Bomber Harris, Criminal or Hero?

[Nickdfresh]

Heres my problem.

While interesting, this debate has stepped outside the bounds of the Thread title.

Maybe someone could start a new thread about nazism and just how they came to power in 1930's germany?

Ive always wondered how a nation who gave us sciences and great composers and literature and humanities and so much more could basically be hijacked by a bunch of complete thugs and be complicit in the whole thing.

But this thread is for bomber Harris, his rights, his wrongs and the actions that he took and the effects of those actions.

Cheers......

Done! Put all posts not related to Air Marshal Harris nor Allied strategic bombing in this new thread. (http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6600)

[Kampfgruppe Cottrell]

Let the bombs fall!

Brian

[Ashes]

When speaking of German wartime leaders and their perspectives on area bombing, none is more important than Albert Speer, Hitler's Armaments Minister from early 1942 to the end of the war. Max Hastings, in Bomber Command, describes him as a man who had "a superb grasp of the German economy and a brilliant talent for improvising." Speer cleverly concealed German industries from Allied bombers by dispersing their locations and functions. As it turned out, it was not until the allies began to adopt precision bombing on oil and transportation targets did the German economy come to a halt. Speer's genius effectively saved the German economy until late 1944.

Speer did feel that the allied bombing policy was a legitimate one for several reasons: one, it opened the second front in Europe which sought to wear down German strength in the West for the D-Day Normandy landings; this strategy also worked to reduce German Wehrmacht strength on the Eastern front against the Red Army. Second, the unpredictability of the air attacks made this front gigantic as every square metre of German territory was a kind of front line; in Speer's own words:

"The defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, 55,000 artillery guns and a large part of the German air force's strength from fighting offensively to defending Germany itself against air raids.

It was this "tying down" factor which was "the greatest lost battle on the German side."


And in '43 bomber command nearly lived up to Harris's expectations In attacking the Ruhr and destroying Hamburg. Speir warned Hitler that if bomber command achieved similar efforts on 5 or 6 other cities, German morale would entirely collapse.


The following is interesting....

http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm

[redcoat]

Harris should have been replaced by Gen. Eisenhower's aide, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder...
Why, he would still have had to follow the policy of the British War Cabinet.

Harris may have completely agreed with the bombing policy, but he didn't decide on that policy, that was in the hands of the British government.

[Nickdfresh]

In "The Second World War," (http://www.amazon.com/Second-World-War-John-Keegan/dp/014011341X) (on pages 415-417) John Keegan writes:

On 12 January 1944 Air Marshal Arthur Harris, chief of RAF Bomber Command,
wrote:

It is clear that the best and indeed the only efficient support which Bomber
Command can give to [Operation] Overlord is the intensification of attacks on
suitable industrial targets in Germany as and when the opportunity offers. If we
attempt to substitute for this process attacks on gun emplacements, beach defences,
communications or [ammunition] dumps in occupied territory, we shall commit the
irremediable error of diverting our best weapons from the military function, for
which it has been equipped and trained, to tasks which it cannot effectively carry out.
Though this might give a spurious appearance of 'supporting' the Army, in reality it
would be the greatest disservice we could do them.

'Bomber' Harris's prognosis of the effect of diverting his strategic bombers from the 'area' bombing of Germany to 'precision' bombing on France was to be proved dramatically in-correct. In the first place, his crews demonstrated that they had now acquired the skill to hit small targets with great accuracy and to sustain this 'precision' campaign even in the teeth of fierce German resistance. In March the objections of Harris and General Carl Spaatz, commanding the Eighth Air Force, Bomber Command's American equivalent, were overruled and both air forces were placed under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower's deputy. From then onwards strategic air forces embarked on a campaign against the French railway system which was to cost them 2000 aircraft and 12,000 aircrew in a little over two months. In April and May Bomber Command, which had dropped 70 per cent of its bombs on Germany in March, reversed its proportional effort: in April it dropped 14,000 tons on Germany but 20,000 on France; in May it launched three-quarters of its sorties against France. During June the weight of attack on France increase when 52,000 tons were dropped in the invasion area and on the military infrastructure surrounding it.

Moreover, in flat contradiction of Harris's forecast, RAF bombers carried out missions with an effectiveness which not only 'supported' the army very effectively indeed but went far towards determining the Germans' defeat in Normandy. By comparison the British and American armies, the German army belonged to a previous generatic military development. Its Panzer and motorised divisions apart, it moved over short distances on foot by road and over long distances by rail; while all its supplies and heavy equipment, even for formations which possessed their own motor transport, moved elusively by rail. The interruption of the French railway system and the destruction bridges therefore severely restricted its ability not only to manoeuvre but even to fight at all; from April to June, and thereafter during the course of the Normandy battle French railway working was brought almost to a standstill and most bridges over the major northern French rivers were broken or at least damaged too severely to be quickly repaired.

Much of the devastation was achieved by the medium-range and fighter bombers the British Second Tactical and the recently formed American Ninth Air Forces; American Thunderbolt and British Typhoon ground-attack fighters flying vast daylight 'sweeps' over northern France destroyed 500 locomotives between 20 and 28 May alone. However. - far more serious structural devastation - to bridges, rail yards and locomotive repair shops - was the work of the strategic bombers. By late May, French railway traffic had declined 55 per cent of the January figure; by 6 June the destruction of the Seine bridges had duped it to 30 per cent, and thereafter it declined to 10 per cent. As early as 3 June a despairing officer of Rundstedt's staff sent a report (decrypted by Ultra) that the railway authorities 'are seriously considering whether it is not useless to attempt further repair work', so relentless was the pressure the Allied forces were sustaining on the network.

The rail capacity that Germany's OB West succeeded in maintaining in June and July 1944 just sufficed to provide the Seventh and Fifth Panzer Armies with the irreducible minimum of food, fuel and ammunition (though not enough to revictual Paris, which way in serious danger of starvation just before its liberation). However, such supplies could be guaranteed to the fighting troops only as long as they did not attempt to manoeuvre; so fragile and so inflexible was the network of communication improvised between the Reich and Germany that the troops at the battlefront could depend upon it only if they remained fixed to its terminals. Once they moved, they risked starvation of essentials - hence their inability to 'make a fighting withdrawal in France'. When their fortified perimeter of the bridgehead was destroyed by Patton's Blitzkrieg, they could only retreat at the fastest possible speed to the next fortified position with which a communication system connected: and that was the West Wall on the Franco-German border.

The Normandy campaign, in both its preliminaries and its central events, therefore proved Harris wrong. Airpower used in the direct support of armies had worked with stunning success at the immediate and at the strategic level. None the less it was inevitable and also understandable that Harris should have resisted pressure from above to direct his bomber force from the attack on German cities. After all, Bomber Command justifiably prided itself on having for three years been the only instrument of force the Western powers had brought directly to bear against the territory of the Reich (the US Eighth Air Force had more recently come to the struggle). Moreover, Harris was the spokesman of a service whose singular and unique raison d'etre was to bomb the enemy's homeland.
...

Penguin: ISBN- 0-14-303573-8

[Chevan]

"The defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous quantities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, 55,000 artillery guns and a large part of the German air force's strength from fighting offensively to defending Germany itself against air raids.

But the allies also have spend a lot of resources and man-hours waste for production of Fantastical figures oof super-expensieve Strategical bombers.
And the 55 000 of artillery guns it's actually not so much with comparition with 21 000 + of Strategical bombers and about 150 000 mens of crew that have been lost by both RAF and USSAF over GErmany.
Besides the GErmans never used more then the 350 fighters at one time since 1943 in their union air Defence system against Strategical bombings.So this hardly refuse their air power in the Eastern front.

[Nickdfresh]

But the allies also have spend a lot of resources and man-hours waste for production of Fantastical figures oof super-expensieve Strategical bombers.
And the 55 000 of artillery guns it's actually not so much with comparition with 21 000 + of Strategical bombers and about 150 000 mens of crew that have been lost by both RAF and USSAF over GErmany.

The bomber production was scarcily a dent in US war production. They prevented a shortage of no weapons and allowed the Allies to pressure the Reich sooner than they otherwise could have....

Besides the GErmans never used more then the 350 fighters at one time since 1943 in their union air Defence system against Strategical bombings.So this hardly refuse their air power in the Eastern front.

That number sounds low, but the Luftwaffe was also under a great deal of pressure from RAF fighter command and the Eighth AAF which accounts for a lot of losses that prevented them from maintaining a larger number of fighters, especially by 1944 even though German fighter production was increasing; pilot production was not increasing.

Those strategic bombers also accounted for the vast fuel and lubricants shortage the Germans faced by 1944. That the Red Air Force was never outnumbered after 1943, so there was a shortage of Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front, especially since they couldn't bomb the new Soviet 'Tankograds' in Siberia and were limited tactical air support...

[redcoat]

Sorry Nickdfresh, but that doesn't alter my argument at all. Harris was indeed totally in favour of using Bomber Command in a strategic bombing campaign against Germany, but he didn't make the policy, that was decided by the British War Cabinet.
Nothing in your post contradicts that.

[Nickdfresh]

Sorry Nickdfresh, but that doesn't alter my argument at all. Harris was indeed totally in favour of using Bomber Command in a strategic bombing campaign against Germany, but he didn't make the policy, that was decided by the British War Cabinet.
Nothing in your post contradicts that.

That was not a specific response to you. It was an overall critique of Harris by Keegan that I tend to agree with that I finally got around to scanning last night...

Although, it is partially where I derive some of my high opinion of Tedders as one of the more underrated and under-appreciated people of WWII...

[Ashes]

By the end of '43, about 49% of the Luftwaffe fighter force was engaged against the bomber offensive.

One table giving 1944 sortie and loss totals for all German combat aircraft from the US archives. Its loss numbers are only about one-third of Groehler's, and probably include only total losses and write offs resulting from combat, a more common definition of the term.


1944 - All Combat Types...Sorties.....Losses....Losses/Sortie
Total West................182,004.....9768......0.0537
Eastern Front.............342,483.....2406......0.00703



The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.


And once the right formula was reached, P-51 + destruction of fuel Industry + transportation Network, it's amazing how quickly Germany was brought to it's knees by the bombing offensive.

[Chevan]

By the end of '43, about 49% of the Luftwaffe fighter force was engaged against the bomber offensive.

I doubt it.
According my source( german historian Friz Gun :"Loses of Wermach" http://history-afr.fatal.ru/luftwaffe.shtml
Table 15 )
The distribution of Luftwaffe in the all fronts
fro instance in the june of 1944 ( when the operation Overlord have been started)
Eastern front - 3267
Western Europe- 1450
Italian front - 353
Balcans - 567
Norway -204
AA-defence of Germany - 1572

So indeed ( according germans datas) the AA-defence has NEVER been exceed the 20& of Luftwaffe.
But .. this is all the fighters
I wrote about 350 , becouse due to from the 1520 they could use just a part of its total park of fighter.
For instance during the bombing of Gamburg in 1943 the Luftwaffe never used more then 400 fighter all of tipes.
Besides .....( table 18)
the total loses of the Luftwaffe since the sep 1943 - oct 1944 were:

Italy/Balcans - 4468
Western/Nothern Europe - 9775
AA-defence over Germany-12807
Eastern front-8600

So from 35 660 overal loses of the Luftwaffe for one year- loses in the Union AA-defence was no more 34%
But it was due to actions of the escort fighters.
Starategical bombers have been used as a .... "bait"


The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51's and P-47's and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

Well according the Fritz Gun the maximum fighters in A-defence has been lost in May of 1944 - 1460.
Besides if we look at the table of loses of RAF that has been presented to us honorable mst Amrit in this thread http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5862&highlight=Strategic+Survivey&page=5
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=1845&d=1205588440
We could observe that the ONLY RAF lost in 1944 even more pilots than in the 1943 - 18 237 over Germany.
Don't look like they had creased to be effective , right:)
Whole 1944 allies lossed the increasing casualties.

And once the right formula was reached, P-51 + destruction of fuel Industry + transportation Network, it's amazing how quickly Germany was brought to it's knees by the bombing offensive.
Yea especially if to keep in mind how many peoples died on the ground to bring them to knees.
P.S. the P-51 wasn't even superior firghter over the last Germans fighters like fw-190D or Bf-109K
In fact the long-range firghter need a great mass of fuel , so its manoeuverability suffered.Beside the water-cooled engine was still very unreliable.
Right formula actually have been reaced when the Me-262 has appeared in scene..
It could destroy the entire strategic bombers by he one single burst of monstrous 4x30 mm guns.Plus the RM4 rockets.
Thank for the God ( and our Allies brave Ground Forces )that the GErmany in since 1944 have lost its resources and war has been ended soon.

[Chevan]

Those strategic bombers also accounted for the vast fuel and lubricants shortage the Germans faced by 1944. That the Red Air Force was never outnumbered after 1943, so there was a shortage of Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front, especially since they couldn't bomb the new Soviet 'Tankograds' in Siberia and were limited tactical air support...

This was not just a strategic bombings that make germans face the chortage of fuel.
In the September 1944 the Romanian , the last oil fields of Reich has been captured by the Red Army, so after that , the GErmans lost over 25% or their fuel production instantly.
And Luftwaffe con't bomb the new soviet Tankograd on definition..Becouse Chelyabinsk city , Ural region, not Syberia was OUT of range of action Germans Tactical bombers (U-88/87 that usially have been used in Eastern front..)
As you remember Germans had no the Strategical ones at all:)

[Nickdfresh]

I doubt it.
According my source( german historian Friz Gun :"Loses of Wermach" http://history-afr.fatal.ru/luftwaffe.shtml
Table 15 )
The distribution of Luftwaffe in the all fronts
fro instance in the june of 1944 ( when the operation Overlord have been started)
Eastern front - 3267
Western Europe- 1450
Italian front - 353
Balcans - 567
Norway -204
AA-defence of Germany - 1572

So indeed ( according germans datas) the AA-defence has NEVER been exceed the 20& of Luftwaffe.
But .. this is all the fighters
I wrote about 350 , becouse due to from the 1520 they could use just a part of its total park of fighter.
For instance during the bombing of Gamburg in 1943 the Luftwaffe never used more then 400 fighter all of tipes.
Besides .....( table 18)
the total loses of the Luftwaffe since the sep 1943 - oct 1944 were:

Italy/Balcans - 4468
Western/Nothern Europe - 9775
AA-defence over Germany-12807
Eastern front-8600

So from 35 660 overal loses of the Luftwaffe for one year- loses in the Union AA-defence was no more 34%
But it was due to actions of the escort fighters.
Starategical bombers have been used as a .... "bait"

Um, firstly, all fighters deployed on the Western and Italian fronts have to be considered as part of Germany's air defense against RAF and USAAF bombers, especially since in April and May of 1944, both organizations shifted much of their focus away from bombing German cities to hit French rail centers and other depots (much to the chagrin of Bomber Harris and Gen. Spaatz), which puts the numbers at over 3200. And it should be noted that the Luftwaffe air defense line began in France...

Well according the Fritz Gun the maximum fighters in A-defence has been lost in May of 1944 - 1460.
Besides if we look at the table of loses of RAF that has been presented to us honorable mst Amrit in this thread http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5862&highlight=Strategic+Survivey&page=5
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=1845&d=1205588440
We could observe that the ONLY RAF lost in 1944 even more pilots than in the 1943 - 18 237 over Germany.
Don't look like they had creased to be effective , right:)
Whole 1944 allies lossed the increasing casualties.

Yea especially if to keep in mind how many peoples died on the ground to bring them to knees.
P.S. the P-51 wasn't even superior firghter over the last Germans fighters like fw-190D or Bf-109K

Actually, it was better than any variant of the Me109, and comparisons to the FW190 is subjective, since they were few in number, and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! But they weren't needed. In any case, as there were no more German pilots to fly them, they were pretty much irrelevant directly corresponding with US long range fighter escorts and the P-51 could be produced in much higher numbers. Also, the final variants of the P-51H were more than a match for any German piston engined fighter. The US was also on the verge to deploying the P-80 Shooting Star, which was superior to the Me262 in air to air performance and in production simplicity...

In fact the long-range firghter need a great mass of fuel , so its manoeuverability suffered.Beside the water-cooled engine was still very unreliable.

The Me109 was also water cooled, and the FW190 suffered from many reliability problems not least of which being it having to use synthetic gasoline which inherently effected its performance, which had to be overcome using complex turbochargers. And then, most of Germany's best pilots were dead or captured, and the slow Luftwaffe training and replacement system prevented many more from being trained...The Luftwaffe, even while trying to avoid direct contact with US escort fighters, still suffered high losses of pilots in 1944. These tactics also hindered their effectiveness at attacking bombers. And by mid-1944, USAAF pilots adopted more aggressive tactics and took the War to Luftwaffe fields destroying many of the Fw190s and Me109s on the ground which all but spelled the end of the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict casualties on US bombers...


Right formula actually have been reaced when the Me-262 has appeared in scene..
It could destroy the entire strategic bombers by he one single burst of monstrous 4x30 mm guns.Plus the RM4 rockets.
Thank for the God ( and our Allies brave Ground Forces )that the GErmany in since 1944 have lost its resources and war has been ended soon.

Why? All Allied fighters did was wait around Luftwaffe Aerodromes where the Me262s were stationed, and shot them down as they took off or landed because their poor performance at lower speeds made them sitting ducks...

[Nickdfresh]

This was not just a strategic bombings that make germans face the chortage of fuel.
In the September 1944 the Romanian , the last oil fields of Reich has been captured by the Red Army, so after that , the GErmans lost over 25% or their fuel production instantly.

Yes, but the fields and their transport facilities, were vulnerable too, and hindered by, bombing nonetheless...

And Luftwaffe con't bomb the new soviet Tankograd on definition..Becouse Chelyabinsk city , Ural region, not Syberia was OUT of range of action Germans Tactical bombers (U-88/87 that usially have been used in Eastern front..)
As you remember Germans had no the Strategical ones at all:)

That was the point I was trying to make. A Luftwaffe strategic bomber may have had some impact on the War. But we'll never know...

[Ashes]

The distribution of Luftwaffe in the all fronts
fro instance in the june of 1944 ( when the operation Overlord have been started)
Eastern front - 3267
Western Europe- 1450
Italian front - 353
Balcans - 567
Norway -204
AA-defence of Germany - 1572



Most of those in defense of Germany would probably be night fighters [which were giving bomber command a very hard time] because by June '44, the German day fighters were swept from the sky, mainly by the ''Cadillac of the skies'' the P-51 Mustang.



the total loses of the Luftwaffe since the sep 1943 - oct 1944 were:

Italy/Balcans - 4468
Western/Nothern Europe - 9775
AA-defence over Germany-12807
Eastern front-8600



Your figures of 12,807 fighters destroyed over Germany sep 1943 - oct 1944, are slightly higher then mine, but close enough.


Have you got a breakdown of German aircraft types lost in the East, mainly fighters in the West, but probably more various types in the East, such as
the G, version of the Ju-87, armed with a pair of 37mm Flak 18 cannon, slung outboard of the main landing gear, it took a fearful toll of Sov armour, Hans-Ulrich Rudel claimed over 800 vehicles destroyed, including 519 tanks.




Well according the Fritz Gun the maximum fighters in A-defence has been lost in May of 1944 - 1460.


That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that's
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it's a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:)





Besides if we look at the table of loses of RAF that has been presented to us honorable mst Amrit in this thread



Yep, tragic figures aren't they, [don't think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:) plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:(



Yea especially if to keep in mind how many peoples died on the ground to bring them to knees.

Yep, it was the poor old foot slogger that had to slug it out mile by mile on the ground, and the Red army thoroughly deserved to take Berlin in the end, after the utter carnage it suffered, and bravery it showed in coming back from the dead, was one of the most remarkable efforts in military history.







P.S. the P-51 wasn't even superior firghter over the last Germans fighters like fw-190D or Bf-109K
In fact the long-range firghter need a great mass of fuel , so its manoeuverability suffered.Beside the water-cooled engine was still very unreliable.



By wars end P-51's claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.




Right formula actually have been reaced when the Me-262 has appeared in scene..
It could destroy the entire strategic bombers by he one single burst of monstrous 4x30 mm guns.Plus the RM4 rockets.



Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ''blitz bomber'' so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it's entry into the war to late to have any significance.




This was not just a strategic bombings that make germans face the chortage of fuel.
In the September 1944 the Romanian , the last oil fields of Reich has been captured by the Red Army, so after that , the GErmans lost over 25% or their fuel production instantly.



Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany's crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany. In 1945, Germany had mined much coal but had no way of moving it from the mines to where it was needed. When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.



The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it's often overlooked.

[Nickdfresh]

....

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany. In 1945, Germany had mined much coal but had no way of moving it from the mines to where it was needed. When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.
....

The defense of Normandy and of France in general were catastrophically effected by Allied air power, as few tanks could be brought from Germany. And few vehicles could escape to Germany. Probably one of the main reasons why comparatively few armored vehicles were encountered by the Western Allies after the Battle of the Bulge...

[Drake]

...and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! ...

Uhm, no. That would have been the Do-335.

[Nickdfresh]

Uhm, no. That would have been the Do-335.

Nope! They only made 11 of those. And we can split hairs, perhaps the Do335 had a higher cruising speed, but the Mustang H was capable of sustained bursts of 487mph (or 784 kph) and could produce 1,655 kw on "war emergency power."

[pdf27]

Hawker Tempest V would do similar speeds when over-boosted (to 2200kW).

Thanks to its 2,400 h.p. engine it had a considerable margin of excess power and its acceleration was phenomenal. It was pretty tricky to fly, but its Performance more than made up for it: at 3,000 feet, at economical cruising speed on one third power (950 h.p.) with two 45-gallon auxiliary tanks, 310 m.p.h. on the clock, i.e. a true air speed of 320 m.p.h.; at fast cruising speed, at half power (1,425 h.p.) without auxiliary tanks, 350 m.p.h. on the clock, i.e. a true air speed of nearly 400 m.p.h.; maximum speed straight and level with +13 boost and 3,850 revs.: 430 m.p.h. on the clock, i.e. a true air speed of 440 m.p.h.

In emergencies you could over-boost it up to nearly 3,000 h.p. and 4,000 revs., and the speed went up to 460 m.p.h. In a dive the Tempest was the only aircraft to reach, without interfering with its handling qualities to any marked extent, sub-sonic speeds, i.e. 550-600 m.p.h.

One caveat to numbers like these - indicated airspeed is entirely irrelevant at speeds like this, and true airspeed only barely more so. Unless you know ambient air temperature and hence can calculate Mach number you just can't do a proper comparison.

[redcoat]

Hans-Ulrich Rudel claimed over 800 vehicles destroyed, including 519 tanks.
The magic word is claimed.
In the only official study done on ground attack fighters effectiveness against armour (by the Allies in Normandy) they found they over claimed by a factor of ten, and if you add in the fact that Rudel was a poster boy for Nazi propaganda, any sensible person would realise that Rudels score is actually far less than claimed


By wars end P-51's claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft. According to the official USAAF figures, the figure for P-51's lost in combat is 2,520 (all combat causes), and is credited with 4,950 air combat kills and 4,131 ground kills (ETO/MTO theaters)


Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ''blitz bomber'' so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it's entry into the war to late to have any significance.Hitlers 'bomber' Me 262 had little effect on the introduction into service of this aircraft, the unreliability of the engines ensured it didn't enter service sooner

http://www.vectorsite.net/avme262.html#m10

[redcoat]

When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.
.
Total production of the King Tiger was only 487

[Nickdfresh]

Total production of the King Tiger was only 487

Yup. But the it is undeniable that the Wehrmacht was rail-bound and horse laden, and that Allied destruction of the French rail system largely doomed them in Normandy from prolonging the War in the West, no matter the type of tank or APC...

[Ashes]

According to the official USAAF figures, the figure for P-51's lost in combat is 2,520 (all combat causes), and is credited with 4,950 air combat kills and 4,131 ground kills (ETO/MTO theaters)


From Wiki...........

The Eighth, Ninth and Fifteenth Air Forces' P-51 groups, all but three of which flew another type before converting to the Mustang, claimed some 4,950 aircraft shot down (about half of all USAAF claims in the European theater) and 4,131 destroyed on the ground. Losses were about 840 aircraft.


One of these groups, the Eighth Air Force's 4th Fighter Group, was the overall top-scoring fighter group in Europe with 1,016 enemy aircraft destroyed, 550 in aerial combat and 466 on the ground.

In aerial combat, the top-scoring P-51 units (both of which exclusively flew Mustangs) were the 357th Fighter Group of the Eighth Air Force with 595 air-to-air combat victories, and the Ninth Air Force's 354th Fighter Group with 701, which made it the top scoring outfit in aerial combat of all fighter groups of any type. Martin Bowman reports that in the ETO Mustangs flew 213,873 sorties and lost 2,520 aircraft to all causes.




Hitlers 'bomber' Me 262 had little effect on the introduction into service of this aircraft, the unreliability of the engines ensured it didn't enter service sooner]


Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm

Total production of the King Tiger was only 487

Albert Speer, in his book “Inside the Third Reich” commented after the war that there were about 300 King Tiger tanks at Munich rail station waiting to be moved to the front – but the Germans had neither the railways nor the fuel needed to move these tanks around; both targets of Allied bombing.

Think about 100 were available for the Ardennes Offensive, which would leave only 87 others to see action.

Perhaps Speer's not good at counting. :)

[redcoat]

From Wiki...........

Losses were about 840 aircraft.

. Martin Bowman reports that in the ETO Mustangs flew 213,873 sorties and lost 2,520 aircraft to all causes.
Interesting...... in the first part of your post its states losses of 820 and then it agrees with my source* and gives a figure of 2,520 :roll:

*Ray Wagner’s, "American Combat Planes: Third Enlarged Edition,"





Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm
"...the simple fact remains that Junkers failed to resolve the problems poised by series manufacture of the turbojet powering the Me 262 until mid-1944, and thus could not commence volume deliveries to Messerschmitt until the following September/October. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion of those actually engaged in the design development and testing of the Me 262 was to be that the fighter was introduced to service at the earliest practicable stage in its evolution; that any earlier deployment of the warplane on a large scale would have been entirely premature”

William Green, "Warplanes of the Second World War:”

;)

[Ashes]

Interesting...... in the first part of your post its states losses of 820 and then it agrees with my source* and gives a figure of 2,520 :roll:
;)

All I can put it down to is the 820 figure ''may'' be the loses in the Mustang offensive ending May, and the latter figure is for total losses in the ETO for the length of the war.:shock:




"...the simple fact remains that Junkers failed to resolve the problems poised by series manufacture of the turbojet powering the Me 262 until mid-1944, and thus could not commence volume deliveries to Messerschmidt until the following September/October. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion of those actually engaged in the design development and testing of the Me 262 was to be that the fighter was introduced to service at the earliest practicable stage in its evolution; that any earlier deployment of the warplane on a large scale would have been entirely premature”

William Green, "Warplanes of the Second World War:”

;)


..............The project of Me-262 was started in 1938. In July 1943, the fifth type of the Me-262 succeeded in the test flight. The next step was mass production for urgent deliveries to the military service. This could maintain the air defense in Europe. The air defense of Europe could prevent air superiority, which was preparing the conditions of Operation Overlord. Hitler’s "illogical" directions postponed Me-262’s first deliveries to the air service until April 1944. By March, the first outputs actually appeared, but training of the pilots began in April. Until the end of July the production exceeded 100 aircraft. In this last year, Allied forces marched on Rome; on another front, they prepared the aerial conditions for the landings on the Normandy coasts in France. Suddenly, Hitler ordered the Me-262 fighter to be converted to a bomber..............................

http://www.academical.org/dergi/MAKALE/9_10sayi/s9cinar1.htm;);)

[Nickdfresh]

So, is the 840 (actually) figure to be taken as P-51s lost in air-to-air combat, while the rest were lost to accidents or shot down by AAA?

[Ashes]

So, is the 840 (actually) figure to be taken as P-51s lost in air-to-air combat, while the rest were lost to accidents or shot down by AAA?

Yep, in 213,873 sorties, all causes. Flak the highest and mechanical/coolant about the same as air losses, weather and accidents the rest.

By all accounts the first Mustang shot down was at Dieppe Aug.'42..........

Flight Officer Hollis "Holly" Hills, an American serving with No. 414 Sqn of the RCAF, took off from Gatwick in the pre-dawn darkness, as "weaver" (wingman) to Flt. Lt. Freddie Clarke. Flying at wavetop level, the glow from the searchlights and AA fire at Dieppe permitted him to stay with his leader. Once over the target, they were promptly separated; both returned safely. On the second mission that morning, they saw a huge dogfight filling the sky over Dieppe, and Hills spotted four Fw 190s off to their right. With his radio out and unaware of the German fighters, Flt. Lt. Clarke left himself open and was hit. Then Hollis caught one of the FW's with a deflection burst. It started smoking and flaming, then the canopy popped off. Hollis fired again, and the plane fell to ground. He headed for home, shepherding Clarke as he went, dueling another Fw 190 for miles. In his fight with the Fw's, he lost sight of Clarke. After that, Hollis flew home uneventfully, to a dinner made rather somber by Clarke's apparent loss. But next morning, Clarke re-appeared over Hollis' bunk, smelling of seaweed; he had ditched off Dieppe and been rescued. He had witnessed and could officially confirm Hollis' victory over the Focke-Wulf, the first of many aerial victories for the Mustang. And Clarke had the dubious honor of being the first combat Mustang to be shot down in the war by the Germans.

[Ashes]

Harris should have been replaced by Gen. Eisenhower's aide, Air Marshal Arthur Tedder...

Would it have been a good idea to replace Harris after the Normandy invasion?

Even though the decision to bomb cities for morale effect was made long before Harris became Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Harris was completely obsessed with area bombing even to the extent that he argued vehemently against releasing any of his bombers for Overlord, and even threatened to resign when given a directive, dated 25 September 1944, recommending that Bomber Command concentrate against oil and communications targets.

Think Portal [and probably others] were coming around by then on concentrating on oil, and in the end he got Harris to play along [to a certain extent] although at any opportunity Harris would revert to type.


''If''Bomber command, like the Americans, concentrated on oil and transportation targets after Normandy, the war may have ended sooner.

[generalderpanzertruppen]

Am I the only one who thinks that the Me 262 as a ground attack plane wasn't a bad idea? IF, (and it's a big If) it was ready as a ground attack plane by D-Day in worthy numbers, it could have done huge damage on the beaches and then been fairly impervious, (compared to Bf 109s and Fw 190s) to Allied fighters after they'd done their high speed bomb runs and cannon straffing over the beaches. Also, think about how the poor Heer and Waffen-SS ground forces on the Eastern Front could have benefited from reliable Me 262s in ground attack mode, hammering the hordes of T-34s sweeping all before them on the way to Berlin, again, fairly impervious to the Red Air Forces air superiority. Pretty sound thinking IMHO! :D

[Chevan]

Most of those in defense of Germany would probably be night fighters [which were giving bomber command a very hard time] because by June '44, the German day fighters were swept from the sky, mainly by the ''Cadillac of the skies'' the P-51 Mustang.

Well have you any realible evidence of that?
Becouse the 8 AF still survived the heavy day casualties during the entire 1944.

That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that's
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it's a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:)

Oh i know my english is very ugly sometimes:)

Yep, tragic figures aren't they, [don't think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:) plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:(

Sorry this is not my point:(
We saw the statistic of RAF casualties, that clearly demonstrates - the Luftwaffe still been the very effective almost till the end of war.

By wars end P-51's claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.
According to the official USAAF figures, the figure for P-51's lost in combat is 2,520 (all combat causes), and is credited with 4,950 air combat kills and 4,131 ground kills (ETO/MTO theaters)


You see , we should be very carefull with "official" datas:)
Besides that statistic 1520x4950 ( when allies had 10x1 superiority in fighters) absolutly does not reflect the effectiveness of the fighters, for instance Fw-190D9 against P-51.


Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ''blitz bomber'' so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it's entry into the war to late to have any significance.

I think mr Redcoat right- the troubles with engine Jumo004 was the mean reason with delay of mass production of Me262.

Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany's crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

I wrote the 25% becouse the natural oil was just the 25% of total oil production in Germany.
So losing the Romania , reich automatically lose the 25% of its production.
BTW where did you get the figures that the Suynntetic oil was dpown by 80?
This is very disputable.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany.

Well lets look at your post #18
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6758&page=2
Some production stats........


Aircraft production

1940 10.247......
1942 15.409......
1944 39.807......

Fighter production

1940 3.106........
1942 5.213........
1944 28.926........

Artillery production (over 37mm)

1940 5.000.........
1942 12.000........
1944 41.000 ........

Automatic weapons production

1940 171.000......
1942 317.000......
1944 787.000......

Munitions production

1940 865.000........
1942 1.270.000.......
1944 3.350.000........
(tons)

Don't look like the GErmany have been paralysed in the 1944:)
Becouse if the Strategical bombings attacked the Railway stations- how could Germans delivered such great sum of materials for productions to their plantsto produce of so big figures of wearpons?

The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it's often overlooked.

Decisive?
May be in the eyes of Bombers Hight command it looks decisived:)
But according the memours of Albert Speer (Inside the Third Reich, recollections)
he wrote ( sorry i found out only it in russian)http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/speer_a/index.html

Через два с половиной года, несмотря на только сейчас по-настоящему начавшиеся бомбардировки, мы подняли наше производство вооружений до рекордного уровня — от среднегодового индекса 98 за 1941 г. до 322 в июне 1944 г. При этом занятая рабочая сила возросла всего лишь примерно на 30%. Удалось наполовину сократить расход живого труда на единицу продукции.
__________________________________________________ ___________________
Though two years after beginning of stategical bombings , we increase our military production since 98 in 1941 till the 322 in the june of 1944.At the same time the manpower has been increasing ONLY 30%.
The such great resault has been reached due to the rise of effectiveness of production.

As you could see no word about Strategic Bombings , that was "decisived":)
Moreover in his memours Speer described, WHY the Allies Bombing stategy WAS far from really effective

Следующий тяжелый удар должен был постичь нас 17 августа 1943 г., две недели спустя после Гамбурга. В воздух поднялся американский воздушный флот для первой своей стратегической воздушной операции. Ее целью были крупные заводы шарикоподшипников в Швейнфурте. Их производство и без того было узким местом, сковывавшим наши усилия по наращиванию вооружений.

Однако уже при этом первом налете противник допустил просчет. Вместо того, чтобы сосредоточиться на шарикоподшипниковых заводах, соединение из 376 «летающих крепостей» разделилось, и 146 самолетов атаковали одновременно сборочный авиационный завод в Регенсбурге, вполне удачно, но с последствиями, довольно малозначащими. Нас продолжало спасать то, что английская авиация по-прежнему беспорядочно бомбила другие города.
.................................................. ...................................
After the bombing of Hamburd two weekslater, the 8 AF attaked the Ball bearings plan in Shweinfurt.
They , however, admited a serious mistake- instead of the concentration all of Bombers against the Ball plans, they have been seperated to attack the different targets.
Our Ball industry have been finally saved by Brits , who continie to fritter away by bombing the GErmans cities

So indeed thee were no even a hint to a "decisived" role of strategic bombings.
On the contrary, Speer described the failure of Strategic command to destroy the Ball Bearings industry of GErmany vy the elementary lack of operative and strategical interaction between the USSAF and RAF:(

[Chevan]

When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.
Total production of the King Tiger was only 487
.........and at least half of them have been sended to the Eastern front where they fought:)
Really , the allies found all of the King Tigers in Western Front in the Munich;)?

[Chevan]

Um, firstly, all fighters deployed on the Western and Italian fronts have to be considered as part of Germany's air defense against RAF and USAAF bombers, especially since in April and May of 1944, both organizations shifted much of their focus away from bombing German cities to hit French rail centers and other depots (much to the chagrin of Bomber Harris and Gen. Spaatz), which puts the numbers at over 3200. And it should be noted that the Luftwaffe air defense line began in France...

As far as i know the USAAF in the Italia has not been involved into the Bombing of GErmany and France at all.
Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.
Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.

Actually, it was better than any variant of the Me109, and comparisons to the FW190 is subjective, since they were few in number, and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! But they weren't needed. In any case, as there were no more German pilots to fly them, they were pretty much irrelevant directly corresponding with US long range fighter escorts and the P-51 could be produced in much higher numbers. Also, the final variants of the P-51H were more than a match for any German piston engined fighter. The US was also on the verge to deploying the P-80 Shooting Star, which was superior to the Me262 in air to air performance and in production simplicity...

The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.
The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.
The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don't believe me, watch the guncameras films.
Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don't play in WW2 simulators, i do play it..

The Me109 was also water cooled, and the FW190 suffered from many reliability problems not least of which being it having to use synthetic gasoline which inherently effected its performance, which had to be overcome using complex turbochargers. And then, most of Germany's best pilots were dead or captured, and the slow Luftwaffe training and replacement system prevented many more from being trained...The Luftwaffe, even while trying to avoid direct contact with US escort fighters, still suffered high losses of pilots in 1944. These tactics also hindered their effectiveness at attacking bombers. And by mid-1944, USAAF pilots adopted more aggressive tactics and took the War to Luftwaffe fields destroying many of the Fw190s and Me109s on the ground which all but spelled the end of the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict casualties on US bombers...

I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.
And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.
This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.

[Nickdfresh]

As far as i know the USAAF in the Italia has not been involved into the Bombing of GErmany and France at all.

That is incorrect. The number of missions wasn't high for Germany proper, but attacks were conducted from both North Africa and later Italy against Eastern European targets such as Ploesti. Targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany were also attacked...

Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.

I think you may be unaware that the Allies shifted emphasis of bombing operations to directly support the D-Day in early 1944, so the dispersed fighters of the Luftwaffe were indeed attacking bombers over France, and again, were part of a comprehensive German early warning and interdiction system that virtually stretched to Britain itself. I'm not even sure what else they would have been attacking as the Allies had complete air superiority. The famous "two FW-190s" over Juno Beach comes to mind. Although, the Luftwaffe did attempt night strikes against the fleets, which were ineffective, using He-111s I think...

Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.

Yet, there as no tactical aviation to speak of, certainly not in the West after late 1943. Remember Chevan, the German soldier had a saying in Normandy: "If (the plane overhead) is camouflage, then it is British. If it is reflective or metallic, then it's American. If the plane is invisible, then it's the Luftwaffe!"

In fact, the only major air operations the Luftwaffe attempted, other than using Stukas in a few strikes against Bridges, was the operations during the "Battle of the Bulge," in which the Luftwaffe inflicted losses a little better than what they received --only the AAF and the RAF could easily make good their losses. The Germans could not...

The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.

Okay, you've got me Chevan. Sixty-seven FW190s made were superior than the P-51D. And I am well aware of the web-wide discussion of German "what-ifs" and "wonder-weapons" that were produced in small numbers, only at blueprint stage, or were in programs that were so divergent and redundant that they stretched the German research and development into a hugely inefficient waste of resources. However, the rest of the 20,000 plus certainly were NOT more maneuverable at combat altitudes as the P-51 had the advantage. And their performance was hindered by poor quality synthetic gasoline (synthetic is great as lubricating oils, not so good in aviation fuels) and pilots that were routinely killed simply because the Luftwaffe lacked a proper training program to produce adequate pilots after the elites were overwhelmed...

Secondly, the ceiling is largely a moot point, since it was the FW190s that had to meet the P-51s to get through to the bombers, not the other way around, so in a sense, it was the USAAF that dictated the terms of battle. Not too mention that the typical German tactics were to avoid fighter dogfights all together since their primary focus was knocking down bombers...

You might ask why if the FW-190 was such a great aircraft, did most of the German aces prefer Me109s?

The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.

The Spitfire is a beautiful, agile aircraft that I shall never speak ill of. But I can't see how it was "more reliable" since I thought the engines were similar or identical. I could be wrong about that. But remember, the Mark VII version came out as a counter to the FW190 after the RAF noticed them in 1942. In a sense, until the P-51H model that never saw combat in the ETO, the Mustang wasn't really specifically modified nor earmarked to engage a specific aircraft. It didn't have to be. And I'm not even sure the later Spitfires could escort bombers to Berlin and back -- the IVs certainly couldn't...

The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don't believe me, watch the guncameras films.

Except apparently it didn't happen all that often, it was the Luftwaffe that began to suffer irreplaceable losses that the Luftwaffe pilot training could not make good. Not the Americans.

Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don't play in WW2 simulators, i do play it..

The P-47 was a heavy barrel with a huge engine. It was great for tactical air support, but only barely competent against Luftwaffe fighters (until perhaps the last versions) and then only because it was rugged. Although, I believe the later versions were comparable, but were already superseded by, newer fighters such as the Mustang and FW-190. But it was still heavy and need a very powerful engine to compensate, making if a poor long range fighter and not all that agile..

And basing your history on video game developers? :lol:

I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.

Except it really didn't happen all that often, and you could say that about any fighter, including the FW-190. One burst of HE incendiary will pretty much take care of any fighter whether it is air cooled or liquid cooled!

And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.

Au contraire! It was part of the battle of attrition that strategic bombing represented!

This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.

Maybe, but then, the Luftwaffe would have had plenty of fuel, wouldn't they? I would also argue that the emphasis of strategic bombing was largely mislayed from the beginning. But there is little doubt that strategic bombing did in fact sap much of Germany's resources --both aerial and otherwise-- that could have been put to good (or bad) use elsewhere...

[Nickdfresh]

Am I the only one who thinks that the Me 262 as a ground attack plane wasn't a bad idea?

Well, there's you and Hitler? :D


IF, (and it's a big If) it was ready as a ground attack plane by D-Day in worthy numbers, it could have done huge damage on the beaches and then been fairly impervious, (compared to Bf 109s and Fw 190s) to Allied fighters after they'd done their high speed bomb runs and cannon straffing over the beaches. Also, think about how the poor Heer and Waffen-SS ground forces on the Eastern Front could have benefited from reliable Me 262s in ground attack mode, hammering the hordes of T-34s sweeping all before them on the way to Berlin, again, fairly impervious to the Red Air Forces air superiority. Pretty sound thinking IMHO! :D

The aircraft was most suited as a fighter, and Hitler wanted it converted to a bomber only so he could hit back a London, which was completely irrational and he wasted valuable time in doing so. The plane's greatest contribution would have been as an interceptor inflicting heavy losses on bombers to give the Reich breathing room in fuel production and transport. Everyone realized this except Hitler in his mania and waffling, which is why deception had to used to keep the program on track, but delaying it in the process. Even attacking shipping, there would have been a wall of AAA fire over the invasion fleets, not too mention the aircraft was vulnerable when taking off and landing. It would have been mincemeat at forward airfields...

[pdf27]

Secondly, the ceiling is largely a moot point, since it was the FW190s that had to meet the P-51s to get through to the bombers, not the other way around, so in a sense, it was the USAAF that dictated the terms of battle. Not too mention that the typical German tactics were to avoid fighter dogfights all together since their primary focus was knocking down bombers...
Define ceiling - and no, that isn't a silly question. The US defined ceiling as the maximum height at which a specified rate of climb could still be achieved, while the German definition was the absolute maximum height possible with both forms of boost going (Water-Methanol and Nitrous Oxide - one lasted 5 minutes, the other 10, and combined they wrecked the engine in short order). Unless you can show me reports on both aircraft done by the same flight test centre (i.e. Boscome Down or Edwards AFB), I'm going to be very sceptical of claims that one outperforms the other I'm afraid.
The speed margin available at that height is also very important - i.e. the gap between stalling speed and Vne (Velocity Never Exceed - i.e. the speed at which structural failure is imminent). This gap reduces radically with altitude and indeed on some aircraft defines the absolute ceiling. IIRC for the U-2 spyplane this gap is only about 10 km/hr.

[Nickdfresh]

Define ceiling - and no, that isn't a silly question. The US defined ceiling as the maximum height at which a specified rate of climb could still be achieved, while the German definition was the absolute maximum height possible with both forms of boost going (Water-Methanol and Nitrous Oxide - one lasted 5 minutes, the other 10, and combined they wrecked the engine in short order). Unless you can show me reports on both aircraft done by the same flight test centre (i.e. Boscome Down or Edwards AFB), I'm going to be very sceptical of claims that one outperforms the other I'm afraid.

Meh, I didn't say "silly question." I said moot point. Mainly because, neither the P-51Ds nor the FW-190 were in an aerobatics competition or race. From what I've gathered and have always read, the P-51 had a clear advantage at higher altitudes over the earlier FW-190s, which is why the Dora variant was developed as well as fears of a B-29 deployment to the ETO. The ceiling advantages the FW-190 might or might not have had are largely irrelevant when speaking in terms of the air war over Germany in 1944-45...

The speed margin available at that height is also very important - i.e. the gap between stalling speed and Vne (Velocity Never Exceed - i.e. the speed at which structural failure is imminent). This gap reduces radically with altitude and indeed on some aircraft defines the absolute ceiling. IIRC for the U-2 spyplane this gap is only about 10 km/hr.

I believe this was a key advantage that the Mustang had throughout the War, its ability to maintain its performance to a greater degree than most of its competition did at high altitudes. The later versions of the FW-190s were meant to challenge that, and although they were excellent aircraft certainly capable of keeping pace with the P-51Ds, it seems that many Luftwaffe fanbois on the Internet make some of the latter German piston engined fighters into super-weapons that would have destroyed the P-51 if issued earlier or in greater numbers, all while ignoring the fact that the Mustang was easy to produce and relatively simple to maintain as well as being an excellent all around fighter aircraft with unmatched range...

[redcoat]

The Spitfire is a beautiful, agile aircraft that I shall never speak ill of. But I can't see how it was "more reliable" since I thought the engines were similar or identical. I could be wrong about that.
Not more reliable, but the P-51 was more prone to unknown structural failures than the Spitfire, and safety limits were advised on certain maneuvers

And I'm not even sure the later Spitfires could escort bombers to Berlin and back -- the IVs certainly couldn't...
They couldn't, but that was mainly due to there was never a requirement issued by the RAF for a long range Spitfire. There is little doubt a longer ranged Spitfire could have been developed if they had done so, a unarmed photo-recon Spitfire was the first Allied single seat fighter design to overfly Berlin in ww2


Except apparently it didn't happen all that often, it was the Luftwaffe that began to suffer irreplaceable losses that the Luftwaffe pilot training could not make good.
Luftwaffe pilot training was failing as soon as the Battle of Britain. The air battles over Germany in late 43-4 was the last stand of the Luftwaffe fighter arm, it had already lost control over the Russian and Mediterranean battlefields

[Drake]

Luftwaffe pilot training was failing as soon as the Battle of Britain. The air battles over Germany in late 43-4 was the last stand of the Luftwaffe fighter arm, it had already lost control over the Russian and Mediterranean battlefields

A guy named Murray wrote an interesting (imho) essay on those issues. It's called strategy for defeat - the luftwaffe 1933-1945.

[Ashes]

Well have you any realible evidence of that?
Becouse the 8 AF still survived the heavy day casualties during the entire 1944.


As dangerous as the fighters were once Allied long range fighters became available
they were nothing compared to the Flak defenses. In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed. More flak guns gradually appeared, mainly the 128mm (5 in) German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of March 24th, 1944. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November of 1944. (Data from Flak History Page)

Suffice to say on D-day there were only 300 Luftwaffe fighters to oppose the Allied landings in France and IIRC, 500 on the Eastern front.



We saw the statistic of RAF casualties, that clearly demonstrates - the Luftwaffe still been the very effective almost till the end of war.



See post above, plus a relatively few night fighters were still extracting a toll.




Besides that statistic 1520x4950 ( when allies had 10x1 superiority in fighters) absolutly does not reflect the effectiveness of the fighters, for instance Fw-190D9 against P-51...

It was more like better trained American pilots. A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours actually required because of.......... fuel shortage.:)



I think mr Redcoat right- the troubles with engine Jumo004 was the mean reason with delay of mass production of Me262....

AND Herr Schicklegruber.:)


BTW where did you get the figures that the Suynntetic oil was dpown by 80?
This is very disputable.


From the U.S. Strategic bombing survey..........


........Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output........ Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun................


http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taoo



And Speer's report to Hitler........

The first massive raids on synthetic plants was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that must perforce have tragic consequences.

Continued attacks also negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.

In his final report, Speer noted that the undisturbed repair and operation of the plants were essential prerequisites for further supply, but the experience of recent months had shown that this was impossible under existing conditions. Behind Speer’s warnings was his awareness that once production of fuels was substantially curtailed, once reserves and the fuel in the distribution system were depleted, the Germans would be finished and the end could be predicted with almost mathematical accuracy. In a way, Speer was merely echoing the prophetic utterance of Field Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of 1943:

The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked.

A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours actually required.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm


Don't look like the GErmany have been paralysed in the 1944:)
.

Again from the Strategic bombing survey.............

“Before the Combined Bomber Offensive the German aircraft industry had at least a 100% excess capacity of plant and equipment. This is indicated by the fact that single-shift operation of most facilities was normal procedure prior to 1944.”

In 1944 the Speer Ministry reported to Hitler that 39,000 aircraft were produced, of which 26,000 were fighters. There are 17,000 German aircraft (8,000 fighters) which the USSBS could not account for based on the number of aircraft delivered and the number destroyed. It was known that Hitler demanded miracles from his subordinates. Under these circumstances it is not entirely impossible that Messrs Speer and Seur, controlling aircraft production, “rigged” their accounting to make a satisfactory showing. The conclusion is than nowhere near 39,000 aircraft were produced in 1944.

“Strategic bombing forced the dispersal of the aircraft industry. This disruption alone paid the cost of Allied bombing. Disruption of production was caused by the physical movement of goods and machinery, the loss of efficiency due to the dilution of management, an increased load on the already overtaxed transportation system were all factors in the final result. In the end dispersal defeated itself, because once the transportation system failed, it became impossible to keep final assembly points fed with the necessary component parts and sub-assemblies to produce finished aircraft. It was largely after that system failed that they decided to re-centralize the plants underground, for efficient and economical operation. This decision came too late to be effective in the German war programs but the cost of the effort added tremendously to the strain on the national economy.”

“Until early 1943 less than half the available capacity was utilized in the German aircraft industry. The industry was coasting along on a one-shift per day basis. The big push for expansion started in 1943 when the German High Command realized the potentialities of the Allied air attack. The realization came too late. The weight of attack that was delivered late in 1943 and early in 1944 set back production plans by many months and denied the German Air force some thousands of aircraft at a time when it needed them most.”



And..................

“By the end of 1944 disintegration of the entire economy had set in. Transportation was disorganized to the point that essential materials could not be delivered to the manufacturers, nor could finished products be taken away. Airframe assembly plants, although relatively invulnerable to direct attack because of dispersal and underground installations, could not get deliveries of engines, accessories or sub-assemblies. Centralized planning broke down completely. Production of aircraft fell precipitously to a point far below the normal requirements of the German Air Force. By war’s end the manufacture of aircraft was at a standstill.”

[Firefly]

Hitler bombed my mam in Leicester England in 1940 but missed.
He also area-bombed other Brit cities.
So I applaud Harris's famous quote -
"They sowed the wind and now they are going to reap the whirlwind"..

At the time that bluster didnt really mean anything and I think that Churchil may have come to regret it later. He could have got the men of Bomber Command a campaign medal but seemed to shy away from it.

[Rising Sun*]

Churchill ... could have got the men of Bomber Command a campaign medal but seemed to shy away from it.

Could you expand on that?

What would be the significance of a campaign medal over whatever they got?

What did they get?

[pdf27]

1) What would be the significance of a campaign medal over whatever they got?
2) What did they get?
1) Recognition of the horrendous casualties they took in comparison to just about any other allied arm or service. IIRC only German U-boat crews took heavier casualties than Bomber Command (not sure about Soviet infantry/armoured units).
2) Nothing beyond the 1939-45 war service medals everyone else got.

[B5N2KATE]

The Allied Bomber campaign over Europe is a classic case of British attitudes. Quite OK to do your worst, as long as the enemy does it first.

Bomber command, and Harris in particular, suffered from the Douhet inspired delusion that they could win the war singlehandedly by bombing alone. Speer actually agreed with them after Hamburg ("Six more raids like that one will finish us"), but Allied capacity was just not that strong. WW2 airwar was a process in development, with nobody actually sure of the results until the Third Reich fell. Morale is such an intangible factor when it's applied to civilians. "The Blitz" did more to bring Londoners and British people TOGETHER....same for Germany.

The plain fact of it is that when you attack a city, whether you are aiming at industry or not, you are attacking civilians with service people in uniform.

Whether modern war can ever get past this abberration is anyone's guess. Maybe we should put politicians in an arena, with the very best equipment of course, and watch them finish what they begin on our behalf, while we all watch and make ironic cheers or groans as they bite the dust. The winners of this contest could then preen themselves as "heroic", hand out medals to eachother, and then get back to the business of enacting state policy, rather than dragging everybody in to their churlish squabbles.

[B5N2KATE]

Story of Harris from wartime.....

Policeman stops Arthur's car. It has been speeding along with no lights. Advising Harris to slow down or "you might kill someone", Harris brusquely replies...

"My dear fellow....I am PAID to kill people."

[PsyWar.Org]

1) Recognition of the horrendous casualties they took in comparison to just about any other allied arm or service. IIRC only German U-boat crews took heavier casualties than Bomber Command (not sure about Soviet infantry/armoured units).
2) Nothing beyond the 1939-45 war service medals everyone else got.


Bomber Command aircrew did receive a special campaign medal, the Aircrew Europe Star.

[B5N2KATE]

The Great War cost Britain 51,000 junior officers, said at the time to be the "flower of our best youth". The British emphasis on airpower, and bombing in particular, was specifically to prevent this same wastage of the country's best and brightest. 54,000 were killed flying British aircraft, many of them the very junior officers this policy was supposed to protect....

Rather ironic....eh old boy?

[B5N2KATE]

someone up top of the post stated that Germany had...

"invented bombing of cities on a large scale"

I challenge this assertion. This is hardly an "invention". It was a concept, based on the theory advocated by an Italian (Douhet) that modern mass land armys were obselete, and that the bombing of cities would result in such an outcry that nations would not have to go to war in the same grand old style, but would rise up and surrender before this became necessary. Douhet's book, "Command of the Air" was fiction, but it certainly got the theorists talking in EVERY country in Europe. The Royal Air Force was the only service that had designed specific aircraft for this task right from the beginning. The German Luftwaffe was an arm of the Army, a tactical tool designed to co-operate with the land forces far more closely than any other air-force of it's day. The fact that it was used against large towns and cities was more a product of circumstance. The British continued their Great War propaganda ideas with the policy that "once it's been done to us, we can do it too." The theorists did not really get a chance to see what airpower could do vis-a-vis Douhet's theory in Poland or France. The Russians attempted to bomb Finland out of the contest, but found they could not control the airspace above. So it was left to the Luftwaffe to be the arm of decision in bringing the war to a successful conclusion against England. The Kriegsmarine was definately half-hearted about it's chances of a crosschannel invasion, and with the new Churchill government rejecting any and all peace overtures, there was really only one policy left to successfully prosecute the war against England.

Churchill himself put it best when he came to power....

"I would say to the House, as I have said to those who joined this government: I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.....You ask, What is our policy? I will say; it is to wage war by sea, land and air, with all our might and all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy....."

So, you see that by virtue of the swift victory in France, in combination with Churchill refusing any form of peace overture, and further combined with the theory of Colonel Douhet, Germany proceeded along the lines of bombing for lack of any other way to bring the war in the west to a successful conclusion....

Rather the same reason that Britain turned to bombing...for lack of any other way to strike at the homeland, and END the conflict with Britain, something that many wished to see, even ADOLF HITLER.....

[B5N2KATE]

I've always found it funny that Churchill, rabid anti-communist that he was, found a way to let Hitler's oft stated policy of "Drang Nach Osten" to work in his favour, playing off an enemy he considered to be "monstrous" (Germany), against another enemy he had spent much of his career warning us about (the Soviet Union), all the while lobbying Roosevelt to come into the war. He knew that once the Americans joined the fray it was all over.....something he referred to after Pearl Harbour as

"merely the proper application of overwhelming force..."

I can't help thinking that as a strategist, Churchill was not as big a buffon as he would have us believe. In fact, he went to great lengths to suggest as much himself. Harry Hopkins noted that Winston was

"very much in charge of strategy..."

and Hitler had opened his mouth about "expansion Eastward" and "lebensraum" many many times, so often as to be unmentionable.....why not play one dictator off against the other? It was obvious even to the cartoonist, the Egyptian KEM, in his famous cartoon of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, that both Hitler and Stalin were tied together at the boot, and each with a hand on his gun. Any fool could see that Hitler was going to attempt a knockout-blow against Communism.

I think Churchill was absolutely willing to see him give it his best shot. Provoking Japan with an Oil Embargo was a quick way to get United States support in actuality. Funny how they embargoed Japan only in 1940, when they had been fighting in China for all of nine years....and funny how Pearl Harbor was bang on time after the failure of the Blitzkrieg.....I don't think Hitler's declaration of war on the US is such a great mystery, he was simply supporting his allies, nothing more.

Churchill was not a strategic buffoon.....he was simply the most influential politician of the 20th century....and thank GOD for that!

RIP WINSTON........

[Rising Sun*]

I can't help thinking that as a strategist, Churchill was not as big a buffon as he would have us believe. In fact, he went to great lengths to suggest as much himself. Harry Hopkins noted that Winston was

"very much in charge of strategy..."

As far as grand strategy goes, Hopkin's is a fair comment.

It doesn't follow that just because he was in charge of it that Churchill was necessarily very good at it. The problem was that sometimes Churchill was too much in charge of strategy at levels below grand strategy, and too unwilling to listen to wiser counsel.

As far as military strategy goes, particularly at the campaign level such as Malaya and Greece, Churchill was seriously deficient.

He certainly wasn't on top of Malaya. He said towards the end of or after the war something to the effect that he would have acted differently if he'd known how bad the situation was (I can't recall the source or exact quote). Not the mark of someone who was sufficiently on top of things to be making decisions about Malaya's defence. Or perhaps the mark of someone who was, but who later wanted to avoid blame for the shambles he presided over.

On the other hand, it could be argued that Churchill's deficiencies over Malaya reflected his mastery of grand strategy and the recognition that putting the necessary resources into Malaya would take them away from the fight against Germany, which was contrary to his 'Germany first' focus.

Against that is Churchill's unilateral diversion to Burma, after Australia refused to agree to such action, of the returning 7th Division shortly after the Singapore surrender. On a large scale strategic basis it makes a degree of sense as if Burma was held then the other Allies could keep supplying China through Burma to keep Japanese forces and LOC engaged there, as well as denying Burma's oil and minerals to the Japanese. But there is a competing and equally compelling large scale strategic argument for returning the 7th Div to Australia to ensure the survival of Australia as a base for Australian and American action against Japan. This had the advantage of stringing out Japan's forces and LOC. Allowing Australia to fall would enbable Japan to concentrate them in China and strike at Burma and India, or perhaps the USSR which was the last thing the Allies needed from the 'Germany first' viewpoint as it could assist a German victory. From a long term viewpoint, putting more troops into Burma and risking losing Australia was, at the time the decision was made, plainly the least effective way of dealing with Japan for the duration of the war once America marshalled its might. The one great advantage it offered Britain was preserving Britain's colony of Burma and protecting India. So, from the viewpoint of British grand strategy it was a reasonable decision, but not from the overall Allied viewpoint of the war against Japan or the Axis powers, with the exception that denying India to Japan denied it that route to Middle Eastern oil.

So far as Greece is concerned, that campaign contradicts any notion that it was consistent with a clear eyed view of grand strategy focused on defeating Germany, Japan not yet having come into the war. Churchill ignored sound military advice about the need for air cover. The Commonwealth troops duly paid the price, to no military purpose. Except perhaps for delaying Barbarossa, but that wasn't something that figured in Churchill's thinking and was just an accidental by-product. It didn't avoid the German occupation of Greece, which was one of its aims. Meanwhile it diverted troops, naval and air forces and LOC from North Africa, where they would have been better employed. From a grand strategy and from a military strategy viewpoint, it is difficult to see why the Greek campaign commended itself to Churchill, as usual over advice to the contrary from is military advisers, including Alan Brooke, the CIGS.

Still, Winston Churchill is the figure most often poked with Alanbrooke's pen. There are at least three reasons for this. The first is bureaucratic: there was a civilian Secretary of State for War who outranked Alanbrooke, but this personage, Sir Percy James Grigg, appears remarkably uninfluential on war policy and was utterly ignored by war historians. Alanbrooke thought him a prince, but this could be in part because Grigg kindly left him alone.

That leaves Alanbrooke, Britain's leading military adviser, with exactly two civilian bosses in direct line above him: Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, both of them with the same name: Winston S. Churchill.10

Another reason for the criticism of Churchill is high-minded and strategic, if not necessarily correct. Alanbrooke felt that this admittedly-great man had no strategy; as late as December 1941, when Alanbrooke became C.I.G.S., he remained "appalled" by the "lack of a definite policy....Planned strategy was not Winston's strong card. He preferred to work by intuition and impulse."11

Proving he does possess a sense of humor, Alanbrooke twice formulates the problem as antithesis: "God knows where we would be without him, but God knows where we shall go with him," says an entry for 1941. Three years hence he writes: "Without him England was lost for a certainty, with him England has been on the verge of disaster time and again."12

A third irritation Alanbrooke had with the Prime Minister was quite the opposite of strategic indecision: in certain narrow corridors, Churchill was focused to a fault, sinking his bulldog teeth into a particular idea or operation that appealed to him. Whenever anyone pointed out how much this laser-focus neglected or damaged other important military matters, the bulldog would shake his head fiercely and keep grinding. Examples include snatching Greek islands and liberating Norway. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=284

Those aspects are balanced by the next paragraph from that source, which perhaps ignores the extent to which Churchill exerted influence over the military,

What Alanbrooke never adds to such accounts of conference room combat is that Churchill would never overrule the Chiefs of Staff when they agreed among themselves. Arguing, testing and debating were part of proper civilian oversight. Alanbrooke missed the point. He thought he was saving Britain from wild variants of hare-brained strategies.

Alan Brooke's following opinion exemplifies the contradictions in Churchill's strategic abilities and actions.

In fact, Brooke had withheld some of the more pointed criticisms of the Prime Minister, which he often wrote after late night arguments with Churchill. If anything, his anger at the Prime Minister grew as the war went on. On 10 September 1944 he wrote in his diary (an entry omitted in the published version):

[Churchill] has only got half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense. I find it hard to remain civil. And the wonderful thing is that 3/4 of the population of this world imagine that Winston Churchill is one of the Strategists of History, a second Marlborough, and the other 1/4 have no conception what a public menace he is and has been throughout the war! It is far better that the world should never know and never suspect the feet of clay on that otherwise superhuman being. Without him England was lost for a certainty, with him England has been on the verge of disaster time and again ... Never have I admired and despised a man simultaneously to the same extent. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=611

[Cash]

For me Harris is a mix of hero and pragmatic wartime leader. He had a difficult job to do and did it well. He was the right man for the job at the right time.

The words of the man himself - http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=KhmRrTsv55Y

[B5N2KATE]

Fair comments Rising sun...

Maybe we could seperate GRAND STRATEGY from GRAND TACTICAL, Churchill having good concepts of the former, and an irresponsible attitude to the latter.

There is no doubt in my mind that Churchill's policy was aimed fairly and squarely at the "long haul".....He often made the point that England's long association with warfare was very much a history of "...losing battles and winning wars."

The Allied bomber offensive is a classic case in point of this attitude.....Harris, in a postwar interview, defended this, stating of the Battle of Berlin...

"You must remember that Bomber Command fought a thousand battles during the war. I'm not saying The Battle of Berlin was a defeat; quite the contrary, I think it was a major contribution to the victory of the Allied alliance."

I detect the hand and mind of WS Churchill in statements like that one. Harris was very much in it for the "long haul", just as his boss.

Greece is a case of justification after the fiasco. The only redeeming feature we can find for it is the oft cited "delayed Barbarossa"......but, doesn't Franz Halder state quite catagorically that Barbarossa "waited for the Spring thaw to come and go, for the ground to dry out. We could not have launched it earlier than what we did."

Malaya suffered from a definate lack of material, if not manpower, and commanders on the spot made little or no effort to study the problems of Jungle warfare, or to put into place proper measures (logistically speaking) for the maintenance of a protracted siege. Yamashita's Army was very much on a shoestring, bluffing Percival into surrender after using unorthodox methods to overcome Malayan terrain. Troop dispositions in Malaya, too, were more to do with securing airfields. A modern bomber force and a genuine attempt to grasp command of the air may well have made the Japanese advance untenable, since it was achieved not by walking down the peninsula as some assume, but by a succession of amphibious landings further and further down the coast. With all of Bomber Command's resources hogged to hit Germany, one wonders what might have been achieved with proper air support, or proper allocation of resources full stop.

[Rising Sun*]

Maybe we could seperate GRAND STRATEGY from GRAND TACTICAL, Churchill having good concepts of the former, and an irresponsible attitude to the latter.

Yes, that's the distinction I was driving at.

Malaya suffered from a definate lack of material, if not manpower, and commanders on the spot made little or no effort to study the problems of Jungle warfare, or to put into place proper measures (logistically speaking) for the maintenance of a protracted siege. Yamashita's Army was very much on a shoestring, bluffing Percival into surrender after using unorthodox methods to overcome Malayan terrain. Troop dispositions in Malaya, too, were more to do with securing airfields. A modern bomber force and a genuine attempt to grasp command of the air may well have made the Japanese advance untenable, since it was achieved not by walking down the peninsula as some assume, but by a succession of amphibious landings further and further down the coast. With all of Bomber Command's resources hogged to hit Germany, one wonders what might have been achieved with proper air support, or proper allocation of resources full stop.

I agree with that in general, but I'd qualify the comment about Yamashita being on a shoestring. He was offered a much larger force but reckoned, correctly, that he could do it with the forces actually employed, to avoid the LOC etc problems of a larger force. To the extent that it was done on a shoestring, it was intentionally so to maximise mobility and flexibility, and command and control. Not that he was quite able to control the Imperial Guards at times, but he didn't want them to begin with.

He did, however, plan the operation and assemble his invasion force in a very short time with impressive results. Having air superiority from day one and having tanks when the Commonwealth forces had none didn't do any harm, either.

The biggest impediment to the British defence at the outset was Churchill, for reasons of grand strategy, refusing to allow Percival into Thailand until the Japanese attacked there, by which time it was too late and the die was pretty much cast, so that he didn't risk losing American support by being seen as the aggressor. If he'd known what the Japanese were going to do at Pearl Harbor, and later at Bataan, he needn't have worried. You might find this discussion interesting . http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4781

[B5N2KATE]

Nice point about Yamashita.....Unprecedented that a commander should refuse a larger allocation of troops for an operation! Yamashita qualifies himself as no fool!

Great post Sun!

[Rising Sun*]

Nice point about Yamashita.....Unprecedented that a commander should refuse a larger allocation of troops for an operation! Yamashita qualifies himself as no fool!

He sure wasn't.

He was allocated five divisions by the high command but decided to use only three.

He reckoned on taking Singapore within 100 days but did it in 70.

[B5N2KATE]

Do we have a case for Yamashita being the PREMIER Japanese General of WW2?

[B5N2KATE]

oh, and thankyou for thread 4781....a nice discussion and some great links there too!

[Rising Sun*]

Do we have a case for Yamashita being the PREMIER Japanese General of WW2?

I don't know enough about all the others, especially those in China, to make a fair comparison.

He was certainly the most effective in the initial phase of the southward push and was called back in the final phase for the Philippines where he was again effective, given he arrived only a few days before the Americans invaded and had no time to organise his defences as he would have wished. I think his reassignment to the Philippines when it was 'backs to the wall' indicates that he was seen as one of the best generals Japan had.

The problem was that he was sidelined by Tojo after Malaya and sent back to China because he was so effective and seen as a bit of a threat, so he didn't get the opportunity to shine in the SWPA or Pacific during most of the war.

He might be the unluckiest Japanese general as it seems that he wasn't responsible for the Manila Massacre which earned him the death penalty, while the Parit Sulong Massacre in Malaya was the Imperial Guards off on a frolic of their own. Not too sure about the massacres of Chinese in Singapore. Tsuji was behind it, but I can't remember the extent of Yamashita's involvement.

[32Bravo]

He sure wasn't.

He was allocated five divisions by the high command but decided to use only three.

He reckoned on taking Singapore within 100 days but did it in 70.


Napoleon said give me a lucky general, or words to that effect.

Yamashita was lucky. he couldn't have susained his assault for a further 30 days. Fortunately, for him, the British were lacking in many things, particularly leadership and training - actually, their biggest drawback was leadership.

Bomber Harris was a man of his times. Between the two world wars it was always thought that strategic bombing would be the winner of future wars. Britan had been bombed by Zepelins in the first war. Not only Harris, but the commander of the US air forces in the Pacific (his name escapes me now) was of the same opinion, and to some extent it proved to be correct.

Naturally, Churchill and Harris would sound alike, they were both educated in the British boarding school system and would have had a classic education. They understood the necessity of sacrifice and ruthlessness to win wars.

No, Harris was not a criminal, he was doing what he believed necessary to succeed and he was in a position to influence the strategy in which he believed.

[pdf27]

Bomber Harris was a man of his times. Between the two world wars it was always thought that strategic bombing would be the winner of future wars. Britain had been bombed by Zeppelins in the first war.
The formative experiences of the likes of Bomber Harris should also be remembered. In his case, it consisted of several years in the RFC looking down on the devastation of the trenches.
Postwar, theoreticians like Douhet postulated that it would be quicker, cheaper and more humane to destroy the warmaking potential of the enemy at source (i.e. flatten the factories where their munitions were manufactured) than to destroy it on the field of battle.
To someone who had spent several years witnessing the literal decimation of a generation, that theory has to have a lot of appeal. Indeed, in his memoirs he wrote the following...
In spite of all that happened at Hamburg, bombing proved a comparatively humane method. For one thing, it saved the youth of this country and of our allies from being mown down by the military as it was in the war of 1914-1918.

[32Bravo]

The formative experiences of the likes of Bomber Harris should also be remembered. In his case, it consisted of several years in the RFC looking down on the devastation of the trenches.
Postwar, theoreticians like Douhet postulated that it would be quicker, cheaper and more humane to destroy the warmaking potential of the enemy at source (i.e. flatten the factories where their munitions were manufactured) than to destroy it on the field of battle.
To someone who had spent several years witnessing the literal decimation of a generation, that theory has to have a lot of appeal. Indeed, in his memoirs he wrote the following...

Absolutely! And it was Total War. Many civillians were killed when caught up in the 'battlefield'. Killed by their own troops and allies on numerous occassions. The Germans set the standard, as Harris remarked with his now famous 'reap the whirlwind' remarks. He was also well aware of the terror bombing of Warsaw, the Lowlands and France.
Having stood on the roof of the Air Ministry and witnessed the devastation of the 'Docklands' and many of its civillian population, he wasn't inclined to be sympathetic towards German casualties. On the contrary, he considered such casualties as being a psychological weapon to put pressure on the German leadership by lowering the morale of the population and the front-line troops.

One of the things about Harris that impresses me is that, at the time of his comment, Britain had not the capacity to launch a 'whirlwind'. However, he was obviously aware of the state of British aero technology and new that there were people such as Chadwick, who designed the Lancaster (from his earlier design of the underpowered Manchester), who would 'deliver the goods' so to speak.

[bluedonkey99]

Total War, is total war............

that said thetargeting taretting of cultural heritage targets has little merit in the way of serving the end game.

the blitz on london, ironically showed that a nations psyche and moral could not be impaired by bombing of civilians, but the converse.... indesriminate bombing of cilvilians strengthens the morale againt the oppresser

[bluedonkey99]

...that said, in 1940-194 what else dd we have?
.....come 1944-1945 did we need to?

i still think overall he IS as british hero, and as i pass his monument on the way to work each morning I am glad of Harris and Dowdings work - on balance!

afterall, who of use has had aperfect carreer at work? we have all made mistaked, albeit perhaps without such terrifying results or impact?

[Adrian Wainer]

Firstly I think it important, to understand German war aims.

1 Germany was not fighting a War over a disputed territory, unless one would consider the entire planet as a disputed territory.

2 Germany was engaged in a policy of industrialized extermination of whole races and peoples.

As it so happened, Hitler considered the British an Aryan race but given that the Third Reich was essentially a Hitler and his dog one man production in terms of authority and that long term policy in the Third Reich was whatever Hitler said it was, whenever he said it, there would be no reason that had the United Kingdom been occupied by the Third Reich, that Hitler might not have decided that the British were one of the lost tribes of Israel and have then decided to exterminate the entire British population.

In Germany, Hitler was hugely popular and his popularity only started to wane when the War started to go seriously wrong for Germany. Therefor to make a distinction between a civilian and soldier in the case of the Third Reich is I would argue a somewhat false one, in that the German soldier crushed under the tracks of a Soviet T-34 might well have been somebody who hated Hitler and all that he stood for and only was in the army because he would have been shot had he refused to serve in the military, whilst the housewife blown to bits by an RAF bomb in Dresden might have baked Hitler a cake in celebration of the defeat of France in 1940 and would have been worried that the Nazi authorities were being too soft in their treatment of the Russians and the Poles. Given that the British were fighting an exterminationist regime, that had popular support, the use of area bombing becomes a legitimate tool of War. The question mark over Harris' actions is that, from what little I know of the subject is that he pursued massed bomber raids on German cities towards the later part of the war with a single minded purpose when in fact there were other targets, which would have produced as great and perhaps greater military advantage for the cost of less German lives. In his defense, a problem which Harris would have had, but today historians and commentators do not, is that he could not have seen the exact results in terms of German morale which area bombing would have had and therefor a continuing attempt to break German morale by area bombing may have seemed rational and even humane. One factor which must have influenced German policy at several levels is that after what the German authorities had got up to in Russia, is that a ferocious response would have been expected in the event of a Russian occupation of Germany and with that in mind, even after the War had gone seriously wrong for Germany it was not an un-rational choice for Germans to take their chances with RAF bombing in the hope that something would turn up, rather than surrendering and being occupied by the Soviet Union. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, and with that in mind, I can't see there is anything the RAF could have done in the policy of the area bombing of cities which would have forced the Germans to surrender, short of having dropped a few nuclear weapons on German cities in 1944/45.

Best and Warm Regards
Adrian Wainer

[figurehead]

You're only a war criminal if you're side loses, think about it.

[blu3bottle]

A few facts.

Arthur Harris did not command policy the war cabinet did and passed orders through under air vice marshal portal. Harris was given a list of targets and choose himself what was the best target for that day.

Dresden was attacked after Churchill needed to show Stalin the American's and British were still aiding the Russians.Harris was given the choise of three citys.Dresden was choosen because it was the main german supply link facing the red army.

Unknown by many the American air force attacked Dresden by day while bomber command at night.The disproportionate blame for the massace was put on Bomber command simply because