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windrider
02-08-2010, 02:21 PM
Hi all, and especially our russian friends here.

A facinating book I just read about the true nature of the disater that struck the red army in the starting stage of Barbarossa.

By signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement, Staline encouraged Hitler to start the war and turn his armies towards the west.
The idea was that Hitler would act as an ice breaker that he would invade when all sides are worn out or overextended. (Before than Barbarossa's planning, there were very few german forces left in germany, for exemple.)

All was almost ready for the big "communist liberation". Massive shock armies were concentrated at the frontier. (in poland). So what happened ?
Hitler struck 2 weeks earlier than Staline on june 22. Staline's plan was for 6 of july.

The main reason that the germans took so many prisonners and war materials was that it was all intended for offensive, huge depots had to be left in the open, there was no defensive positions, no defensive weapons, in fact, they dismantled even the barbwire in the days/weeks before.
In the end, all those BT-7s (intended for travel on German roads),
Those paratroopers (SU had the biggest airborne army ) and invasion plans were useless. They had no defensive plans whatsoever.

There was many implications to this plan, one of which is the second thought Churchill and Roosevelt might have to lend-lease war material to a country that wanted to invade europe a few weeks before...

The author was a GRU officer (army intelligence).
Have you heard of it ?
If so, feel free to elaborate;)

Emchista
02-12-2010, 08:20 AM
Hello, Windrider! I'm not a historian, nor do I play one on television, but I find this theory you've put forward quite intriguing. Certainly it's hard to imagine why two men as Joseph and Adolph, with such monumental egos (and working at such cross-purposes) would pledge "Love and Friendship Forever" unless ulterior motives were involved.....!

With all the recently "un-archived" material coming to light, the "IceBreaker" theory seems as tenable as any .....I personally believe that Stalin for his part wanted to gain insight into Hitler's war-making capabilities (and Hitler would not have been able to resist showing off his new "toys", especially his Panzers)-- going so far as to engineer the massacre of Polish Officers at Katyn to show his "good faith."

Stalin, it seemd, was convinced Hitler would eventually invade Russia, but only AFTER England had been "dealt with", and so went to absurd lengths to avoid triggering the invasion prematurely, even sending his best-trained troops on "exercises" hundreds of miles away lest moving them up to the Border should be interpreted by Hitler as an "Act of Aggression". (Remember how those Siberian Troops "suddenly appeared" as the Germans prepared to take Moscow?)

The "IceBreaker" theory doesn't seem all that far-fetched, but I wonder if Stalin's factories and munitions plants, etc were up and running at full capacity by July of 1941.....

Thank you for Posting !!

Egorka
02-12-2010, 08:44 AM
This topic has been the biggest one on RUssian military/politics related Internet sites. Both sides brought forwad and religiosly defended their point of view.

At the end of the day after scruitiny the Suvorov's books are a collection of faults, exagerations and such, spiced up with bits of real facts. The book are writen brilliantly , though - very easy to read.

windrider
02-12-2010, 11:23 AM
This topic has been the biggest one on RUssian military/politics related Internet sites. Both sides brought forwad and religiosly defended their point of view.

At the end of the day after scruitiny the Suvorov's books are a collection of faults, exagerations and such, spiced up with bits of real facts. The book are writen brilliantly , though - very easy to read.

Hi Ergorka. I thought the book very well documented, with a rich bibliography. He had access to the military archives which were open for a certain period during the Glassnost. Would you elaborate on said faults, exageration, etc.?
I find very strange to mass the complete first echelon of the russion army at the border and not have dig defensive positions except in plain view of the germans.
And what about the dismantlement of the Staline Line ? It was a massive defensive line that blocked the territory from sea to sea, built at the cost of many russian lifes during a famine period. So why destroy it ?
(I'll post some maps soon, as I still have the book)

This book expose too many myths and interrogations to be simply put aside. it's too easy. But I'm not surprised:mrgreen:, it is said that the author had 2 deaths condamnations from the soviets, was it before or after he defected to the west ?

Egorka
02-12-2010, 12:24 PM
The problem is that Resun (that is his real second name) got carried away dissolving old SOviet dogmas and replaced them with new ones.
Resun thinks that Stalin was bad. For Resun this alone is enough to be the prove of his idea. The rest of his arguments are just add on to the main argument - "bad Stalin". i don't think it is good enough.

Give me 5 main arguments from the book that support alleged planned soviet attack on 6th of July 1941 and I will try to reply if time permits.

windrider
02-15-2010, 09:10 AM
The problem is that Resun (that is his real second name) got carried away dissolving old SOviet dogmas and replaced them with new ones.
Resun thinks that Stalin was bad. For Resun this alone is enough to be the prove of his idea. The rest of his arguments are just add on to the main argument - "bad Stalin". i don't think it is good enough.

Give me 5 main arguments from the book that support alleged planned soviet attack on 6th of July 1941 and I will try to reply if time permits.

Of course ! Every one should remember that Staline was a gentle, peace-loving all-around good guy. He was also a great artist, considering the beautiful photo-retouchings he did with his good buddy Lavrenti on official photographs...

The exact date of the planned attack is not that important, it's a tree in a forest of details.

Egorka
02-15-2010, 11:47 AM
Of course ! Every one should remember that Staline was a gentle, peace-loving all-around good guy. He was also a great artist, considering the beautiful photo-retouchings he did with his good buddy Lavrenti on official photographs...

The exact date of the planned attack is not that important, it's a tree in a forest of details.
I get it that you can't produce the list of 5 most important argument supporting the "Ledokol"s claim on the Soviet attack on Germany on 6th of July 1941.
No arguments - empty statement!
It is as simple as that!

You say "the planned attack is not that important".
OK, then what is THAT important? And what does "that important" thing (what ever it is) prove?

Nickdfresh
02-15-2010, 12:07 PM
I'm far from a Stalin apologist, and I've looked into things regarding this question a bit, and there seems to be little in the way of direct evidence that the Red Army was planning any sort of attack on the Third Reich. Gen. Zhukov supposedly had some contingency plans regarding something of a preemptive strike, but this was far from detailed offensive planning anywhere near the intricate level of Barbarossa...

windrider
02-15-2010, 02:04 PM
I get it that you can't produce the list of 5 most important argument supporting the "Ledokol"s claim on the Soviet attack on Germany on 6th of July 1941.
No arguments - empty statement!
It is as simple as that!

You say "the planned attack is not that important".
OK, then what is THAT important? And what does "that important" thing (what ever it is) prove?

Patience, my friend !
I have a somehow choppy internet connection at home, huge files to render at work, and what you ask, (without yourself serously refuting anything) needs a certain amount of work on my behalf, translate from french to english AND isolate & condense the most significant arguments of the book.
I said in an earlier thread that I'm not surprised of your reaction, but PLEASE ! read the post before answering and when you quote something, don't remove the key word in the phrase, as, in this case, the word "date".
As in "the exact DATE is not that important", may it be the 5,6,7th of july,
it doesn't change anything because they were caught by surprise.

Nick,
So Zhukov supposedly had some contingency plans regarding something of a preemptive strike ?
He had recently beaten the Japanese and after the non-agression pact with Japan, was secretly moved at the border with his army. (along the complete first echelon of the soviet forces, as mentioned before).

windrider
02-15-2010, 03:36 PM
Found this on Wiki,
to give you something to chew-on until I post my own details (tomorrow ! I swear!:rolleyes:)


One of Suvorov's pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices — SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce. Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders. According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that General Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who simply did not expect a German attack.[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-3)

Reactions and critiques
In some countries, particularly in Russia, Germany and Israel Suvorov's thesis has jumped the bounds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-undricks-0) However, the most widely read and specialized studies of the Soviet history lend no support to Suvorov's ideas. Nevertheless, studies of some historians, e.g. Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Meltyukhov) (“Stalin's Missed Chance (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stalin%27s_Missed_Chance)”) gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany. Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Nevezhin), Boris Sokolov (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Vadimovich_Sokolov), Valeri Danilov (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeri_Danilov) and Joachim Hoffmann (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joachim_Hoffmann).[18] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-17). Offensive interpretation of Stalin's prewar planning is also supported by Robert C. Tucker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_C._Tucker) and Pavel Bobylev.[19] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-18) Moreover, it is argued that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the border, just like fuel depots and airfields. All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations.[20] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-19) It is interesting to note that while mainstream Western historians mainly dismiss Suvorovs' ideas and are not in support of reassessing Stalin and his war plans, historians from Post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe (for example one of main Latvian historian of the World War 2 period - Inesis Feldmanis) and also liberal historians in Russia are much more in favor of rethinking Soviet Union's foreign policy during Stalin and look more favorably on Suvorovs thesis.

Supporters of Soviet offensive plans theory also refer to some recently discovered facts, e.g. publication of Zhukov's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgy_Zhukov) proposal of May 15, 1941[24] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-23), which called for a Soviet strike against Germany. This document suggested secret mobilization (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobilization) and deploying Red Army troops next to the western border, under the cover of training.[25] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-24) However, Robin Edmonds argued that RKKA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RKKA)'s planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered a potential possibility of a pre-emptive strike against Wehrmacht,[12] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-edmonds-11) whereas Teddy J. Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that this Zhukov's proposal was accepted by Stalin.[1] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-undricks-0) Another piece of evidence is a recently discovered Stalin's speech on the 5 May 1941 when he revealed his mind to graduating military cadets.[26] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-25) He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack"[27] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-26). However, according to Michael Jabara Carley, this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching the war.[28] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#cite_note-27)


The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July 1941, though, amounted to a little more than 5 million men, 2.6 million in the west, 1.8 million in the far east, with the rest being deployed or training elsewhere.[50] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa#cite_note-49) These figures, however, can be misleading.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] The figure for Soviet strength in the western districts of the Soviet Union counts only the First Strategic Echelon, which was stationed on and behind the Soviet western frontier to a depth of 400 kilometers; it also underestimates the size of the First Strategic Echelon, which was actually 2.9 million strong.[citation needed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] The figure does not include the smaller Second Strategic Echelon, which as of 22 June 1941 was in process of moving toward the frontier; according to the Soviet strategic plan, it was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Strategic Echelon by early July.


On 22 June, the German Wehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 German divisions), including 29 armoured and motorized divisions, some 90% of its mobile forces, attacking on a front of 1,200 km between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian Mountains, against NKVD border troops and the divisions of the Soviet First Operational Echelon (the part of the First Strategic Echelon stationed immediately behind the frontier in the three western Special Military Districts) because it had completed its deployment and was ready to attack about two weeks before the Red Army was scheduled to have finished its own deployment with the Second Strategic Echelon in place. At the time, 41% of stationary Soviet bases were located in the near-boundary districts, many of them in the 200 km strip around the border; according to Red Army directive, fuel, equipment, railroad cars etc. were similarly concentrated there.[51] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa#cite_note-50)

My Red-Bold-underlined.

more detailed information tomorrow
till then, ciao!

Nickdfresh
02-15-2010, 04:18 PM
I found this on Wiki and I assume it is related to yours, it supports the contention that your beliefs are not a mainstream historical notion and most historians do not accept this...

From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy


In some countries, particularly in Russia, Germany and Israel Suvorov's thesis has jumped the bounds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public.[1] However, the most widely read and specialized studies of the Soviet history lend no support to Suvorov's ideas[5] Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,[6], Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev and Lev Bezymensky, and perhaps his most vehement Russian opponent Alexei Isayev,[7] the author of Anti-Suvorov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,[1] Derek Watson,[8] Hugh Ragsdale,[9] Roger Reese,[10] Stephen Blank,[11] Robin Edmonds,[12] agree that the major Suvorov's writings rest circumstantial evidences,[13] or even on "virtually no evidentiary base"[1] [14] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"[15] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".[16] Late Soviet emigre historian Alexandr Nekrich (extremely critical of Stalin in other contexts) also rejected major Suvorov ideas as unsubstantiated and contrary to the broader Stalin's policy.[17]

Nevertheless, studies of some historians, e.g. Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (“Stalin's Missed Chance”) gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany. Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Valeri Danilov and Joachim Hoffmann.[18]. Offensive interpretation of Stalin's prewar planning is also supported by Robert C. Tucker and Pavel Bobylev.[19] Moreover, it is argued that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the border, just like fuel depots and airfields. All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations.[20] It is interesting to note that while mainstream Western historians mainly dismiss Suvorovs' ideas and are not in support of reassessing Stalin and his war plans, historians from Post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe (for example one of main Latvian historian of the World War 2 period - Inesis Feldmanis) and also liberal historians in Russia are much more in favor of rethinking Soviet Union's foreign policy during Stalin and look more favorably on Suvorovs thesis.
Strength of the opposing forces on the
Soviet Western border.

June 22, 1941
Germany and Allies Soviet Union Ratio
Divisions 166 190 1 : 1.1
Personnel 4,306,800 3,289,851 1.3 : 1
Guns and mortars 42,601 59,787 1 : 1.4
Tanks (incl assault guns) 4,171 15,687 1 : 3.8
Aircraft 4,389[21] 11, 537[22] 1 : 2.6
Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” table 47,[23]

Supporters of Soviet offensive plans theory also refer to some recently discovered facts, e.g. publication of Zhukov's proposal of May 15, 1941[24], which called for a Soviet strike against Germany. This document suggested secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops next to the western border, under the cover of training.[25] However, Robin Edmonds argued that RKKA's planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered a potential possibility of a pre-emptive strike against Wehrmacht,[12] whereas Teddy J. Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that this Zhukov's proposal was accepted by Stalin.[1] Another piece of evidence is a recently discovered Stalin's speech on the 5 May 1941 when he revealed his mind to graduating military cadets.[26] He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack"[27]. However, according to Michael Jabara Carley, this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching the war.[28]

Other Russian historians, Iu. Gor'kov, A.S. Orlov, Iu. A. Polyakov, Dmitri Volkogonov analyzed newly available evidence to demonstrate that Soviet forces were certainly not ready for the attack.[1]

According to Meltyukhov, the January 1941 strategic war games on 'Northern' and 'Southern' variants (conducted respectively on January 2-6 and Jan. 8-11 1941, as also depicted in articles by Pavel Bobylev[29]) did indeed assume that the forces of the 'East' (i.e. USSR) at first had to repel an assault by the 'West' (i.e. Germany), no concrete actions on how this could take place were covered. Instead, the war games concentrated on the Soviet 'counterattack'. As the attack of the forces of the 'East' was more successful in the Southern variant, this area was chosen as the main direction of Soviet forces[30].

Egorka
02-16-2010, 04:09 AM
... don't remove the key word in the phrase, as, in this case, the word "date". As in "the exact DATE is not that important", may it be the 5,6,7th of july,
...
My fault. I ment to include the word "date", but copy-paste it wrongly.

The question remains though: If the date is not that important, then what is that important - month, year, decade, anything else?

windrider
02-17-2010, 08:53 AM
I found this on Wiki and I assume it is related to yours, it supports the contention that your beliefs are not a mainstream historical notion and most historians do not accept this...

From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy

Well I know that history is not a science in the true sense of the word,
but if we always had followed mainstream thinking and sticked with it, we would still believe we live on a flat earth, in the center of the universe.

I dont mind thinking "outside of the box", when it is based on well researched and argumented assumptions.

windrider
02-17-2010, 08:59 AM
So here’s my little “essay” on the “Ice Breaker – Staline secret plan to invade Europe in 1941” by Victor Suvorov 1989.

***Note : First two parts in this post

I’m not trying here to convince anyone that this is the truth, I just find interesting the facts exposed in this book. I translated extracts from it from french and since I don’t have any dictionnary, you’ll excuse my sometimes crude translation.

Communist mythology has for a long time preserved the Stalinist point of view regarding the start of the second world war : (which starts with the surprise invasion of Hitler and doesn’t include the Baltic Republics takeover, Romanian territory annexions, Poland partition, and Finland war!)

“The ones that are responsible for the war are not only the imperialists in Germany but those of the entire world”
- Lieutnant-general P.A. Jiline, chief historian of the Soviet army, in Red Star, sept 24, 1985.

So no wonder this subject is still controversial in ex-soviet union…
I don’t think that we’ll ever have absolute evidence of this…Staline was pretty good at making things disappear, may it be people, ideas, or archives. So we are left with circonstancial evidences, which are often enough to convict someone of a crime, but not enough to re-write history or change mainstream historical thinking.
Even if we may never be sure about this, I think it is very plausible.
Staline was anything but stupid. Just look at how he thoroughly eliminated his ennemys, real or alledged, how carefully placed his pieces on the map, how he grabed surounding countrys much without a fight following the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. This guy had a long established plan.

1- The bolshevik international revolution

Marx & Engels predicted prolonged world conflicts of 15, 20, even 50 years. This did not scare the authors of the communist party manifest. On the contrary, they tought that a global conflict would bring the best conditions for a definitive victory of the working class. The Kominterm described itself as a universal communist party, devoted to the creation of a worldwide Soviet Republic.

Lenine signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty in 1918, the idea was to leave Germany wage war in the west and let them and the allieds mutually exhaust themselves, while keeping his forces to consolidate his power at home. By that time, he was already preparing the overthrow of the german government. The Spartacus group was created in Petrograd. German communist newspapers were printed in Petrograd (Die Fackel, Die Weltrevolution, Die Rote Fahne).

“if Europe revolution starts somewhere, it will be in Germany […] and a victorious german revolution ensures a succesfull international revolution.”
- Staline, july 3th 1924

After the failed revolution in Germany (1923), Staline position was simple : “ We must fight socio-democrats and pacifists that turns workers unions away from the war. It is impossible to finish-off capitalism if we don’t get rid of social-democracy in proletariate movements.”
- Staline, Pravda nov. 6-7 1927

see WEIMAR REPUBLIC for more details…

In 1927, Staline predicted that the facists would gain power and that it would be positive, as it would lead to aggravate internal situations in capitalist countries and start workers revolutionary uprisings.

2- The dimemberment of Poland

What were the reasons for the invasion of Poland ? Hitler’s motivations were clear, but Staline’s ? On june 22 1941, Germany launched a surprize attack. It’s a historic fact that somehow hides a strange reality : before the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, Germany had no common borders with Soviet Union, and therefore could not launch a surprize attack. So what was behind Staline's decision to invade Poland ? Soviet historians have 3 different views on the subject:

1- to push S.U. borders to the west to increase security of the country. Nonsense, since it created a contact zone between the two states.
2- By attacking Poland while it was strugling with the nazis, they were buying time to delay a german-soviet war.
3- France and England didn’t want to sign agreements with Soviet Union, which freed Hitler’s hands. (How would have they defended a country which alledged objective was the overthrow of all democracys ?)

These explanations have been made after the war and don’t take into account the views of the soviet rulers, which included war in the west as early as 1916. Don’t forget that the Soviet army was stopped before Warsaw in 1920. (Toukhatchevski)

Once the “buffer zone” was eliminated, Staline should have used the time to consolidate his defences, upgrade existing positions, create new ones, mine bridges, dig anti-tank ditches, etc. Instead, he made it more accessible by building roads and bridges, extended the railroad network, destroyed existing fortifications. In the following year, Staline continued removing the buffer-zone by annexing the Baltic Republics and a good part of Romania (Bessarabia, Bukovine). So, ten month after the signing, there was no neutral state left between Germany and Soviet Union.

Only a week after the signing of the pact, Staline already played a trick on Hitler. The two countries were to invade Poland simultaneously, but Stanine’s troops were not ready. So Hitler appeared as the sole aggressor in the eyes of the world.

windrider
02-17-2010, 09:09 AM
continued - parts 3 and 4 :

3- NKVD’s role

There is a big difference between the Soviet army and the NKVD. The soviet army fight on exterior fronts, and the NKVD used to fight in internal fronts, or behind the main forces.
The great purges ended in december 1938. They split NKVD’s command in to 6 different independent groups : border troops, escort, protection, railway , supply and building.
At the start of 1939, their numbers expanded considerably, and their role was
Changed by re-equiping them with trains, armored cars, field guns, tanks and aviation.
Those forces in 1939 had no use in the Soviet territory, there was no new purge and no repression to do.
In 1939, the Blocking divisions were created to increase the combativity of the Red Army, by being deployed behind the troops and stopping any retreat. In august 1939, the “Osnaz” units were created from border troops, to be used as shock troops.
These were the first to enter Poland, Baltic republics, Bessarabia, Bukovine and Finland. Their role was to neutralize border outposts, capture bridges, cut communications, destroy and terrorize just before the offensive, and get rid of the “unwanted elements” once the army had gone through.

From may 1940 to february 1941, 99 000 political commissar reservists have been re-examined before party commissions. This preparation was followed by the order for 3700 of those reservists to report to the army on june 17, 1941. Numbers from the “cleansing” of the annexed territorys in 1940 have never been published, to get an idea on the NKVD’s activities, one must examine actions similar the the Katyn massacre of Polish officers and elites. That also happened in Lithuania, Lettonia, Estonia.
In february 1941, there is a change in NKVD’s activities, since they start to secretly move on the occidental border.

Communist historians have never exlained why NKVD troops were still at the occidental border , as the terror and repression in occupied territories was considerably reduced in february 1941. If Staline really wanted to protect himself from German invasion, he would have slowed down the creation of repression units and created instead defense units like sapers to blow bridges and mine roads, dig anti-tank ditches, etc. Defense was not his concern.

Those troops, equiped with heavy weapons, were stationed behind the army to destroy resistance pockets once the army had crossed the border and rapidly advance in ennemy territory. Once the German attacked, the Central command of the operational NKVD was useless and was dissolved, the troops were incorporated in the Red Army. ( as an exemple : the NKVD 21 div. Motorized Rifles, commanded by Col. Pantchenko became 109 div. Infantry of the Red Army)

4 -The suppression of the forward defensive zone

A country that prepares for defense doesn’t concentrate his forces on the borders.
He disperse them deep in the potential combat area and create a zone filled with obstacles and mine fields. The soviet army knew perfectly this concept, as it had to deal with it when it attacked Poland in 1920, and later in Finland.

At the end of 1929, only in the Kiev military region, there was 60 demolition commandos totalling 1400 men, with 1640 explosive charges and 10000 fuses ready to use. This forward soviet defensive zone was constantly improved with new obstacles and artificial lakes. During the thirties, the occidental borders of the S.U. was separated in 13 fortified sectors (UR). This was officialy called The Staline Line.

Each UR had brigade stenght effectives, medium and heavy artillery, AA, tanks, transmission and others. It covered 100 to 180 km frontlines 30 to 50 km deep,
with an elaborate bunker system including depots, electrical plants, hospital, command posts and transmission. Each of these was autonomous and was equiped to deal with a prolonged fight. Col.-General A.I Chebounine recalls that during 3 years, only in the Proskourov UR, they built more than a thousand defensive bunkers with many protected by artificial lakes.

The Staline line was not like the Maginot Line, it was not located on the border. It was constructed in total discretion. In cas of a surprize attack, soldiers would have many days to prepare themselves. It was not continuous, large open spaces was left between them that could be mined or used as the starting point for a conteroffensive.
The construction of the Staline line represents huge efforts and gigantic expenses during the first two quinquennial plans. It was decided to reinforce it in 1938 with heavy atrillery and 8 new Urs. There was more than 1000 new bunkers built. Then the Ribentropp-Molotov pact was signed.

In such a tensed context, Staline could have taken mesures to reinforce border security and assure S.U.’s neutrality in the conflict by:

- accelerate weapons production for URs
- augment troop numbers manning them
- augment production of all defensive weapons, especially anti-tank guns and rifles
- mobilize all ressources to accelerate the line’s construction
- build a new line behind it
- order the red army to dig trenches and anti-tank ditches to use the bunker network as a backbone for defense.

That is not what happened. As early as fall 1939, all work stopped on the Staline line. Troop numbers were reduced, then units were dissolved. Factorys stopped producing fortification materials. The existing UR were disarmed and the weapons and ammunition were stored. Some bunkers were given to kolkhozes, for use as grain storage, the majority was burried.

In spring 1941, the agony of the Staline line is achieved. Gen. Grigorenko write :
“ I don’t know how future historians will explain this crime against our people. The soviet government has pumped billions of roubles from the people to built this incrossable fortification line, from Baltic sea to Black sea. And now, at the eave of war in spring 1941, on all the length of this 1200 km, we hear deafening explosions. Everything is blown up on direct orders from Staline himself.”

That's it for now ! I keep the end for dessert :
part 5 - soviet buildup
part 6 - the attack that didn't happen

Egorka
02-17-2010, 10:04 AM
If you can type such long post you sure able to produce a list of 5 most important arguments to support "ice breaker"'s claim that Hitler preempted Soviet attack by 2 weeks.

My friendly advice to you: try to keek your posts shorter.

Egorka
02-21-2010, 04:42 AM
Is that it!?
Well, that was easy. :)