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Nickdfresh
05-16-2016, 06:05 PM
This map predicted how Japan would attack the US during World War II

Jeremy Bender,Business Insider (https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/map-predicted-japan-attack-us-151420834.html) 6 hours ago Comments

On November 7, 1937, the Los Angeles Examiner published a prescient map predicting how Imperial Japan could attack the US during World War II.

Created by Howard A. Burke, the map imagined a Japanese attack on the US that closely predicted the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor four years later on December 7, 1941. Burke rightly noted that Japan's first target would be Hawaii and the US fleet docked at Pearl Harbor.

"The first objective must be capture of Hawaii," Burke notes on the map. "This would mean crippling or annihilating the U.S. fleet, giving Japan one of the world's greatest naval bases — Pearl Harbor."

After that attack, Burke then imagined that Japan would follow up the assault with a two-pronged naval and aerial strike from Hawaii against Los Angeles and San Francisco, with a simultaneous Japanese assault from Alaska working its way down the Pacific Northwest.

You can see Burke's map below:

7701

kallinikosdrama1992
05-17-2016, 05:34 AM
I dont think there was a plan with more strategic value, than attacking Hawai. Although landing in Alaska might work for the Japanese to. No one bat an eye though

Rising Sun*
05-17-2016, 10:10 AM
I dont think there was a plan with more strategic value, than attacking Hawai.

Debatable, but one has to try to balance knowledge at the time with 20/20 hindsight.

If Japan hadn't attacked the US in Hawaii, the Philippines or elsewhere, and despite the erosion of isolationism as evidenced by watering down of the Netrality Acts so that they were virtually irrelevant by November 1941 despite a seeming majority of the American people not wanting to get involved in external wars, it's debatable whether the US would have gone to war with Japan if Japan had limited its conquests to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies as territories of two imperial / colonial powers which offended everything many politicians and people in America stood for as staunch anti-imperialists / anti-colonialists. Then again, Roosevelt and Co were determined that Japan should not get its hands on NEI oil to overcome the US and British embargoes on oil exports to Japan, so on that basis Japan didn't have a choice but to attack the US as a potential enemy.

Japan had to decide whether, even if it didn't attack the US, the US would allow Japan to exploit the resources from its conquests in Indo-China, Malaya, Burma and the NEI, all of which required Japan's ships to transport their bounty in range of the Philippines with its US forces. If Japan saw the Philippines as a threat then it had to take the Philippines. If Japan took the Philippines, then it made sense to destroy the fleet at Pearl to prevent it coming to the rescue of the Philippines.

Regardless, the Japanese attack on Hawaii was a tactical success but a strategic failure because, essentially:
1. The IJN attack was pretty much on rails to launch the attack at a fixed time and place, largely to ensure the fleet’s route to Hawaii wasn’t detected by the US or others, so it missed the opportunity and intelligence to await the return of the critical US carriers to Pearl. But also to ensure that the fleet and its oilers and fleet train could return to Japan to continue the war Japan started to overcome its domestic scarcity of oil.
2. Despite basing its attack on the lessons of Taranto where the British succeeded in damaging enemy ships in a shallow harbour, the IJN sunk very few US ships. Most were grounded in the shallow harbour and later returned to service (for example, IIRC, about six of the eight US battleships supposedly sunk by the IJN at Pearl returned to service and sunk a good number of IJN ships later in the war and in a combined action by most or all of those US battleships in the Philippines later in the war).
3. Critically, the IJN focused on sinking US ships rather than destroying the oil storages and general supply and repair facilities without which the US capital ships would have been forced to return to the US West Coast, whether or not they were damaged, and to conduct the rest of the war from there. At least until the oil storages etc at Hawaii were able to sustain operations from Hawaii, which would have required considerable transport and other resources to reinstate Hawaii.
4. Hawaii was just a large scale hugely tactically impressive but strategically not very successful raid by the IJN. It fell a long way short of forcing the US fleet back to the West Coast of the USA while Japan went southwards into Malaya, NEI etc in pursuit of its war plans to grab resources, trade and labour in those regions. Japan did not have the troops, ships, fuel, and any other logistical requirements to invade and hold Hawaii, which is why it didn’t do so when it had its best chance early in December 1941. Meanwhile, Japan left the crucial US carriers and most of the fuel and facilities at Pearl in good working order.
5. Overall, Japan’s raid on Hawaii was an own goal by outraging the American people and bringing them into a war, determined to destroy Japan, which Japan’s smartest leaders knew before it started was a war Japan could not win.
6. The fundamental flaw in Japan’s war strategy was that it didn’t really have a clearly articulated strategy with defined territorial aims beyond grabbing territory and resources to the south and south east in a ribbon defence which Japan thought it could hold while it wore down the Allies until Japan was allowed to hold those territories. The first (strictly second, but first will do for here) phase of Japan’s advance stopped with its necessary oil gains in the NEI but, under the influence of what some senior Japanese military, naval and other leaders correctly identified as ‘the victory disease’ flowing from unexpected successes, expanded to Papua New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Japan suffered its first land defeats in those two places, which started the land campaigns which ended up with Japan in ruins.

Comment: The absence of clearly defined strategy and aims has seen plenty of other powers come unstuck since, notably the US and its allies in Vietnam; the USSR in Afghanistan; and the US and its allies in the last version of Iraq. These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces in suppressing the communists during the Malayan Emergency. (And, for cynics like me, anyone want to know why it was called an Emergency rather than a war? I haven’t been able to verify it as accurate, but there is a view that this was to allow the colonial rubber planters to keep insurance cover on their plantations. http://www.thelincolnshireregiment.org/malayemerg.shtml )
Then again, it’s always easier to define the aim to defeat an aggressor than to specify the territorial or other limits of aggression. One day Hitler is going to invade Britain, then he’s cleaning up the Italian disaster in Greece and pursuing the defeated British Commonwealth forces into Crete while he’s continuing his war with the British Commonwealth in North Africa and on the seas, just before he blasts into the USSR. All Hitler’s enemies had to do for strategy was to resist and repel him until Germany was defeated. Ditto for Japan.


Although landing in Alaska might work for the Japanese to. No one bat an eye though

See 4 above, only more so with Alaska and less tactical and strategical threat to the US by any large Japanese land and naval forces pretty much marooned and easily contained there.

Frankly Dude Really
05-18-2016, 06:23 AM
The DEI oil fields/refineries:
These fields produced 65 million barrels of oil in 1940, a rate which should have been more than adequate for Japan’s import needs.
The United States, was a major producer of oil ;1.35 billion barrels a year in 1940, 63% of world production.

and oh: "Unlike gasoline, fuel oil is not easily ignited and fuel oil tanks were not as easy a target to destroy as might be supposed. One Japanese pilot who participated in the raid on Wheeler Field recalled strafing some nearby fuel tanks and being surprised that they refused to ignite even after several strafing runs."



It is said that the US would (be willing to?) attack Japan if Japan wld only attack the DEI.
(any links to such agreements and detail battle order ?).

I think if that would happen, the US (with intact Pearl Harbor fleet) would not know how to invade, attack or strike Japan as hard or tough as it did in 1942. And the IJN would be able to set up traps and be able to cripple the US better/more effective than what actually happened.
Simply because the US would not go full throttle for "somebody else's war" (either for some chinese peasants, or dutch colonials, or british colonials).

Nickdfresh
05-18-2016, 08:16 AM
The infamous "Third Wave" of Japanese Naval aircraft was never sent against Pear Harbor. That was the main attack wave that was to target primarily the oil facilities. They of course would have used bombs rather than just ineffectual 7.7mm machine gun fire. IIRC, the main problem for the Japanese Navy was that they were to have been launched late in the day, and it would have been dark as they returned making it a rather dicey preposition for the IJN as they did not have much, if any, practice in nighttime carrier landings.

A Third Wave also exposed the fleet to greater risk of a counter strike by the missing USN carriers, or even surviving land based aircraft at Pearl. Not that many USAAC aircraft were left, but the Japanese would have to assume that a credible force might have been assembled. Also, the Japanese suffered a large majority of their casualties in the second attack wave from increasingly accurate ground fire, as Navy and Army AAA gunners were more awake and grew more proficient after the First Wave bombed and strafed with near impunity. It was thought a third attack wave would have contended with even greater ground fire may have suffered serious losses of planes, but more importantly, the nearly irreplaceable pilots...

Rising Sun*
05-18-2016, 09:17 AM
and oh: "Unlike gasoline, fuel oil is not easily ignited and fuel oil tanks were not as easy a target to destroy as might be supposed.

Which merely reinforces my point that the Japanese failed to identify the oil storages as a target and didn't have the necessary munitions to set them on fire. Although it wasn't necessary to set fire to them as breaching the above ground and recently filled to capacity tanks at ground level would have been sufficient.

If any USN ships had to draw water from the harbor to cool their engines, I expect that oil flooding into the harbor from the tanks wouldn't have improved their performance.

As for not being an easy target, that would apply only if the Japanese planes were being flown by the blind pilots' guide dogs with blindfolds on the dogs.



https://irsab27r4go1tazwq48tiyg1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Pearl-Harbor-Oil-Containers-Wide.jpg



http://www.pacificaviationmuseum.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Blog-Post-PH-1.png




One Japanese pilot who participated in the raid on Wheeler Field recalled strafing some nearby fuel tanks and being surprised that they refused to ignite even after several strafing runs."

1. Wheeler Field was a long way inland from the naval oil tanks at Pearl Harbor.
2. Any fuel storage tanks at Wheeler Field presumably would have been holding highly inflammable fuel for aeroplanes or motor vehicles rather than less inflammable naval fuel oil.
3. The Wheeler Field event you mention is irrelevant to the naval storage tanks at Pearl Harbor, except to reinforce the point that Japanese planes were not equipped with munitions to destroy even highly inflammable aviation fuel storage tanks although, as with the recently filled naval oil tanks, it is much more difficult to cause an explosion or fire in full tanks of any oil / petrol type fuel than it is in ones which have a good deal of vapour rather than liquid in them.


and oh:

It would be refreshing to see you post without being a sarcastic smart arse, and more so when you are hopelessly wrong as in your last post.

Rising Sun*
05-18-2016, 09:29 AM
The infamous "Third Wave" of Japanese Naval aircraft was never sent against Pear Harbor. That was the main attack wave that was to target primarily the oil facilities. They of course would have used bombs rather than just ineffectual 7.7mm machine gun fire. IIRC, the main problem for the Japanese Navy was that they were to have been launched late in the day, and it would have been dark as they returned making it a rather dicey preposition for the IJN as they did not have much, if any, practice in nighttime carrier landings.

A Third Wave also exposed the fleet to greater risk of a counter strike by the missing USN carriers, or even surviving land based aircraft at Pearl. Not that many USAAC aircraft were left, but the Japanese would have to assume that a credible force might have been assembled. Also, the Japanese suffered a large majority of their casualties in the second attack wave from increasingly accurate ground fire, as Navy and Army AAA gunners were more awake and grew more proficient after the First Wave bombed and strafed with near impunity. It was thought a third attack wave would have contended with even greater ground fire may have suffered serious losses of planes, but more importantly, the nearly irreplaceable pilots...

All correct.

Plus Admiral Nagumo was concerned that the long turn around time to mount the third strike exposed his fleet to the risk of US carrier or land based air attacks, while his fleet
was about at the end of its logistical tether and he feared that further action and the associated delay might have jeopardised the safe return of the fleet to Japan.

However, those who claim that the Japanese recognised the importance of destroying the oil and maintenance facilities by planning for the third wave ignore the fact that if Japan had seen those facilities as the priority then they would have been attacked in the first wave when Japan had the advantage of surprise.

The oil storages etc were not a priority in Japan's ill thought out attack.

EDIT: Japan's attack was not 'ill thought out' but was well planned and executed to the extent that its aim was to prevent the USN steaming from Hawaii to interfere in Japan's assaults on Malaya, the Philippines and the NEI, although for reasons beyond Japan's control the US carriers it most needed to destroy weren't at Pearl Harbor.

However, as longer term strategy it was 'ill thought out' not to force the US fleet back to the US West Coast by destroying the oil storages and other facilities on Pearl, which would have given Japan a much greater breathing space while advancing southwards to the NEI and was a much more sensible plan. And that would have applied regardless of whether or not the US carriers were at Pearl as they would have had to return to the West Coast if denied fuel at Hawaii.

Separate issue: if the carriers couldn't refuel at Pearl if Japan had destroyed the oil there, did the carriers have enough fuel to reach the West Coast or would they have needed oilers to come out them them?

Nickdfresh
05-18-2016, 02:08 PM
Or did the Japanese have some sort of inane hope that THEY would shortly capture the fuel oil at Pear for their use?

Frankly Dude Really
05-19-2016, 04:18 AM
It would be refreshing to see you post without being a sarcastic smart arse, and more so when you are hopelessly wrong as in your last post.

WHat the fokk are you on about ? ARSE ? ARSE ????
and "you are wrong " ???
YOu make it personal ...why ?

You want it personal ?:
you dipshit armchair failed in life amateur douchebag.


Look at this " These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces in suppressing the communists during the Malayan Emergency. (And, for cynics like me, anyone want to know why it was called an Emergency rather than a war? I haven’t been able to verify it as accurate,"...
WHO IS ASKING FOR MALAYAN AFTER WW2 SHIT ???????
AND WHO IS ASKING FOR YOUR OPINION ON AFTER WAR MALAYAN SHIT ???

(and that is just ONE of your ill conceived contemptuous remarks and just bark into the air thoughts)


and what about this:
Comment: The absence of clearly defined strategy and aims has seen plenty of other powers come unstuck since, notably the US and its allies in Vietnam; the USSR in Afghanistan; and the US and its allies in the last version of Iraq. These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces

OH yeah? EVERYBODY fails in this world EXCEPT THE MOTHERFOKKING AWESOME BRITISH EMPIRE ...(btw also failed in Afghanistan in 19th c..you fool)
YOu arrogant TWAT.
How the FOK can you compare STRATEGY concepts in coldwar GLOBAL affairs in Vietnam, afghanistan with a LOCAL small scale uprising of SOME handfull of communists in Malaya !!! STRATEGY ??? in Malaya ???
That is at a scale of POLICING action in Belfast !

Frankly Dude Really
05-19-2016, 04:44 AM
or this :

"Despite basing its attack on the lessons of Taranto where the British succeeded in damaging enemy ships in a shallow harbour, the IJN sunk very few US ships. Most were grounded in the shallow harbour and later returned to service (for example, IIRC, about six of the eight US battleships supposedly sunk by the IJN at Pearl returned to service "..

Well, have a look at Taranto: The italian damaged ships didnot sink deep in the water , hey ?
1 battleship lost
2 battleships heavily damaged
1 heavy cruiser slightly damaged
2 destroyers slightly damaged
2 aircraft destroyed on the ground
(actually, the above list is NOT AT ALL intimidating..ppfff)


So why is it then that the italian vessels were NOT repaired (..in time...) and the US ships in PH were repaired ????
Is it because the Brrrrrritish were MARVELlous ? and smart and keen and brilliant warriors ???? AND THE JAPANESE SUCKED COMPARED TO THE BRITISH ???
NO!
It is because the italians HAD NO RESOURCES IN MONEY,MANPOWER, RAW MATERIAL, AND INTEREST TO LIFT AND REPAIR THESE DAMAGED VESSELS AND THE USA IN CONTRAST DID HAVE THE VAST RESOURCES !!!!

And this is just another one of the examples of your short sightedness, arrogance and contempt of other nation's efforts and peoples, rising sun.



add info:
"Littorio was repaired with all available resources and was fully operational again within four months, while restoration of the older battleships proceeded at a much slower pace (repairs took seven months for Caio Duilio, and the repairs for Conte di Cavour were never completed)".

WOW just WOW. Littorio repaired in FOUR months and OPERATIONAL during the war.
Shows that YOU Rising SUn , talk CRAPP.

Rising Sun*
05-19-2016, 04:55 AM
Or did the Japanese have some sort of inane hope that THEY would shortly capture the fuel oil at Pear for their use?

I doubt it.

The third wave was intended to destroy the oil storages. They survived only because of the abandonment of the third wave.

Frankly Dude Really
05-19-2016, 05:06 AM
and to all you self repeating armchair suckers, wrt "strategic blunder" of not bombing oil tanks at PH;
again I repeat:
The United States, was a major producer of oil ;1.35 billion barrels a year in 1940, 63% of world production.
SIXTY THREE PERCENT !!!

EVEN if the tanks at PH were blown, it is REPAIRED (simple steel containers) within 3 months, and the oil "losses" is restocked in the same time or even faster (all you need is four oil tankers in harbour).
It is safe to say that the oil "losses" of PH are QUICKER restored than the wrecked Battleships in PH .



And for the advanced strategic "class"; again my repetition of the STRATEGIC alternative (suggestion):
HAd Japan attacked ONLY DEI , the resulting war with USA would have been MORE favourable to the IJN than as it did now.
Yes, or no ...debate.
(instead of repeating the same shit all over about what Japan did wrong with PH...djeeesh).

Rising Sun*
05-19-2016, 05:10 AM
WHat the fokk are you on about ? ARSE ? ARSE ????
and "you are wrong " ???
YOu make it personal ...why ?

You want it personal ?:
you dipshit armchair failed in life amateur douchebag.


Look at this " These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces in suppressing the communists during the Malayan Emergency. (And, for cynics like me, anyone want to know why it was called an Emergency rather than a war? I haven’t been able to verify it as accurate,"...
WHO IS ASKING FOR MALAYAN AFTER WW2 SHIT ???????
AND WHO IS ASKING FOR YOUR OPINION ON AFTER WAR MALAYAN SHIT ???

(and that is just ONE of your ill conceived contemptuous remarks and just bark into the air thoughts)


and what about this:
Comment: The absence of clearly defined strategy and aims has seen plenty of other powers come unstuck since, notably the US and its allies in Vietnam; the USSR in Afghanistan; and the US and its allies in the last version of Iraq. These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces

OH yeah? EVERYBODY fails in this world EXCEPT THE MOTHERFOKKING AWESOME BRITISH EMPIRE ...(btw also failed in Afghanistan in 19th c..you fool)
YOu arrogant TWAT.
How the FOK can you compare STRATEGY concepts in coldwar GLOBAL affairs in Vietnam, afghanistan with a LOCAL small scale uprising of SOME handfull of communists in Malaya !!! STRATEGY ??? in Malaya ???
That is at a scale of POLICING action in Belfast !

Thank you for that well reasoned and valuable contribution to the discussion, ably supported by historical evidence.

After reading your concise and penetrating insights into history, not to mention your concise and penetrating analysis of me, I am sure that all members will agree that you are correct and I was wrong.

On a personal note, I resent your description of me as an amateur douchebag. I am widely regarded as a professional douchebag.

Rising Sun*
05-19-2016, 05:11 AM
and to all you self repeating armchair suckers, wrt "strategic blunder" of not bombing oil tanks at PH;
again I repeat:
The United States, was a major producer of oil ;1.35 billion barrels a year in 1940, 63% of world production.
SIXTY THREE PERCENT !!!

EVEN if the tanks at PH were blown, it is REPAIRED (simple steel containers) within 3 months, and the oil "losses" is restocked in the same time or even faster (all you need is four oil tankers in harbour).
It is safe to say that the oil "losses" of PH are QUICKER restored than the wrecked Battleships in PH .



And for the advanced strategic "class"; again my repetition of the STRATEGIC alternative (suggestion):
HAd Japan attacked ONLY DEI , the resulting war with USA would have been MORE favourable to the IJN than as it did now.
Yes, or no ...debate.
(instead of repeating the same shit all over about what Japan did wrong with PH...djeeesh).

I think you should have stopped with your previous post, parts of which were coherent.

Rising Sun*
05-19-2016, 05:49 AM
Or did the Japanese have some sort of inane hope that THEY would shortly capture the fuel oil at Pear for their use?

Good article at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/INTA4803TP/Articles/Oil%20Logistics%20in%20the%20Pacific%20War=Donovan .pdf

The author's opening quotation is wrong, as amateurs talk tactics rather than strategy, but the rest of it is a sound treatment of the oil issue.

Rising Sun*
05-19-2016, 06:12 AM
Look at this " These failures might be contrasted with the success of the British Commonwealth forces in suppressing the communists during the Malayan Emergency. (And, for cynics like me, anyone want to know why it was called an Emergency rather than a war? I haven’t been able to verify it as accurate,"...
WHO IS ASKING FOR MALAYAN AFTER WW2 SHIT ???????
AND WHO IS ASKING FOR YOUR OPINION ON AFTER WAR MALAYAN SHIT ???

(and that is just ONE of your ill conceived contemptuous remarks and just bark into the air thoughts)


.....


How the FOK can you compare STRATEGY concepts in coldwar GLOBAL affairs in Vietnam, afghanistan with a LOCAL small scale uprising of SOME handfull of communists in Malaya !!! STRATEGY ??? in Malaya ???
That is at a scale of POLICING action in Belfast !

I apologise for barking into the air my thoughts relating the British Commonwealth success in Malaya to Vietnam, as you clearly know that Malaya had nothing to do with Vietnam.

If he was still alive, you could also seek an apology from General Westmoreland for studying the Malayan experience and incorporating it into his command in Vietnam. I'm sure he would be grateful to you for your superior knowledge. If only you'd been there at the time, you could have stopped him making a massive mistake in Vietnam by trying something that succeeded in Malaya.


Vietnam Tries the Tactics That Halted Malaya Reds

PETER GROSE; Special to The New York Times OCT. 10, 1964

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 9—Quietly, behind the blare of the political upheavals of recent weeks, the United States and Vietnamese military commands have embarked on an intricate and intensive pacification ef*fort in the provinces sur*rounding Saigon.

Many months in the planning, the operation is an attempt to apply to South Vietnam the lessons of the 12‐year Malayan struggle against Communist terrorists.

The operation holds priority in the American military effort though few important results can be expected for some time. Its purpose is to defeat the Vietcong insurgents militarily and politically in specified areas rather than in scattershot fashion.

The program is combining theories and tactics long talked about here but never applied in more than a half‐hearted and

Senior officials directing the program are aware that their effort may go the way of the poorly implemented 1962 pro*gram of fortifying so‐called strategic hamlets and building militia among the inhabitants, or of the hastily conceived country‐wide participation ef*fort launched last March.

Furthermore, the upheavals in the cities during the last six weeks have given a clear warn*ing that it may be too late for victory through a pacification program

The example of Algeria in 1962 reminds officials that po*litical developments can lose a war even if the ground has been won. International and internal pressures on the French Government to negotiate a settlement with the Moslem nationalists had become so over*whelming that the military situ*ation was ignored.
Continue reading the main story

The current attempt is de*signed for political as well as military impact. It follows a careful study of the nature of this war, so unlike any previous military action in which the United States has played a major role.

Observers have long noted that the Vietcong consider that their route to victory lies through political penetration and agitation rather than through purely military action.

‘Winning the War’

To deal with this, according to the concept based on the Malayan experience, “winning the war” is more complex than a classically defined military goal. A terrorist political or*ganization must he isolated and crushed by military, police and civilian operations performed in harmony before any meaningful victory is won, it is “said.

The Vietcong concentrations close to Saigon are not new. For many years two of the strongest guerrilla positions have been in the thick jungles of two zones within 50 miles of the capital. It is the Vietcong's increasing ability to move freely out of these seemingly impen*etrable areas to carry out at*tacks, ambushes and terrorism that helped to inspire the new pacification program.

The Malayan experience has been closely studied by Ameri*can civilian and military offi*cials. From 1948 to 1960 a spreading Communist revolt was by Britain through the use of new methods of warfare.

Britons with Malayan experi*ence have been working in South Vietnam since 1961, but their ad*vice was seldom heeded by the Americans or the Vietnamese until this spring. Then both countries had a new team di*recting the war effort. Premier Nguyen Khanh had none of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem's suspicions of foreign ideas or interference, and Gen. William C. Westmoreland had arrived with a fresh look at the mili*tary problems facing him at the start of his command of the United States military assist*ance organization.

More Than Up Service

Instead of having only lip service paid to their lessons, the experts from Malaya found a receptive atmosphere at the top levels.

In June General Westmore*land flew to Kuala Lumpur with a few senior civilian offi*cials for a three‐day briefing on the British methods. The cur*rent effort is a direct out*growth of that visit.

The essence of the system is that success comes with the destruction not of the enemy's main fighting force or of his “will to win” but rather of his apparatus of communication and command.

Once the system of inter*mediaries through which pass orders, taxes and intelligence is detected and eliminated, the insurgency becomes nothing more than aimless banditry.

This was the ‐ lesson from Algeria and Malaya. General Westmoreland and the then United States Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, became convinced it applied equally to South Vietnam. In Algeria, ad*mittedly, the nationalist army usually operated in smaller units than does the Vietcong. Even greater differences be*tween the Malayan and Viet*namese situations were noted.

First, it was said, the enemy in Malaya was clearly identifi*able by appearance—the insur*

Second, Malaya has no sig*nificant land frontier with an*other country that could act as a base of supply and personnel for the guerrillas. South Viet*nam has 900 miles of frontier with Cambodia and Laos, both of which are said to provide facilities to the Vietcong, and with Communist North Vietnam where the guerrillas, most of whom are South Vietnamese, undergo training and from which they receive supplies.

Third, ultimate authority and responsibility in Malaya lay with the British. At every level in Vietnam, the Americans are able to offer only advice and support. Furthermore, in almost every measurable factor, such as the size of the forces on both sides, the emergency in Malaya was about half the scale of that in. Vietnam.

12‐Year‐Long Effort

Finally, it took 12 years for the system to achieve success in Malaya. For six or eight of those years the British and the Malays were living from month to month and wondering if they could continue to hold on.

The United states has been in Vietnam on an extensive scale for only three years, and during that time many energies have been dissipated in political matters remote from the war effort.

Clearly the situation is dif*ferent from that in Malaya, and few purely political parallels can be drawn. However, the military differences were not judged to be so great as to preclude application of the Ma*layan tactics here.

The essence of the Malayan system that is absent in South Vietnam is a tight organization of all civilian and military re*sources under one direction, called in Malaya the War Exec*utive Committees.

On his return from Kuala Lumpur, General Westmoreland undertook to establish similar committes for the United States effort, bringing together military advisers and represen*tatives of civilian agencies for each of the 45 provinces.

The operation was first given the code name Pica, though now Americans generally refer to it by the Vietnamese code word Hoptac, meaning “cooperation.”

The plan envisages a series of concentric circles around the capital in which, step by step, the Vietcong presence is to be eliminated.

Military units operate just outside a particular perimeter to engage and disrupt Vietcong military concentrations. Inside the perimeter it is the task of the police and administrative officers to register and scruti*nize the population, detect and arrest Communist agents, and substitute a new administrative apparatus to maintain two‐way contact between the Govern*ment and the population—some*thing lacking in South Vietnam for a number of years.

Neither the United States mission nor the Government of Premier Khanh has given any publics explanation of the oper*

It will take many months be*fore meaningful results will ap*pear, and a senior American officer acknowledged a few days ago that the undertaking, which began early last month, had got off to a “very, very slow start.”

Clearing operations are being conducted just outside the first concentric circle, with a radius of about 12 miles from the center of the city. Most nights artillery fire can be heard in downtown Saigon.

Gia Dinh Province surround*ing the capital is the limit of the first circle. Outside this area, troops of Hoptac's first phase are operating in Hau Nghia Binh Duong and Long An Provinces.

Hoptac is the most complex pacification operation under*taken in South Vietnam. It will require time. With the maneu*ver barely begun, it is an open question whether the onrush of political developments will al*low the time needed.

tankgeezer
05-19-2016, 07:07 PM
Back to lighting up bunker fuel tanks, this is about the most viscous fuel oil there is, looking far more like Tar, than refined oil. It would be nearly impossible to set fire to Bunker oil (No. 6 residual fuel ) using 7.7 mm tracers, even small caliber incendiary ammo will not light it normally. It has to be preheated for use in ship's boilers. A pic will show what it looks like, and that aught to explain it's disinterest in lighting up.

Rising Sun*
05-20-2016, 05:48 AM
Back to lighting up bunker fuel tanks, this is about the most viscous fuel oil there is, looking far more like Tar, than refined oil. It would be nearly impossible to set fire to Bunker oil (No. 6 residual fuel ) using 7.7 mm tracers, even small caliber incendiary ammo will not light it normally. It has to be preheated for use in ship's boilers. A pic will show what it looks like, and that aught to explain it's disinterest in lighting up.

As the tanks were full, there wasn't much prospect that any bullet of any calibre or type fired from an IJN plane was going to set fire to the tanks.

It's a bit similar to the basics in an internal combustion petrol engine, where you need fuel and air in the correct ratios plus an ignition source to fire the mixture.

Once the fuel tanks at Pearl were breached and oil flooded the berms around them so that the large surface area of oil was exposed to air, I suspect that suitable bombs of an incendiary type burning at much higher temperature than, depending on the fuel grade, the approximately 150 - 270 degrees Centigrade required to preheat it for burning in a ship's engine would have been sufficient to ignite a localised fire. As the fire spreads, the heat increases and expands across the surface and presumably continues to burn until all burnable fuel is exhausted.

Be interesting to see if the Japanese had considered this aspect and carried suitable munitions to ignite the oil.

If not, and contrary to my earlier comment about oil flooding into the harbour before I recalled that (I think, anyway) there were captive berms around the tanks, my recollection from some past reading is that a good quantity or perhaps all of the oil from breached tanks would have been trapped in the berms around the tanks, from where it could have been recovered.

tankgeezer
05-20-2016, 08:52 AM
The image you posted of a tank farm showed the containment Berms clearly, these as you said would certainly contain and Oil that an attack might have let loose, unless the Japanese were using a large number of large general Demolition bombs.

Rising Sun*
05-20-2016, 10:51 AM
The image you posted of a tank farm showed the containment Berms clearly

Yeah, a perfect example of tunnel vision. I was focused exclusively on the big white tanks and nothing else in the picture registered.

Nickdfresh
05-20-2016, 02:59 PM
I apologise for barking into the air my thoughts relating the British Commonwealth success in Malaya to Vietnam, as you clearly know that Malaya had nothing to do with Vietnam.

If he was still alive, you could also seek an apology from General Westmoreland for studying the Malayan experience and incorporating it into his command in Vietnam. I'm sure he would be grateful to you for your superior knowledge. If only you'd been there at the time, you could have stopped him making a massive mistake in Vietnam by trying something that succeeded in Malaya.

I didn't read the article closely but I believe it is touched on fact that there were significant differences between the Malaysian communists - that were essentially of Chinese ethnic extract and a separate and distinct culture from the Malaysian people, making them easy to isolate the population from IIRC. In Vietnam, most of the NLF/VC were southerners and the Vietnamese were deeply tied to their ancestral lands and resented being hauled off into guarded camps far away from their dead ancestors. The camps also made easy targets for underfunded, poorly armed garrisons that were undermanned and easily overwhelmed by VC attacks. It was so bad by the end that many of the South Vietnamese militia were either terrorized strawmen that would melt under any assault, or were bought off into handing over excess ammunition and weapons to the VC. In some cases the SVN militia were basically thinly veiled-Viet Cong/National Liberation Front members being armed (but not paid much, if at all) by the Saigon graft gov't. It should also be noted that well into the 1960's, many on the South saw the Viet Minh as the liberators of the French colonial yoke and even ARVN troops referred to the VC as "Viet Minh".....

Rising Sun*
05-21-2016, 06:41 AM
I didn't read the article closely but I believe it is touched on fact that there were significant differences between the Malaysian communists - that were essentially of Chinese ethnic extract and a separate and distinct culture from the Malaysian people, making them easy to isolate the population from IIRC.

Correct.

However, there was a chance for the same principles to apply in Vietnam, if they had been applied with the same energy and rigour as they were in Malaya. But they weren't, not least because the US didn't support the program properly. Some years ago I read an excellent book by an American soldier (?Lt?) who with a few other American troops was plonked into a village to try to win over the local area. They weren't supported by the Army and duly failed. Can't recall the author or the title, and I think I lent it to a mate who still has it.

IIRC, there was a marked difference between USMC and US Army approaches and results in Vietnam, with the Marines focusing with some success (outside main battles) on their version of the Malayan approach while the Army went for a more armed conflict approach at all levels, which further alienated the locals

A favourite tv show starting now. More later.

Rising Sun*
05-21-2016, 09:04 AM
Searched forum as I thought I'd mentioned it before (maybe a couple of years ago rather seven years ago as it turns out, but that's how old age goes), and here is the book I couldn't recall above.


If you haven't already read it, you might find David Donovan's (it's not his real name) Once a Warrior King interesting. Summary and reviews here.
http://www.amazon.com/Once-Warrior-King-David-Donovan/dp/0345333160

I read it a few months ago. He makes the point strongly that he feels the US could have done a lot better if it had provided more support to the small teams like his living in the villages as this would have increased effective grass roots opposition to the VC.

His account shows that teams like his were given grossly inadequate support, at all levels.

It's illustrated by a petty event when his team was told they could have a hot meal choppered in for Thanksgiving (or maybe Christmas - I can't remember) as it's apparently traditional in the US Army for the men to get a hot roast dinner on that day. He accepted the offer and was then told that he and his men had to pay for the meal. He told HQ to shove their dinner.
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-10060.html

Rising Sun*
05-21-2016, 10:25 AM
In Vietnam, most of the NLF/VC were southerners and the Vietnamese were deeply tied to their ancestral lands and resented being hauled off into guarded camps far away from their dead ancestors. The camps also made easy targets for underfunded, poorly armed garrisons that were undermanned and easily overwhelmed by VC attacks. It was so bad by the end that many of the South Vietnamese militia were either terrorized strawmen that would melt under any assault, or were bought off into handing over excess ammunition and weapons to the VC. In some cases the SVN militia were basically thinly veiled-Viet Cong/National Liberation Front members being armed (but not paid much, if at all) by the Saigon graft gov't. It should also be noted that well into the 1960's, many on the South saw the Viet Minh as the liberators of the French colonial yoke and even ARVN troops referred to the VC as "Viet Minh".....


All true.

Some of the important differences between Malaya and Vietnam were:
1. Scale of conflict. Malaya was a small scale guerrilla war with no regular, let alone enemy forces able to engage British Commonwealth forces in even battalion or upwards scale battles.
2. In Malaya there was a single British Commonwealth military / political command without the corruption and duplicity of the SVN forces and government.
3. In Malaya the British Commonwealth forces had no territorial restrictions preventing them from going into the enemy’s territory and fighting him there and depriving him of food and logisitical support streaming southwards because SVN and its allies wouldn’t cross the DMZ to take the steps necessary to win the war. Also, in Malaya the British Commonwealth forces didn’t have much to deal with in the way of troops or supplies coming south from Thailand.
4. In Malaya, the British Commonwealth forces could bring much greater forces to suppress the enemy than the enemy had any hope of bringing against the Brits, so the Brits could deny the enemy ground, food, etc. This was much the same as the tactics applied in Vietnam, but against a much more fluid enemy with much greater local support (whether voluntary or by extortion) which was continually supplied from NVN.
Be all that as it may, the failure of village protection / segregation in Vietnam was essentially a failure of will, commitment and resources by SVN and the US which allowed the VC to terrorise some villagers and thereby to encourage others at least to do nothing to obstruct the VC / NVA and at worst to aid them. However, that is all against a background of corrupt and duplicitous SVN government and armed force people, mostly at senior levels, who undermined their own country to the extent that it was impossible for anything like the unified British Commonwealth effort in Malaya to succeed in Vietnam.

The problem wasn’t with the Malayan strategy but in trying to implement it in circumstances where it had little chance of success because of the local background and the lack of necessary commitment by relevant authorities.

Then there is the simple fact, generally ignored by the US and its allies including my country and most other countries (notably post WWII France, USSR / Russia, UK), that nobody likes outsiders sending soldiers into their country or otherwise jerking their country around to suit the invader and riding roughshod over the locals.

If Indonesia invaded Australia, does anyone think it's softest and cuddliest soldiers could make me well-disposed towards them while they're imposing their military rule and culture on me?

Yet major nations all seem to think they can win the hearts and minds of people in the lands they invade for their own purposes, which almost never align with the purposes or benefits of the locals.

Nickdfresh
05-21-2016, 11:06 AM
Correct.

However, there was a chance for the same principles to apply in Vietnam, if they had been applied with the same energy and rigour as they were in Malaya. But they weren't, not least because the US didn't support the program properly. Some years ago I read an excellent book by an American soldier (?Lt?) who with a few other American troops was plonked into a village to try to win over the local area. They weren't supported by the Army and duly failed. Can't recall the author or the title, and I think I lent it to a mate who still has it.

...

A favourite tv show starting now. More later.


Have you ever read The Bright Shining Lie (http://www.amazon.com/Bright-Shining-Lie-America-Vietnam/dp/0679724141) by Neil Sheehan? Long but excellent read about a very proficient and competent, but deeply flawed, US Army turned civilian pacification officer named John Paul Vann. He basically became a civilian "general" commanding US and ARVN troops in the field towards the very end...

I came away from it with the thoughts that the "Strategic Hamlet Program" was deeply mislaid culturally, and the US strategy of Attrition and Search and Destroy were deeply asinine as well...


IIRC, there was a marked difference between USMC and US Army approaches and results in Vietnam, with the Marines focusing with some success (outside main battles) on their version of the Malayan approach while the Army went for a more armed conflict approach at all levels, which further alienated the locals

Sheehan goes into this in some detail. I believe the Marine General was Krulak (IIRC). Initially he hates Vann, but essentially believed the same ideal of pacification through "Clear and Hold" while isolating large units of NVA rather than directly engaging them, because it was usually on the NVA terms when the US infantry went in. Krulak came to despise Westmorland and his crony attrition strategists...

Rising Sun*
05-22-2016, 09:20 AM
Have you ever read The Bright Shining Lie (http://www.amazon.com/Bright-Shining-Lie-America-Vietnam/dp/0679724141) by Neil Sheehan?

No, but as you recommend it I'll order it online soon.

For an outside view of pacification, anti-guerrilla warfare etc by a long serving Australian adviser in Vietnam, you might be interested in Ted Serong's experience.
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/tenyears.php