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kurt
07-26-2010, 04:56 PM
This thread has been transferred from http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?3667-Should-the-atomic-bombs-have-been-dropped-on-Hiroshima-and-Nagasaki/page55 after post #817



More to the point, what is your point?

The 1917 agreement was overtaken by subsequent events, most notably Japan's exit in 1934 from the Washington Naval Treaty and its successors, allowing it to build up its navy to challenge the US and Britain, and entering the Tripartite Pact in 1940 thereby aligning itself with Germany which in due course would declare war on the US, albeit only after Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

Pulling out obscure and outdated and irrelevant minor agreements between the US and Japan concerning China has no material bearing on the causes of the war or the legitimacy, or illegitimacy, of either nation's wartime conduct.

I can't think of anything more illegitimate that Japan's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and I can't see how America's abrogation of the 1917 agreement has anything to do with it in any way that justifies or even explains Japan's conduct in commencing the war and its appalling conduct in prosecuting it, or that warranted America not using atomic weapons against Japan.

According to the directives of Orange Plan, Pearl Harbor doesn't look like a " sneak attack" after all:

The Navy Base War Plan Orange for 1938 contained three new assumptions inspired by extensive Army revisions to the Joint Plan, which eliminated all references to offensive warfare: (1) outbreak of war would be preceded by a period of strained relations; (2) Orange would attack without warning; and (3) a superior US fleet would operate west of Hawaii
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htm

Based on documents available by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), author Robert B. Stinnett wrote a well documented book that states that Pearl Harbor was not only foreknowledged but provoked by warmongers in the US, strangling Japan's economy by an oil and raw materials embargo which put Japan in the disjunctive of accepting being a second order power subordinated to the US interests or try to impose it's will through the war....

Perhaps the single most important document discovered by Stinnett is a 7 October 1940 memorandum written by Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. McCollum’s memo outlines a strategic policy designed to goad the Japanese into committing "an overt act of war" against the United States. McCollum writes that such a strategy is necessary because "it is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado." McCollum suggests eight specific "actions" that the United States should take to bring about this result. The key one is "Action F" which calls for keeping "the main strength" of the U.S. Pacific Fleet "in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands." McCollum concludes his memo by stating that "if by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better." Stinnett has little trouble demonstrating that the strategy outlined in this memo became the official policy of the Roosevelt administration. Not only was the memorandum endorsed by Capt. Dudley Knox, one of Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisers, but White House routing logs demonstrate that Roosevelt received the memorandum; and over the next year, Roosevelt put every one of the eight suggested actions into effect. He implemented the last one (Action H) on 26 July 1941 when he ordered a complete embargo of all U.S. trade with Japan.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/trask1.html

Another quote on this topic from the Independent:

On November 25, 1941 Japan’s Admiral Yamamoto sent a radio message to the group of Japanese warships that would attack Pearl Harbor on December 7. Newly released naval records prove that from November 17 to 25 the United States Navy intercepted eighty-three messages that Yamamoto sent to his carriers. Part of the November 25 message read: “...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow...”
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=408

Rising Sun*
07-26-2010, 07:03 PM
Based on documents available by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), author Robert B. Stinnett wrote a well documented book that states that Pearl Harbor was not only foreknowledged but provoked by warmongers in the US, strangling Japan's economy by an oil and raw materials embargo which put Japan in the disjunctive of accepting being a second order power subordinated to the US interests or try to impose it's will through the war....

Well, there is the other conspiracy theory that Churchill withheld from Roosevelt knowledge of the impending Pearl Harbor attack so that America would be drawn into the war, but the problem with that for Stinnett adherents is that the Churchill conspiracy requires Roosevelt to be ignorant of Japanese intentions.

As for Stinnett's theory:


A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of
"Day of Deceit"
By: Philip H. Jacobsen

The author, Robert B. Stinnett, made a thorough search of National Archives files other repositories and contacted numerous personnel to justify his long held belief that President Franklin D. Roosevelt not only actively fomented war with Japan as a pretext to aid Britain in its fight with Hitler but that he purposely made Pearl Harbor an attractive target for the Japanese Navy. Then (as the theory goes) after learning of the of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt (through conspiracies continuing today) not only kept Admiral Kimmel and General Short from obtaining information on Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor but ordered or had ordered actions that prevented those commanders from discovering the Kido Butai and adequately defending Pearl Harbor from the expected attack by the Japanese.

"Day of Deceit" argues that Roosevelt was convinced the loss at Pearl Harbor must be of sufficient magnitude to overcome the isolationist views of the general public so that he could safely declare war on both Japan and Germany. Furthermore, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt through his co-conspirators (who apparently include General Marshall, Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, Anderson, Captain Turner and Commander McCollum and by implication Admiral Noyes, Captain Redman, Commander Rochefort and many others), attempted to cover up his and his co-conspirators' dastardly deeds. However, through Stinnett's foresight, expertise and diligence, he was able to see through this monstrous conspiracy and its cover-up to reveal its details to us some 58 years later when all previous efforts by revisionist conspiracy theorists have failed and all the participants are dead and cannot defend themselves. Nevertheless, this book will sell well among rabid Roosevelt haters, many Kimmel and Short supporters, and dedicated conspiracy theorists.

Beginning in World War I with the nascent United States involvement in cryptology, followed by the Yardley Black Chamber, the book rapidly progresses into the beginnings of the Army involvement in cryptology after Secretary of State Stimson closed the Yardley Black Chamber. Mr. William Friedman, who headed the Army's Signal Intelligence Service since 1929, in 1930 hired three mathematician assistants, Mr. Frank Rowlett, Mr. Solomon Kullback, and Mr. Abraham Sinkov. (According to Mr. Rowlett in his book The Story of Magic it was called Signal Intelligence Section. The Section was part of the Army Signal Corps, and the immediate boss was actually Major Crawford, USA, who reported directly to the Chief Signal Officer). The four individuals functioned in a small secure space in the third wing of the old Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. until the beginning of WW II.

In an effort to support his conspiracy theory, Stinnett came up with many new documents not generally known to be available. However, these documents do not add anything new to the question of who knew what and when. In his zeal, he misinterprets not only some of these "new" documents but comes up with radically new meanings for the plain words and characterizations of well accepted documentation already available in this Pearl Harbor arena. One of the centerpieces of his argument is an October 1940 memorandum by then Lieutenant Commander McCollum of ONI in response to the September 1940 signing of the Tripartite Pact by Germany, Italy and Japan and not as any blueprint for initiating war with Germany and Japan. McCollum recognized the danger to the western powers if Japan was able to connect up with Germany and Italy through Asia and suggested eight actions designed to contain Japan generally and to keep her from making such connection with its other Axis partners. Unfortunately, the book seizes on an off hand comment that is not one of the main points of the memo as the springboard for its conspiracy theory. That comment was if the eight proposed actions designed to contain Japan should by chance cause Japan to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. No proof of any official implementation of this mid-level memo is provided. Furthermore, Stinnett improperly ascribes McCollum's office as "an element of Station US (by which he means OP-20-G), a secret American cryptographic center located at the main naval headquarters" in an effort to tie McCollum closer to OP-20-G than he actually was before WWII. A non-cryptologic fallacy of the book is the fact that Roosevelt had no assurance that Germany would declare war on the U.S. if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor thus negating any reasonable conspiratorial design to get the U.S. into war with Germany by forcing Japan to attack the U.S.

It is well established that the SRN series of Japanese naval messages in the National Archives were decrypted in 1945-46 and translated in 1946-47, but Stinnett incorrectly suggests they may only have been transcribed at those times and that these decrypts (or at least some of them) were available not only in radio intelligence centers in Washington, but Stations Hypo (Rochefort) in Hawaii and Cast on Corregidor. Among other things, the book misinterprets an article by Captain Pelletier in the "Cryptolog." Even though Pelletier is now dead, he also wrote in the NCVA History Book that all such JN-25B raw messages were two months old by the time he saw them in Washington and that no Kido Butai transmissions while enroute from the Kuriles to Hawaii were ever found before or after 7 December 1941. Further, the book fails to inform its readers that Rochefort and his Hypo personnel were only assigned to and only worked on the unproductive Flag Officer's Code and not the main Japanese Fleet Code JN-25B as well as the fact that they were only given the go ahead to work on JN-25B a few days or so after the Pearl Harbor attack. As mentioned before, Stinnett also omits the well known information that JN-25B intercepts from Corregidor, Guam and Station H were only forwarded to Washington by mail and took up to two months to arrive mostly by ship and rail. Thus, even Washington's alleged 10 percent capability on JN-25B decrypts had not even begun to be applied to the November and December 1941 intercepts enroute there while Stinnett maintains they were available to all commanders except of course Kimmel and Short due to FDR's co-conspirators. continued

Rising Sun*
07-26-2010, 07:05 PM
The book implies more improprieties by the fact that Hypo had no assigned Japanese diplomatic intercept or decrypt authority until RCA President Sarnoff made available RCA cables from Honolulu beginning in early December 1941. Part of Stinnett's overall conspiracy theory includes the allegation that Hypo only decrypted the administrative messages of these low level Japanese diplomatic messages provided by RCA before Pearl Harbor and did not decrypt the "bomb plot" messages until after Pearl Harbor.

Although Stinnett obtained definite information from Captain Whitlock that no significant JN-25B decrypts were made by Station Cast on Corregidor during the period in question, he disputes this fact and misinterprets other documents and sources as proof that Whitlock is wrong. Some navy cryptologic veterans involved in this book have complained Stinnett gained their confidence by agreeing to tell their stories but ignored their version of events in favor of the monstrous conspiracy theory finalized in the book. Admiral Layton terminated his interview with the author, most likely when he learned where the book was going. It should be noted that it took OP-20-G some 14 months to read the much simpler JN-25A system that was used from 1 June 1939 to 1 December 1940. The book misleads its readers by not revealing there were two distinct codes, the earlier JN-25A and its much more complicated successor JN-25B used during the period in question and refers to them collectively as "Code Book D" or "5-Num code." Thus, the final successes of JN-25A are improperly imputed to JN-25B which was not read to any significant extent until March 1942 when the first published decrypt is found. The ever-increasing requirements to provide Japanese diplomatic decrypts and translations during 1941 took most of the time of navy cryptographers so that few people at both Washington and Station Cast were assigned to work on the new version of the Fleet Code, JN-25B. In addition, JN-25B used about eight additive cipher books up through 4 December 1941 further delaying the effort to read any significant amount of this new and far more complicated code and cipher combination.

Stinnett and his sources are apparently not aware that Japanese naval shore broadcast stations transmitted simultaneously on a number of frequencies covering their communications area and it was up to the ships in their communications zone (or U.S. intercept operators) to choose the best frequency on which to copy such broadcast. Thus, the deduction that because an intercept operator copied one message in the 12 MHz. range part of one day and 16 MHz. on part of a different later day means the ship or force has moved further away from the shore station is patently incorrect. These Tokyo broadcast transmitters were active on several of their assigned frequencies simultaneously and the 16 MHz. frequency had long been used by the Tokyo broadcast as a daytime frequency.

Stinnett often claims carriers or fleet units must have transmitted on high frequencies when they are only seen in the headings of messages on fleet broadcasts. He does not tell his readers that many ships are tied up at docks and have landline or cable communications available to them so they do not have to use radio and the original transmissions of such messages will never be heard by foreign intercept operators. In this regard, he maintains that Admiral Yamamoto's messages sent (while tied up at a Kure dock) to the Pearl Harbor attack force and other ships on the Tokyo broadcast violated radio silence when, in fact, the radio silence imposed then only meant that ships (or aircraft) are not permitted to transmit by high frequency radio, not that messages to these units cannot be sent by fleet broadcasts or that fleet units or commands that have landline, cable or other approved facilities available to them cannot use them.

Apparently, Stinnett did come up with records to substantiate Hypo's summaries about the carrier Agaki being active on the air on 26 and 30 November 1941. However, there is no documentation that any high frequency direction finder (HFDF) fixes were available to Hypo on such transmissions. The single line bearings reportedly obtained by Corregidor's old DY-2 HFDF went by the island of Honshu as well as the Kurile Islands and the former location with acceptable HFDF variations was within Hypo's previous general determination of carrier locations. According to the book, a possible cross bearing from Dutch Harbor was found in that station's November monthly report that did not reach Station H until after 7 December and for some reason was not reproduced in the book. No documentary evidence was shown that such bearing was actually transmitted to Station H or subsequently forwarded to Rochefort at Hypo except a general statement as to routine forwarding by a Dutch Harbor operator.

Although the book claims more carrier and carrier commander transmissions were made after 26 and 30 November, this information is apparently due to a misinterpretation of the TESTM reports from Corregidor to Station H and a misunderstanding of traffic analysis procedures identifying call signs appearing in broadcast and point to point messages sent by shore communication stations. The single TESTM report provided in the book first lists the transmissions heard and their bearings and such bearings are mainly on unidentified call signs. Then, any fleet level call signs identifications made from the traffic analysis of message headings in shore station transmissions by Station Cast are given. In his enthusiasm to support its conspiracy theory, Stinnett apparently assumes that the latter call sign identifications by traffic analysis of shore station transmissions actually represent high frequency radio transmissions by such fleet units and commanders. Layton, Pelletier and Whitlock among others deny such transmissions were ever received. One wonders why Stinnett did not reproduce the other two TESTM reports upon which he relies to make his specific allegations to clarify his identification and deductive processes, especially since the one page reproduced does not support his allegations. continued

Rising Sun*
07-26-2010, 07:06 PM
Gross misinterpretations of two decrypts and translations in the SRN series at the National Archives make up the other parts of the book's centerpiece of its conspiracy theory. In an effort to give some credence to its allegation of a massive conspiracy, the book contradicts the plain meaning on the face of translations of these two decrypted messages, established Japanese naval communications practice, and standard decryption procedures. These messages were reported on long ago by Frederick D. Parker in "Cryptologia" Vol. 15 (4) p. 295. However, Parker fully reported that JN-25B was being decrypted at best on a 10 percent basis in Washington and those November and December 1941 raw messages discussed were enroute to Washington D.C. so that they were not available to be worked on until long after the Pearl Harbor attack. The glaring omission in the book of this vital "unavailability" information is instructive.

The first decrypt refers to naval spy Suzuki who was sent to the First Air Fleet on business to be picked up on 23 or 24 November at Hitokappu Wan (Bay). It is abundantly clear from the document that Hitokappu Wan is spelled out letter by letter in five numeral code groups of JN-25B because there was no two or three letter coded geographic designation available for this remote location (like AF for Midway Island.) Nevertheless, the book baldly claims, without any substantiation, that the words Hitokappu Wan were sent in plain language while the rest of the message was sent in code, an incredible absurdity. No other examples of plain language inserts within a high level Japanese naval coded message were ever claimed or reported. No one else has had the temerity to make such a ridiculous assertion when confronted with the JN-25B code designation on the face of the decrypt and no reference to a plain language insert in the decrypt.

The second gross misinterpretation contained in the book is that Yamamoto's famous message of 2 December 1941 only referred to as "Climb Mount. Niitaka 1208" may have been sent in plain language. If so, it implies Rochefort knew of these two plain language "busts" by the Japanese and therefore is part of the conspiracy for not reporting them in his summaries. For this strong implication, one Japanese historian is cited saying the message was sent in the clear while Yamamoto's biographer is identified as saying the message was encoded in a five numeral code (JN-25B). Captain Pelletier in the Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association History Book confirmed this message was sent in JN-25. To show the extreme lengths the book will go to conjure up his implication of conspiracy, it omits the fact in the narrative that this message labeled SRN 115376 by the National Archives had a cryptographer's reference below the heading clearly showing that it was encoded in JN-25B. Furthermore, Stinnett does not clearly point out to his readers that "Climb Mount Niitaka" was prefaced by the words, "This dispatch is Top Secret. This order is effective at 1730 on 2 December #10." Can you imagine the Japanese sending a Top Secret message in the clear and depending on a transparent underlying meaning for security? Except for battle tactical reports during the war, the Japanese seldom used plain language and even then preferred tactical codes. These are only a small part of the omissions, errors and misinterpretations contained in the book to try to make its revisionist conspiracy theory seem plausible to the uninitiated.

The book also resurrects the old allegations of Robert D. Ogg, a seaman in the 12th Naval District Intelligence office, and disregards Ogg's recorded interview by then Commander Newman that he only plotted two very closely parallel bearings from California stations 100 miles apart. Stinnett now says Ogg had prewar information on Japanese warship transmissions in the Kuriles with HFDF bearings by Dutch Harbor in spite of Ogg's original transcript to the contrary.

The old and thoroughly repudiated hearsay report of dead Dutch codebreakers' prewar determinations that Japanese carriers were in the North Pacific enroute to Hawaii are regurgitated by the book. Only now it has the Dutch putting them in the Kuriles instead of the North Pacific. Stinnett also repeats Parker's reporting of the tanker Shiriya moving eastward from the Bonin Islands in a 1 December 1941 message (SRN 115398) to Destroyer Division 7 with the Kido Butai that was intercepted on the Tokyo broadcast. Again, he does not tell his readers that this JN-25B message was only decrypted in 1945-46 and translated in 1946-47 and that the raw intercept was enroute to Washington DC in the U.S. postal system on 7 December 1941.

To further its revisionist conspiracy theory, the book argues that government censors are still withholding the publication of decryptions (and translations) of hundreds of vital Japanese naval messages whose secrecy is a part of this monstrous conspiracy. Stinnett points to missing Station Message Serial (SMS) numbers and missing versions of original transmissions by fleet units and commanders (supposedly on high frequency radio) that appear on shore station fleet broadcasts to naval ships and point to point circuits. However, the book does not mention that after the war navy analysts discovered that about 7,000 Japanese naval messages per month were forwarded to Washington from Corregidor, Guam and Hawaii from July to December 1941. During the expanded intercept coverage of WWII, an OP-20-G official estimated that the U.S. intercepted 60 percent of Japanese naval traffic. Therefore, far more than 10,000 messages were probably sent over the airways by the Japanese Navy per month in the months before Pearl Harbor and less than 60 percent were actually intercepted. Thus, the missing SMS numbers and original transmissions could be accounted for by missed intercepts and transmissions originated by landline, cable, visual means or even hand carried to shore radio stations. In fact, there was a cable office at Hitokappu Wan available to fleet units to send messages to Tokyo without transmitting on high frequency radio.

Again, in 1945-46 analysts decrypted those intercepts from the Pacific that were available in Washington. A total of 26,581 messages in seven different crypto systems were intercepted between 5 September and 4 December 1941. Between 15 March 1946 to 20 August 1947, OP-20-G analysts and linguists from ONI undertook the study of these 26,581 post war decrypts and only 2,413 were considered important enough for full translations. Of these, only 188 were isolated as pertaining specifically to the events of 7 December 1941. This information contradicts Stinnett's assertion that government censors are withholding disclosure of hundreds of vital decrypted and translated messages in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy by President Roosevelt and many top an middle level government officials. Those 2,413 messages that were translated in this period are available in the SRN series and no other decrypts or translations are available for this period of time..
continued

Rising Sun*
07-26-2010, 07:07 PM
To his credit, Stinnett does recognize that the Winds Execute message (a favorite revisionist conspiracy allegation) was never sent. He also recounts Secretary of War Stimson's blatant attempt to reverse the Army Board of Inquiry's determination that Marshall was in dereliction of his duty as to his Pearl Harbor actions. Stimson sent attorney Clausen around the world to obtain new affidavits countering the witnesses' previous testimony of Marshall's neglect to act on Purple decrypts. However, Stinnett omits the fact that Clausen also tried to place the blame for not fully informing Hawaiian commanders on navy cryptologic officers. The latter effort is also part of the aim of this book, but its shot is far wide of the mark.

To those of us who are familiar with Japanese naval codes and communications procedures at the time, available documentation in the Pearl Harbor arena as well as the pertinent personnel and history of OP-20-G, it is abundantly clear that the book fails to prove any part of its massive revisionist conspiracy theory. In fact, the expansion of prior revisionist conspiracy theories to include so many new allegations of wrong doing by Roosevelt and his mid and high level co-conspirators plus a continuing cover-up makes its enormous conspiracy theory a complete impossibility.

In conclusion, it is still clear that no U.S. official knew beforehand of the Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor or discovered that the Kido Butai was on its way to Hawaii for such an attack in spite of this latest in a series of revisionist conspiracy theory books.

AFTERWARD: A few of the more gross errors noted after researching the actual archives documents

Further research confirms reports by numerous high ranking Japanese officials who participated in the Hawaiian Strike Force that programs of Japanese radio deception activities were carried out from major naval bases of Sasebo, Kure and Yokosuka to deceive the U.S. Navy's radio intelligence organization that the carriers were still in home waters. The actual Station C Corregidor TESTM HFDF bearing reports from 13 November through 4 December 1941 show the Akagi's bearings remaining between 026 and 030 degrees even though the Kido Butai first transited from the Inland Sea to Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles and thence across the North Pacific Ocean to Hawaii. If the Corregidor bearings on the radio deception transmissions using the Akagi's call sign for 27 and 30 November and 4 December had been valid, they would have been 041, 048 and 051 degrees instead of remaining between 026 to 030 degrees. The reports of "carrier" transmissions on 26 and the Akagi on 30 November intercepted by Station H, Heeia, Oahu, Hawaii [but without HFDF bearings] were obviously part of the same Japanese radio deception program emanating from Sasebo (027 degrees from Corregidor) and Kure (030 degrees from Corregidor).

Official OP-20-GYP-1 reports verify that zero decrypts of JN-25B were made prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. All the early JN-25B decrypts are listed in numerical order with Station Hypo, Pearl Harbor making the first decrypt in January 1942. See Stephen Budiansky's article, "Too Late For Pearl Harbor" in the December 1999 issue of "U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and my article, "Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The Story of the U.s. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B. In addition, Commander Rudolph Fabian, the Officer-in-Charge of Station C Corregidor testified before a Congressional committee about breaking JN-25B before the war. "We were in the initial stages, sir. We had established liaison with the British unit at Singapore. We were exchanging values both code and cipher, but we had not developed either to the point where we could read enemy intercepts." Stinnett dismisses Captain Whitlock's confirmation of this no decrypt testimony. The fact that Station C located the Akagi off Corregidor on 8 December 1941 based direction finder bearings on more radio deception activity is further evidence that they had not broken JN-25B and relied only on traffic analysis and direction finder bearings for their reports.

Stinnett blatantly misconstrued Station H's Comint Summary of 25 November 1941 that reported that ViceAdmiral Inoue, CinC Fourth Fleet in the mandated islands, was observed in "extensive communications" with many entities like Commander Submarines, Commander Carriers, Juluit and other mandate island bases as evidence that Nagumo violated radio silence and that U.S. Navy stations obtained bearings and fixes on such phantom radio transmissions. However, it was Inoue who was "observed" in the extensive communications not Nagumo. In the parlance of the times, the word "observed" meant these communications noted were only in the form of addressees of messages seen mostly on the Tokyo Fleet broadcast and not original radio transmissions as Stinnett alleges. Had Rochefort intended to describe extensive communications of Nagumo such an entry would have been under the heading of Combined Fleet and he would have specified "heard transmitting" instead of "observed." Thus, Stinnett completely turns the summary upside down to support his predetermined conspiracy agenda. Stinnett also erroneous states that this Comint Summary of 25 November covers the Japanese naval activity of 26 November 1941 when Nagumo departed Hitokappu Bay due to the time difference of the International Date Line. However, all U.S. Naval radio intelligence logs, messages, supervisor's reports and Comint Summaries covering Japanese naval activities used the Tokyo [-9] time zone of their target to avoid confusion. Thus, this summary reported Japanese naval activity for 25 November when Nagumo was at Hitokappu Bay not 26 November 1941 as Stinnett claims.

Stinnett also claims some 129 violations of radio silence during a 21 day period which he implies is from mid-November on. The figure of 60 actual radio transmissions by Admiral Nagumo being intercepted is ridiculous. Only a few were seen on the Tokyo broadcast and were not original radio transmissions. The messages were undoubtedly filed while in port by messenger, blinker or landline. None of these alleged transmissions by Nagumo were during his transit from Hitokappu Bay to Hawaii. The same for the 40 messages allegedly sent by radio by Kido Butai carrier commanders and units. Stinnett even makes the absurd claim that 25 messages sent on the Tokyo fleet broadcast by Yamamoto and other commands and ships were violations of radio silence. The reason for using the broadcast method of transmission from shore stations is to maintain radio silence by not requiring ships and commands to use their transmitters to receipt for messages.

Philip H. Jacobsen
Lieutenant Commander, USN (ret.)
http://www.usncva.org/books/book-10.html

Nickdfresh
07-26-2010, 08:44 PM
That's great news, maybe I can "abrogate" my marriage after all,
I will post a proper answer for you and Mr. Rising Sun later,

Perhaps. Does the fact that you're married to your wife mean that you have the right to rape her, beat her, and steal her assets? Because that's a rather interesting analogy you're attempting to pose...

Rising Sun*
07-26-2010, 08:59 PM
According to the directives of Orange Plan, Pearl Harbor doesn't look like a " sneak attack" after all:

The Navy Base War Plan Orange for 1938 contained three new assumptions inspired by extensive Army revisions to the Joint Plan, which eliminated all references to offensive warfare: (1) outbreak of war would be preceded by a period of strained relations; (2) Orange would attack without warning; and (3) a superior US fleet would operate west of Hawaii
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htm

You clearly misunderstand War Plan Orange and rely upon a version which had been abandoned by 1941.

WPO a few years before the war assumed, first, that America would be at war only with Japan and, second, that Japan would attack the Philippines, not Pearl Harbor, without warning. You, like most people fond of conspiracy theories, make the mistake of reading into a statement more than is there to support your theory rather than investigating the background to it and deducing the facts from that.

The USN part of WPO assumed that Hawaii would be a base for operations, along with Truk and the British base in Singapore, both of which were in fact captured by the Japanese.

An understanding of WPO in its various versions and the thinking behind it shows that the attack on Pearl Harbor was not anticipated by American planners, so it is futile to rely on selective quotes about WPO for evidence of anything to do with Pearl Harbor except that America was completely unprepared for Japan's sneak attack there.

If you had read beyond your above selective quote you would have found this out for yourself, or you could have read Louis Morton's original article http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_06.htm from which some of the Global Security article is taken and which expands upon it.

kurt
07-27-2010, 09:46 AM
Perhaps. Does the fact that you're married to your wife mean that you have the right to rape her, beat her, and steal her assets? Because that's a rather interesting analogy you're attempting to pose...

There is a little problem with this analogy, which is that the abrogation was around 1922 and the supposed raping, beating and stealing not until 1937...., but maybe if she were a distant relative to Nostradamus, which I doubt.

kurt
07-27-2010, 09:53 AM
Regarding posts from #819 to # 822 ,
This is what I call "overwhelming evidence", I will study this testimony but perhaps I will not be able of answering before the Tag der Toten.

Rising Sun*
07-28-2010, 01:53 AM
Regarding posts from #819 to # 822 ,
This is what I call "overwhelming evidence", I will study this testimony but perhaps I will not be able of answering before the Tag der Toten.

Here's some more to study, with links to further articles in Budiansky's reply to Sinnett. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

But if you want conspiracy theories, this is the place. http://www.apfn.org/apfn/pearl_harbor.htm

kurt
07-28-2010, 07:18 PM
Here's some more to study, with links to further articles in Budiansky's reply to Sinnett. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

But if you want conspiracy theories, this is the place. http://www.apfn.org/apfn/pearl_harbor.htm

Well, conspiracy theories is a tag that sounds like fiction, it implies lack of seriousness , I prefer documents, like the ones that Sinnett refers (FOIA files). There is a serious accusation against Budiansky and Kahn in the article of the Independent that you recommended:

Concurrent with the NSA withdrawals, Budiansky, with the aid of Kahn and Drea, began a two-year media campaign to discredit the paper trail of the U.S. naval documents that form the backbone of Day of Deceit. One of the most egregious examples of ethical violations appeared in an article by Kahn published in the New York Review of Books on November 2, 2000. In that article, Kahn attempted to bolster his contention that Japanese admirals and warships observed radio silence while en route to attack American Pacific bases. Kahn broke basic journalism ethics and rewrote a U.S. Naval Communication Summary prepared by Commander Rochefort at his crypto center located in the Pearl Harbor Naval Yard.

kurt
07-28-2010, 07:36 PM
Budiansky affirms against Sinnett's arguments the following:
"He seriously misquotes a late November 1941 U.S. Navy radio intelligence report—the words he places in quotation marks are altered significantly from the words that actually appear in the document he claims to be citing" http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

.......why he doesn't tell us the words that , according to him, "actually appear" in the document?? that would be interesting.

Nickdfresh
07-28-2010, 09:07 PM
The answer to the above question is that it would be completely irrelevant. There was no "central intelligence" authority in the United States gov't architecture at the time and no way to coalesce the intelligence into any meaningful, accurate prediction.

Secondly, the "FDR knew of an impending Pearl Harbor attack" has to be one of the most nonsensical of typically nonsensical conspiracy theories as it makes no sense whatsoever. Why would the command intentionally prevent their forces from being on alert and sacrifice every battleship in the row in order to force an impressionable outrage for war when any sort of Japanese provocation and declaration of war would have had a similar affect.

The fact is that of course FDR's inner circle were well aware of a Japanese attack, but they thought it would be in the Philippines as most USN senior brass still held that the carrier was second to the battleship in 1941...

Nickdfresh
07-28-2010, 09:11 PM
Budiansky affirms against Sinnett's arguments the following:
"He seriously misquotes a late November 1941 U.S. Navy radio intelligence report—the words he places in quotation marks are altered significantly from the words that actually appear in the document he claims to be citing" http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

.......why he doesn't tell us the words that , according to him, "actually appear" in the document?? that would be interesting.


Why don't you get the document yourself? Maybe you should actually read his reply instead of relying on the ramblings of a thoroughly discredited fringe-book that has little merit with actual historians...


Reply by Stephen Budiansky:

I have already discussed the considerable evidence, including many newly released archival documents, which confirms that the Japanese attack force did not break radio silence and that the main Japanese naval code was not broken by U.S. intelligence before Pearl Harbor. This is not a “cover story” but a thoroughly documented historical conclusion.

Mr. Stinnett cites the Lietwiler memorandum as proof that Station CAST was “current” in reading messages transmitted in the Japanese naval operations code in fall 1941. Here Mr. Stinnett continues his habit of incompletely quoting original documents. In fact Lietwiler refers not to the decryption of current traffic but rather to the massive and far from complete effort to reconstruct the code system itself, specifically the “current” version of its huge key book—a series of 50,000 random numbers that Japanese code clerks used to further disguise encoded messages before transmission. Far from showing that messages were being decoded by CAST at this time, it confirms that CAST in fact had a long way to go before any messages could be decoded at all. CAST personnel have stated repeatedly that their work was not far enough along to read any messages for intelligence value before Pearl Harbor. Are we to assume that they are all participants in the “cover up” too?

I am frankly at a loss as to how Mr. Stinnett can accuse me in one sentence of being mistaken in referring to Rudolph Fabian as commander of CAST and then acknowledge two sentences later that he was commander of CAST. I am not sure what Mr. Stinnett is referring to in his comments about the International Dateline, but they have no relation to any statements I have made here or elsewhere.

Mr. Stinnett’s focus on these few trivialities while ignoring the gaping lapses in logic and accuracy in his own case speaks for itself. He has been caught red-handed misquoting original sources to build his spurious case but his only response is to hurl anew the charge of “cover up.” Until he starts dealing with evidence as it actually exists, and not as it is misquoted and misinterpreted to fit his theories, it is hard to take his claims seriously.

Nickdfresh
07-28-2010, 09:19 PM
An interesting article on the fringe, conspiracy theories:


Why Those Pearl Harbor "Conspiracy" Theories Ain't So
By Sherwood Ross
Created Dec 6 2008 - 12:26pm
As the anniversary of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rolls around, critics of President Franklin Roosevelt will again claim he had advance knowledge of the strike and allowed it to happen. That would be treasonable on FDR's part, of course. A rational examination of events, though, shows that FDR had no such knowledge of the attack and that, preoccupied with the Nazi threat to Great Britain, he had absolutely no intent to provoke war with Japan.

It's interesting to me, by the way, that those who excoriate FDR for treason never denounce General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. commander in the Philippines, who was told of the actual attack after it occurred on December 7th and still did not order his Army Air Corps planes aloft to strike back. When MacArthur's air arm was caught on the ground hours later, FDR is reported to have broken down and wept, "not again, not on the ground!" Overlooking MacArthur's "treason," (it wasn't), while accusing a liberal president of it, a man who was weeping at his desk with his head on his arms utterly heart-broken by the surprise attack, has a strong aroma of right-wing political motivation.

An article published earlier this year in the monthly Rock Creek Free Press of Washington, D.C., reproduces the front page of the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30th, 1941, with its headline "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend!" The article claims FDR allowed the attack to happen. Since, presumably, U.S. military personnel on Hawaii could all read, why didn't they respond by unlocking the ammunition lockers on the warships, cancel shore leaves, and take other readiness steps? Please note the Advertiser was a whole week early with the story about the threat of war, so there was plenty of time for Hawaiian military officers to prepare if they believed an imminent strike was aimed at Hawaii.

Could the explanation be they all believed the Japanese would attack Philippines, not Hawaii? It's useful to keep in mind the U.S. was a racist country in 1941 and it was not believed Asiatics were technologically capable of such an audacious strike. U.S. ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew learned early that year from a friendly Latin American embassy that a drunken Japanese translator had mentioned the attack but it was ignored just as previous warnings were ignored. An attack on Pearl Harbor had even been postulated in 1921 in a prophetic book by British journalist and naval authority Hector Bywater, "The Great Pacific War." Japanese admiralty officials studied the book closely and top U.S. naval officials gave it rave reviews---but still none of the latter believed war would begin at Pearl Harbor.

Besides, in 1941 FDR was interested in fighting Germany, not Japan, as evidenced by his strategy, once war broke out, of defeating Hitler first. Other indications that this was his primary concern were the enactment of lend lease for Great Britain and the transfer of 50 overage U.S. destroyers to the Royal Navy. FDR even lied to the public that Nazi U-boat attacks on American warships were unprovoked, when in fact the opposite was true. Hitler, who found himself in a desperate struggle after invading Soviet Russia and could not conquer England had strictly ordered his U-boat commanders not to attack American-flag vessels. Moreover, the U.S. Navy also violated neutrality by sending the Royal Navy information on the position of the German battleship Bismarck in May, 1941, that led to its destruction.

If FDR wanted an excuse to fight Japan he had every reason when the gunboat U.S.S. Panay was sunk by Japanese aviators in China's Yangtze River in 1937 but he knew his Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine army were unready for war. This was still true in 1941 when Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was telling FDR that he wouldn't have enough Flying Fortresses based in the Philippines for war until April, 1942. Marshall put great stock in the bomber and told reporters at an off-the-record press conference in November, 1941, that if war broke out Japan's wood and paper cities would be scorched by the warplane, as later proved to be true with its B-29 successor. Another indication the Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise is that the B-17s that arrived from the States as Pearl Harbor was under fire did not even have their machine guns in place.

Indeed, the U.S. knew war was coming in the Pacific but Washington did not know when or where Japan would strike. It is fair to say the U.S. was making diligent efforts, though, to prepare as rapidly as it could. That U.S. carriers were not in Pearl Harbor December 7th had nothing to do with getting them out of harm's way because an attack was expected on that port but everything to do with their ferrying fighter planes to reinforce unprepared U.S. Pacific outposts such as Wake Island.

The idea that FDR, a former assistant secretary of the Navy in World War One, would have deliberately concealed knowledge of an imminent attack on a U.S. base, defies everything known about the character of the man, his lifelong love of ships, (see his childhood sketches on the wall at Hyde Park), and his visionary efforts to build shipyards to mass produce warships and to modernize the fleet upon taking office in 1933. In fact, FDR sparked the largest naval buildup in U.S. history from the time he took office, doubling naval personnel between 1939 and 1941 alone. Six months after Pearl Harbor at the battle of Midway, the Japanese navy suffered a terrible reverse largely at the hands of U.S. vessels built before the war under FDR or under prior presidents. If FDR had advanced knowledge of an imminent attack to precipitate a war with Japan he would at minimum have ordered the fleet into battle readiness and sent it steaming out into open water. That FDR knew the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and allowed it to happen is one conspiracy theory that should be sunk promptly.

http://www.smirkingchimp.com/thread/19056

Wizard
07-28-2010, 11:14 PM
An interesting article on the fringe, conspiracy theories:


Why Those Pearl Harbor "Conspiracy" Theories Ain't So
By Sherwood Ross
Created Dec 6 2008 - 12:26pm
As the anniversary of the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rolls around, critics of President Franklin Roosevelt will again claim he had advance knowledge of the strike and allowed it to happen. That would be treasonable on FDR's part, of course. A rational examination of events, though, shows that FDR had no such knowledge of the attack and that, preoccupied with the Nazi threat to Great Britain, he had absolutely no intent to provoke war with Japan.

It's interesting to me, by the way, that those who excoriate FDR for treason never denounce General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. commander in the Philippines, who was told of the actual attack after it occurred on December 7th and still did not order his Army Air Corps planes aloft to strike back. When MacArthur's air arm was caught on the ground hours later, FDR is reported to have broken down and wept, "not again, not on the ground!" Overlooking MacArthur's "treason," (it wasn't), while accusing a liberal president of it, a man who was weeping at his desk with his head on his arms utterly heart-broken by the surprise attack, has a strong aroma of right-wing political motivation.

An article published earlier this year in the monthly Rock Creek Free Press of Washington, D.C., reproduces the front page of the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30th, 1941, with its headline "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend!" The article claims FDR allowed the attack to happen. Since, presumably, U.S. military personnel on Hawaii could all read, why didn't they respond by unlocking the ammunition lockers on the warships, cancel shore leaves, and take other readiness steps? Please note the Advertiser was a whole week early with the story about the threat of war, so there was plenty of time for Hawaiian military officers to prepare if they believed an imminent strike was aimed at Hawaii.

Could the explanation be they all believed the Japanese would attack Philippines, not Hawaii? It's useful to keep in mind the U.S. was a racist country in 1941 and it was not believed Asiatics were technologically capable of such an audacious strike. U.S. ambassador to Tokyo Joseph Grew learned early that year from a friendly Latin American embassy that a drunken Japanese translator had mentioned the attack but it was ignored just as previous warnings were ignored. An attack on Pearl Harbor had even been postulated in 1921 in a prophetic book by British journalist and naval authority Hector Bywater, "The Great Pacific War." Japanese admiralty officials studied the book closely and top U.S. naval officials gave it rave reviews---but still none of the latter believed war would begin at Pearl Harbor.

Besides, in 1941 FDR was interested in fighting Germany, not Japan, as evidenced by his strategy, once war broke out, of defeating Hitler first. Other indications that this was his primary concern were the enactment of lend lease for Great Britain and the transfer of 50 overage U.S. destroyers to the Royal Navy. FDR even lied to the public that Nazi U-boat attacks on American warships were unprovoked, when in fact the opposite was true. Hitler, who found himself in a desperate struggle after invading Soviet Russia and could not conquer England had strictly ordered his U-boat commanders not to attack American-flag vessels. Moreover, the U.S. Navy also violated neutrality by sending the Royal Navy information on the position of the German battleship Bismarck in May, 1941, that led to its destruction.

If FDR wanted an excuse to fight Japan he had every reason when the gunboat U.S.S. Panay was sunk by Japanese aviators in China's Yangtze River in 1937 but he knew his Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine army were unready for war. This was still true in 1941 when Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was telling FDR that he wouldn't have enough Flying Fortresses based in the Philippines for war until April, 1942. Marshall put great stock in the bomber and told reporters at an off-the-record press conference in November, 1941, that if war broke out Japan's wood and paper cities would be scorched by the warplane, as later proved to be true with its B-29 successor. Another indication the Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise is that the B-17s that arrived from the States as Pearl Harbor was under fire did not even have their machine guns in place.

Indeed, the U.S. knew war was coming in the Pacific but Washington did not know when or where Japan would strike. It is fair to say the U.S. was making diligent efforts, though, to prepare as rapidly as it could. That U.S. carriers were not in Pearl Harbor December 7th had nothing to do with getting them out of harm's way because an attack was expected on that port but everything to do with their ferrying fighter planes to reinforce unprepared U.S. Pacific outposts such as Wake Island.

The idea that FDR, a former assistant secretary of the Navy in World War One, would have deliberately concealed knowledge of an imminent attack on a U.S. base, defies everything known about the character of the man, his lifelong love of ships, (see his childhood sketches on the wall at Hyde Park), and his visionary efforts to build shipyards to mass produce warships and to modernize the fleet upon taking office in 1933. In fact, FDR sparked the largest naval buildup in U.S. history from the time he took office, doubling naval personnel between 1939 and 1941 alone. Six months after Pearl Harbor at the battle of Midway, the Japanese navy suffered a terrible reverse largely at the hands of U.S. vessels built before the war under FDR or under prior presidents. If FDR had advanced knowledge of an imminent attack to precipitate a war with Japan he would at minimum have ordered the fleet into battle readiness and sent it steaming out into open water. That FDR knew the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and allowed it to happen is one conspiracy theory that should be sunk promptly.

http://www.smirkingchimp.com/thread/19056


Besides being a shill for a left-wing blog, Ross gets a number of details wrong in this article.

But first let me state that while I am certainly no fan of Roosevelt and feel that his legacy is definitely a mixture of good and harm for the country, I am adamantly opposed to the idea that Roosevelt could, or would, have deliberately withheld information of any attack on Pearl Harbor. He couldn't because he had no way of having such information, and he wouldn't have because, misguided as many of his policies were (packing the Supreme Court comes to mind), he was a patriot and loved the US Navy as few presidents ever have.

Now to the errors;

The article in the Honolulu Advertiser about the possibility of a Japanese attack over the weekend referred to the possibility that the Japanese might attack Malaya, Singapore and the NEI. In fact, the British had positive intelligence of invasion convoys for these areas being formed at Hainan and Formosa and had passed that intelligence to the US government. So even if the Army and Navy Commanders at Pearl Harbor had read the article, it wouldn't have given an y hint of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself. At the same time, it must be said that Roosevelt definitely knew that the Japanese would be attacking somewhere within a few days but all the evidence in Roosevelt's possession was that the attack would be in the Far East, not at Pearl Harbor.

As far as the great expectations of the B-17's in the Philippines were concerned, it was Hap Arnold, the Army Air Force Chief of Staff, who oversold these aircraft, not Marshall. As it turned out, the B-17 could not even reach most of Japan with any kind of bomb load from the bases in the Philippines. In order to bomb Japan with B-17's in 1941-42, it would have been necessary to utilize air bases in Soviet Siberia, and the Soviets were not about to jeopardize their relations with Japan by allowing that. So it didn't really matter how many B-17's the US might have been able to build up in the Philippines, they wouldn't have been a creditable deterrent to Japanese aggression in Asia.

Ross claims that Roosevelt began to build up the US Navy from the very beginning of his first term in 1933. Nothing could be further from the truth. The US Navy did not begin a modest program of reconstruction until 1938 when it was authorized (by Congress) to build up to it's treaty limits under the Washington and London Naval treaties. The real rearmament programs for both the Army and Navy were not authorized until the advent of the "Two Ocean" Navy Act in July 1940, and similar legislation that same month authorizing massive expenditures for the Army and Army Air Force. These acts were quickly passed by Congress upon the Fall of France in June, 1940, and did not owe so much to Roosevelt's "vision" as to the very real fear that the US might soon find itself standing alone against the Axis forces.

It irks me to read the fantasies of the conspiracy buffs presented as fact and bolstered by the half-truths, misinformation and outright deception of hacks like Stinnett, but it does not serve history to defend Roosevelt with erroneous information, either.

Rising Sun*
07-29-2010, 07:14 AM
I prefer documents, like the ones that Sinnett refers (FOIA files).

Out of all the other sources mentioned so far, you prefer Sinnett's alleged sources. Despite the holes punched in his facile arguments and tortured analyses by people referring to rather more convincing documents and, worst of all, facts.

Why are documents allegedly released to Sinnet under the Freedom of Information Act preferable?

After all, wouldn't the the all-powerful national security apparatus that Sinnett reckons has been concealing the truth about FDR's conspiracy be able and determined to control and manipulate the release of documents which confirm that treasonable conspiracy by concealing any documents which confirmed that conspiracy?

Or am I missing something here, along the lines that there was and is an all-powerful conspiracy by the NSA et al to conceal the truth but the all-powerful conspirators nonetheless allowed supposedly incriminating documents to be released to Sinnett so he could expose their treason?

Yep, that makes sense, just like FDR allowing Japan to attack Pearl Harbor makes sense. If about 80% of your brain has shut down, and the rest is mush.

Nickdfresh
07-29-2010, 09:52 PM
Besides being a shill for a left-wing blog, Ross gets a number of details wrong in this article.

Well, shill left wing blogs have their place as do shill right wing ones. I tend to read neither in case anyone cares. In any case, he gets some details wrong, but I think we agree he's more right than wrong (no ironic pun intended :) )


But first let me state that while I am certainly no fan of Roosevelt and feel that his legacy is definitely a mixture of good and harm for the country, I am adamantly opposed to the idea that Roosevelt could, or would, have deliberately withheld information of any attack on Pearl Harbor. He couldn't because he had no way of having such information, and he wouldn't have because, misguided as many of his policies were (packing the Supreme Court comes to mind), he was a patriot and loved the US Navy as few presidents ever have.

I'm a fan of Roosevelt, but yet I think he's overrated on many levels. But we agree here, even if the FDR administration had "omnipotent competence," as many conspiracists (both left and right) insinuate, a deliberate dive makes little sense on many levels. I have no idea as to Sinnett's ideological motivations as I haven't read the book and there's little to his background on any online biographies. But I sense there seems to be a sensationalist bent along the lines of Alex Jones and 9/11 conspiracy theorists to propagate dribble for profit.. In any case, we can argue about FDR ideologically. But I think one topic that transcends this is that FDR bettered all of his wartime rivals as an executive that delegated authority to his military brass and didn't meddle in the day to day decisions as his contemporaries often did...


Now to the errors;

The article in the Honolulu Advertiser about the possibility of a Japanese attack over the weekend referred to the possibility that the Japanese might attack Malaya, Singapore and the NEI. In fact, the British had positive intelligence of invasion convoys for these areas being formed at Hainan and Formosa and had passed that intelligence to the US government. So even if the Army and Navy Commanders at Pearl Harbor had read the article, it wouldn't have given an y hint of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself. At the same time, it must be said that Roosevelt definitely knew that the Japanese would be attacking somewhere within a few days but all the evidence in Roosevelt's possession was that the attack would be in the Far East, not at Pearl Harbor.

Correct. But the article also states that FDR and his cabinet/advisors believed that a Japanese attack was inevitable and would occur on the outer possessions of the U.S. dominions, i.e. the Philippines...


As far as the great expectations of the B-17's in the Philippines were concerned, it was Hap Arnold, the Army Air Force Chief of Staff, who oversold these aircraft, not Marshall. As it turned out, the B-17 could not even reach most of Japan with any kind of bomb load from the bases in the Philippines. In order to bomb Japan with B-17's in 1941-42, it would have been necessary to utilize air bases in Soviet Siberia, and the Soviets were not about to jeopardize their relations with Japan by allowing that. So it didn't really matter how many B-17's the US might have been able to build up in the Philippines, they wouldn't have been a creditable deterrent to Japanese aggression in Asia.

He gets this wrong, but remember at the time that the B-17 (and high level bombing in general) were thought to be effective against shipping and that the bomber was originally (deceptively) designated a long range coastal patrol aircraft with anti-shipping capability. In any case, the bombers in the Philippines were caught on the ground and rendered scrap, as was most of the fighter force. I don't think anyone can argue that Mac didn't drop the ball on that one...


Ross claims that Roosevelt began to build up the US Navy from the very beginning of his first term in 1933. Nothing could be further from the truth. The US Navy did not begin a modest program of reconstruction until 1938 when it was authorized (by Congress) to build up to it's treaty limits under the Washington and London Naval treaties. The real rearmament programs for both the Army and Navy were not authorized until the advent of the "Two Ocean" Navy Act in July 1940, and similar legislation that same month authorizing massive expenditures for the Army and Army Air Force. These acts were quickly passed by Congress upon the Fall of France in June, 1940, and did not owe so much to Roosevelt's "vision" as to the very real fear that the US might soon find itself standing alone against the Axis forces.

The U.S. Navy embarked on producing carriers in the early on in accordance with "New Deal" programs designed to spurn "premium prevailing wage" ship building jobs in the early 1930s, and the carrier tonnage was typically underreported in order to skirt said treaties...


It irks me to read the fantasies of the conspiracy buffs presented as fact and bolstered by the half-truths, misinformation and outright deception of hacks like Stinnett, but it does not serve history to defend Roosevelt with erroneous information, either.

I couldn't agree more...

Wizard
07-30-2010, 12:50 AM
Well, shill left wing blogs have their place as do shill right wing ones. I tend to read neither in case anyone cares. In any case, he gets some details wrong, but I think we agree he's more right than wrong (no ironic pun intended :) )

As far as Roosevelt's actions and motivations are concerned, I agree, but that's no excuse for getting the de3tails wrong. I just can't tolerate historical inaccuracies no matter which side they favor. I tend to be right wing and despise Leftists who are correct for the wrong reasons. If you read neither, why did you post a Left-wing article?


I'm a fan of Roosevelt, but yet I think he's overrated on many levels. But we agree here, even if the FDR administration had "omnipotent competence," as many conspiracists (both left and right) insinuate, a deliberate dive makes little sense on many levels. I have no idea as to Sinnett's ideological motivations as I haven't read the book and there's little to his background on any online biographies. But I sense there seems to be a sensationalist bent along the lines of Alex Jones and 9/11 conspiracy theorists to propagate dribble for profit.. In any case, we can argue about FDR ideologically. But I think one topic that transcends this is that FDR bettered all of his wartime rivals as an executive that delegated authority to his military brass and didn't meddle in the day to day decisions as his contemporaries often did...

Yes. I suspect many of the conspiracy theorists have profit rather than historical accuracy as their major motivation. Sensationalism definitely sells books, as the general public is ignorant of the actual history of the Pearl Harbor attack, and tends to accept whatever oddball theories are advanced, as long as they sound half-way plausible. And yes, Roosevelt takes honors among his contemporaries as a leader who generally left the conduct of military operations to the professionals during WW II. But he was not perfect in that regard; for example, Roosevelt insisted on the production of small escort vessels that were practically useless against the U-boat menace, and this left the US Eastern coast virtually defenseless in early 1942. The resulting massacre of US and British merchant ships has been blamed on Admiral King, when it should be laid at Roosevelt's feet.


Correct. But the article also states that FDR and his cabinet/advisors believed that a Japanese attack was inevitable and would occur on the outer possessions of the U.S. dominions, i.e. the Philippines...

Actually, this was mere speculation as no intelligence was available to indicate where the invasion convoys were bound. But it made sense to think that the Philippines would be included in the Japanese plans as the Philippine archipelago sat astride the sea routes necessary to the Japanese plans for expansion of their empire. The US had always assumed that the Japanese coveted the Philippines and that a war would start with a seizure of the US possession. In any case, the Japanese had always assumed that a US presence in the Philippines would be used to frustrate Japanese plans for seizing what they called the Southern Resources Area.


He gets this wrong, but remember at the time that the B-17 (and high level bombing in general) were thought to be effective against shipping and that the bomber was originally (deceptively) designated a long range coastal patrol aircraft with anti-shipping capability. In any case, the bombers in the Philippines were caught on the ground and rendered scrap, as was most of the fighter force. I don't think anyone can argue that Mac didn't drop the ball on that one...

I'm not arguing that Mac didn't drop the ball in the Philippines. In fact, I think Mac's performance in the Philippines deserved a court martial at the very least. It would have been better for Roosevelt to leave Mac in command in the Philippines, and let him be captured by the Japanese. That would have enabled a unified command in the Pacific and saved many American lives over the course of the war. But Roosevelt was cognizant of Mac's political ramifications and failed to treat him as he should have; that was Roosevelt's failing.

As for the B-17, the USAAF knew very well that it was not an effective anti-shipping bomber, at least in the numbers available, or projected to become available, in the Philippines. Hap Arnold knowingly oversold the capabilities of the B-17 in an attempt to promote strategic bombing and an independent Air Force. Certainly, the US Navy was not convinced and quite correctly withdrew it's major forces from the Philippines promptly upon the outbreak of war.


The U.S. Navy embarked on producing carriers in the early on in accordance with "New Deal" programs designed to spurn "premium prevailing wage" ship building jobs in the early 1930s, and the carrier tonnage was typically underreported in order to skirt said treaties...

No, in the early 1930's the US Navy was governed by Congress, primarily through the Vinson Act, which limited the authorized tonnage of every class of warship the Navy was allowed to build. The Vinson Act did not even allow the Navy to build up to Washington and London Naval treaty limits until 1938. In fact, the designed tonnage of US navy vessels was typically held under treaty limits and resulted in unsatisfactory carriers such as the Ranger (on which my father served in the late 1930's). It was not until mid-1940, and the Fall of France, that the US Navy was authorized to build the Essex-class carriers which began to become available in 1943. Contrary to what most people think, the US Navy was NOT battleship-oriented after1939; absolute top priority was given to the construction of carriers in 1940, and resulted in construction times of Essex-class carriers averaging an astonishing 18 months.

Chevan
07-30-2010, 03:07 AM
the "FDR knew of an impending Pearl Harbor attack" has to be one of the most nonsensical of typically nonsensical conspiracy theories as it makes no sense whatsoever. Why would the command intentionally prevent their forces from being on alert and sacrifice every battleship in the row in order to force an impressionable outrage for war when any sort of Japanese provocation and declaration of war would have had a similar affect.
...
it wouldn't have had a simular effect.
Becouse the main effect of PH was a ....psycholigical act of sudden attack on american minds.That is quite different.If say the admiral Kimmel knew about japanese plans for sure , he may succesfully interrupt the Japane attack and probably the win the battle( having the superior forces) . But it would not have had an simular effect on american public which would learn in this case that the American fleet has enough power to deflect any Japane agression.By the other world- in this case hardly the lazy american public wouldn't vote for entering to war.

Chevan
07-30-2010, 03:42 AM
Why to critize the some historian like Sinnet, gentlemens , if we have the primary source from "another side".
Let's better read the admiral Kimmel interview (http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v11/v11p495_Manion.html)
CM: Admiral Kimmel, for myself and the radio audience, I am very greatful for the privilege of this interview. You know, of course, that you hold the key to one of the great tragic mysteries in our country's history. What you are doing here to day is a continuation of the great patriotic service to which your whole life has been dedicated.

HEK: Thank you, Dean Manion. In view of our long family friendship, I'm delighted to give this information to you, and through you, to the American people.

CM: To your present knowledge, how many people knew in advance that the Japanese planned to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7?

HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Jpanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.

CM: Who are some of these people and from what source did they get the information?

HEK: Those who saw the intercepted Japanese messages as they were received included: the President, Mr. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson; the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the Chief of War Plans, Army, General Gerow; the Chief of War Plans, Navy, Admiral Turner; the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Miles; Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Worthington. Recorded testimony shows that all of these, except General Marshall and Admiral Stark were shown 13 parts of the 14-part message by 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, or shortly thereafter. When Mr. Roosevelt had read the 13 parts, about 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, he remarked: "This means war." All investigations of the disaster have failed to disclose where George Marshall spent the evening of December 6, 1941, or what he did. Admiral Stark, some two years after he had first been asked, finally produced evidence that he had attended the theater on that evening, though he still maintained that he had no independent recollection of where he spent the evening or what he did during the evening of December 6, 1941. In 1957, I received information, which I believe to be reliable, that the British subject serving in the Chinese government as commissioner of education and in telligence in China, received on November 30, 1941, from his intelligence sources in Japan, information of the planned at tack on Pearl Harbor to be launched on December 7. Where the Japanese fleet would congregate to launch the planes, the hour the planes were to be launched, the berths of the U.S. fleet in Pearl and which ships were to be bombed first. This information was sent to London in a coded message, on Sunday, November 30, and Monday, December 1, 1941. Whether the Chinese commissioner's intelligence was transmitted from London to Washington, I do not know, but it appears highly probable that it was made available to Mr. Roosevelt. If Mr. Roosevelt did, in fact, receive the Chinese commissioner's intelligence, it was merely a detailed confirmation of the in tercepted Japanese messages already available to him.

CM: In your opinion, why were you and General Short not notified well in advance that the attack was expected?

HEK: My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full suppport of the American public.( i.e. answer to previous Nick's post)

CM: Thank you, Admiral Kimmel, for this interview and for the patriotic persistence with which you have pursued and corralled the tragic facts about the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Who will first call him "conspiracy theory admirer"?

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 08:07 AM
HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Jpanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.

There is nothing in the 14 part message to support Kimmel's opinion that Pearl Harbor was or could have been identified in or from the message as the target, let alone the time and date of the attack on Pearl or that it was the fleet at Pearl that was the target.

Indeed, the message text merely confirms that Japan was pretending to be looking for peace while its attack force was steaming towards and about to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was a sneak attack.


JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
(Generally referred to as the "Fourteen Part Message.")

(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)

On November 26 the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese
representatives a document which stated the principles governing
the policies of the Government of the United States toward the
situation in the Far East and setting out suggestions for a
comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific
area.

At 1 p.m. December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an
appointment for the Japanese representatives to see the
Secretary of State. The appointment was made for 1:45 p.m. The
Japanese representatives arrived at the office of the Secretary
of State at 2:05 p.m. They were received by the Secretary at
2:20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of
State what was understood to be a reply to the document handed
to him the Secretary of State on November 26.

Secretary Hull carefully read the statement presented by the
Japanese representatives and immediately turned to the Japanese
Ambassador and with the greatest indignation said:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese
Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one
word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record.
In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a
document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and
distortions - infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so
huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on
this planet was capable of uttering them."

The text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to
the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941, reads as
follows:

"Memorandum

"1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to
come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the
United States in order that the two countries by their joint
efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby
contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and
advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization
of the Pacific Area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its
views concerning the claims the American Government has
persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States
and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight
months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to
insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and
thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in
the world.

"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the
part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the
Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and
it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the
extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end
that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace
with Germany and Italy.

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted
to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as
to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan
and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours
toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the
Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they
have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of
common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes.
Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it
as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the
Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets
freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan.
While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these
countries have strengthened their military preparations
perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a
situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of
Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the
United States for a discussion of important problems between the
two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the
American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese
proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential
questions.

"3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government
submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the
American Government, taking fully into consideration past
American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement
of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised
proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding
the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and
endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American
Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions,
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of
conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its
utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations,
submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to
arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent
questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated
the following points:

"(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake
not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting
French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern
Pacific area.

"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing
the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods
and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

"(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial
relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the
required quantity of oil.

"(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to
resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for
the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of
peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable
peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the
Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the
northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

continued

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 08:11 AM
"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast
to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an
inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the
negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the
American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call
the attention of the American Government especially to the
following points:

"1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace
those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese
Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may
be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable
formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and
mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such
as ignores realities and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon
others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the
consummation of negotiations.

"Of the various principles put forward by the American
Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there
are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in
principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems
only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.

"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression
pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the
Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned
after the old concept of collective security, is far removed
from the realities of East Asia.

"2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states -
'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has
concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted
by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose
of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace
throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above
provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from
fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the
United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and
opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the
war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by
stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand,
in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of
self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to
establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at
variance with the many principles upon which the American
Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area
through peaceful means.

continued

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 08:11 AM
"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it
rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through
military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great
Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse
to such pressure as a means of dealing with international
relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane
that military pressure.

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the
American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in
coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant
position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other
areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries
of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have
been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-
American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice
themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese
Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation
since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to
enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to
French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-
mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the
United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China,, and
Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves
to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French
Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint
guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from
the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of
France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that
such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to
French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty
structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present
predicament of East Asia.

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government
regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or
unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination
in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of
China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American
Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily,
politically or economically any regime other than the regime at
Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking
Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations.
This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in
line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the
Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the
American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to
East Asia.

"5. (sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain
acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including
the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the
freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar
exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China.
On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores
Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair,
menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour
and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.

"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early
conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the
conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to
be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries.
The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However,
since the American Government has made the proposal of November
26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by
catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions
of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at
one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to
conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct
Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the
creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve
Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at
war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiation.

"Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American
Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the
American Government that in view of the attitude of the American
Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach
an agreement through further negotiations.

"December 7, 1941." http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/14_part.html

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 08:28 AM
HEK: My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full suppport of the American public.( i.e. answer to previous Nick's post)


'My belief" by Kimmel is not supported by facts to support his following florid conspiracy statement.

It is more consistent with the facts that there was no need to notify him of an impending attack because:
(a) Nobody in authority in America knew that the Japanese fleet was approaching Hawaii to attack.
(b) Everybody in authority in America expected the Japanese attack to be in the Philippines, as indeed its first major land attack against America was.

Kimmel was entitled to feel hurt by his treatment after Pearl, and quite probably was unfairly made a scapegoat by politicians and others in the nature of the world in such things, but that doesn't give his opinions any weight beyond the facts which contradict them.

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 08:41 AM
Newspaper articles aren't always the most reliable source or comment, but this one is worth considering and notably in the context of this thread the part I have highlighted in red.


Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show
By HOWARD W. FRENCH
Published: December 9, 1999

TOKYO, Dec. 8— Freshly discovered diplomatic papers published here this week seem to overturn standard versions of the events leading up to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, which have been told with little disagreement over the essential facts in history books on both sides of the Pacific.

The picture that emerges from the papers is one of a breathtakingly cunning deceit by Tokyo aimed at avoiding any hint to the Roosevelt administration of Japan's hostile intentions.

For decades, conventional wisdom has held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of fateful accidents and plain bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document to Washington hinting at war.

Textbooks have dwelt on the problems of transmission and translation of the so-called Final Memorandum, on Dec. 7, 1941 -- the day Pearl Harbor was attacked -- in which Japan notified the United States that it was ''impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.''

The accounts have focused on the slowness of the Japanese Embassy in Washington to produce a cable of the memorandum from Tokyo, and on delays caused by security rules prohibitingthe embassy's American secretary from typing the document.

The newly discovered documents include an earlier draft of the Final Memorandum, dated Dec. 3, in which the Japanese Foreign Ministry, mindful of the country's obligation under the Hague Convention to declare war before attacking, proposed stating that ''we are forced to terminate negotiations.''

More ominously, it added that Washington ''would be held responsible for any and all the consequences that may arise in the future.''

Takeo Iguchi, the researcher who discovered the papers in the Foreign Ministry archives, said the draft memorandum, together with the wartime diary of Japan's general staff, pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war.

In its entry for Dec. 4, the diary mentions the draft version of the Final Memorandum and makes clear that the general staffs of the navy and army rejected the Foreign Ministry's proposed warning to Washington. The definitive memorandum, with its much weaker wording, was drafted the next day.

That document was intercepted before its delivery and read by President Roosevelt, who saw it as amounting to a declaration of war. But his aides saw nothing new in the message, and preparations against an attack were not taken.

While the wording and timing of Tokyo's message were being fine-tuned, Japan's diplomats in Washington, deliberately kept in the dark by their capital, were meeting with their American counterparts.

A Dec. 7 entry in the war diary notes approvingly that ''our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success.''

''The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations,'' said Mr. Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo. ''And they clearly prevailed.'' Mr. Iguchi said the general staff, together with a pliant Foreign Ministry, had controlled not only the content of the message to Washington, but also its timing.

The staff specified that the message be delivered to the State Department at 1 p.m. Washington time on Dec. 7. But in the end, the document was delivered to Secretary of State Cordell Hull about 2:20 p.m., approximately one hour after the sinking of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The famous delay in delivering the message, he said, was probably the result of deliberate planning. As evidence, he cited the many unusual, heavy garbles in the original cable that set it apart from most of Tokyo's clean transmissions and may have been intended to slow its delivery to Washington.

''The stereotypical version says that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor after intending to submit an ultimatum to Washington,'' Professor Iguchi said, ''but because of a misunderstanding, the message was delivered an hour too late. It has long been taught that had there not been this delay, the attack would have been honorable. Instead, it has been called treachery.

Mr. Iguchi said many of Japan's top historians had long spoken of the supposed embassy mix-up that delayed the delivery of Tokyo's final message to Washington as an ''ugly blemish'' on the country's history. ''But the blemish belongs to those who engaged in deliberate deception, or who have failed to ever go into the documentary evidence,'' he said.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry confirmed that the documents at the center of Mr. Iguchi's research were genuine but declined to make any further comment, saying only that ''there are many views about these events.''

The first account of Mr. Iguchi's work was a small notice in the daily Yomiuri Shimbun in April. This week, The Japan Times, an English-language daily, printed a long article on the research. Mr. Iguchi said almost none of Japan's other news publications had shown any interest in his work.

Mr. Iguchi's findings clash with more comfortable views of the start of the war, and even many historians whose expertise focuses on the same events say they were unaware of his research.

Shinji Sudo, who teaches the history of international relations at Kyoto Sangyo University, was one of those who learned of the newly uncovered documents from a foreign journalist.

''Professor Iguchi's enthusiasm has moved the debate forward, and I value his work highly,'' he said. ''I had thought that the blame should be placed on the negligent embassy staff, but my views have changed considerably. Still, the are others in academic circles who regard Professor Iguchi's work rather coldly, saying that he is just trying to clear the dishonor of his father.''

Mr. Iguchi, who is himself a retired diplomat, is the son of a senior counselor who was serving in the Japanese Embassy in Washington at the time of the attack. Until now the embassy staff has been forced to carry most of the blame for not informing the State Department in time. Speculation in Japan has focused on drunkenness among key staff members the night before, and late arrival at work.

Many in Japan, particularly conservative historians, have clung to the view that Washington forced war on their country. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor was a feat of bold and courageous military planning and would have been completely honorable, they say, were it not for an incompetent diplomatic staff in Washington.

Other historians, though, said Mr. Iguchi's work would be taken immediately into account by specialists of this period and would gradually work its way into textbook accounts of the start of the war.

''We have, in essence, a new historical drama told to us by Professor Iguchi, and it is a contribution that will encourage further research and teaching,'' said John Stephan, a professor of modern Japanese history at the University of Hawaii. ''Time magazine once described the Pearl Harbor attack as 'murder hidden by a toothy smile.' But since the early 1960's, this has been tempered by research that focused on the communications blunders.

''The evolution right now would seem to be back in the direction of the kind of interpretive leanings that existed in this country during the war. But these sorts of vicissitudes are constant in history.''
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html?pagewanted=1

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 09:04 AM
Just in case it's not clear from reading it, the 14 Part Message does not indicate that war is about to commence, let alone that it is a declaration of war.

Any inference that Roosevelt or others drew from it that war was about to commence is a tribute to their ability to perceive Japanese deceit and duplicity rather than anything on the Japanese side which overtly expresses Japan's intention to attack America, and sundry other nations.

Chevan
07-30-2010, 09:50 AM
HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message.....


JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
I think the Kimmel meant the another Japane masages that was interrupted and decoded by US intelligence.Usially the official diplomatic notes are not classified for the side to be sent which, right?

There is nothing in the 14 part message to support Kimmel's opinion that Pearl Harbor was or could have been identified in or from the message as the target,
Well i believe the Japanese were not that stupid to identify the target of their sneak attack in the official diplomatic note for US gov, preceding to attack:)
But their military radio massages , probably those which Sinnett talk about, definitally contained the information about first strike.

Wizard
07-30-2010, 09:54 AM
it wouldn't have had a simular effect.
Becouse the main effect of PH was a ....psycholigical act of sudden attack on american minds.That is quite different.If say the admiral Kimmel knew about japanese plans for sure , he may succesfully interrupt the Japane attack and probably the win the battle( having the superior forces) . But it would not have had an simular effect on american public which would learn in this case that the American fleet has enough power to deflect any Japane agression.By the other world- in this case hardly the lazy american public wouldn't vote for entering to war.

This is an opinion that is highly questionable. There were two aspects of the Pearl Harbor attack that combined to cause the American public to almost universally support the war against the Japanese. The first was the nature of the attack itself; a surprise attack in time of peace when both countries were ostensibly continuing negotiations in good faith to avoid war. This deeply offended American's sense of justice and fair play and made it impossible for them to contemplate any future negotiations with the Japanese of any sort until the Japanese had been severely chastised.

The second aspect of the PH attack was that of the sense of humiliation that America's strongest base in the Pacific had been so easily attacked and severe casualties inflicted. This deepened the outrage felt by Americans and reinforced their attitude that the Japanese were not to be trusted in negotiations.

Had the Japanese attack on PH been foiled by an alert military and naval force that consequently suffered only moderate casualties while inflicting severe damage on the attackers (or possibly even destroying them), the sense of humiliation would not have been engendered in the American public. But the feelings of outrage and anger at Japanese duplicity and the nature of the attack would still prevail, and would cause the American public to demand a war to chastise the Japanese.

Moreover, I find it interesting that you characterize the American public as "lazy" simply because they refused to support entry into a war that did not directly concern them. It seems to me that the world would have been a lot better off in the 1930's and 1940's if the world's populations had refused to support wars unless they were directly attacked.


Just in case it's not clear from reading it, the 14 Part Message does not indicate that war is about to commence, let alone that it is a declaration of war.

Any inference that Roosevelt or others drew from it that war was about to commence is a tribute to their ability to perceive Japanese deceit and duplicity rather than anything on the Japanese side which overtly expresses Japan's intention to attack America, and sundry other nations.

I agree whole-heartedly.

It's absurd for Admiral Kimmel to assert that had he seen the 14-part message that he would have intuited an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. Nothing in the message explicitly or implicitly indicates a military attack anywhere in the world. The message, had it been transmitted to Kimmel would simply have puzzled him, as it is NOT a declaration of war, but only a list of diplomatic complaints and alleged grievances. It did not even directly break off peace negotiations, although that was implied.

President Roosevelt's statement, "This means war", upon seeing the message was merely his assessment of the likely next steps o be taken by Japan and the US. There is certainly no hint in that statement that Roosevelt, or any one else, believed that the future war would start with an attack on Pearl Harbor. Unless Kimmel was far more prescient than events ultimately demonstrated, he would have probably had the same reaction; that war was coming, but where and when the first shots would be fired would be anyone's guess.

Wizard
07-30-2010, 10:03 AM
I think the Kimmel meant the another Japane masages that was interrupted and decoded by US intelligence.Usially the official diplomatic notes are not classified for the side to be sent which, right?

Well i believe the Japanese were not that stupid to identify the target of their sneak attack in the official diplomatic note for US gov, preceding to attack:)
But their military radio massages , probably those which Sinnett talk about, definitally contained the information about first strike.

What other messages? The messages that Sinnett refers to do not exist and never did. The Japanese never sent radio messages either specifying a surprise attack on US forces nor identifying the intended location of the attack. This is confirmed by post-war Japanese records. The US government knew that war with the Japanese was about to commence because Japanese troops convoys had been spotted by the British and Dutch moving in the direction of Malaya and this information was transmitted to the US. This fact reinforced the very logical belief that the first attack on US territory would come in the Philippines.

kurt
07-30-2010, 10:44 AM
The answer to the above question is that it would be completely irrelevant. There was no "central intelligence" authority in the United States gov't architecture at the time and no way to coalesce the intelligence into any meaningful, accurate prediction.

Secondly, the "FDR knew of an impending Pearl Harbor attack" has to be one of the most nonsensical of typically nonsensical conspiracy theories as it makes no sense whatsoever. Why would the command intentionally prevent their forces from being on alert and sacrifice every battleship in the row in order to force an impressionable outrage for war when any sort of Japanese provocation and declaration of war would have had a similar affect.

The fact is that of course FDR's inner circle were well aware of a Japanese attack, but they thought it would be in the Philippines as most USN senior brass still held that the carrier was second to the battleship in 1941...

I'm quite sure that this late november radio report wouldn't be irrelevant at all ,since, according to Sinnett's version of the document, it is a clear indisputable evidence that the attack was unavoidable:

“...the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow...”
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=408

If we had Budianski's version of this transcription we all would be capable of making a judgment about this issue, and determine who is the lier. It would be even better having the official document content.

kurt
07-30-2010, 10:58 AM
What other messages? The messages that Sinnett refers to do not exist and never did. The Japanese never sent radio messages either specifying a surprise attack on US forces nor identifying the intended location of the attack. This is confirmed by post-war Japanese records. The US government knew that war with the Japanese was about to commence because Japanese troops convoys had been spotted by the British and Dutch moving in the direction of Malaya and this information was transmitted to the US. This fact reinforced the very logical belief that the first attack on US territory would come in the Philippines.

Budiansky affirms that those Sinnett's radio messages were "misquoted", he doesn't say they don't exist.

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 11:06 AM
I think the Kimmel meant the another Japane masages that was interrupted and decoded by US intelligence.

Then it's surprising that in the past seventy or so years nobody, and most of all the Kimmel supporters and the different group of conspiracy theorists, has produced those messages.

The beauty of conspiracy theories is that they invariably rely upon the absence of allegedly secret information known only to the adherents of the theories, so they can never be disproved because the absent information is not available.

Meanwhile the rest of us just work on the facts known from the historical record.

As for 'decoded by US Intelligence'', there was no overall US intelligence agency at the time. Even if there was it hadn't got anywhere near breaking any Japanese code which would have given warning of PH, not least because the Japaneses naturally did not transmit anything in code or, much less likely, plain language to or from the approaching fleet which would have revealed to the enemy the fleet approaching Hawaii or its intentions.

Read up on the fleet and you'll find that radio silence was observed most carefully. Meanwhile deception signals were being transmitted from Japan to suggest that the capital ships were at home. Not unlike Patton's army in Britain for similar but larger radio purposes to deceive the enemy some years later.


Usially the official diplomatic notes are not classified for the side to be sent which, right?

The 14 part message was sent in a code, which America had largely broken.

The problem with a lot of arguments by people who claim that America should have seen what was coming (and some others who claim a different conspiracy by Australia's Prime Minister to keep Australia in a war which virtually had been won by early 1942) because the Japanese diplomatic code had been largely broken by America, is that they ignore the inconvenient facts that the IJA codes and, especially in relation to PH, IJN codes had not been broken to any useful extent at the critical time.


Well i believe the Japanese were not that stupid to identify the target of their sneak attack in the official diplomatic note for US gov, preceding to attack:)

Exactly.

Which is why Roosevelt etc had and would have had no warning of it, because there is nothing in the diplomatic code transmissions to suggest it.

It has to be remembered that, worldwide, the most significant decrypts from the Japanese diplomatic code related to instructions that caused the diplomatic missions to start burning and otherwise destroying their records, which was a firm sign that war was coming.


But their military radio massages , probably those which Sinnett talk about, definitally contained the information about first strike.

Q. So why haven't Sinnett et al been able to produce the 'military radio messages' containing information about the the 'first strike'?

A. Because they don't exist.

A very long time ago in another existence one of my jobs was to check the security of war instructions held by Australian navy and merchant ships. These instructions were held in captain's safes, to be opened only in time of war. You would never find any radio transmissions regarding them, because they hadn't been opened, nor will you ever find even nowadays any version of them because it can still put people in gaol for revealing official secrets. More to the point, nobody(apart from the people who prepared them) should be able to say what was in those plans, or in current plans, because nobody should have opened them as we never had a war which authorised opening them.

Given that nobody will find any radio or other record of the many copies of the many versions of those plans distributed fairly widely by a peaceful nation which never went to war on them, what do you think are the chances of finding radio records of an aggressive nation which mounted a sneak attack based very much on radio silence and which towards the end of the war enthusiastically destroyed those records which had not been destroyed by Allied (i.e. American) bombing?

The whole purpose of the attack on PH was to approach without detection, including radio detection.

And Japan did that 100% successfully.

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 11:33 AM
Moreover, I find it interesting that you characterize the American public as "lazy" simply because they refused to support entry into a war that did not directly concern them.

That assumes that all Americans felt exactly the same way, which they didn't.

A good number of Americans were fighting and fighting well, mainly as pilots and aircrew, in Britain and China long before PH.

At the other extreme a good number of Americans were still shoeless in remote parts of the nation and more concerned with personal survival than international conflict.

In the very large middle there was a mix of opinions but which, I think, was predominantly in favour of keeping out of what was seen as a European war which threatened to bleed America pointlessly of more young men as WWI had done (albeit in numbers about the same as Australia in WWI from a vastly larger population in America).

Whatever they may have been, Americans in 1939-41 were anything but 'lazy'.

As they demonstrated 1942-45 when they fuelled America's industrial capacity which, more than its military manpower, overwhelmed the Axis powers and won the war.


It's absurd for Admiral Kimmel to assert that had he seen the 14-part message that he would have intuited an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. Nothing in the message explicitly or implicitly indicates a military attack anywhere in the world. The message, had it been transmitted to Kimmel would simply have puzzled him, as it is NOT a declaration of war, but only a list of diplomatic complaints and alleged grievances. It did not even directly break off peace negotiations, although that was implied.

Even if he had got it and somehow magically interpreted it as a threat to strike PH at the time it actually occurred, what could he have done in the short time between receiving it and the Japanese attack on PH that would significantly have altered the result?

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 11:40 AM
I'm quite sure that this late november radio report wouldn't be irrelevant at all ,since, according to Sinnett's version of the document, it is a clear indisputable evidence that the attack was unavoidable

So?

If the Japanese attack was unavoidable, WTF did it matter what anyone on the American side did to prepare for an unavoidable attack they didn't know was coming?

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 11:47 AM
Budiansky affirms that those Sinnett's radio messages were "misquoted", he doesn't say they don't exist.

This is going beyond silly.

I don't give a flying **** what Budiansky affirms.

If Sinnett, and you, say those radio messages exist, then produce them.

The burden of proof is upon the person who claims something is the case.

Rising Sun*
07-30-2010, 12:15 PM
It would be even better having the official document content.

Here it is. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/Wallin-6.html

The document you rely upon is about a fortnight before PH, which merely confirms the bleeding obvious that Japan had to launch its PH fleet and attack long before the 14 part rubbish was sent at the last moment.

Do us a favour and stop presenting Japan as a victim of America in WW II

The last time I looked America didn't start the conflict by invading any of Japan's territories and massacring the people there.

kurt
07-30-2010, 04:35 PM
This is going beyond silly.

I don't give a flying **** what Budiansky affirms.

If Sinnett, and you, say those radio messages exist, then produce them.

The burden of proof is upon the person who claims something is the case.
Maybe is my english shortcomings, but I understood that you cited Budiansky as a valid testimony against Sinnett's book, you quoted him, not anyone else. He was your "witness" , not mine.
Budiansky, as the head of the official version defenders, affirms that radio message was "misquoted", hence he accepts it's existence but doesn't tell us what it "actually" said.
I posted twice Sinnett's version of the radio message.

kurt
07-30-2010, 04:39 PM
War is not about victims and murderers, nor about good and evil, is just about interests, that's my point and hipocrisy is what results disgusting to my taste.

kurt
07-30-2010, 04:48 PM
The case under discussion is whether the US military and government knew it or not. Of sure it matter, IF they knew it and didn't prepare for the attack, they WOULD BE gilty of indirectly causing thousands of american casualties in Pearl Harbor.

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 07:27 PM
As far as Roosevelt's actions and motivations are concerned, I agree, but that's no excuse for getting the de3tails wrong. I just can't tolerate historical inaccuracies no matter which side they favor.

I think there are historical inaccuracies in just about any text one reads if one gets nit-picky enough. The question is intention and magnitude and whether it's incompetence or sophism. I don't think Ross had any egregious errors here, although I think he does take an overly partisan track not meant for the consumption of amateur historians.


I tend to be right wing and despise Leftists who are correct for the wrong reasons. If you read neither, why did you post a Left-wing article?

I tend to be moderately left and despise ANYONE who are knowingly incorrect for the wrong reasons. In any case, it's hard to gauge this as merely a left wing article, and the reason I Googled it was I think I ran across it for the last series of Pearl Harbor "Conspiracy" posts as it was a nice (if imperfect) summarization that debunks many of the assertions presented by the typical "Let-it-Happen-on-Purpose" conspiracists who vary widely in their motivations--some just because they hate FDR and the "New Deal" legislation. Other's because they're paranoids who believe that everything happens for a reason and that a few in power can somehow control everything (the latter is called "omnipotent competence", something any rational or sane person would ever accuse a gov't of being). However, I don't think the article anymore particularly "left wing" than some of the great stuff Popular Mechanics did to debunk the idiotic "Bush-Inside Job" conspiracy theories regarding 9/11. I'm no fan of Bush, but found myself defending him on many forums on that issue (if one could call that an "issue" for lack of a better term)...


Yes. I suspect many of the conspiracy theorists have profit rather than historical accuracy as their major motivation. Sensationalism definitely sells books, as the general public is ignorant of the actual history of the Pearl Harbor attack, and tends to accept whatever oddball theories are advanced, as long as they sound half-way plausible. And yes, Roosevelt takes honors among his contemporaries as a leader who generally left the conduct of military operations to the professionals during WW II. But he was not perfect in that regard; for example, Roosevelt insisted on the production of small escort vessels that were practically useless against the U-boat menace, and this left the US Eastern coast virtually defenseless in early 1942. The resulting massacre of US and British merchant ships has been blamed on Admiral King, when it should be laid at Roosevelt's feet.

Agreed, for the most part.


Actually, this was mere speculation as no intelligence was available to indicate where the invasion convoys were bound. But it made sense to think that the Philippines would be included in the Japanese plans as the Philippine archipelago sat astride the sea routes necessary to the Japanese plans for expansion of their empire. The US had always assumed that the Japanese coveted the Philippines and that a war would start with a seizure of the US possession. In any case, the Japanese had always assumed that a US presence in the Philippines would be used to frustrate Japanese plans for seizing what they called the Southern Resources Area.

Yeah. I think there also tended to be a strain that severally underestimated the IJN's aviation capability and believed that the Japanese would be incapable of launching strikes on Midway or Wake, much less Hawaii, in the initial phases of the War. I think the question was more like "should the U.S. go to war to assist the British or the Dutch?" as opposed to "are we going to be bombed here?"..


I'm not arguing that Mac didn't drop the ball in the Philippines. In fact, I think Mac's performance in the Philippines deserved a court martial at the very least. It would have been better for Roosevelt to leave Mac in command in the Philippines, and let him be captured by the Japanese. That would have enabled a unified command in the Pacific and saved many American lives over the course of the war. But Roosevelt was cognizant of Mac's political ramifications and failed to treat him as he should have; that was Roosevelt's failing.

I mostly agree here. But Mac was painted as a heroic figure, and perhaps he was. He may have been incompetent (or acted so despite possessing considerable talent). Whether one can court martial a senior general of Mac's standing just for sucking is debatable however. And I'm sure you're aware that it was pretty much the U.S. military's policy in WWII to basically quietly relieve failed commanders and assign them to stateside training duties (something that contributed to the maddening continuation of outmoded dogmatic tactics in TRADOC). An example would be Gen. Fredendall, generally recognized as one of the worst Western Allied commanders to ever hold a post above division commander and who badly mangled the command at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass (although, to be fair, he wasn't the only one and British Gen. Anderson also made critical errors). Even though one of Ike's aids reported he was drunk and far to the rear in his legendary command post and was a "cowardly" "son-of-a-bitch!". He was only quietly fired and sent back to the states with a hero's accolades to train soldiers on how not to fight. I suspect, a similar fate would have befell MacArthur had his hubris in the Philippines been better understood and hindsight removed from the "fog-of-war"...


As for the B-17, the USAAF knew very well that it was not an effective anti-shipping bomber, at least in the numbers available, or projected to become available, in the Philippines. Hap Arnold knowingly oversold the capabilities of the B-17 in an attempt to promote strategic bombing and an independent Air Force. Certainly, the US Navy was not convinced and quite correctly withdrew it's major forces from the Philippines promptly upon the outbreak of war.

I agree that the B-17 was limited in its effectiveness and was disingenuously oversold firstly as a maritime patrol aircraft for political purposes--mainly because the idea of strategic bombing was an anathema to the American public and regarded as tantamount to nuclear warfare today--then as a miracle strat bomber. I would take issue with the fact that the USAAF DID believe that strategic bombing could be effective against enemy fleets for quite sometime before they adopted tactical skip-bombing tactics using medium bombers later in the War. The U.S. Navy pulled back because they had already been savaged at Pearl Harbor and could not afford to take anymore losses and everyone involved knew that no relief force would come to the beleaguered Americans' aid for quite sometime...


No, in the early 1930's the US Navy was governed by Congress, primarily through the Vinson Act, which limited the authorized tonnage of every class of warship the Navy was allowed to build. The Vinson Act did not even allow the Navy to build up to Washington and London Naval treaty limits until 1938. In fact, the designed tonnage of US navy vessels was typically held under treaty limits and resulted in unsatisfactory carriers such as the Ranger (on which my father served in the late 1930's). It was not until mid-1940, and the Fall of France, that the US Navy was authorized to build the Essex-class carriers which began to become available in 1943. Contrary to what most people think, the US Navy was NOT battleship-oriented after1939; absolute top priority was given to the construction of carriers in 1940, and resulted in construction times of Essex-class carriers averaging an astonishing 18 months.

Yet the hulls of the venerable Enterprise and Yorktown were laid down by early 1934 as the result of the Vinson-Trammell Expansion Program which sought to both 'stimulate the economy' and aid national defense. I agree that the Fall of France was a watershed moment for the U.S. Armed Forces, but there were attempts to gradually upgrade the U.S. fleets in the early 1930s. I do also concur that the U.S. Navy was beginning to transcend the 'battleship-first' mentality and had been on the cutting edge of dive-bombing for sometime. Something the Luftwaffe was well aware of when they procured USN dive-bombers for their own experimentation--ultimately leading to the tactics and the weapons systems such as the Stuka...

kurt
07-30-2010, 07:38 PM
[QUOTE]Or am I missing something here, along the lines that there was and is an all-powerful conspiracy by the NSA et al to conceal the truth but the all-powerful conspirators nonetheless allowed supposedly incriminating documents to be released to Sinnett so he could expose their treason?

Maybe because those all-powerful conspirators are all dead, don't you think?

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 08:02 PM
it wouldn't have had a simular effect.
Becouse the main effect of PH was a ....psycholigical act of sudden attack on american minds.That is quite different.If say the admiral Kimmel knew about japanese plans for sure , he may succesfully interrupt the Japane attack and probably the win the battle( having the superior forces) . But it would not have had an simular effect on american public which would learn in this case that the American fleet has enough power to deflect any Japane agression.By the other world- in this case hardly the lazy american public wouldn't vote for entering to war.

Actually, there was a war-game aided by computers conducted a couple of years ago in which both sides suffered heavy losses and it was hardly a clear-cut American victory as they suffered more naval casualties than what took place at Pearl Harbor. Although, the Japanese also suffered much higher losses, including over 150-planes shot down and a few ships of their own sunk. In any case, advance warning may still not have given the U.S. fleet time to sortie. At best, they may have scrambled the congested fields of P-40 Tomahawk fighters, something that would have taken almost an act-of-God to do on a Sunday morning...

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 08:16 PM
War is not about victims and murderers, nor about good and evil, is just about interests, that's my point and hipocrisy is what results disgusting to my taste.

Those would be the arguments of the losers of a war attempting to insulate themselves from the responsibilities of their actions as aggressors...

War is EVERYTHING about victims and murders, and while I agree there is no absolutist "black and white," I think we can regard those who started the War in shades of much darker gray...

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 08:19 PM
The case under discussion is whether the US military and government knew it or not. Of sure it matter, IF they knew it and didn't prepare for the attack, they WOULD BE gilty of indirectly causing thousands of american casualties in Pearl Harbor.

And why would the Imperial Japanese be innocent even if that were the case? And I think it has been shown that this isn't the case as no one thought the Japanese were going to hit Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, with the exception of the instigators...

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 08:21 PM
Maybe because those all-powerful conspirators are all dead, don't you think?

Or maybe because conspiracies of such scale and involving so many actors are completely impossible to keep secret. Read "Chaos Theory" for more info...

tankgeezer
07-30-2010, 08:21 PM
Kurt must be a fan of Hegelian Dialectics.

kurt
07-30-2010, 08:53 PM
Or maybe because conspiracies of such scale and involving so many actors are completely impossible to keep secret. Read "Chaos Theory" for more info...

You are right, it is impossible to keep it secret that's why people like Admiral Kimmel knew about it.
Why don't you help us with a synthesis Mr. Tankgeezer?

tankgeezer
07-30-2010, 09:25 PM
No thank you, if ever I were to enjoy pointless drama, I would watch Jerry Springer.

Nickdfresh
07-30-2010, 09:49 PM
You are right, it is impossible to keep it secret that's why people like Admiral Kimmel knew about it.
Why don't you help us with a synthesis Mr. Tankgeezer?

What did Adm. Kimmel "know about" again? Specifically? And why did he have such knowledge?

tankgeezer
07-31-2010, 02:17 AM
It doubtless came through his U.S. Navy issue Ouija board.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 02:44 AM
It doubtless came through his U.S. Navy issue Ouija board.

You could be on to something here.

Kimmel's board was the early 1938 model made by Telefunken in Germany.

FDR's was the superior mid-1941 model made in America by IBM. It was the first form of over the horizon Ouija, whereas Kimmel's was pretty much line of sight and subject to weather interference.

FDR wouldn't let the armed forces have the IBM model until 10 December 1941, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained.

I think we can all see why now.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 07:44 AM
Maybe is my english shortcomings, but I understood that you cited Budiansky as a valid testimony against Sinnett's book, you quoted him, not anyone else. He was your "witness" , not mine.

No, I didn't quote him and he's not my witness.

Here is my entire post at #10:


Here's some more to study, with links to further articles in Budiansky's reply to Sinnett. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

But if you want conspiracy theories, this is the place. http://www.apfn.org/apfn/pearl_harbor.htm

You might as well accuse me of supporting conspiracy theories from that post.


I posted twice Sinnett's version of the radio message.

Where?

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 07:48 AM
BTW, somewhere along the way I / we have started saying Sinnett rather than Stinnett

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 08:26 AM
Maybe because those all-powerful conspirators are all dead, don't you think?

What I think is irrelevant.

It's Stinnett who thinks they're still active in the NSA so, unfortunately for your position, the conspirators are not all dead. Obviously they're still very active, as Stinnett shows here.


Immediately after Day of Deceit appeared in bookstores in 1999, NSA began withdrawing pre-Pearl Harbor documents from the Crane Files housed in Archives II. This means the government decided to continue 60 years of Pearl Harbor censorship. As of January 2002, over two dozen NSA withdrawal notices have triggered the removal of Pearl Harbor documents from public inspection.

The number of pages in the withdrawn documents appears to be in the hundreds. Among the records withdrawn are those of Admiral Harold R. Stark, the 1941 Chief of Naval Operations, as well as crypto records authored by Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, the chief cryptographer for the Pacific Fleet at the time of Pearl Harbor. Under the Crane File transfer agreement with National Archives, NSA has the legal right to withdraw any document based on national defense concerns. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=445

So the conspiracy continues either because (a) the NSA is run by people aged at least well into their 80s and probably 90s and 100s who are still trying to bury evidence of what FDR did in WWII or (b) the NSA is protecting those people even though the NSA didn't exist in WWII and has nothing to gain and everything to lose by failing to demonstrate the supremacy of code-breaking for national security purposes, in which case it would be to the NSA's advantage to support the Stinnett position that America had broken the IJN codes.

Nonetheless, the NSA has been busy for years creating and spreading disinformation about Pearl Harbor and supporting the claim that America hadn't broken the IJN codes http://www.nsa.gov/applications/search/index.cfm?q=fdr%20pearl%20harbor Could there be clearer evidence of a conspiracy? :shock:

Just look at this transparent attempt to pretend that America could read only the Japanese diplomatic code and not the IJN codes, with convenient claims of changes to the JN-25B code in the months and days leading up to PH to try to conceal the fact that America was reading everything the Japanese transmitted (including everything that wasn't transmitted by the PH attack force while observing radio silence on its journey).


A second version of this system, known to U.S. Navy cryptanalysts as JN-25B, was introduced on December 1, 1940. Six months later, the Japanese Navy replaced the additive book. The additive book was replaced in August and again on 4 December 1941, three days before the Japanese attack on American bases in Hawaii.

These rapid changes in the codebook and its additive required that U.S. cryptanalysts begin again with each change -- virtually at the beginning -- to attack the system. It is estimated that prior to the change of the additive book in August 1941, the cryptanalysts had recovered only 2,000 code groups in JN-25 -- about 4% of the codebook -- and these were mostly numerals and stereotyped phrases.

During the Currier-Sinkov mission to Great Britain [see tomorrow's installment], as U.S.-UK cooperation began, the British authorized their cryptologic unit at Singapore to begin exchanges about JN-25. It turned out the Americans and the British had had roughly equal success in recovering JN-25 codebook values -- but the recoveries were in different parts of the codebook, so, at a stroke, each doubled their number of recoveries!

Even with this bonanza, however, there were too few recoveries to begin reading the underlying text.

One factor limiting progress was the limited staffpower available for cryptanalysis. Another factor was priorities: since America's political leaders were avid readers of the PURPLE diplomatic decrypts, the major effort in Washington was to process the diplomatic system.

Yep, that's sure an open and shut case against the NSA, just like Stinnett says. :confused: :confused:

tankgeezer
07-31-2010, 09:29 AM
You could be on to something here.

Kimmel's board was the early 1938 model made by Telefunken in Germany.

FDR's was the superior mid-1941 model made in America by IBM. It was the first form of over the horizon Ouija, whereas Kimmel's was pretty much line of sight and subject to weather interference.

FDR wouldn't let the armed forces have the IBM model until 10 December 1941, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained.

I think we can all see why now.

I saw this on a repeat of "In search of" with Leonard Nimoy. An irrefutable source authority.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 10:04 AM
I saw this on a repeat of "In search of" with Leonard Nimoy. An irrefutable source authority.

I came across it in some obscure references to a closed session of the House Un-American Activities Committee in the late 1940s or early 1950s.

I can't confidently recall the name of the bloke, but I think it was something like Mack or Ken or MacKenzie Worth, whose testimony never reached the public record although there are references to it in the few obscure publications which haven't been pulped by the NSA.

He died a few months after the Committee hearing in a single car 'accident' in Arizona. Which is very odd as up till then he had lived all his life in Boston, apart from service in the USN starting in 1932 and which from about 1939 was in units related to code-breaking, most notably on the roving signal corvette USS Enterprise which was expunged from the records because of the secrecy attached to its work. However, there are still details here http://www.corvette/enterprise.com/

kurt
07-31-2010, 11:51 AM
It doubtless came through his U.S. Navy issue Ouija board.
:) For me conspirators were the people who actually were part of this plot in 1941, (internet is kind of a ouija, as you noted with horror we had admiral Kimmel summoned by Chevan in this thread)
the other people that try to hide information nowadays, just employees doing their work, would you imagine the effect in the american public of such revelation after the Irak " massive destruction weapons" swindle?

tankgeezer
07-31-2010, 11:58 AM
Mr Worth was reported to have shared a booth at a roadside diner with Carlos Allende. the Corvette Enterprise was birthed very near Uss Eldridge. The waitress( "Madge") on duty at the time reported to authorities that worth passed secret documents cleverly disguised as a menu to Carlos, and that after communicating through "some type of secret code" i.e. shakes of the sugar dispenser, stirring coffee this way, then opposite in a clearly subversive manner, Mr. Worth departed, after which Carlos made a phone call . (the record of this call oddly, is somehow missing from Bell Company records) Mr. worth's mysterious crash occurred at roughly the same time The secret system aboard the Eldridge was being "calibrated" by a technician from the OSRD named Edgar Kilroy. What is unusual is that Mr, Kilroy's presence has been reported in many places far distant from each other, all within days, or weeks of each other.
This incongruity has never been properly explained, and the Pentagon staunchly refuses to comment stating that all records of such personnel, divisions, and activities were destroyed on 9-11 when the hijacked (??) airliner crashed into that building.

kurt
07-31-2010, 12:04 PM
What did Adm. Kimmel "know about" again? Specifically? And why did he have such knowledge?

this:

I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Jpanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.
Why he knew it?, maybe Tankgeezer can resume the interview using his Ouija.

kurt
07-31-2010, 12:23 PM
Mr Worth was reported to have shared a booth at a roadside diner with Carlos Allende. the Corvette Enterprise was birthed very near Uss Eldridge. The waitress( "Madge") on duty at the time reported to authorities that worth passed secret documents cleverly disguised as a menu to Carlos, and that after communicating through "some type of secret code" i.e. shakes of the sugar dispenser, stirring coffee this way, then opposite in a clearly subversive manner, Mr. Worth departed, after which Carlos made a phone call . (the record of this call oddly, is somehow missing from Bell Company records) Mr. worth's mysterious crash occurred at roughly the same time The secret system aboard the Eldridge was being "calibrated" by a technician from the OSRD named Edgar Kilroy. What is unusual is that Mr, Kilroy's presence has been reported in many places far distant from each other, all within days, or weeks of each other.
This incongruity has never been properly explained, and the Pentagon staunchly refuses to comment stating that all records of such personnel, divisions, and activities were destroyed on 9-11 when the hijacked (??) airliner crashed into that building.
It would be funny, except when this kind of messy conspirations end tragically, for example with a first lady's dress stained with the President blood.

kurt
07-31-2010, 12:34 PM
You could be on to something here.

Kimmel's board was the early 1938 model made by Telefunken in Germany.

FDR's was the superior mid-1941 model made in America by IBM. It was the first form of over the horizon Ouija, whereas Kimmel's was pretty much line of sight and subject to weather interference.

FDR wouldn't let the armed forces have the IBM model until 10 December 1941, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained.

I think we can all see why now.
Just in case, do you know which brand was used to anticipate in 1923 the japanesse misbehavior with China in 1937? For sure it was an Apple, they are always one step ahead when it comes to abrogations.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 12:50 PM
It would be funny, except when this kind of messy conspirations end tragically, for example with a first lady's dress stained with the President blood.

Your comment displays a disturbing ignorance of the, I would have thought by now well known, Worth-Madge Diner Incident which by itself would have brought Nixon down except it came to light only during the much more devastating Watergate affair.

It ranks with Teddy Kennedy's Chappaquid**** (this rude word filter is ****ing stupid) Incident in the annals of deplorable conduct by American politicians.

Kilroy was there, but the conspiracy to protect Nixon ensured that nobody heard what Kilroy had to say. It is strongly rumored that Kilroy had his fingers busted so that they ended up like claws holding onto a wall for the rest of his life.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 01:05 PM
Just in case, do you know which brand was used to anticipate in 1923 the japanesse misbehavior with China in 1937? For sure it was an Apple, they are always one step ahead when in comes to abrogations.

You seem to think that this is funny.

If you delve into history you will find that many nations devoted great resources to Ouija boards and based their national defences upon it.

For example, around 1923 Monsieur Gallard, formerly a colonel in the French Army intelligence department, received a message on his army issued conseil d'ouija, or what we would call a Ouija board, which said that any future German attack would come around the area subsequently known as the Maginot line. His report on this is at www.conseil.d'ouijamaginot . It was ignored by the French General Staff and the rest is history.

Rising Sun*
07-31-2010, 01:23 PM
this:

I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Jpanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.
Why he knew it?, maybe Tankgeezer can resume the interview using his Ouija.

Or you could just point us to the bits in the 14 part message or any other document that say (a) war was coming and (b) PH was a target, never mind the date and time.

tankgeezer
07-31-2010, 01:43 PM
Ouija boards have become passe' dowsing is the method presently favored for use by most governmental entities world wide.

"In modern times dowsing is used for hundreds of things other than finding water. The U.S. military had a dowser teach the marines how to find land mines and underground tunnels of the Viet Cong. Vernon Cameron, a dowser, told Navy officials, where all the U.S. and other submarines were located by map dowsing. They would not confirm or deny his findings, but a few years later he was denied a passport because he was considered a security risk."

http://www.tamar-dowsers.co.uk/articles/history.htm

tankgeezer
07-31-2010, 01:55 PM
It would be funny, except when this kind of messy conspirations end tragically, for example with a first lady's dress stained with the President blood.

Wrong decade Sunshine, but in any event it is said to be common knowledge that JFK was removed by agents for Onassis in order to possess Jackie K. and take her to wife. With so many other nations, and other "interests" having a grudge against the U.S. and JFK personally, it would be an easy matter to conceal his actions in the matter. This may be a genetic predilection, as similar spousal thefts are not unknown in Greek history . (Theseus of Greece first abducted Helen of troy when she was 12)

Nickdfresh
07-31-2010, 05:51 PM
:) For me conspirators were the people who actually were part of this plot in 1941, (internet is kind of a ouija, as you noted with horror we had admiral Kimmel summoned by Chevan in this thread)
the other people that try to hide information nowadays, just employees doing their work, would you imagine the effect in the american public of such revelation after the Irak " massive destruction weapons" swindle?

It wasn't a swindle to the extent that the Bush Admin (and most everyone else) genuinely BELIEVED Iraq had WMDs. It certainly, like the attack on Pearl Harbor, was an intelligence failure of the first magnitude and so-called evidence was politically influenced and fixed to create an aura of an "open-and-shut-case" type mentality. But in fact it was the NSA that intercepted Iraqi military traffic that was a deception designed to fool the Iranians into believing that the Iraqi Army could deliver poison gas in the event of an Iranian attack--yet the Hussein regime was (truthfully) telling the West that there were no usable stockpiles of chems. It was this deception designed to deter the Iranians that ultimately did the Baathists in...

kurt
08-01-2010, 05:43 PM
Wrong decade Sunshine, but in any event it is said to be common knowledge that JFK was removed by agents for Onassis in order to possess Jackie K. and take her to wife. With so many other nations, and other "interests" having a grudge against the U.S. and JFK personally, it would be an easy matter to conceal his actions in the matter. This may be a genetic predilection, as similar spousal thefts are not unknown in Greek history . (Theseus of Greece first abducted Helen of troy when she was 12)

It seems that you are into every single detail on conspiracies, would you tell us something about that lady ( not the first I think) that got her dress stained too, but with some other presidential's fluid,
and why the secret service failed in removing it opportunely?

tankgeezer
08-01-2010, 06:43 PM
It seems that you are into every single detail on conspiracies, would you tell us something about that lady ( not the first I think) that got her dress stained too, but with some other presidential's fluid,
and why the secret service failed in removing it opportunely?

Not much conspiracy there,, just a Gold Digger who got lucky. (if you can call that lucky) If she had tried to blackmail the President, I think he would have just laughed in her face. (Besides, how do you know the Secret Service didnt make sure it wasnt removed?)

kurt
08-01-2010, 06:56 PM
Not much conspiracy there,, just a Gold Digger who got lucky. (if you can call that lucky) If she had tried to blackmail the President, I think he would have just laughed in her face. (Besides, how do you know the Secret Service didnt make sure it wasnt removed?)
That's a disturbing thought....yeah, maybe it was a plot from the latex industry moguls against the Logistic Department at the White House for not supplying the Gold Diger with their high tech devices.

Wizard
08-01-2010, 09:45 PM
Budiansky affirms that those Sinnett's radio messages were "misquoted", he doesn't say they don't exist.

The messages that I referred to that don't exist are the intercepted and decrypted radio messages that Stinnett claims referred to an attack on Pearl Harbor. Budiansky may "affirm" that Stinnett "misquoted" some radio messages to give the impression that they did contain references to a Pearl Harbor attack, but this is the same as saying that Stinnett is lying, and the messages as quoted by Stinnett, do not exist.

The Japanese were extremely careful about communications security when it came to planning the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese records of the the planning process were all destroyed at the end of the war, but surviving Japanese officers involved in the PH planning process were unanimous in claiming that no radio messages were ever sent from either IGHQ or Combined Fleet to the PH strike force prior to it's departure; couriers or secure land-lines were used to transmit orders. It does not make much sense for the Japanese to enforce radio-silence to the point of removing the transmitter keys from the radios on the PH-bound ships, but allowing the Combined Fleet HQ to radio the PH strike force orders blabbing about it's target.

Wizard
08-01-2010, 10:20 PM
That assumes that all Americans felt exactly the same way, which they didn't.

A good number of Americans were fighting and fighting well, mainly as pilots and aircrew, in Britain and China long before PH.

At the other extreme a good number of Americans were still shoeless in remote parts of the nation and more concerned with personal survival than international conflict.

In the very large middle there was a mix of opinions but which, I think, was predominantly in favour of keeping out of what was seen as a European war which threatened to bleed America pointlessly of more young men as WWI had done (albeit in numbers about the same as Australia in WWI from a vastly larger population in America).

Whatever they may have been, Americans in 1939-41 were anything but 'lazy'.

As they demonstrated 1942-45 when they fuelled America's industrial capacity which, more than its military manpower, overwhelmed the Axis powers and won the war.

The original characterization may assume that all Americans thought (or behaved alike) but my statement does not. It is safe to say that most Americans wished to stay out of the European war, not because they were "lazy", but because they viewed it as a European problem best resolved by the Europeans themselves. I am well aware that there were Americans fighting in the European war; one of the witnesses at the PH hearings was a USMCR pilot who had served in the US Navy, the US Marines, the RAF, and the Royal Navy, and was advising as an expert in fighter-direction and radar-directed air defense at the time PH was attacked. My own father served in the US Navy as a carrier pilot in the late 1930's and did time on the so-called Neutrality Patrol, which, despite it's name, produced US casualties well before PH.


Even if he had got it and somehow magically interpreted it as a threat to strike PH at the time it actually occurred, what could he have done in the short time between receiving it and the Japanese attack on PH that would significantly have altered the result?

It would depend on when it was intercepted and decrypted. If I recall correctly, the message was actually sent some time in advance of the PH attack, and was decrypted by US intelligence even before the Japanese diplomats were able to decipher it. Secretary Hull and Roosevelt were aware of the contents before the note was delivered by the Japanese ambassador. If the note had revealed anything at all about PH, which it didn't, it would have been just barely possible to give Kimmel and Short perhaps an hour or two warning. If that had been the case, at least the Army could have had it's fighters up and it's AA batteries manned and the Navy ships, even if they had not been able to get up sufficient steam to put to sea, would still have all their guns manned and their WT doors closed. Under those conditions, the Japanese would have been able to cause much less damage, and would have paid a much higher price for the attack.

Rising Sun*
08-02-2010, 08:54 AM
If the note had revealed anything at all about PH, which it didn't,...

Which is the major problem in expecting PH to be ready, and in criticising Kimmel et al for not being ready for something they had no forewarning of and about which nobody could reasonably be expected to have forewarned them.


... it would have been just barely possible to give Kimmel and Short perhaps an hour or two warning. If that had been the case, at least the Army could have had it's fighters up and it's AA batteries manned and the Navy ships, even if they had not been able to get up sufficient steam to put to sea, would still have all their guns manned and their WT doors closed. Under those conditions, the Japanese would have been able to cause much less damage, and would have paid a much higher price for the attack.

I don't know enough about the details of such readiness, but in a peacetime army and navy, albeit ones facing a remote risk of war, what would be the times on any day which seemed like a drill and even worse early on a Sunday morning involved in fuelling, arming and launching planes and manning naval and land-based guns and supplying them with live ammunition with orders to fire it?

I have a suspicion that bureacracy could have overwhelmed any warning of an hour or two as various people in the chain demanded authorisations to supply this and start up that.

Wizard
08-02-2010, 12:25 PM
Which is the major problem in expecting PH to be ready, and in criticising Kimmel et al for not being ready for something they had no forewarning of and about which nobody could reasonably be expected to have forewarned them.

Not really. Both Kimmel and Short were the commanders of their respective service's facilities and bases on Oahu, and as such jointly, responsible for the defense of those bases and facilities against any possible attack.

And it's certainly NOT true they had no "forewarning" of the possibility of just such an attack as the Japanese actually launched. There were numerous reasons to believe that a carrier attack was not only possible, but the most likely form of attack, including naval exercises in which US Navy forces launched mock surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor. There was also a report issued in 1941 by a US naval officer which described a carrier attack by Japan on PH remarkably similar to the one that actually eventuated. It was certainly NOT reasonable to believe that a carrier attack on PH was out of the question.

As for being warned of the possibility of war with Japan, Kimmel and Short would have as much warning simply by reading the newspapers as they would have gleaned from reading Japan's 14-part message. The reality is that Kimmel and Short let themselves be lulled into lassitude by the belief that any Japanese attack was going to fall first on the Philippines. If Washington shares any complicity in the disaster at PH, it is in letting, perhaps even encouraging, Kimmel and Short to entertain that belief.


I don't know enough about the details of such readiness, but in a peacetime army and navy, albeit ones facing a remote risk of war, what would be the times on any day which seemed like a drill and even worse early on a Sunday morning involved in fuelling, arming and launching planes and manning naval and land-based guns and supplying them with live ammunition with orders to fire it?

I have a suspicion that bureacracy could have overwhelmed any warning of an hour or two as various people in the chain demanded authorisations to supply this and start up that.

Well, it will forever remain speculation, but just extrapolating from what did happen, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that PH's defenses would have been much more effective.

It is recorded that every naval ship at PH was able to open fire on the enemy within five minutes of the opening of the attack. It takes only a few minutes to close and secure all WT doors on a naval vessel, so with a couple hours warning that almost certainly would have been done and the ship's AA batteries would have been manned and ready with a supply of ammo at hand.

The summoning of land-based air defenses is more problematical. I do not know how long it would take to arm and fuel fighter planes or find pilots for them, but I do know that a small number of US planes did get into the air with no warning at all, so two hours warning, it would seem to me, would give sufficient time to get many more into the sky. The manning of Army AA batteries probably would take longer but would not be impossible given two or more hours warning. As I understand it, some Army 37 MM batteries were manned and ready about two hours after the attack opened (just as the last wave of attackers was retiring), so a two hour warning should have found those guns ready to fire just as the attackers came in.

The Japanese lost 29 planes shot down over PH and an additional 20 returned but damaged beyond repair, as it was, so more US planes in the air, manned and ready AA batteries, and some dispersal of aircraft either on the ground or in the air would definitely render the attack less damaging and more costly. I don't think it's implausible that the Japanese might have lost twice as many planes, say perhaps 100, as they actually did, and been able to destroy far fewer US aircraft. How many ships they would have been able to sink or damage is really more difficult to speculate on because it really depends on random factors.