the Korean war?
For me this madman could easy began the Third world war couse his own ambitions. Considering the limited war IMO it was forces mean not to let the new world war.

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 06:16 AM

Does it mean if Washington let him to use nucler wearpon against N.Korea in 1951 he could won the Korean war?
For me this madman could easy began the Third world war couse his own ambitions. Considering the limited war IMO it was forces mean not to let the new world war.

I think nuking North Korea, and China, and the USSR in 1951 would have gone a long way to ensuring a US - sorry, UNO ;) - win in Korea. :)

More seriously, Mac went, or was prepared to go, too far. From a political viewpoint. From a military viewpoint, where his task was to win a war, it made sense to take the same step that had won the war against Japan just six years earlier.

I was just making the point that I think he was right that limited wars are a stupid idea, as Korea, Vietnam, and most recently the 2006 Israeli incursion into Lebanon demonstrate. All they do is antagonise one side without defeating it and, usually, make them more determined to keep fighting without doing anything to defeat them so they can't fight any more.

Nobody would think it made sense for the Allies to agree that they would fight Japan in WWII but not go past, say, a line from Luzon in the Philippines to Iwo Jima to Atta Island in the Aleutians and, worse, announce it to the world at large and to the enemy in particular. It's a self-evidently stupid way to try to win a war, and it would never have brought Japan to surrender. Nonetheless, a lot of politicians since WWII seem to think that it makes perfect sense to get into a war and then draw a line beyond which their troops can't go to get the enemy where he lives, to avoid drawing the enemy's friends into the conflict. If they're not prepared to fight a full war with the enemy and, if necessary, his friends, they shouldn't start it in the first place. All wars are a waste of life and everything else, but limited wars are an even bigger waste as they never finally resolve the conflict.

Rising Sun

02-11-2007, 07:26 AM

It was Australian infantry that broke the 'invincible' Japanese soldiery. NOT Dougie, or yr GI's, and well before Guadalcanal even began. Do try to get your heads around this.

Just to explode the myths about who exploded the myth about Japanese invincibility, here is a summary of the three events that are contenders.

1. 11 December 1941. Wake Island. US Marine shore gunners drive back a Japanese invasion force before it can land. Landing abandoned. This was the only time this ever happened in the war with Japan. Wake was invaded later in December so it was only a temporary victory, like Australians at Gemas in Malaya in early 1942 and various other actions that won an important action in a longer battle or campaign but ultimately didn't change the result.

2. 20 August 1942, Tenaru River, Guadalcanal. US Marines killed all of the 1,000 Japanese landing force (actually, only 999, because the Japanese C.O., Colonel Ichiki, committed seppuku while kneeling with the remaining twenty or so Japanese in the final moments). This was the first defeat of a Japanese landing force. It did not, however, decide the Guadalcanal campaign which went on until early 1943 as the Japanese landed further and larger forces.

3. 6 September 1942, Milne Bay, Papua. About 600 Japanese survivors of a landing force of about 2,000 were evacuated by the IJN. The rest were killed by the Australian force which defeated the landing force in battles following the landing nearly a fortnight earlier This was the first time a Japanese landing force had been defeated and forced to withdraw. It was the first time the Japanese had been prevented from achieving their objective, being control of Milne Bay.

Laconia

02-11-2007, 03:55 PM

If Mac had been allowed to fight Korea the way he wanted, he might have won. He was opposed to the notion of a limited war, and was proved right in Korea and Vietnam. His view was that if you fight, you fight all-out to win. The politicians lost Korea, not Mac, just as they lost Vietnam. Admittedly there were wider international political considerations in each case, which only demonstrates the futility of "limited" wars, and which Mac ignored. Mac pushed his luck politically in Korea, but I think he was right so far as not fighting limited wars goes.

Inchon was mac's greatest gamble, and it paid off. But the last thing we needed at that time was a full scale war with China and Russia. He messed up here in Korea by sending everyone up to the Yalu, while ignoring intelligence reports about many Chinese troops. The only thing that saved the day was the Marines and their fighting withdrawal to Hunghnam. The Marine General went slow, made sure he had airfields up the MSR. The Army really screwed up here. It was Mac and General Almond I believe. It was almost time for Mac to go.

32Bravo

02-12-2007, 04:31 AM

Just to redress the balance a little. The Royal Marine Commandos made a huge contribution as the rear-guard.

Gen. Sandworm

02-12-2007, 06:40 AM

This is starting to become more and more about the Korean war. Might have to split this one to Korean War section. MacArthur and the Korean war.

Try to stick to what he did during WW2.

Thanks!

Rising Sun

02-12-2007, 06:57 AM

One of the most revealing events about Mac was when he sent Gen Robert Eichelberger to Buna in Papua in late 1942 to fix up the shambles with the ill-trained, under-supplied and poorly led US National Guard 32nd Division which had pretty much given up fighting. Mac told him, in effect, to win or die there but that, what the publicity-obsessed and publicity-controlling Mac thought was an incentive, if he won he would release Eichelberger's name to the press. See Eichelberger's book "Our Jungle Road to Tokyo".

Also

The War in the Pacific, 1941-1945
There is considerable analysis of mistakes made, the lessons to be learnt, the importance of good leadership and the crucial part Eichelberger played in these campaigns, often leading troops in the front line himself. Nowhere was this more in evidence than during the Buna campaign. General MacArthur, with his own position in some doubt, badly needed a land victory against the Japanese. He sent Eichelberger to take over command at Buna with the following instructions:

"I want you to go to Buna and capture it. If you do not do so I don't want you to come out alive and (pointing at Byers, Lt. General Eichelberger's Chief of Staff) that applies to your Chief of Staff also. Do you understand Bob ! "

MacArthur continued:

"Time is of the essence ! I want you to relieve Harding, Bob. Send him back to America. If you don't do it, I will. Relieve every regimental and battalion commander. Put corporals in command if necessary. Get somebody who will fight. When do you want to start, Bob ! "

Eichelberger replied that he would leave after breakfast next morning.

Buna was the first victorious operation by American Army ground forces against the Japanese. When it came to writing his detailed report, immediately after Buna, Eichelberger told the Buna Task Force Liaison Officer at General MacArthur's headquarters:

"Write the damn thing so that whoever fights in the jungle in the future will learn from our mistakes and our successes."

The liaison officer, R M White, recalls:

"The 32nd Division had been inspected by I Corps and rated not ready for combat. MacArthur's only other division, the 42nd, was also inspected and rated less ready than the 32nd. General MacArthur had been told that he might be relieved if he faltered in his return north. Yet, he was convinced the Buna operation was necessary so he ordered it. The 32nd Division had been shipped out from the states before being reorganized as were other guard divisions back in the states. It was not properly equipped. The officers and men had no idea - I repeat, no idea - of what the jungle was like and the professional skill of the enemy - basically Japanese Marines with an outstanding combat record going back to Malaya...When Eichelberger took over, whole units were already reduced to fractions of their TO strength.... The shortage of officers was most severe....We were losing when Eichelberger took over. He led our forces to victory. Perhaps it is not a well-known victory because our casualties, including a part of the sick, totalled 10,960 compared with a counted enemy dead of about 2,600. Yet, it was a historic victory."

http://www.ampltd.co.uk/collections_az/JapanAm-1-1/description.aspx

Apart from trying to impress Washington, what really pissed Mac off about Buna was that he had disparaged Australian troops in their performance on Kokoda and elsewhere, extolling the supremacy of American troops, in dealings with the Australian commander, and Mac's land commander, Gen Thomas Blamey. The first time American troops, being the 32nd Div, under Mac's command came into contact with the Japanese they largely failed. Worse, they were fighting in the Buna - Gona - Sanananda Japanese beachhead which the Australians had reached by repelling Gen Horii's force over Kokoda and reducing and eventually defeating them at Gona and Sanananda by themselves, while the US Army fell apart at Buna until Eichelberger arrived and performed the prodigious feat of turning the remnants of the 32nd Div into a better fighting force than the original full Division had been.

Rising Sun

02-15-2007, 05:21 AM

Just to explode the myths about who exploded the myth about Japanese invincibility, here is a summary of the three events that are contenders.

1. 11 December 1941. Wake Island. US Marine shore gunners drive back a Japanese invasion force before it can land. Landing abandoned. This was the only time this ever happened in the war with Japan. Wake was invaded later in December so it was only a temporary victory, like Australians at Gemas in Malaya in early 1942 and various other actions that won an important action in a longer battle or campaign but ultimately didn't change the result.

2. 20 August 1942, Tenaru River, Guadalcanal. US Marines killed all of the 1,000 Japanese landing force (actually, only 999, because the Japanese C.O., Colonel Ichiki, committed seppuku while kneeling with the remaining twenty or so Japanese in the final moments). This was the first defeat of a Japanese landing force. It did not, however, decide the Guadalcanal campaign which went on until early 1943 as the Japanese landed further and larger forces.

3. 6 September 1942, Milne Bay, Papua. About 600 Japanese survivors of a landing force of about 2,000 were evacuated by the IJN. The rest were killed by the Australian force which defeated the landing force in battles following the landing nearly a fortnight earlier This was the first time a Japanese landing force had been defeated and forced to withdraw. It was the first time the Japanese had been prevented from achieving their objective, being control of Milne Bay.

I should have added

4. Guadalcanal, 21 February 1943 (or any of the various February dates you want to pick as the end).

Victory on Guadalcanal brought important strategic gains to the Americans and their Pacific allies but at high cost. Combined with the American-Australian victory at Buna on New Guinea, success in the Solomons turned back the Japanese drive toward Australia and staked out a strong base from which to continue attacks against Japanese forces, especially those at Rabaul, the enemy's main base in the South Pacific. Most important for future operations in the Pacific, the Americans had stopped reacting to Japanese thrusts and taken the initiative themselves. These gains cost the Americans 1,592 killed in action and 4,183 wounded, with thousands more disabled for varying periods by disease. Entering the campaign after the amphibious phase, the two Army divisions lost 550 killed and 1,289 wounded. For the Japanese, losses were even more traumatic: 14,800 killed in battle, another 9,000 dead from disease, and about 1,000 taken prisoner. On Guadalcanal General Hyakutake's troops gave American fighting men a chilling introduction to the character of the Japanese soldier: willing to fight to the death rather than surrender. Both navies lost twenty-four ships during the campaign but with a smaller industrial base to replace them, Japanese losses were more significant. Even more costly to Japan was the loss of over six hundred aircraft and pilots.
http://www.army.mil/cmh/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm

Leaving aside the quoted American centred focus on Buna in Papua (not New Guinea, fer chrissake!)which happened to be where the Americans fought while the American army historians conveniently ignore Gona about ten miles away where the Australians fought and defeated the Japanese earlier than at Buna, as they had on Kokoda and at Milne Bay (injured national pride correction ends here :) ), the fact is that Guadalcanal was the first major and sustained campaign on land, sea and air against the Japanese. It was the first complete defeat of the Japanese on a defined piece of land, being the Guadalcanal island, which was the object of a campaign rather than a landing as part of a campaign. The Australians, and Americans, fought in Papua New Guinea (They're two separate territories - three if you want to include Dutch New Guinea) from mid-1942 until the end of the war without expelling or defeating the Japanese as the American Marines and Army did at Guadalcanal.

There is no comparison between any of the earlier events and Guadalcanal. It was the first campaign defeat of the Japanese. And a fine run thing it was, too.

Nickdfresh

02-15-2007, 09:38 PM

If Mac had been allowed to fight Korea the way he wanted, he might have won. He was opposed to the notion of a limited war, and was proved right in Korea and Vietnam. His view was that if you fight, you fight all-out to win. The politicians lost Korea, not Mac, just as they lost Vietnam. Admittedly there were wider international political considerations in each case, which only demonstrates the futility of "limited" wars, and which Mac ignored. Mac pushed his luck politically in Korea, but I think he was right so far as not fighting limited wars goes.

And the fact that the Chinese People's Liberation Army caught him completely with his pants down? Despite capturing numerous PLA "volunteers" in quilted uniforms previous to the Chosen intervention and refusing to believe that the Chinese were about to enter the War in great numbers?

No, MacArthur was fine when he was going against a third world army with first class weapons, but he presided over what was nearly the greatest defeat of a US army.

No, MacArthur's hubris is inexcusable, and a blunder directly comparable to his failings in the initial phases of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines...

He was just another overrated, overblown windsock filled with his own mythos, and a bombastic fool that mostly took credit for underlings work, which is probably why he was unable to respond to crisis of the surprise variety...

Nickdfresh

02-15-2007, 09:44 PM

Rising Sun

02-16-2007, 06:08 AM

No, MacArthur ... presided over what was nearly the greatest defeat of a US army.

If this refers to Mac in Korea, he must have been going for a personal best. He's already presided over America's worst defeat in the Philippines.

He was just another overrated, overblown windsock filled with his own mythos, and a bombastic fool that mostly took credit for underlings work, which is probably why he was unable to respond to crisis of the surprise variety...

He had a lot of failings, but he also presided over some great victories. It's an unfortunate fact of life that a lot of so-called great men (and women) are total arseholes, but it doesn't undermine their achievements. The selfish drives which spur them on to control others are what sets them apart.

One view of Mac, which is common in Australia and in all recent popular Australian writing, is that he was an arrogant, publicity-seeking, petty prick. True. And that he drove Australian forces on relentlessly over the Kokoda Track without even flying over it to see just what lousy country they were fighting in and how unreasonable his demands were. True. Also true of the Australian commander, Blamey, who was just as big a prick but with no idea about public relations as he made the mistake of saying what he thought. There are other criticisms of Mac, all true.

But for all those criticisms, we have a man in his sixties who has come through the most gruelling experiences in the Philippines and during his escape from them to arrive in Australia radiating public confidence (which he didn't feel personally) and bolstering the public and government. It's a great piece of leadership and of personal grit. He was as inspirational to the Australian public at that critical time as Churchill was to the British public at his best. Morale wins wars and lack of morale loses them. Mac was a morale builder.

If we had had a commander who was happy to accept defeat then the Japanese might have got over the Kokoda Track to Moresby, and changed the course of the war, for Australia anyway. Mac wouldn't accept this. He pressed his commanders to press their subordinates to press their troops to attack, attack, attack! His demands might have been unreasonable, but they produced a win.

Mac was a complex and intriguing man, but it is most unfair to write him off in a series of perjorative comments, however accurate they may be, without balancing them with his good qualities and successes.

Nickdfresh

02-24-2007, 09:43 AM

If this refers to Mac in Korea, he must have been going for a personal best. He's already presided over America's worst defeat in the Philippines.'

:D You are correct indeed...

Korea is such a double edged sword for Mac. He turned around an undertrained, retreating army. Then turned them back into a retreating army. But in the Philippines he was fighting a first class army (as far as training and discipline go), and his forces were cut off. Even if he ran the campaign perfectly, they probably would not heave been relieved; they only would have blooded the Japanese for a few more months (which could have shortened the Pacific campaign)...

He had a lot of failings, but he also presided over some great victories. It's an unfortunate fact of life that a lot of so-called great men (and women) are total arseholes, but it doesn't undermine their achievements. The selfish drives which spur them on to control others are what sets them apart.

One view of Mac, which is common in Australia and in all recent popular Australian writing, is that he was an arrogant, publicity-seeking, petty prick. True. And that he drove Australian forces on relentlessly over the Kokoda Track without even flying over it to see just what lousy country they were fighting in and how unreasonable his demands were. True. Also true of the Australian commander, Blamey, who was just as big a prick but with no idea about public relations as he made the mistake of saying what he thought. There are other criticisms of Mac, all true.

But for all those criticisms, we have a man in his sixties who has come through the most gruelling experiences in the Philippines and during his escape from them to arrive in Australia radiating public confidence (which he didn't feel personally) and bolstering the public and government. It's a great piece of leadership and of personal grit. He was as inspirational to the Australian public at that critical time as Churchill was to the British public at his best. Morale wins wars and lack of morale loses them. Mac was a morale builder.

If we had had a commander who was happy to accept defeat then the Japanese might have got over the Kokoda Track to Moresby, and changed the course of the war, for Australia anyway. Mac wouldn't accept this. He pressed his commanders to press their subordinates to press their troops to attack, attack, attack! His demands might have been unreasonable, but they produced a win.

Mac was a complex and intriguing man, but it is most unfair to write him off in a series of perjorative comments, however accurate they may be, without balancing them with his good qualities and successes.

Some excellent points in his defense. But I know that those that chafed under him that did most of the actual planning, including the Aussies and US Marine commanders.

Certainly, his occupation of Japan could not have been carried out any better than it was, so we can thank him for that. But I really think there were far better generals that didn't get promoted because of Mac. And his attempted usurpation of Pres. Truman is unforgivable to me...

Rising Sun

02-24-2007, 10:52 AM

Mac ...turned around an undertrained, retreating army. Then turned them back into a retreating army.

He stuck to what he knew best! :D

Except that in the Philippines he never turned around the undertrained, ill-equipped army he was paid a ridiculous amount to ensure that the Philippines wouldn't suffer exactly what his deficient leadership achieved, ably assisted by Filipino political incompetence.

But in the Philippines he was fighting a first class army (as far as training and discipline go), and his forces were cut off. Even if he ran the campaign perfectly, they probably would not heave been relieved; they only would have blooded the Japanese for a few more months (which could have shortened the Pacific campaign)...

If they'd held out strongly, as distinct from the tenacious and courageous but not militarily strong way they did, for another couple of months, which they couldn't do because of Mac's failures, they would have influenced the Japanese drive southwards. Although probably not to any noticeable extent, unless large forces and supplies were diverted to the Philippines.

On the other side, Gen Homma was pretty close to giving up on defeating the entrenched Americans but was spurred on by higher command. If the American defense had been stronger, as it would have been but for Mac's stuff ups, in the last days then Homma might have been driven to press for his earlier proposal of just leaving them there as a beseiged but harmless garrison, just like Mac and other US commanders did later to the Japanese.

But I really think there were far better generals that didn't get promoted because of Mac.

Like so many great men, Mac was a great man in his own mind which enabled him to keep lesser men out of the eye of the public and his superiors as, with relentless and purely self-promotional control of the press, he fought his most desperate battles against his worst enemies, being Halsey, Nimitz, King, the USN, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs. If only the Japanese had received as much attention from him, Mac might have done better against them. ;)

Pottsy

03-08-2007, 09:18 AM

Hello everyone my first post here, I hope to learn alot and share on a war that we still feel global repercussions from.

Some very interesting opinions of Macarthur in here, some are not privy to the extensive writings of what went after the fall of Baatan it would appear.

Macarthur so I see played the media and the public much like a politician but as a general there was much better IMO.

4 theaters. ended the japanese's attempts at controlling the asia region.
Midway.
Coral sea.
Gaudacanal.
New guinea.

Each as important as the next, each as unique to the survival of the communication and supply line between Australia and America.

Macarthur was only involved in 1 of these theaters.

It is worth noting his complete failure in the Phillipines, however the naval aspect of that battle was always going to over ride any difference to what went on. America and Australia could of never supplied that area with the Navy Japan had there.

New Guinea should of been lost, no doubts about it, Japan should of got to moresby and thus have a base to interupt the supply line from America and hit the port of brisbane where so many offensives were built from.

Macarthur really stuffed up in New Guinea, He made silly WW1 style orders. He stated he would never be a WW1 general and sit miles behind the lines giving out orders when not knowing the true conditions of the front or sharing them with the soldiers . He did exactly that but from a different country and enviorement.

He made orders based on his own intelligence section that completly contridicted the reports from the Owen Stanley front line, He told and ordered and bullied a far inferior and supplied force completly without any military initiative to attack and nothing else and that there not doing there job, yet they were facing an enemy at points 6 times greater, the enemy were the veterans of Malaya and amongst the very elite of Japanese soldiers.

The commanders on the ground ignored macarthur completly, took no word he said. They would of been Slaughtered instantly had they.

They staged a fighting withdrawal threw the Oewen Stanlety mountains.

When the battle first erupted the supply line was massive threw an unforgiving jungle mountain range, everything had to be carried, The Japanese had a really short supply line and no such mountains.

The commanders on the spot could only force the Japanese to contest each and every centimeter threw ambushes and slow them down. Every potential point in which a stand could be made was, and before over run by superior numbers a withdrawal with ambush after ambush.

The commanders could only buy time, each mile conceeded was a mile shorter supply line for us and a mile longer for them.

Eventually a much larger force was brought to its knees as re inforcements for us arrived.

The Japanese in an unforgiving enviroment were delayed by about a month and forced to endure horrendous conditions.The soldiers withdrawing destroyed everything they could not carry, this hurt the japanese as they needed supplies just like we did when we had the mass supply line

Thus the withdrawal defeated them.

Macarthur though kept ordering attack, he kept denying the size of the force and never once comprehended the conditions and theater.

If he was listened to Major General Hori's south seas force would of marched into Port moresby and Macarthur would of lost again.

Quite a serious incompetant piece of leadership from him. Not well known but recorded at the time by the commanders and telegraphs, communications between macarthur and others, japanese records and japanese casulties.

This was the only battle Macarthur was involved in that stopped Japan.

Some may point to Milne bay, same thing happened except with the goings on in Gaudacanal Japan couldnt muster a force capable of taking her.

All the commanders that ignored macarthur basically got sacked, not good.

What went on in the counter attack once the Japanese were brought to her knees is quite abbhorrent to.

When Macarthur was givin command of the allied armies in the south west pacific area he was ordered to have a staff consisting of officers from all involved, he chose his baatan gang only, yet ignored officers more experienced and proven officers who had fought the werhmach successfully in Nth Africa and had seen mostly a full ww1.

Really macarthur in combat operations only ever mopped up what japan left behind after failing to isolate Australia and over committing herself in trying too.

The real American contributer to Japans stopping was a Mr Nimitiz and his action to take Henderson Field. The briallant tactics at Midway which put the three strong carrier force in a position to get some luck and the allied efforts in challanging the attempted seaborne invasion of Moresby.

After that really the allies had the full military iniative, mass more of everything to throw at the japs and basically control of the air and most of the sea once the mighty American industrial machine kicked in.

He could handle superiority and succeeded except in Baatan but couldnt handle mot having the iniative.

Much over rated military commander and much unknown one.

There is some very well researched material written by a Peter Brune which considers everything in the initial battles of New Guinea.

The next stages in New guinea campaign were carried out by an Australian Army corps which was probably the most experienced and successful corps at that point in WW2 on the allied side.

Really only logistic support and naval and air support was contributed by macarthur in the 1 battle that shaped japans eventual defeat that he was involved in, but at first he should of lost it from his doing if not his orders were not ignored.

Lurkmensch

03-08-2007, 09:55 AM

Pottsy

03-08-2007, 07:13 PM

I don't disagree with the essence of your comments, but how do you respond to the comment that Japan was defeated on the water as much as, or more than, on the land? And in the air from water-borne planes?

Coral Sea saved Moresby.

Midway tipped the balance.

USN in various engagements saved Guadalcanal.

USN in Philippines enabled MacArthur to land.

USN in central Pacific allowed the island campaign there.

The ground war was horrible, but the naval war allowed the ground war to advance toward Japan?

As I said 4 battles defeated Japan, 3 of them Naval.

Midway was the one you could highlight. If she fell and fell cheaply the other 3 would of been fought on different levels than what they were.
however once she survived the other 3 became as important as eachother and each as unique.

I was pointing out macarthurs involvement when the war was up for grabs, after that it was a question of time and casulties before Japan was utterly defeated.

There's alot of stuff out there about Macarthur hardly known about that went on in his early days as supreme allied commander, also some misgivings about the Phillipines invasion.

royal744

05-16-2007, 06:37 PM

MacArthur did very well in the WWII Pacific, it's just that he seemed to lose it a bit in Korea which rather ruins his mystique.

Actually, MacArthur should have been court-martialed. He allowed his entire air force in the Phillipines to be destroyed on the ground when it was already known for a considerable number hours that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. He was like a deer caught in the headlights, frozen stiff.

General Marshall said to him, "General, you don't have a staff, you have a court." Macarthur was a megalomaniac of the first order - he brooked no one gainsaying him and promptly fired or demoted anyone who dared to. The Pacific War, as if anyone needs reminding, was fundamentally a navy war and was mostly won by the navy. if the navy hadn't decisively defeated the Japanese not 6 months after Pearl Harbor at the Battle of Midway, Macarthur would still be treading water off the coast of New Guinea. In this context, Korea fits right in. He never spent a single night in Korea during that war. Imagine.

royal744

05-16-2007, 07:41 PM

There's alot of stuff out there about Macarthur hardly known about that went on in his early days as supreme allied commander, also some misgivings about the Phillipines invasion.

Well, the Phillipines probably would have had to have been invaded at some point in time, but it may not have been necessary to do so in order to defeat Japan. What I find really reprehensible about Macarthur, in addition to the comments I made earlier, is that he passed the buck to General Wainwright, on orders to be sure, and then actively opposed Wainrwright receiving any kind of recognition or a medal which congress wanted to accord him! What kind of man sends another to certain defeat on his[I] orders, relegates him to three years of Japanese prisons, and then opposes his getting any kind of recognition at all? A very, very small man, indeed.

Macarthur, lest we forget, had an ego larger than this planet. He called, sneeringly, Eisenhower, "one of the best chiefs of staff I ever had" when he was seething with jealousy that it was Eisenhower who was picked to run for President when he Mac was convinced that [I]he should have been chosen. LOL. We make heroes out of midgets sometimes.