View Full Version : The most secret weapon of the Luftwaffe

11-07-2015, 05:14 AM
I share with you a lot of pictures, some of them previously unreleased, rare and never before seen by me, referring to one of the secret weapons of the Luftwaffe. We are talking about the Horten flying wing. Perhaps, the aircraft of the Second World War the most ahead of its time than any other, went into production too late to be put into service. Do you think if he had gone into production would have changed the course of the war and history? Visit the link below and give us your opinion about it.


Best Regards.

11-08-2015, 11:46 AM
nice post,the predecessor of today's aircraft and spacecraft shows, looks like the Führer want to going to the space :D
Where they found the plane in Peenemünde?

11-08-2015, 02:34 PM
All looked good on paper, but since it never actually engaged an enemy, no one will know if it would survive an engagement with the Allied fighters. The wing shape may be good for some types of flight, but dog fighting might not be one of them. I recall the bomber version of the Wing was unable to cope well, which resulted in the shelving of the program at least until computer technology could be relied upon to operate the control surfaces. The Horten was not very stealthy either, being only about 25% stealthier than a normal fighter.

11-09-2015, 09:15 AM
AFAIK, wing shape aircraft are chronically unstable in flight and have only been made possible with the advent of on-board computers with fly-by-wire control (aka the B-2 Spirit)...

11-09-2015, 10:31 AM
Actually, very many modern aeroplanes - including just about all modern civil airliners - are very unstable, and few could fly them for any protracted period of time without the assistance of onboard computers to adjust for this. In the fighters of the WW1 era, a degree of instability was desirable, as it added to the aircraft's maneuverability. Some designs of the time went too far when it came to the "wobbles". A notable example is the famous Fokker triplane, which had a strong tendency to dive (being front-heavy) even when this was not desired, as well as other faults. It was not a popular aircraft except with master fliers like the Red Baron, whose skills and natural ability allowed him to make the most of its advantages while limiting the effect of its disadvantages. Best regards, JR.

01-09-2016, 03:12 AM

another Fuhrer Lost Cause.

01-09-2016, 10:44 AM
Flying wings are not so unstable for human pilots as thought. Indeed they are more complicated to fly, there is no doubt about it. But both American (Northrop) and English (Armstrong Whitworth) companies put experimental flying wings in the air, it was not impossible for WWII technology. A lot of problems with German and American propositions are related to engines. The end of Northrop Flying Wings is more related to political issues than the technical difficulty to achieve operational status.

01-10-2016, 11:19 PM
Be that as it may, its still just an excuse for neo nazis to indulge in daylight fantasy 'what-if' scenarios concerning the continued survivability of a dead Third Reich.

The Nazis had fully four years of time to develop a potentially air superiority gaining aircraft type and failed miserably, chiefly for the reason they did not believe it would be ever needed.

Such a big-headed approach to the advent of new technology as a replacement for good old fashioned numbers and mass is indicative of how far out of touck they were, right at the moment of their biggest victories.

Seen in this light, It makes the early surrender of France look like battlefield genius. Give them their damned victory and let them propagandize themselves out of the technological race, then watch superior numbers and production do the rest.

Game over. And no "re-set" button to bail them out.

Frankly Dude Really
01-12-2016, 09:14 AM
The Nazis had fully four years of time to develop a potentially air superiority gaining aircraft type and failed miserably, chiefly for the reason they did not believe it would be ever needed.
Such a big-headed approach to the advent of new technology as ...

meeeh... The USA had 22 years of unproductive development of armour, submarines, aircraft, torpedos, locomotives, and what not all, since 1918.

Having won big time in a short time span, having won all(!) objectives (Austria, Poland, France -threat-) as set out before the investment in re-armament and re-development , is a VERY sound economic argument to stop or limit further investments. Especially if all other economic budgets (on an occupied landmass 5 times the size of the mothercountry) press on heavily on the balances.
Time to readjust and assess what and where deserves budget.

The attack on the SU was only a dear wish, or an expected eventuality, but not an essential thoroughly planned (between military, politics, diplomacy, economics) venture in the years 1935-1937.
The time of that eventuality would have been prophesized by the military (alone) by the year 1942-ish...and even so , not at all in immediate proximity to the campaigns against poland and france.

The opportunity or rather vital necessity to attack the SU arose in 1941 through different fortunate AND unfortunate accidents and incidents. Nothing of them being anticipated in the 1938-1939 s.

01-14-2016, 07:41 AM
Germany appears to have been caught up in a process of political momentum that propelled it into war before it was really ready, even according to its own strategic and economic projections. This momentum continued through the early part of the war, eventually producing the (as it turned out) disastrous invasion of the Soviet Union. By the time of that invasion, the momentum was such that those advising caution (whose ranks included no less than Hermann Georing) had little chance of prevailing; even speaking out for caution was, arguably, dangerous.

It is questionable whether Germany had the resources to take on the Soviet Union with confidence of victory at any point. One reason why the counsel of caution was ignored was a sort of complacency that seems to have pervaded much of Germany's decision-making apparatus between 1938 and 1942. On the military and political side, the capacities of the Soviet Union to resist were unthinkingly underestimated. This is strange, as the Germans had had good opportunity to appraise the Soviet military during periods of positive co-operation between the two, notably in the period preceding Hitler's assumption of power, and during the period of the Ribbentrop Pact. There were plenty of hints that the Soviet military, while in a shambles following the first officers' purge, had the capacity to regenerate itself as a formidable fighting force. These seem largely to have been ignored. On the economic front, complacency may have been promoted by the Reichsbank's brilliant performance in financing the government through the creation of "creative" financial instruments, and by the Nazi practice, even before 1939, of plundering the resources of their internal "enemies", notably the Jews. The early victories (arguably lucky in many respects) greatly increased the opportunity for plunder which further masked the fundamental dearth of Germany's resources for pursuing a major war in the East. The failure, or denial, of this fact resulted in policies that were inconsistent with the requirements of a major, possibly protracted war. Germany did not impose a "war economy" until the failure of the Caucasus-Stalingrad offensive, which finally destroyed the delusion that the essential plunder required of the Soviet Union (food, rare minerals and above all oil) would easily be secured. As much of the plunder secured in the West declined to a trickle, Germany's fundamental resource deficit came to the fore - too late for the Germans to rectify the situation, however hard they tried. Complacency was replaced, increasingly, by desperation.

In this context, it is perhaps understandable that the new delusion of "wonder weapons" arose. Hitler himself promoted the development of what might be described as "political weapons". Some of these reached operational capacity before the end of the war. Some had their impact but, given the great difficulty in securing the materiel and labour to produce them, few were produced in numbers sufficient to make much difference, and many were simply wrong-headed. Between 1943 and 1945, a great deal of labour, brainpower and materiel were diverted into developing "wonder weapons" of all sorts, for very little result. I have little doubt that these scarce resources would have been better employed in improving the practical weapons already available. But, in any event, after the Caucasus/Stalingrad debacle, the game was up for Germany in any event.

By the way - I am a bit puzzled by the suggestion coming through in some of these posts that the "early French surrender" was something like a strategy for the French. This certainly does not chime with the activities of the French government as the German invasion proceeded. But then, the real problem was the "French government". Petain's assumption of power was the culmination of the unhappy history of the French Third Republic. At the outset of the invasion, the French government was divided between those determined to resist, and right-wing elements less inclined to do so. The latter had an ulterior motive - the destruction of the Republic, and its replacement by some ill-defined reactionary regime. For this, they appear to have been willing to tolerate a defeat at the hands of the generally-unpopular (even among French Right-wingers) Germans. In the event, the reactionary Right were successful in this, manipulating the government and parliamentary apparatus to produce the Pétain coup. The result was the institution of the "État Francais,, a sort of monarchy without a king, but with a "Head of State". This was the real objective of the reactionaries - the destruction of the Third Republic, whatever the cost. France (even the "Occupied Zone") continued under this odd régime until the Liberation. For the people of France, oppressed and plundered, this was hardly a good outcome. Best regards, JR.

01-14-2016, 09:47 PM
Early French surrender was not a strategy...

It turned out to be exactly the "correct" strategy.