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flyerhell
10-02-2011, 05:30 PM
Looking back on WWII, if Germany would have produced the ME-262 a couple of years prior to when they actually came into service, and in greater numbers (7500), it is very scary to think what might have happened. I do not know if the USA would have been able to produce a jet fighter quickly enough to counter Germany. I know this thread is about Tanks, and with regard to that, Germany had a winner in the Tiger, but did not use it in ways that could have turned the tide of the war. If Germany had numbers in the thousands of the Tiger Tank and parts to keep them running, along with using them smarter, God only know what would have happened. Believe me, I am glad the war turned out the way it did. I think all of us has at one time or another, wondered what might have happened if things such as what I am talking about had occured. I am German by family tree with my great grandfather coming to America in 1889. When I did my family tree research, I found out that I actually had family that fought for Germany in WWII and died for Germany. The whole mess of WWII was and is still sickening to dwell over with the result of what happened to so many human beings from all sides, and of that, I hope and pray we never fight WWIII.

There was a thread a few months ago where we debated if there was any way that Germany could have won the war. I believe that came to the consensus that there was just too much stacked against Germany (they were fighting countries with much larger industrial resources, larger population, etc) for them to win (though, some things like you mentioned above, would have delayed the end of the war a bit).

Of course, even though they were so ideologically opposed, it would be interesting to think about if there was some kind of alliance between the USSR and Germany.

tankgeezer
10-03-2011, 01:58 PM
Join Date: Oct 2009Location: BelgiumPosts: 234


alliance of German socialism,and Soviet Socialism










Originally Posted by flyerhell

Of course, even though they were so ideologically opposed, it would be interesting to think about if there was some kind of alliance between the USSR and Germans



Response to Flyerhell by Steben: " Sure thing these thoughts were already once the Terror of the Western gouvernments in the late 30ties.
In pre-nazi times Germans and Russians already joined secret weapon programs.
And Stalin grasped every opportunity to delay conflict with Hitler afterwards...."

steben
10-03-2011, 02:43 PM
To make things clear, the last post above was posted by me, not flyerhell ;)

tankgeezer
10-03-2011, 03:24 PM
To make things clear, the last post above was posted by me, not flyerhell ;)

Fixed.

Churchill
10-03-2011, 06:22 PM
Heh, that could've been interesting...

Soviet raw materials matched with Germany's industrial might.

I'd say those two could have easily conquered Africa and the Middle East, just due to sheer manpower, then rolled over to India. I'm not sure about how the Indians would've reacted, either seeing the Nazi/Soviet troops as conquerors or liberators... Then you'd have to deal with the Japanese in China, assuming the Nazi/Soviet troops made it past India. That would've been interesting as well, maybe a fight on racial grounds, with possible Chinese-Japanese alliance against the 'round-eyes'...

This takes nothing into account of any islands off the shore of any conquered lands, such as the British Isles or Madagascar or Ceylon, though I don't imagine the Soviets had that great a navy(Not that I know anything about the Soviet Navy, I'm just going on what they told me while playing Axis and Allies), or Franco in Spain... He'd probably see the Nazi/Soviet forces conquer great tracts of land and be jealous, maybe join in...

But against Nazi/Soviet combined forces, would the US see reason to join this war? Sure, the industrial base existed there, and raw materials could be brought in from Canada or South America, but would the public be willing to fight against what then would've been the majority of Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East?

Just what I'm thinking...

tankgeezer
10-03-2011, 07:39 PM
Quote by Churchill: "and raw materials could be brought in from Canada or South America"
I've looked in the industrial indexes, and I'm not certain what we could make out of bacon, banana's, and tequila. ('cept for maybe breakfast) ;) :)

Churchill
10-03-2011, 08:22 PM
http://www.buyouthosting.com/images/hero_pose.jpg

The foundation of a productive day is a health breakfast!!!

steben
10-04-2011, 03:42 AM
Heh, that could've been interesting...

Soviet raw materials matched with Germany's industrial might.

I'd say those two could have easily conquered Africa and the Middle East, just due to sheer manpower, then rolled over to India. I'm not sure about how the Indians would've reacted, either seeing the Nazi/Soviet troops as conquerors or liberators... Then you'd have to deal with the Japanese in China, assuming the Nazi/Soviet troops made it past India. That would've been interesting as well, maybe a fight on racial grounds, with possible Chinese-Japanese alliance against the 'round-eyes'...

This takes nothing into account of any islands off the shore of any conquered lands, such as the British Isles or Madagascar or Ceylon, though I don't imagine the Soviets had that great a navy(Not that I know anything about the Soviet Navy, I'm just going on what they told me while playing Axis and Allies), or Franco in Spain... He'd probably see the Nazi/Soviet forces conquer great tracts of land and be jealous, maybe join in...

But against Nazi/Soviet combined forces, would the US see reason to join this war? Sure, the industrial base existed there, and raw materials could be brought in from Canada or South America, but would the public be willing to fight against what then would've been the majority of Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East?

Just what I'm thinking...

When American Revolution was set on fire, It was almost an army of peasants rising up against 50% of the world map. Yet, that 50% was ruled by only 1,6% of the world...

Nazi/Soviet pact would lead up to 4% rulers and would stretch mainly out over land, but the adversaries wouldn't be peasants.

Chevan
10-04-2011, 05:51 AM
Well it pure theoretically , put aside the race hate of nazis toward "jewish russia" , the Nazis-Soviet military alliance might be very succesfull in fight against anglo-saxons.While the Red Army might to advance into Iran and further- the GErmans with Italy might to concentrate over Africa and "sealion" . Anyway the BRitain would have survived more then year or half. The Japane might be directed deep into the asia and Pacific, tieding the USA more and more.
However the very interesting question is - what would happend after the war should have ended? No guaranties the former Allies will have not attack the USSR later. Unless the Stalin wouldn't reformed the soviet ideology into the pro- nazis favoure.I mean the abandoning of Marxism and creating a new ideology kinda "National-bolshevism" that take the race factor as a major factor.

steben
10-04-2011, 06:02 AM
Well it pure theoretically , put aside the race hate of nazis toward "jewish russia" , the Nazis-Soviet military alliance might be very succesfull in fight against anglo-saxons.While the Red Army might to advance into Iran and further- the GErmans with Italy might to concentrate over Africa and "sealion" . Anyway the BRitain would have survived more then year or half. The Japane might be directed deep into the asia and Pacific, tieding the USA more and more.
However the very interesting question is - what would happend after the war should have ended? No guaranties the former Allies will have not attack the USSR later. Unless the Stalin wouldn't reformed the soviet ideology into the pro- nazis favoure.I mean the abandoning of Marxism and creating a new ideology kinda "National-bolshevism" that take the race factor as a major factor.

Yes ... but along with this, Hitler would need to let go of his racist ideas concerning Slavic people as well.
Taking in account that the suppression of Slavic people and "routing" them out was the main nucleus of Nazi geopolitics, it would never happen.
Implementing antisemitism in early USSR on the other hand was very easy, since it was already vivid.

Chevan
10-04-2011, 07:14 AM
Yes ... but along with this, Hitler would need to let go of his racist ideas concerning Slavic people as well.
Taking in account that the suppression of Slavic people and "routing" them out was the main nucleus of Nazi geopolitics, it would never happen.
Implementing antisemitism in early USSR on the other hand was very easy, since it was already vivid.
Of course the White-arian ideology should be transformed as well. Slavic nations might be partly "rehabilited" in their race-hierarchy in manner like asiatic japananese nation was recognized as almost equal to GErmans nation. Finally the GErmans ideology wasn't that hostile to all slavs - remember the Slovenians and Bulgarians were the part of axis coalition.
Soviet antisemitism also might be finally legalized during the war and post war.

steben
10-04-2011, 07:19 AM
Of course the White-arian ideology should be transformed as well. Slavic nations might be partly "rehabilited" in their race-hierarchy in manner like asiatic japananese nation was recognized as almost equal to GErmans nation. Finally the GErmans ideology wasn't that hostile to all slavs - remember the Slovenians and Bulgarians were the part of axis coalition.
Soviet antisemitism also might be finally legalized during the war and post war.

slavic axis .... True ...
Why did they reject the Ukraine as axis partner then?

Chevan
10-04-2011, 07:29 AM
slavic axis .... True ...
Why did they reject the Ukraine as axis partner then?

They have not rejected the Ukrainians. During the occupation the ukrainians ( and russian as well) volunteres were welcomed by both Heer and WaffenSS. They just rejected to grant the independence to Ukraine. Hitler , folowed the line developed in "Mein campf" seen at Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia like at German's colony under the the rule of GErman governors ( gaulauters).This line led to hostilities with UPA since 1943, however the colloborated so called "ROA" fought in GErmans side to the most end.

tankgeezer
10-06-2011, 07:08 PM
Royal's post cobcerning ME-262's has been moved to the correct thread

http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?7393-Most-Effective-Tank-of-the-war.

DVX
10-17-2011, 08:42 AM
There was more than an opportunity of alliance. Of course there was an ideological hostility, but the nazism and communism have more points of conctact than of difference. The true point it's another: Hitler wanted to destroy Russia, not just Soviet Union.
Since the time of Von Clausevitz, arriving to Bismarck, many German political leaders thought that if not an alliance, at least a good relationship with Russia was a must. This position started to change after Bismarck, with the Wilhelm II imperialism. After the WWI, the new political situation retook among the German leaders the evidence of the good opportunities of good relationships with Russia, think for example to von Seeckt, or to the agreements between Weimar Germany and Russia.
For Hitler, the alliance with Russia was just a tactic of a moment, not a strategical view. Many people inside the German leadership thought differently, especially if war with GB was not yet resolved. On this point was based the Mussolini's attempt in 1943, with the other main Axis powers, to force Hitler to get an armistice or a peace with Russia. Read here:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?10876-Why-did-the-Italians-lose/page6

steben
10-17-2011, 10:26 AM
There was more than an opportunity of alliance. Of course there was an ideological hostility, but the nazism and communism have more points of conctact than of difference.

Aggressive, destructive regimes that worship violence and eternal struggle as a positive force of nature always look alike but always fight each other.

The same can be said about peaceful regimes: they always melt in each other.

Chevan
10-21-2011, 02:03 AM
Many people inside the German leadership thought differently, especially if war with GB was not yet resolved. On this point was based the Mussolini's attempt in 1943, with the other main Axis powers, to force Hitler to get an armistice or a peace with Russia.
Why did they think the Stalin should agree to stop a war after the two years bloody compain in USSR and millions of death, especially when RED Army was about to break the military initiative to its favour ? This is pure adventurism.

DVX
10-21-2011, 08:41 AM
Why did they think the Stalin should agree to stop a war after the two years bloody compain in USSR and millions of death, especially when RED Army was about to break the military initiative to its favour ?

Because he had already adavanced twice proposal of peace or armistice; the first time in late 1941, the second a year later. Furthermore, the western Allies had promised the big landing firstly for 1942, afterwards for 1943, "reneging on their own promise" and Stalin thought they wanted to fool him, lefting to Russia the biggest burden of war. When Russia and Germany wou had very good bled and massacred each other, only then they would have intervened to win, indirectly over Russia too.

Chevan
10-22-2011, 12:37 PM
Because he had already adavanced twice proposal of peace or armistice; the first time in late 1941,the second a year later.
Who did make the proposal of peace- Stalin or Hitler? This is something absolutly new for me. DO you have any reliable confirmations?


Furthermore, the western Allies had promised the big landing firstly for 1942, afterwards for 1943, "reneging on their own promise" and Stalin thought they wanted to fool him, lefting to Russia the biggest burden of war. When Russia and Germany wou had very good bled and massacred each other, only then they would have intervened to win, indirectly over Russia too.
But why then allies did launch the wide lend-lise help for Russia. Not to mention the bloody firebombing compain which they started since 1943 over germany.FInaly the landing in Sicily in 1943. Do you mean the west did nothing serious to break Germany and wanted to stay it in war with Russia as long as possible?

DVX
10-22-2011, 04:46 PM
Who did make the proposal of peace- Stalin or Hitler? This is something absolutly new for me. DO you have any reliable confirmations?


Stalin of course. Read here my last post http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?10876-Why-did-the-Italians-lose/page6 :

About the sources on the matter (those I know):

Bodo Sheurig, "Das nationalkomitee und der Bund Deutcher Offiziere in der Sowietunion 1943-45", Munich 1960.
Gianfranco Bianchi, "Perchè e come cadde il fascismo: 25 luglio crollo di un regime", Milano 1963.
Joachim von Ribbentrop, "Zwichen london und Moskau", Leoni 1953
"Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunals", Washington 1951
Peter Kleist, "Zwichen Hitler und Stalin", Bonn 1950
Fulvio Bellini, Gianfranco Bellini, "Storia Segreta del 25 luglio '43", Milano 1993
(plus others that at the moment I should look for in my library...).



But why then allies did launch the wide lend-lise help for Russia. Not to mention the bloody firebombing compain which they started since 1943 over germany.FInaly the landing in Sicily in 1943. Do you mean the west did nothing serious to break Germany and wanted to stay it in war with Russia as long as possible?

No, I meant that was what Stalin thought. He thaught that the Allies were temporizing to let him alone against Hitler, and make them massacre each other.

Chevan
10-24-2011, 05:34 AM
Stalin of course. Read here my last post http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?10876-Why-did-the-Italians-lose/page6 :

About the sources on the matter (those I know):

Bodo Sheurig, "Das nationalkomitee und der Bund Deutcher Offiziere in der Sowietunion 1943-45", Munich 1960.
Gianfranco Bianchi, "Perchè e come cadde il fascismo: 25 luglio crollo di un regime", Milano 1963.
Joachim von Ribbentrop, "Zwichen london und Moskau", Leoni 1953
"Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunals", Washington 1951
Peter Kleist, "Zwichen Hitler und Stalin", Bonn 1950
Fulvio Bellini, Gianfranco Bellini, "Storia Segreta del 25 luglio '43", Milano 1993
(plus others that at the moment I should look for in my library...).

From which i read only Ribbentrop "Between London and Moscow" and honestly i never meet a fragment that Stalin offered the separate peace to Hitler. He wrote actualy that he , Ribbentrop, welcomed the peace with Russia and tryed to persuade the Hitler in winter 1941-42 and later in 1943. However, he wrote Hitler was relictant to idea of peace with Stalin.This point confirm also Von Below ("Als Hitlers adjutant"). No any other top rated nazis i read , neither Albert speer, Guderian or Mainstain never admit the Stalin's proposal for peace.
Not to mention the leading british ww2 historians - Bevour or Tayler. Non of them even hinted to an STalin's proposals. My favorite Alan Clarck even critisized STalin for that in his "Barbarossa". Now you see why i look at this matter suspiciously.FInaly - how could t happend that in West , anglo-saxon west i mean, nobody told about Stalin's will to separate peace with Hitler.Imagine the accusation thay thay would have on USSR if the negoration took place.But nothing were published except the very few books you have listed.


No, I meant that was what Stalin thought. He thaught that the Allies were temporizing to let him alone against Hitler, and make them massacre each other.
Probably might thought so. But he also knew that allies were interested not to let USSR fall down- coz othervise the Britain should be doomed. He saw like allies - americans and Brits were involving itno the war more and more - so German victory in war becoming unclear since 1942.

DVX
10-24-2011, 09:29 AM
Ribbentrop confirms the episode narrated by Peter Kleist in his book. December 14th 1942, in Stockolm, the German communist Edgar Clauss, officer of NKVD, by order of the last Soviet ambassador in Germany, Dekanozof, met the German diplomat Kleist. Clauss said that his government thought that was time to finish the war, and if Germany had accepted the Soviet conditions, Russian government would had been ready to sign an armistice in 8 days. Kleist immediatly flew to Berlin to report to Ribbentrop. After a first shock, Ribbentrop ran to Rastemburg trying to convince Hitler to open immediatly negotiations, with the only result of another histerical crisis by the Fuhrer.

Chevan
10-25-2011, 08:46 AM
Ribbentrop confirms the episode narrated by Peter Kleist in his book. December 14th 1942, in Stockolm, the German communist Edgar Clauss, officer of NKVD, by order of the last Soviet ambassador in Germany, Dekanozof, met the German diplomat Kleist. Clauss said that his government thought that was time to finish the war, and if Germany had accepted the Soviet conditions, Russian government would had been ready to sign an armistice in 8 days. Kleist immediatly flew to Berlin to report to Ribbentrop. After a first shock, Ribbentrop ran to Rastemburg trying to convince Hitler to open immediatly negotiations, with the only result of another histerical crisis by the Fuhrer.
I heard about such an attempts of Ribbentrop and Goebels (!!!) to persuade a Hitler to find a possibility to conclude a peace with USSR from a few different memours i read. However i still doubt the any soviet attempt of negorations took place. Especialy if to keep in mind the political situation of the moment.14 december of 1942 the Red Army has already almost surrounded the 6 army in STalingrad and the anglo-american allies succesfully and quickly pursued the retreating Rommel in Africa.What was the political sense of negoration when it's becoming clear that Germans can't win the war in East and definitelly losed war in Africa?
Stalin, who never suffered of political stupidity, hardly didn't understand that new pact with Hitler should make him a sort of Axis-ally with all the bad consequences for USSR.He never underestimated the ability of anglo-saxon coalition to fight( unlike the manies axis leaders)

DVX
10-25-2011, 10:27 AM
14 december of 1942 the Red Army has already almost surrounded the 6 army in STalingrad and the anglo-american allies succesfully and quickly pursued the retreating Rommel in Africa.What was the political sense of negoration when it's becoming clear that Germans can't win the war in East and definitelly losed war in Africa?


Consider that in diplomacy everyone always tries to start from a position of superiority, in giving, receiving and proposing. The Soviet proposal was accompanied by conditions such as strong as the battleground was in favor of the Soviet Union.

DVX
08-09-2013, 04:40 PM
About this theme of negotiations between Germany and Russia, reported for its conseguences in Mussolini's politics after their failure (forcing the Italian dictator to find an his way of solution, that was an Italian armistice towards the Alleys if Germany would had refused the Italian ultimatum ofa a peace on the East, way that after the fall of Mussolini lead to a completely different and disastrous armistice), there are new interesting books (in Italian language). I can suggest:
"Le potenze dell'Asse e l'Unione Sovietica" of E. Di Rienzo and E. Gin;
"1943. L'estate delle tre tavolette" of Franco Bandini;
The number of july of the current year of the magazine "Storia in Rete".

J.A.W.
08-09-2013, 05:25 PM
& just why are the British archives on the matter [inc' the Hess proposals] locked down until 100+ years have elapsed?

pdf27
08-09-2013, 06:19 PM
& just why are the British archives on the matter [inc' the Hess proposals] locked down until 100+ years have elapsed?
J.A.W. has been given a fortnight's vacation, but in case anybody else is interested the answer is that this is routine for UK archives - everything innocuous is on the 30 year rule, anything even vaguely sensitive is on the 100 year rule. Anything properly embarrassing/secret is never released.

DVX
08-10-2013, 09:34 AM
So we'll never know the secret letters and agreements between Churchill and Mussolini.... but who decides if the documents are embarassing/sensitive? The Government I guess. In this case many secrets... will remain secrets.
Following J.A.W. statement, probably the Hess proposals will remain secret to cover the "dark side" of the British leading class.
For example the big oil company Shell was a great financer of the Nazism, up to 40 million Reichsmark per a single year.
The leadership of Shell consisted of people fully integrated into the Masonic lodges and sects, esoteric, more or less covertly racist, and that so much had been in the cultural and ideological birth of Nazism. These kind of leaderships were quitle spread in many environments, political, diplomatic, economical, and were not a little influential in the British plutocratic ruling class, even if they generally shew a low profile.
And the Nazi leaders knew well these "sects" and had attended them, although more or less secretly of course, so much to push Hess to his famous flight (not at all "crazy") to try to change British policy through Germany (those entourages favorable to Nazism operated quite hidden, but not without influence).
The big mistake of Hitler and the less pragmatic Nazi leaders was to find a very difficoult, if not impossible agreeement with GB, and to attack Russia before this agreement or a victory over Britain had been reached.
Later, when an agreement was still possible with the Sovet Union, Hitler's strictness made to fail the negotiations. Because despite the Hitler's will, and later the conspirators of july 1944 aspirations (when however it was too late), an agreement was effectively possible only with Russia. German leaders had forgotten the Bismarck lesson.

Rising Sun*
08-10-2013, 10:12 AM
... in case anybody else is interested the answer is that this is routine for UK archives - everything innocuous is on the 30 year rule, anything even vaguely sensitive is on the 100 year rule. Anything properly embarrassing/secret is never released.

Actually, now it's everything is released after 20 years unless there is some compelling reason why it shouldn't be released. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/20-year-rule.htm#text

I still can't see what great damage could be done by releasing records relating to Hess's flight to the UK about three quarters of a century later, particularly given the release of so much sensitive information about things such as code breaking and listening in on captured German generals and other secretive stuff in the UK during and after WWII, including Philby and Co and related matters.

Whatever relates to the Hess records, it seems most likely to be necessary to preserve something which could still be damaged by revelation. But I can't think of anything that could fit that bill, with the possible exception of bringing the Royal Family into further disrepute via the former King's involvement in some way. I doubt that anyone of significance in that era and on that issue is still alive and needing protection from disclosure.

royal744
08-12-2013, 12:51 PM
[QUOTE] Originally posted by DVX: Because he had already adavanced twice proposal of peace or armistice; the fi
rst time in late 1941, the second a year later. Furthermore, the western Allies had promised the big landing firstly for 1942, afterwards for 1943, "reneging on their own promise" and Stalin thought they wanted to fool him, lefting to Russia the biggest burden of war. When Russia and Germany wou had very good bled and massacred each other, only then they would have intervened to win, indirectly over Russia too. [QUOTE]


No one promised an invasion in 1942 - where did you get fantasy from, DVX? There were a few American generals who wanted to invade in 1943 but they were dreaming and they were wrong. The raid on Dieppe threw cold water on that idea. Of course Stalin was suspicious of the West: he was pathologically suspicious of everyone. He probably couldn't believe it when the West sought to help him - he wouldn't have helped the West if the positions were reversed. Having said this, I wouldn't be particularly surprised if Stalin made discreet peace feelers during the initially successful stages of Barbarossa, but rather surprised if he did so later on. The only thing Stalin respected was power and the willingness to use it ruthlessly. Why would he make peace after Barbarossa? He was winning.

DVX
08-12-2013, 04:28 PM
No fancy Royal 744. I've posted my sources and I have not invented them.
Even after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army had losses 8 times bigger than the Whermacht; every success costed so much higher to the Soviets... than Stalin have clear suspects on the continuos Anglo-American delays... because the blood of the Russian army was erupting much more than the Western Allies one, as matter of fact....

royal744
08-13-2013, 02:31 PM
No fancy Royal 744. I've posted my sources and I have not invented them.
Even after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army had losses 8 times bigger than the Whermacht; every success costed so much higher to the Soviets... than Stalin have clear suspects on the continuos Anglo-American delays... because the blood of the Russian army was erupting much more than the Western Allies one, as matter of fact....

DVX, "who" promised an invasion of Europe in 1942? You said it had been promised - who promised it?

leccy
08-14-2013, 05:02 AM
No fancy Royal 744. I've posted my sources and I have not invented them.
Even after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Red Army had losses 8 times bigger than the Whermacht; every success costed so much higher to the Soviets... than Stalin have clear suspects on the continuos Anglo-American delays... because the blood of the Russian army was erupting much more than the Western Allies one, as matter of fact....

As the war progressed the Soviets were on the offensive so losses would usually be higher, they were also not just fighting the Germans but quite a few other Axis nations, so all losses have to be included not just the Wehrmacht which most seem to think is all that was fighting in the east.

Higher losses does not also equate to wanting to make peace, the Soviets were in a better position to replace losses than the Germans were generally throughout the war (who were suffering manpower shortages in 1940 and equipment was reliant on huge amounts of captured materiel to supply their own shortfalls from 1938).

The US had some sort of idea about launching a cross channel invasion in 1942 which was a complete impossibility (no troops built up, no landing craft, no supplies stockpile, green troops, no experience of large sea borne assaults), there was an agreement to possibly cross in 1943 which had to be put back as it was still not possible for the western allies.

royal744
08-14-2013, 08:05 PM
As the war progressed the Soviets were on the offensive so losses would usually be higher, they were also not just fighting the Germans but quite a few other Axis nations, so all losses have to be included not just the Wehrmacht which most seem to think is all that was fighting in the east.

Higher losses does not also equate to wanting to make peace, the Soviets were in a better position to replace losses than the Germans were generally throughout the war (who were suffering manpower shortages in 1940 and equipment was reliant on huge amounts of captured materiel to supply their own shortfalls from 1938).

The US had some sort of idea about launching a cross channel invasion in 1942 which was a complete impossibility (no troops built up, no landing craft, no supplies stockpile, green troops, no experience of large sea borne assaults), there was an agreement to possibly cross in 1943 which had to be put back as it was still not possible for the western allies.

Thanks, Leccy. Was a promise of an invasion in 1942 actually made to Stalin? I mean, was this formal in any way shape or form? I know that in the US there was a blustery "Second Front Now" movement, but it was a citizen-inspired (or "otherwise" inspired) movement not rooted in anything official. Given that Pearl Harbor didn't occur until the end of 1941, "unrealistic" doesn't even begin to describe thoughts of a cross-channel invasion in '42.

leccy
08-15-2013, 05:53 AM
Thanks, Leccy. Was a promise of an invasion in 1942 actually made to Stalin? I mean, was this formal in any way shape or form? I know that in the US there was a blustery "Second Front Now" movement, but it was a citizen-inspired (or "otherwise" inspired) movement not rooted in anything official. Given that Pearl Harbor didn't occur until the end of 1941, "unrealistic" doesn't even begin to describe thoughts of a cross-channel invasion in '42.

Going to be away for a few days so not got much time to search for the sources but they might be in the Green Books (US official history WW2 iirc). There was also some information in Stalin/Churchill or Stalin/Roosevelt letters which I have saved somewhere on one of my computers/external hard drives which of course are all indexed and ready to hand - erm nope

A quick passage from this tome

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/USA-E-XChannel-1.html


In the meantime, both U.S. and British planners were independently investigating the possibility of being forced into action in 1942 in order to assist the Soviet Union. When Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941, many observers felt that the Russians would fall before the German blitz as quickly as had most of the rest of Europe. Then the Red Army tightened and held in front of Moscow and, when the snows came, struck back. Despite this success, however, neither American nor British military leaders were sanguine about the ability of the Russians to withstand a new German offensive in 1942. U.S. planners wrote: "Although Russia's strength was greatly underestimated by military authorities, including the Germans, a true test of Russia's capacity to resist the enemy will come this summer."28 The outcome of that test, they believed, was the key to the European and possibly to the world situation. Defeat of the USSR would enable the Germans to dominate the whole of Europe, complete the blockade of England, and probably force England to capitulate. If so, then it followed that every possible effort should be made by the Western Powers to insure that Russia was not defeated.

At the end of February 1942, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, wrote: "The task of keeping Russia in the war in involves . . . immediate and definite action. It is not sufficient to urge upon the Russians the indirect advantages that will accrue to them from Allied operations in distant parts of the world . . . Russia's problem is to sustain herself during the coming summer, and she must not be permitted to reach such a precarious position that she will accept a negotiated peace, no matter how unfavorable to herself, in preference to continuation of the fight." The two ways of assisting Russia, General

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Eisenhower noted, were Lend-Lease aid and early operations in the west to draw off from the Russian front large portions of the German Army and Air Force. He was dubious whether a sizable ground attack from England could be mounted soon, but at least, he thought, air operations could be initiated.29

The U.S. Joint Planning Staff, studying the whole question of U.S. troop deployment, went much further. They believed that a considerable land attack could be launched across the English Channel in 1942. Although it would have to be done at first largely by British forces, American participation would build up rapidly, and the prospect of such reinforcement should enable the British to mount the attack on a slimmer margin than would otherwise be possible. On this basis, the planners outlined what they thought would be a possible operation to take place in the summer of 1942 with a D Day between 15 July and 1 August. The operation was to open with a fifteen-day air attack, the strategic purpose of which would be to divert the German Air Force from the east. The immediate tactical objectives were to establish control of the air over the Channel and at least a hundred kilometers inland between Dunkerque and Abbeville, and to inflict the maximum damage on German military installations and lines of communication. During the air offensive, commandos were to raid the coasts of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Normandy. In phase two, beginning about D plus 30, major land forces were to cross the Channel with the mission of securing the high ground north of the Seine and Oise Rivers, and of destroying enemy ground and air forces in the general area Calais-Arras-St. Quentin-Soissons-Paris-Deauville. The plan did not go into operational detail. The critical problem of landing craft received little attention beyond a listing of the barge requirements and a notation that both Americans and British would have to construct special craft.30

Additional information

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_07.htm

It does seem there was some twisty turny politician talk, say one thing but mean something else without it being completely clear.

Alleged transcript of Molotov-Roosevelt meeting in 1942

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Documents/russia.us.1942.htm

Dept. of State Bulletin, (June 13, 1942)


CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MR. MOLOTOV
Dept. of State Bulletin, June 13, 1942.

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, following the invitation of the President of the United States of America, arrived in Washington on May 29 and was for some time the President's guest. This visit to Washington afforded an opportunity for a friendly exchange of views between the President and his advisers on the one hand and Mr. Molotov and his party on the other. Among those who participated in the conversations were: The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Maxim Litvinov; Mr. Harry Hopkins; the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall; and the commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King. Mr. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, joined in subsequent conversations on non-military matters.

In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942. In addition, the measures for increasing and speeding up the supplies of planes, tanks, and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union were discussed. Also discussed were the fundamental problems of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States in safeguarding peace and security to the freedom-loving peoples after the war. Both sides state with satisfaction the unity of their views on all these questions.

At the conclusion of the visit the President asked Mr. Molotov to inform Mr. Stalin on his behalf that he feels these conversations have been most useful in establishing a basis for fruitful and closer relations between the two governments in the pursuit of the common objectives of the United Nations.

royal744
08-17-2013, 02:38 PM
Certainly, then, a great deal of "talk" and chin-wagging on the subject, and even preliminary "blue-sky" planning on a cross-channel invasion in 1942. none of which was grounded in reality nor based upon 1) the availability of US troops and materiel in England, 2) nor on the existence of landing craft in the British Isles. Doubtless too, Molotov must have reported the rubbery conversations to Stalin which, in the minds of Roosevelt, Hopkins and King, were fully hedged and well-beyond the abilities of the allies to fulfill. So, while I'm confident no formal or detailed planning down to the level of ships, landing craft, actual fire support, air support, not to mention supplies (much less the construction of artificial harbors) was done, I have to give DVX his due in that Stalin may have claimed to have been "misled" into thinking that some kind of landing might have been imminent. I don't really think so. Stalin was nothing if not a ruthless realist, knew that no cross-channel invasion was possible in the near future and used his "disappointment" as leverage to get as much for his own forces - supplies, trucks, aircraft, etc. - as possible.

DVX
08-25-2013, 06:18 PM
Firstly, thanks Leccy for your interesting links, that confirm my sources.
Secondly, as you can see royal744, there were negotiations, promises, studies, hipotesys, talks, call you them as you like, for the second front in 1942. Clearly, any delay caused trouble and suspicion in Stalin.
I can agree with you that these delays were caused by well motivated military and industrial causes, but these couldn't change the Stalin's suspicion towards the Allies, instead just the opposite: he felt these delays like "fake excuses" done by bad allies.
It happens in relationships, and the misunderstandigs could be tolerate until things go well, thereafter...
For example the Steel Pact pointed the start of the war not before the 1943, becouse until that time Italian armed forces wouldn't be absolutely able to fight a great world war. Nevertheless Italy entered into the war when Germany looked to be the winner. But when the war was going to be lost, the violation of Steel pact (war in 1939 instead of 1943) was resumed with the so called "molibdenum list" - the request of Mussolini to Hitler to start immediatly the war, before 1943: 18 millions of tons of strategical materials needed by Italian industry to manage a great war, for just 1 year war-lasting! (I newly suggest the book of Erich Kuby "The German betrayal. Like Third Reich ruined Italy".
So, as you can see even Eisenhower feared a compromise peace between Hitler and Stalin: there had to be a reason (or more than one).
Don't forget that just in USA was firstly published in 1939 the book of Walter Krivistky, former chief of the Soviet secret service in western Europe: "In Stalin's secret service; an exposé of Russia's secret policies by the former chief of the Soviet Intelligence in western Europe". At the time it was clearly an editorial bomb (I've the Italian edition of 1940 "Sono stato agente di Stalin" and I've to say it' s a really interesting book and, for people who like spy-stories, perhaps even better than the Ian Fleming novels, with the difference Krivitsky talks about his true story, it's not a novel).
Krivitsky says that since 1933 onwards the foreign policy of Stalin was directed only to find an agreement with Hitler; at the time it was a scoop and explained the secret reasons of the German-Soviet pact, that for the author - the no. 2 on the killing list of the Ghepeu, after Trotsky - was all but surprising.
So why not another agreement during the German-Soviet war? Many sources say that the only obstacle to this agreement was Hitler himself, as he was the only obstacle since 1933 to 1939. After the Rapallo treaty of 1920, Germany and Russia were in good relationship, like General Von Seekt's and Marshall Tugachevsky's armies...
Hitler changed this policy, until he rediscovered a "filo-Russian" policy for tactical reasons since 1939 to 1941.
In 1943 Mussolini (and even before), some German leaders like Goering, other Axis governments (Romenian, Hungarian and even Japanese), wanted a new agreement, an armistice, between Russia as last possibility to not lose the war, and the western Allies feared this possibility.

steben
08-26-2013, 06:36 AM
There is a thing crossing my mind and it summarizes well with "Why did the US wanted "Russia" to continue the fight that much and why did they wanted germany to be defeated that bad?" Do they deliberately avoid the label "Soviet Union"?
Or is it just the fact Germany declared war? There was no point in wanting the Soviet Union to become stronger.

Another agreement between Hitler and Stalin would not demand to much of Stalin, but of Hitler. As I said before, Hitler did not see war as "an extension of politics", rather the other way around: it was Hitler who needed to convince generals that politics actually were what was needed to serve his war eventually. The only exception was the peace with the UK in 1940.
The destruction of the Soviet Union however was crucial in his mindset. Once the war broke out it was to death. And everything after fell into this paradigm. Including negotiation with the west.

It is no far jump into the dark to state that if Hitler would have succeeded in peace negotiations in 1940 - giving in to some demands of Western powers, including the release of France, Norway, ... but holding tight to the Polish gains - he would probably have been called a great man in German history. This would have made the blitzkrieg war the extension of his first geopolitical goal : a stable conquest of Poland. Czechoslovak territories didn't need such war, or at least: UK and France did not wanted a war for that .